The Office of the Attorney General William Tong
Formal Opinions
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This office previously responded to an inquiry concerning the authority of a Special Deputy Sheriff to serve a capias. At that time we provided an informal advice to the effect that the "better practice" was for a regular Deputy Sheriff to serve the capias, but that a Special Deputy Sheriff could assist, and suggested that it would be advisable to obtain legislative clarification with respect to what authority a Special Deputy Sheriff had. During the period since that informal advice the issue of what authority a Special Deputy Sheriff had in connection with serving a capias has continued to arise. Accordingly, you have asked us to issue a formal opinion on this question. We have carefully considered the relevant legal authorities.
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I reviewed the questions that you have presented to me as follows: 1. Must an HMO medical plan, the terms and conditions of which contain a custodial care exception, offer a plan to the public, after receiving Department of Insurance approval, that: (a) meets the requirements of CGS 38a-553(c)(10), (b) complies with CGS 38a-478 et seq., as from time to time amended, and Article XXI of the Connecticut Constitution, and (c) does not use rehabilitation or improvement as criteria in determining whether care for disabled persons or persons suffering from biologically-based mental illnesses or nervous conditions is to be considered custodial? 2. Must the external appeal panel, acting pursuant to CGS 38a-478n, when reviewing appeals certified by the Department of Insurance and which construe or involve the custodial care exception (CGS 38a-553(c)(10)) as applied to disabled persons or persons suffering from biologically-based mental illnesses or nervous conditions (CGS 38a-478 et seq., as from time to time amended): (a) apply said CGS 38a-478 et seq. and Article XXI of the State Constitution, and (b) not use rehabilitation or improvement as tests for custodial care?
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In your communication of December 27, 1999, you state that the Board of Trustees for the Community-Technical Colleges ("Board of Trustees") had voted earlier in 1999 to change its name and the names of each of its twelve colleges by reducing "regional community-technical college(s)" to "community college" in each title. You state that the Board of Trustees' action was based upon a "yearlong public relations study." On behalf of the Board of Governors for Higher Education ("Board of Governors") you asked whether the approval of the Board of Governors pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §10a-6 and/or of the General Assembly is required to effect legally these name changes.
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2017-03 Formal Opinion, Attorney General, State of Connecticut
Honorable Senator Bob Duff has asked whether certain potential changes to Connecticut's Education Cost Sharing ("ECS") formula would violate our state constitution. Specifically, you ask whether our constitution requires that the ECS formula measure a town's ability to raise property tax revenue "using a ratio of ninety percent property wealth and ten percent income wealth."
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2017-04 Formal Opinion, Attorney General, State of Connecticut
Commissioner Robert Klee asked my office for an opinion identifying the owner of a structure commonly known as the Stonington Harbor Breakwater, which is located in the Stonington Harbor adjacent to Stonington, CT (the "Breakwater").
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2017-05 Formal Opinion, Attorney General, State of Connecticut
Formal opinion on whether, for purposes of administering the provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-28(b), a resident of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation (MPTN) reservation is a bona fide permanent resident of the Town of Ledyard such that local authorities are empowered to issue a temporary state permit to such individuals, and based thereon, the Commissioner of the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection (Commissioner) is authorized to issue a state permit to carry pistols and revolvers.
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2017-06 Formal Opinion, Attorney General, State of Connecticut
Speaker Aresimowicz and Majority Leader Ritter have requested an opinion about whether the legal principles and cautions set forth in Attorney General Opinion No. 89-11 , 1989 WL 505894 (May 9, 1989) ("Opinion 89-11 ") concerning the constitutionality of legislative enactments altering the provisions of collective bargaining agreements between the State and its employees remain in force today. Although subsequent cases have further developed the law, we conclude that the principles and cautions expressed in Opinion 89-11 continue to apply.
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2017-07 Formal Opinion, Attorney General, State of Connecticut
An opinion about certain legal questions pertaining to a proposed police training facility in the Town of Griswold. Specifically, you ask (1) whether the requirements under Chapter 297a of the General Statutes relating to priority funding areas apply to the proposed training facility; (2) whether the Department of Administrative Services (DAS) has satisfied the requirement of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16a-35e that state agencies cooperate with municipalities to ensure programs and activities in rural areas sustain village character; and (3) whether the proposed training facility requires the approval of the State Properties Review Board as part of the State Facility Plan.
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2017-08 Formal Opinion, Attorney General, State of Connecticut
An opinion on questions about the Governor's authority to direct the expenditure of funds by executive order in the absence of legislatively enacted appropriations.
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2017-09 Formal Opinion, Attorney General, State of Connecticut
Formal opinion concerning two matters identified in the State of Connecticut Auditors' Report, Military Department, for the Fiscal Years Ended June 30, 2012 and 2013 ("Auditors' Report"). First, you have asked whether the requirements under Connecticut General Statutes § 4-37e et seq. pertaining to foundations established for the principal purpose of supporting or improving state agencies or for coordinated emergency recovery purposes apply to the Connecticut National Guard Foundation, Inc. (CNGFI). Second, you have asked whether the authority of the Governor of the State of Connecticut pursuant to the provisions of Connecticut General Statutes §§ 27-9 and 27-10, as delegated to and administered by the Connecticut Miiitary Depmtment (CTMD), is restricted to ordering members of the Connecticut State Guard to active service under the "State Active Duty" (SAD) program only for "emergency situations" as suggested by the Auditors' Report.
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The Honorable John G. Rowland, The Capitol, 2002-018 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut
On October 9, 2002, the Freedom of Information Commission (Commission) ruled that the Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority (CRRA) was not required to disclose to the public eight documents in CRRA's possession which were the subject of an April 17, 2002, and an April 23, 2002 Freedom of Information Complaint filed by Paul A. Green and the Journal Inquirer. According to the Commission, the eight documents in question either constitute attorney-client communications or relate to CRRA's possible litigation strategy to recover the $220 million loaned to Enron and are, therefore, exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§1-210(b)(10) and 1-210(b)(4). By letter dated October 11, 2002, you have asked me to obtain from CRRA the eight documents that have not yet been disclosed and release them to the public.
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I am writing in response to your request for a formal opinion as to whether the Department of Banking ("Department") has the authority to reimburse an electronic service provider for reasonable costs associated with complying with an administrative subpoena, in light of the requirements imposed by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2706 ("ECPA") and section 36b-26(b) of the Connecticut Uniform Securities Act ("Act").
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Your office has asked whether the recent injunction regarding Connecticut's Sexual Offender Registration Act (SORA) issued by the United States District Court of Connecticut, and upheld by the Second Circuit, impedes in any way the implementation of Public Act 01-211, concerning victim notification. That Act requires victim notification of applications for exemption from the Sex Offender Registry or its notification requirements.
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You have requested an opinion concerning the validity of certain claims of testimonial privilege asserted by officials of the State Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) subpoenaed to testify at a hearing of the Joint Committee on Labor and Public Employees ("Joint Committee").
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This letter is in response to your request for a formal legal opinion as to whether your office is "authorized to issue or accept primary petitions of candidates for state and district offices?"1 It is our understanding you are questioning whether you are required to place the name of a candidate for state or district office2 on the Democratic or Republican Party primary ballot based solely on the fact that the candidate has obtained the signatures of a certain percentage of the political party's registered voters within the candidate's district.