1998 Formal Opinions
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You have asked for an opinion regarding the interpretation of certain provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), originally executed April 25, 1994, between the State of Connecticut and the Mohegan Tribe ("Tribe") which permits the Tribe to operate video facsimile games as long as the Tribe contributes to the State a percentage of the revenue generated from those games in accordance with the terms of the MOU. In particular, a dispute has arisen between the Division of Special Revenue ("Division") and the Tribe concerning how to calculate certain payments.
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Your department requests clarification of a previously issued opinion regarding the question of whether interior designers, practicing within the scope of services described in Conn. Gen. Stat.
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You have requested a formal opinion by this office regarding issues presented in Public Act 98-111, Connecticut's most recent "Megan's Law." Public Act 98-111, which becomes effective October 1, 1998, establishes a sexual offender registration system for Connecticut that significantly expands the circumstances under which a convicted sexual offender is required to register with and provide current information to the Department of Public Safety and Connecticut State Police. Failure to register as required is a Class D felony under the act.
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You have asked this office for an opinion regarding whether Conn. Gen. Stat. 20-627 to 20-630 apply to the "Pequot Pharmaceutical Network", a pharmacy owned and operated by the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation on the Mashantucket Pequot Reservation in Ledyard, Connecticut. These statutory provisions regulate "nonresident pharmacies", which are defined as "any pharmacy located outside this state which ships, mails or delivers, in any manner, legend devices or legend drugs . . . into this State." Conn. Gen. Stat. 20-627. Thus, the dispositive question is whether a pharmacy located solely on reservation land situated within the geographical boundaries of the State of Connecticut is "within" the State of Connecticut for purposes of the statute.
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This is in response to your request for an opinion on whether the "revolving door" limitation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-557d(c) applies to you if you resign as Acting Executive Director of the Division of Special Revenue to accept a position as President and Chief Executive Officer of the Connecticut Lottery Corporation (CLC).
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This is in response to your December 2, 1997 request for an opinion regarding the status of state employee home addresses under the state Freedom of Information Act ("FOI Act" or "Act"), Conn. Gen. Stat.
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I have reviewed your December 23, 1997 request for our opinion on whether local registrars of voters are required by law to supply the Social Security numbers of voters to the State Jury Administrator to assist the Administrator in the preparation of the master jury list. According to your letter, the legislature mandated the disclosure of this information in Public Act 97-200 as a means to properly and more precisely compile lists of potential jurors.
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You have asked our office to provide an opinion on the legality of random drug testing of student-athletes at the University of Connecticut. The Division of Athletics at the University has revised its drug testing policy; this opinion addresses that revision.
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You have asked whether the Southeastern Connecticut Regional Resource Recovery Authority (SCRRRA) is subject to your auditing authority as set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat.
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You have asked for general advice regarding correspondence the Department of Consumer Protection (the "Department") received from the Mohegan Tribe and Mashantucket Pequot Tribe concerning the proposed sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages at particular sites on the Tribes' federal reservations.
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This is a formal opinion regarding whether abortion must be included in the coverage provided under the Husky Plan, Part B ("Husky B"), a program designed to ensure health care coverage to all children in Connecticut.
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You have asked for my opinion with regard to a question raised by the state auditors on the propriety of an expenditure made by the Criminal Justice Commission. It is my understanding that your request was prompted by a recommendation made by the auditors, who concluded that it appeared that the Division's June 1996 reimbursement of legal fees to a State's Attorney in connection with his reappointment to that position in 1988 may have circumvented the intentions of the General Assembly with respect to the total monies approved for payment to the State's Attorney by the Claims Commissioner.
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In a memorandum dated October 5, 1998, your agency asked for our opinion regarding two questions that have arisen since the issuance of our September 28, 1998 opinion regarding Public Act 98-111. The first question asks the following: 1) A review of the opinion would seem to indicate that an individual convicted of, for example, C.G.S. Sec. 53a-71(a)(1), and sentenced to a term of probation commencing September 28, 1998 would not have to be registered under either Public Act 97-183 or Public Act. 98-111. Your second question is as follows: 2) Section 3(b) of the Act provides that any individual who has been subject to the registration requirements of Public Act 97-183 must register under Public Act 98-111 in the manner required for sexually violent offenders.
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In 1995, the Commissioners of the Departments of Social Services and Children and Families requested a legal opinion on their ability to share information about families and children, notwithstanding certain statutory client confidentiality restrictions. Both Commissioners indicated that increased sharing of client-specific information would allow their agencies to fulfill their statutory responsibilities more effectively.
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This is in response to your letter dated June 2, 1998, in which you request our opinion regarding the scope of authority delegated to the State Traffic Commission ("Commission") to establish speed limits on multiple lane, limited access state highways. More specifically, you ask whether or not the Commission has the authority to establish a speed limit above fifty-five (55) miles per hour but less than the sixty-five (65) miles per hour maximum speed limit set forth in Conn. Public Acts No. 98-181, Sec. 1.