The Office of the Attorney General William Tong
2000 Formal Opinions
Page 1 of 3
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You have asked for our opinion on whether towns can spray for mosquitoes in areas in which the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) does not intend to spray and whether towns can prevent the state from conducting its own spraying program within town boundaries.
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I am writing in response to the letter of August 12, 2000 requesting an opinion on whether a contract between the Connecticut Department of Correction (Department) and the Virginia Department of Correction will terminate on October 21, 2000 for noncompliance with the provisions of Conn. Gen. Stats. §§ 4a-60 and 4a-60a.
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This is in response to a request for advice from the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (hereinafter CHRO) which asked this office to consider the following questions: 1. Is the Criminal Justice Commission required to comply with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-68(a) which requires state agencies to file affirmative action plans with the CHRO? 2. Is the Criminal Justice Commission required to cooperate with the Division of Criminal Justice by providing information and support necessary to allow the Division of Criminal Justice to meet its responsibilities to file and implement an affirmative action plan pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-68?
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You have inquired whether the State has authority to establish standards for air emissions which are stricter than those established under the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et. seq. You have also inquired whether the cost of establishing more stringent standards must be borne by the State.
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You recently requested an opinion from this office regarding the following question: Whether DRS may disclose information including the names and/or addresses of rebate check payees who, as a result of the U.S. Postal Services or other reasons, did not receive their checks.
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This is in response to your letter dated January 19, 2000, in which you request our opinion on whether the Department of Transportation ("DOT") has the authority to enter into major contracts regarding development at Bradley International Airport ("BIA") when the Bradley International Airport Commission ("Commission") believes that DOT has failed to fully cooperate with the Commission in accordance with the provisions of subsection (b) of Section 15-101s of the Connecticut General Statutes.
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You have written to this office seeking an interpretation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §12-63c(a), a statutory provision concerning the procedure local tax assessors are to employ in the valuation of commercial and industrial property used "primarily for purposes of producing rental income." Specifically, you ask whether the term "primarily" as used in this provision means "that more than 50% of the area of the structure is used for the purpose of producing rental income, or does 'primarily' mean that more than 50% of the income from the property is a result of rental income?" You posed a second question that stated: "If the second interpretation is correct, would gross or net income be used to determine the primary purpose?"
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You have asked what regulatory authority the Elections Enforcement Commission ("EEC") has with respect to alleged violations of Conn. Gen. Stat. §2-30a(b), which provides in relevant part: "No expenditure of state funds shall be made to influence electors to vote for or against any such proposed constitutional amendment."
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This office previously responded to an inquiry concerning the authority of a Special Deputy Sheriff to serve a capias. At that time we provided an informal advice to the effect that the "better practice" was for a regular Deputy Sheriff to serve the capias, but that a Special Deputy Sheriff could assist, and suggested that it would be advisable to obtain legislative clarification with respect to what authority a Special Deputy Sheriff had. During the period since that informal advice the issue of what authority a Special Deputy Sheriff had in connection with serving a capias has continued to arise. Accordingly, you have asked us to issue a formal opinion on this question. We have carefully considered the relevant legal authorities.
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This letter responds to yours of December 29, 1999, in which you ask this office for a formal opinion regarding the applicability and effect of Sections 26 and 45 of Public Act 99-2, June Special Session on tobacco settlement monies. Specifically, you have asked for an opinion "concerning whether Section 45 alters, in any way, the express provisions of Section 26 and, if so, the nature and extent to which it does."
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This is in response to your request for an opinion on whether the two-store limit rule in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-48a bars the issuance of a package store permit to Jaimax, Inc. for premises at 701 North Colony Road, Wallingford, CT.
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In your letter dated August 31, 2000, you asked whether the state can recover interest from the United States Postal Service as a result of the late delivery of certified mail containing tax returns and $140 million in tax payments. In analyzing this issue, it must be noted that any action against the United States Postal Service is, in fact, an action against the United States.
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This is in response to your request for a formal opinion of the Attorney General regarding the ability of the Department of Public Health ("Department") to access information contained in the personnel files of employees of institutions licensed by the Department. The Department's inspectors have recently been refused access to institutional employee personnel files when conducting inspections at a hospital. The hospital asserted that unless the Department issued an "administrative summons", the records could not be released unless consent of the employee was obtained. You also asked whether such information would be subject to release by the Department pursuant to a Freedom of Information request.
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John P. Burke, Department of Banking, 2000-006 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut
You have asked for our opinion as to whether Section 36a-158(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes violates the Commerce Clause of the Unites States Constitution or the Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal constitutions as to an out-of-state state-chartered bank that wishes to establish an automated teller machine ("ATM") in this state.
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You have asked for an interpretation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 26-3 as regards DEP's authority to take any animal by whatever means reasonably necessary to carry out its functions, even if the means DEP intends to use is contrary to another statutory provision.