The Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection has provided notice to the Attorney General of an abnormal market disruption regarding the wholesale price of motor gasoline or gasohol. Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-234, no seller of motor gasoline or gasohol shall sell, or offer to sell, an energy resource at an unconscionably excessive price between October 8, 2026, and November 8, 2026.

Formal Opinions

Page 7 of 42

  • Ms. Cynthia Watts-Elder, CHRO Executive Director, 2000-002 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This is in response to a request for advice from the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (hereinafter CHRO) which asked this office to consider the following questions: 1. Is the Criminal Justice Commission required to comply with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-68(a) which requires state agencies to file affirmative action plans with the CHRO? 2. Is the Criminal Justice Commission required to cooperate with the Division of Criminal Justice by providing information and support necessary to allow the Division of Criminal Justice to meet its responsibilities to file and implement an affirmative action plan pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-68?

  • Mitchell R. Harris, Esq., Chairman, State Marshal Commission, 2001-017 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    As Chairman of the State Marshal Commission you have requested a formal Opinion of the Attorney General as to the following four questions: 1. While the State Marshal Commission has duly appointed all state marshals, none has been “sworn.” Must state marshals be "sworn"? If so, what oath is to be administered and who may administer it? 2. Does a state marshal have "police" or law enforcement powers? If so, what is the scope of such powers? 3. State marshals are referred to in the General Statutes as "peace officers." What powers are conferred upon "peace officers"? Are these the only "police" or law enforcement powers that state marshals possess? 4. Do you have any suggested modifications to the above certificate language?

  • Jaekle and Johnston, Auditors of Public Accounts, 2001-019 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have requested our advice regarding your obligations under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-61dd, known as the "whistleblower" statute. You have explained that, in the course of reviewing a whistleblower complaint, you have obtained access to client records from the Office of Protection and Advocacy.

  • Thomas Rotunda, Division of Special Revenue, 2000-022 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This is in response to your request for an expedited opinion on the proposal of the Connecticut Lottery Corporation (CLC) to participate in a new multi-state lottery game which, in part, lets players appear on a televised game show to compete and win.

  • Mr. Burton S. Yaffie, Secretary, Trumbull Park Business Center, 1996-010 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    The Board of Pardons asked this office the following questions with regard to the possibility of future executions in the State of Connecticut: When is the first execution likely to be scheduled? When will a hearing be required in anticipation of an execution date? On the date of execution? Just before the execution? After all other appeals have been exhausted? Is it necessary for the Board to convene a commutation hearing in all cases whether requested or not? Who could request the convening of this special session: the defendant, his attorney, the Governor, a family member, etc.?

  • Sheriff Gerry Egan, Chairman, County Sheriffs/Sheriffs Advisory Board, 1996-005 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    Your agency forwarded the findings of the U. S. Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Wage and Hour Division audit investigation of Connecticut's employment and compensation of special deputy sheriffs pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),1 seeking our advice.

  • President Pro Temp. Sullivan and Speaker Lyons, Legislative Office Building, 2000-014 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This is in response to the letter from Representative Shawn T. Johnston dated February 4, 2000, inquiring whether the Governor can enter into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Veterans Memorial Casino Organization to allow it to operate high stakes bingo1 in Connecticut.

  • Ms. Nancy Wyman, State Comptroller, 2000-024 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked two related questions about the State Employee Campaign for Charitable Giving (the "campaign"), which is an annual campaign "to raise funds from state employees for charitable and public health, welfare, environmental, conservation and services purposes." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 5-262(a)(3). Specifically, you ask whether the State Employee Campaign Committee (the "Committee") may prohibit a federation1 from participating in the campaign if one or more of the federation's member agencies solicits from state employees during the designated campaign period other than through the campaign. You have also asked whether the Committee may require a federation that seeks to participate in the campaign to certify to the Committee that it will refrain from soliciting charitable contributions from state employees during the designated campaign period other than through the campaign.

  • Ms. Mary Ann Hanley, Office of Workforce Competitiveness, 2000-018 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    In your letter dated April 27, 2000 you requested a formal opinion as to whether the chairman of a council of government has the authority to sign on behalf of all the chief elected officials of a workforce investment area an agreement by which the council of government will administer and oversee federal Workforce Investment Act funds and activities.

  • The Honorable Nancy Wyman, State Comptroller, 2001-007 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked whether the expenditure of state funds to pay for costs related to the nursing home strike, including the cost of mobilizing the National Guard and the expedited payment to nursing home operators of the cost of replacement workers, would violate any state or federal labor laws.

  • Honorable David B. Pudlin, Legislative Office Building, 2002-006 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This will acknowledge and reply to your request of November 28, 2001 for an advisory opinion as to whether the State has the authority to consolidate workforce development regions pursuant to the federal Workforce Investment Act and, if so, what criteria must be satisfied before such consolidation is approved. You also ask whether a workforce development board which has demonstrated adequate fiscal capability and achieved satisfactory performance results can be forced to change its current service area or method of operation.

  • Mitchell R. Harris, State Marshal Commission, 2002-035 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have requested our advice as to the required number of State Marshals in each county pursuant to the provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 6-38. Specifically, you have requested a formal opinion of the Attorney General as to "whether the Commission has the discretion to determine whether to fill these vacancies or whether the Commission is required [to] fill all vacancies in every county up to the statutory maximum."

  • Senator Jepsen and Representative Pudlin, State Capitol, 2002-008 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This letter is in response to your request for a formal legal opinion as to whether Peter Ellef, the current chairman of the Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority ("CRRA""), is serving in that capacity without having received the necessary legislative approval.

  • Honorable Patricia A. Wilson-Coker, Department of Social Services, 2000-010 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This office previously responded to an inquiry concerning the authority of a Special Deputy Sheriff to serve a capias. At that time we provided an informal advice to the effect that the "better practice" was for a regular Deputy Sheriff to serve the capias, but that a Special Deputy Sheriff could assist, and suggested that it would be advisable to obtain legislative clarification with respect to what authority a Special Deputy Sheriff had. During the period since that informal advice the issue of what authority a Special Deputy Sheriff had in connection with serving a capias has continued to arise. Accordingly, you have asked us to issue a formal opinion on this question. We have carefully considered the relevant legal authorities.

  • Honorable Kevin B. Sullivan, President Pro Tempore, 2000-004 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This letter responds to yours of December 29, 1999, in which you ask this office for a formal opinion regarding the applicability and effect of Sections 26 and 45 of Public Act 99-2, June Special Session on tobacco settlement monies. Specifically, you have asked for an opinion "concerning whether Section 45 alters, in any way, the express provisions of Section 26 and, if so, the nature and extent to which it does."