The Office of the Attorney General William Tong
Formal Opinions
Page 39 of 42
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This letter responds to the March 25, 1993, inquiry of Assistant Treasurer Lawrence A. Wilson wherein he asked whether the Connecticut Bar Foundation, Inc. may invest Interest On Lawyers' Trust Account ("IOLTA") funds in the State's Short-Term Investment Fund ("STIF").
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This is in response to your department's request for a formal opinion from this office as to whether or not Section 3-7 of the General Statutes is applicable to certain internal service/revolving funds administered by the Department of Administrative Services (DAS). Your department's request focuses on whether monies owed to the funds by other State agencies may be cancelled from the books of DAS or otherwise compromised in accordance with the provisions of Section 3-7.
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You ask in your letter to this office whether Conn.Pub.Act No. 93-435, § 87(b) violates Art. II, Conn. Const., relating to the separation of powers. You suggest that this question arises because the legislature would be imposing the UAPA rule-making procedure of the executive branch upon the probate courts.
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This is in reply to a request for advice asking if the person you appoint as an Executive Director of the Department of Public Utility Control (DPUC), pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-2(f), to fill a vacancy in that position receives an appointment for four years or rather serves the balance of the prior Executive Director's unexpired term.
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You have asked whether or not foster parents are entitled to representation and indemnification from the State of Connecticut. The corollary question is whether they are independent contractors and therefore not entitled to representation or indemnification.
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I write in response to your letters, which request my interpretation of Connecticut's General Statutes as they pertain to the legality of same sex marriages in our state. Specifically, you wish to know whether local officials may issue marriage licenses to, or perform marriage ceremonies for, same sex couples.
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In separate letters to us you requested our advice on two questions concerning indemnification of state marshals. Your first question seeks our opinion on whether state marshals serving capias warrants on behalf of Support Enforcement Services are entitled to indemnification by the State of Connecticut. Your second question asks whether state marshals who train new appointees would be indemnified under Connecticut General Statutes § 4-165.
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I write to respond to your request for an advisory opinion regarding religious exemption provisions included within Connecticut's child abuse and neglect statutes. The critical statutory language is contained in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-104 (with essentially similar language found in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-120) which provides: "...[t]he treatment of any child by a Christian Science practitioner in lieu of treatment by a licensed practitioner of the healing arts shall not of itself constitute maltreatment."
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The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has asked for an opinion analyzing the Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (the Act) 42 U.S.C. § 5101 and regulations issued under that Act in relation to state law, particularly Conn. Gen. Stat. § l9a-570 et seq. Specifically, HHS questions whether Connecticut law meets the requirement imposed by the federal statutory mandates regarding critically-ill children.
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You have asked for an opinion interpreting Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-101i(a) regarding the Department's obligation to notify and provide records to an employing superintendent of schools when it has substantiated abuse of a child by certain school employees. Specifically, you are requesting a determination as to whether the applicable notification requirements apply to abuse of any child or only to abuse of a child who is a student in the employing school or school system.
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We are replying to your letters of January 14, 1993 and January 22, 1993 in which you ask whether the Governor has the constitutional and statutory authority to execute without legislative approval a Memorandum of Understanding between the State and the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe regarding the installation and operation of video slot machines (i.e., video facsimile games as defined in that Memorandum and the Federal Procedures to which it refers) at Foxwoods Casino at Ledyard, and whether the Secretary of the Interior has to approve the agreement or take any action relating to it
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This is in response to your letter of September 11, 1992 in which you relate that the State Teachers' Retirement Board has requested an opinion of this office on the following question: Does the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act preserve a right for persons covered by the Act to purchase retirement service credit in the State Teachers' Retirement System under the terms of the state law governing such purchases of service credit as were in effect when such persons were inducted into the Armed Forces?
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In response to then Commissioner Joxel Garcia's and Chairman Murphy's requests, this is a formal opinion responding to the following questions: 1) Does "phototherapy" as used in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-34, incorporate the use of "laser therapy equipment"?; 2) Does the State Board of Natureopathic Examiners have the authority to expand its scope of practice either with or without the consent of the Commissioner?; 3) Does the Department of Health's use of the 1997 Connecticut Medical Examining Board's "declaratory ruling on use of hair removal" to prohibit a licensed natureopathic physician from employing laser hair removal constitute an unfair restriction of trade?
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This is in response to your request for an opinion on the lawfulness of a proposed entertainment program at liquor permit premises involving the playing of poker for prizes. The proposal comes in the wake of recent announcements outlawing the betting on poker tournaments due to criminal laws against gambling.
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You have requested a formal opinion from this office as to whether the Department of Administrative Service's ("DAS") use of private collection agencies on a contingency fee basis would be in violation of Conn.Gen.Stat. § 4-100 or any other section of the General Statutes of Connecticut.