Formal Opinions
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On October 9, 2002, the Freedom of Information Commission (Commission) ruled that the Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority (CRRA) was not required to disclose to the public eight documents in CRRA's possession which were the subject of an April 17, 2002, and an April 23, 2002 Freedom of Information Complaint filed by Paul A. Green and the Journal Inquirer. According to the Commission, the eight documents in question either constitute attorney-client communications or relate to CRRA's possible litigation strategy to recover the $220 million loaned to Enron and are, therefore, exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§1-210(b)(10) and 1-210(b)(4). By letter dated October 11, 2002, you have asked me to obtain from CRRA the eight documents that have not yet been disclosed and release them to the public.
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The Honorable John G. Rowland, The Capitol, 2002-018 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut
On October 9, 2002, the Freedom of Information Commission (Commission) ruled that the Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority (CRRA) was not required to disclose to the public eight documents in CRRA's possession which were the subject of an April 17, 2002, and an April 23, 2002 Freedom of Information Complaint filed by Paul A. Green and the Journal Inquirer. According to the Commission, the eight documents in question either constitute attorney-client communications or relate to CRRA's possible litigation strategy to recover the $220 million loaned to Enron and are, therefore, exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§1-210(b)(10) and 1-210(b)(4). By letter dated October 11, 2002, you have asked me to obtain from CRRA the eight documents that have not yet been disclosed and release them to the public.
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I am writing in response to your request for a formal opinion as to whether the Department of Banking ("Department") has the authority to reimburse an electronic service provider for reasonable costs associated with complying with an administrative subpoena, in light of the requirements imposed by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2706 ("ECPA") and section 36b-26(b) of the Connecticut Uniform Securities Act ("Act").
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This is in response to your recent request for an opinion on whether the Division of Special Revenue (DOSR) must review and approve the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Commission's Cashless Wagering System (CWS) for slot machines proposed for use at Mohegan Sun Casino in Uncasville, Connecticut, in advance of implementation.
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Honorable John G. Rowland, State Capitol, 2002-014 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut
I write to supplement my opinion dated April 17, 2002, regarding the constitutionality of House Bill No. 5346, and to notify you of a United States Supreme Court decision providing powerful and decisive support for my conclusion that the measure is constitutional.
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You have asked for advice on whether inmates working within a correctional institution other than as part of an enterprise program combining State Use Industries with Private Sector Prison Industries may be considered employees of the Connecticut Department of Correction
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In your August 28, 2007 memorandum, you sought this Office’s advice regarding the interpretation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-417i(n) of the New Home Construction Contractors Act, and Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-432(o) of the Home Improvement Act
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This letter responds to your request for a formal opinion on “whether or not the Board of Pardons has the authority to commute a non-parole eligible offense, as defined by CGS § 54-125a(b)(1), to make it a parole eligible offense.”
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You have asked for a formal opinion as to whether Connecticut's "Voter's Bill of Rights" requires municipalities to provide a voting system accessible to the physically disabled in each polling place in non-federal elections, including elections held this year.
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You have asked this Office for an opinion concerning the use of the City of New Haven’s “Elm City Resident Cards" during the electoral process. Specifically, you have asked us to opine whether your Office has the legal authority to issue the following directives with respect to the use of such cards by individuals seeking to vote or register to vote in Connecticut
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This letter is in response to your November 19, 2007 request that I reconsider my formal legal opinion issued to Comptroller Nancy Wyman on July 25, 2007 (Attorney General Opinion 2007-012).
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As Chairman of the State Marshal Commission you have requested a formal Opinion of the Attorney General as to the following two questions: 1. Are the two ex officio, nonvoting members of the State Marshal Advisory Board, appointed pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 6-38b(a), entitled to attend executive sessions of the State Marshal Commission’s meetings? 2. If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, are they entitled to attend all executive sessions, or are there executive sessions they are not entitled to attend? Specifically, are ex officio members entitled to attend executive sessions regarding personnel and disciplinary matters?
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Your department has requested a formal opinion concerning the following questions: “What impact, if any, does the placement of a lis pendens against property (real estate) have upon the bond limit set for a properly licensed and authorized bondsman, when the property in question has been designated as an asset by the bondsman in the calculation of their authorized bond limit?”
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You have requested our advice on whether the Department of Correction should continue to follow its procedure of initiating speedy trial paperwork for an arrest warrant that has not been served. You advised us that the Court Operations Division of the Judicial Branch sent you a memorandum in which they indicate that the right to a speedy trial does not apply to an arrest warrant that has not been served
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You have asked this Office whether Section 32-664(b) of the Connecticut General Statutes preempts the City of Hartford’s Living Wage Ordinance, Ord. No. 17-99, Art. XII, Sec. 2-761-744, as that ordinance may apply to the operations of the Marriott Hartford Downtown Hotel (the “Hotel”).
