The Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection has provided notice to the Attorney General of an abnormal market disruption regarding the wholesale price of motor gasoline or gasohol. Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. ยง 42-234, no seller of motor gasoline or gasohol shall sell, or offer to sell, an energy resource at an unconscionably excessive price between September 24, 2026, and October 24, 2026.

2000 Formal Opinions

Page 1 of 3

  • Ms. Cynthia Watts-Elder, CHRO Executive Director, 2000-002 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This is in response to a request for advice from the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (hereinafter CHRO) which asked this office to consider the following questions: 1. Is the Criminal Justice Commission required to comply with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-68(a) which requires state agencies to file affirmative action plans with the CHRO? 2. Is the Criminal Justice Commission required to cooperate with the Division of Criminal Justice by providing information and support necessary to allow the Division of Criminal Justice to meet its responsibilities to file and implement an affirmative action plan pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-68?

  • Thomas Rotunda, Division of Special Revenue, 2000-022 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This is in response to your request for an expedited opinion on the proposal of the Connecticut Lottery Corporation (CLC) to participate in a new multi-state lottery game which, in part, lets players appear on a televised game show to compete and win.

  • President Pro Temp. Sullivan and Speaker Lyons, Legislative Office Building, 2000-014 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This is in response to the letter from Representative Shawn T. Johnston dated February 4, 2000, inquiring whether the Governor can enter into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Veterans Memorial Casino Organization to allow it to operate high stakes bingo1 in Connecticut.

  • Ms. Nancy Wyman, State Comptroller, 2000-024 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked two related questions about the State Employee Campaign for Charitable Giving (the "campaign"), which is an annual campaign "to raise funds from state employees for charitable and public health, welfare, environmental, conservation and services purposes." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 5-262(a)(3). Specifically, you ask whether the State Employee Campaign Committee (the "Committee") may prohibit a federation1 from participating in the campaign if one or more of the federation's member agencies solicits from state employees during the designated campaign period other than through the campaign. You have also asked whether the Committee may require a federation that seeks to participate in the campaign to certify to the Committee that it will refrain from soliciting charitable contributions from state employees during the designated campaign period other than through the campaign.

  • Ms. Mary Ann Hanley, Office of Workforce Competitiveness, 2000-018 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    In your letter dated April 27, 2000 you requested a formal opinion as to whether the chairman of a council of government has the authority to sign on behalf of all the chief elected officials of a workforce investment area an agreement by which the council of government will administer and oversee federal Workforce Investment Act funds and activities.

  • Honorable Patricia A. Wilson-Coker, Department of Social Services, 2000-010 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This office previously responded to an inquiry concerning the authority of a Special Deputy Sheriff to serve a capias. At that time we provided an informal advice to the effect that the "better practice" was for a regular Deputy Sheriff to serve the capias, but that a Special Deputy Sheriff could assist, and suggested that it would be advisable to obtain legislative clarification with respect to what authority a Special Deputy Sheriff had. During the period since that informal advice the issue of what authority a Special Deputy Sheriff had in connection with serving a capias has continued to arise. Accordingly, you have asked us to issue a formal opinion on this question. We have carefully considered the relevant legal authorities.

  • Honorable Kevin B. Sullivan, President Pro Tempore, 2000-004 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This letter responds to yours of December 29, 1999, in which you ask this office for a formal opinion regarding the applicability and effect of Sections 26 and 45 of Public Act 99-2, June Special Session on tobacco settlement monies. Specifically, you have asked for an opinion "concerning whether Section 45 alters, in any way, the express provisions of Section 26 and, if so, the nature and extent to which it does."

  • Honorable James T. Fleming, Department of Consumer Protection, 2000-030 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This is in response to your request for an opinion on whether the two-store limit rule in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-48a bars the issuance of a package store permit to Jaimax, Inc. for premises at 701 North Colony Road, Wallingford, CT.

  • Joxel Garcia, M.D., Commissioner, Department of Public Health, 2000-031 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This is in response to your request for a formal opinion of the Attorney General regarding the ability of the Department of Public Health ("Department") to access information contained in the personnel files of employees of institutions licensed by the Department. The Department's inspectors have recently been refused access to institutional employee personnel files when conducting inspections at a hospital. The hospital asserted that unless the Department issued an "administrative summons", the records could not be released unless consent of the employee was obtained. You also asked whether such information would be subject to release by the Department pursuant to a Freedom of Information request.

  • John P. Burke, Department of Banking, 2000-006 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked for our opinion as to whether Section 36a-158(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes violates the Commerce Clause of the Unites States Constitution or the Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal constitutions as to an out-of-state state-chartered bank that wishes to establish an automated teller machine ("ATM") in this state.

  • Honorable Gene Gavin, Department of Revenue Services, 2000-028 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    In your letter dated August 31, 2000, you asked whether the state can recover interest from the United States Postal Service as a result of the late delivery of certified mail containing tax returns and $140 million in tax payments. In analyzing this issue, it must be noted that any action against the United States Postal Service is, in fact, an action against the United States.

  • Honorable Arthur J. Rocque, Jr., Department of Environmental Protection, 2000-012 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked for an interpretation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 26-3 as regards DEP's authority to take any animal by whatever means reasonably necessary to carry out its functions, even if the means DEP intends to use is contrary to another statutory provision.

  • Honorable Valerie F. Lewis, Department of Higher Education, 2000-011 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    In your communication of December 27, 1999, you state that the Board of Trustees for the Community-Technical Colleges ("Board of Trustees") had voted earlier in 1999 to change its name and the names of each of its twelve colleges by reducing "regional community-technical college(s)" to "community college" in each title. You state that the Board of Trustees' action was based upon a "yearlong public relations study." On behalf of the Board of Governors for Higher Education ("Board of Governors") you asked whether the approval of the Board of Governors pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §10a-6 and/or of the General Assembly is required to effect legally these name changes.

  • Honorable Senator M. Adela Eads, State Capitol, 2000-017 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    I reviewed the questions that you have presented to me as follows: 1. Must an HMO medical plan, the terms and conditions of which contain a custodial care exception, offer a plan to the public, after receiving Department of Insurance approval, that: (a) meets the requirements of CGS 38a-553(c)(10), (b) complies with CGS 38a-478 et seq., as from time to time amended, and Article XXI of the Connecticut Constitution, and (c) does not use rehabilitation or improvement as criteria in determining whether care for disabled persons or persons suffering from biologically-based mental illnesses or nervous conditions is to be considered custodial? 2. Must the external appeal panel, acting pursuant to CGS 38a-478n, when reviewing appeals certified by the Department of Insurance and which construe or involve the custodial care exception (CGS 38a-553(c)(10)) as applied to disabled persons or persons suffering from biologically-based mental illnesses or nervous conditions (CGS 38a-478 et seq., as from time to time amended): (a) apply said CGS 38a-478 et seq. and Article XXI of the State Constitution, and (b) not use rehabilitation or improvement as tests for custodial care?

  • Jeffrey Garfield, Esq., Elections Enforcement Commission, 2000-020 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked what regulatory authority the Elections Enforcement Commission ("EEC") has with respect to alleged violations of Conn. Gen. Stat. §2-30a(b), which provides in relevant part: "No expenditure of state funds shall be made to influence electors to vote for or against any such proposed constitutional amendment."