Formal Opinions
Page 3 of 42
-
2015-01 Formal Opinion, Attorney General, State of Connecticut
Does the language in a proposed draft deed between the City of New Britain and a private developer satisfy the City's statutory obligation to use the parcel for the specified purposes and does it extinguish the reverter contained in the 2013 deed. The Attorney General concludes that the language and conditions contained in the proposed deed accomplishes both purposes, provided the deed is executed prior to October 7. 2015.
-
As Chairman of the State Marshal Commission you have requested a formal Opinion of the Attorney General as to the following two questions: 1. Are the two ex officio, nonvoting members of the State Marshal Advisory Board, appointed pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 6-38b(a), entitled to attend executive sessions of the State Marshal Commission’s meetings? 2. If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, are they entitled to attend all executive sessions, or are there executive sessions they are not entitled to attend? Specifically, are ex officio members entitled to attend executive sessions regarding personnel and disciplinary matters?
-
Your department has requested a formal opinion concerning the following questions: “What impact, if any, does the placement of a lis pendens against property (real estate) have upon the bond limit set for a properly licensed and authorized bondsman, when the property in question has been designated as an asset by the bondsman in the calculation of their authorized bond limit?”
-
You have requested our advice on whether the Department of Correction should continue to follow its procedure of initiating speedy trial paperwork for an arrest warrant that has not been served. You advised us that the Court Operations Division of the Judicial Branch sent you a memorandum in which they indicate that the right to a speedy trial does not apply to an arrest warrant that has not been served
-
You have asked this Office whether Section 32-664(b) of the Connecticut General Statutes preempts the City of Hartford’s Living Wage Ordinance, Ord. No. 17-99, Art. XII, Sec. 2-761-744, as that ordinance may apply to the operations of the Marriott Hartford Downtown Hotel (the “Hotel”).
-
This letter is in response to your request for a formal legal opinion as to whether $2.8 million designated for non-emergency medical transportation and vision benefits under the State-Administered General Assistance program (“SAGA”) in the recently approved state budget may be spent without further legislative action
-
You have asked for an opinion on the following two questions: 1. Does a municipal corporation have the authority to set different mill rates for the taxation of non-vehicle personal property and real property located within the same municipal tax or sub tax district? 2. Does OPM have the authority to pursue a reimbursement, either by direct payment or by offsetting the pending claim of the City of Stamford, for grant claims it has paid based upon Grand List years 1999, 2000 and 2001?
-
As you know, Section 31-57f of the Connecticut General Statutes provides for the payment of a standard wage rate to certain service workers employed by contractors of the state or its agents.
-
You have requested an opinion on whether the one million dollar annual cap on assessments by the Connecticut Siting Council (“Council”) contained in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-50v (b)(1) is a cap on assessments on individual energy companies or a cap on total assessments on the energy industry as a whole.
-
You ask for our opinion on whether you may issue rulings on two issues that have been presented to you: (1) whether to approve the party designation "Independent Party" proposed by the Independent Party of Waterbury in connection with an anticipated gubernatorial candidacy
-
You have asked whether transfers of surplus State property to municipalities, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 3-14b , or pursuant to special or public acts of the Connecticut General Assembly directing the disposition of particular parcels of property, implicate the provisions of the Connecticut Environmental Policy Act
-
You have asked our opinion on whether a firefighter injured in the line of duty on April 5, 1997 is eligible for benefits from the Connecticut State Firefighters Association under the provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 3-123, as amended by Public Act 98-263.
-
This is in response to your request for an opinion on whether the two-store limit rule in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-48a bars the issuance of a package store permit to Jaimax, Inc. for premises at 701 North Colony Road, Wallingford, CT.
-
In your letter dated August 31, 2000, you asked whether the state can recover interest from the United States Postal Service as a result of the late delivery of certified mail containing tax returns and $140 million in tax payments. In analyzing this issue, it must be noted that any action against the United States Postal Service is, in fact, an action against the United States.
-
This is in response to your letter dated January 19, 2000, in which you request our opinion on whether the Department of Transportation ("DOT") has the authority to enter into major contracts regarding development at Bradley International Airport ("BIA") when the Bradley International Airport Commission ("Commission") believes that DOT has failed to fully cooperate with the Commission in accordance with the provisions of subsection (b) of Section 15-101s of the Connecticut General Statutes.
