1995 Formal Opinions

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  • Richard J. Howard, P.E., State Traffic Commission, 1995-023 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have requested our opinion on whether the owner of an unimproved parcel of land abutting a state highway must obtain a certificate of operation from the State Traffic Commission ("STC") under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-311 in order to operate a so-called "flea market" on the land.

  • Senator M. Adela Eads, Legislative Office Building, 1995-009 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This is in response to a request for advice from fromer President Pro Tempore John B. Larson in which he asked if owners of commercial or residential rental properties are required to permit telecommunications providers access to their buildings prior to adoption of implementing regulations by the Department of Public Utility Control.

  • T. William Knapp, Municipal Police Training Council, 1995-013 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have requested our advice on whether first selectpersons who exercise criminal law enforcement powers must successfully complete the training requirements established by the Municipal Police Training Council ("MPTC") pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-294d.

  • The Honorable Jesse Frankl, Workers' Compensation Commission, 1995-032 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This is in response to your letter dated October 16, 1995, wherein you requested a legal opinion from this office concerning the computation of cost of living adjustments (COLAs) under the Workers' Compensation Act for the years 1994 and 1995 for persons injured prior to July 1, 1993.

  • The Honorable John G. Rowland, Governor, State of Connecticut, 1995-027 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    I am in receipt of your letter dated September 21, 1995, in which you emphasize your concern that the establishment of a third casino in this state not jeopardize the level of revenues currently being received by the State under the Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) between the State and the Mashantucket Pequot and Mohegan Tribes. In response to this concern, you issued an RFP that required each casino proposal to provide a guarantee that the State will receive, over a three-year period, up to $610 million to make up for any cessation in the Tribes' payments under the MOUs.

  • The Honorable Nancy Wyman, Comptroller, 1995-019 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This is in response to your predecessor, William E. Curry's request for an opinion inquiring whether the Departments of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and Children and Family Services may operate trustee accounts for their outpatient clients as activity funds pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-52, et seq.

  • Honorable Kenneth Kirschner, Commissioner of Public Safety, 1995-025 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    Recently, it has come to the attention of this office that certain retail firearms dealers have advertised that customers may purchase handguns until October 1, 1995 without a permit to carry such weapons, and without an eligibility certificate. This "policy" is apparently prompted by their interpretation of the interplay between Connecticut General Statutes §§ 29-33 and 29-36j. The purpose of this letter is to (1) clarify the relationship between these two statutes, and (2) afford the Department of Public Safety appropriate guidance concerning the proper implementation of the statutes' provisions.

  • Honorable Louis S. Goldberg, Department of Administrative Services, 1995-022 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked for our opinion on whether the provisions of Special Act 95-12 preclude you from entering into a contract with Corporate Express, a private corporation, for a statewide direct delivery service for office supplies.

  • Honorable Robert M. Ward, Legislative Office Building, Rm 4200, 1995-007 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    In a letter dated August 16, 1994, Representative Krawiecki, then House Minority Leader, requested that this office answer two questions regarding an alleged boundary dispute in the Borough of Newtown. We now reply to your attention. 1. His first question asked: What is the appropriate method for taxpayers who assert that the boundaries of a political subdivision of the state are unknown or inadequately marked to compel that entity to conduct a survey of its boundary? 2. His second question asked: Does an individual member of the General Assembly have the power to compel a political subdivision such as a borough to survey its boundary?

  • Honorable Robert M. Ward, Legislative Office Building, Rm. 4200, 1995-033 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have written to this office seeking an opinion on the eligibility of a trustee to vote at a school district meeting. In your letter you relate that the provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-6 apply to this voters' meeting, which is a type of referendum as defined in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-1(n)(2). Section 7-6 permits "any citizen" to vote who is 18 or older and who is "liable" to the town or district on property assessed at one thousand dollars or more.

  • Honorable Ronald F. Petronella, Department of Labor, 1995-016 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    By letter dated March 3, 1995 you requested an opinion from this office which raises the following question: Has the department of labor's practice of annually transferring those funds in excess of $500,000 from the Employment Security Special Administration Fund to the regular Employment Security Administration Fund, for the purpose of offsetting projected deficits of federal administrative funds in future fiscal years, complied with Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 31-259 and any other applicable laws?

  • John P. Burke, Department of Banking, 1995-017 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    Your department has sought our opinion on two questions relating to the interplay, if any, between Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 36a-380 and 42-202. The first question asks us: (1) Is a broker-dealer which is a member of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or registered under CUSA [Connecticut Uniform Securities Act] a "registered broker-dealer", "authorized by law to act as an escrow agent", within the meaning of Section 42-202 of the Connecticut General Statutes? The second question was posed as follows: (2) Does Section 36-314 apply to a corporation that is appointed to act as escrow agent with regard to the money or securities received from the sale of funeral services contracts? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative: (a) Must such corporation obtain a special act of the Connecticut General Assembly in order to act as an escrow agent under Section 42-202, or is such corporation, by virtue of Section 42-202 or otherwise, "specifically empowered so to act by a general statute of this state" within the meaning of Section 36-314; and (b) Does such corporation come within the jurisdiction of both the Department of Banking and the Department of Public Health and Addiction Services?

  • Morton L. Weinstein, Connecticut Board of Examiners of Embalmers and Funeral Directors, 1995-020 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This is a response to your request for formal advice regarding whether it is lawful, under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-202, for licensed funeral establishments to invest escrow monies received pursuant to funeral service contracts in life insurance policies.

  • Mr. George A. Precourt, Board of Education and Services for the Blind, 1995-003 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked for an opinion regarding the Board of Education and Services for the Blind's ("BESB") reimbursement to towns, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §10-295, for certain special education instructional and service costs for special education students who are blind or visually impaired. In particular, you have indicated that while the statute places yearly monetary limits on the amount BESB may reimburse towns per student for such costs, due to billing and paperwork delays, reimbursements owed to towns have gone into arrears in recent years. Further, you have indicated that in dealing with this statutory reimbursement scheme, BESB has switched from a cash to an accrual basis of accounting, and you now wish to know whether, consistent with the statutory amount limitations, actual reimbursement payments to towns in a given year may exceed the statutory limits, provided the costs being reimbursed accrued within the yearly statutory limits per child.

  • Mr. George Precourt, Board of Education and Services for the Blind, 1995-021 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked for an opinion regarding whether the payments for educational and other services which the Board of Education and Services for the Blind ("BESB") makes for the benefit of blind or visually impaired students and blind or visually impaired students with additional disabilities, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §10-295(a) and (b), respectively, are discretionary expenditures or in the nature of mandatory entitlements.