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2000 Formal Opinions

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  • Hon. George Jepsen, Majority Leader, State Senate, 2000-009 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have inquired whether the State has authority to establish standards for air emissions which are stricter than those established under the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et. seq. You have also inquired whether the cost of establishing more stringent standards must be borne by the State.

  • Honorable Arthur J. Rocque, Jr., Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 2000-025 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked for our opinion on whether towns can spray for mosquitoes in areas in which the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) does not intend to spray and whether towns can prevent the state from conducting its own spraying program within town boundaries.

  • Honorable Arthur J. Rocque, Jr., Department of Environmental Protection, 2000-012 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked for an interpretation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 26-3 as regards DEP's authority to take any animal by whatever means reasonably necessary to carry out its functions, even if the means DEP intends to use is contrary to another statutory provision.

  • Honorable Gene Gavin, Department of Revenue Services, 2000-028 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    In your letter dated August 31, 2000, you asked whether the state can recover interest from the United States Postal Service as a result of the late delivery of certified mail containing tax returns and $140 million in tax payments. In analyzing this issue, it must be noted that any action against the United States Postal Service is, in fact, an action against the United States.

  • Honorable James T. Fleming, Department of Consumer Protection, 2000-030 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This is in response to your request for an opinion on whether the two-store limit rule in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-48a bars the issuance of a package store permit to Jaimax, Inc. for premises at 701 North Colony Road, Wallingford, CT.

  • Honorable John P. Burke , Department of Banking , 2000-001 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You recently requested an opinion from this office regarding the following questions: 1. Is the filing of a notice and fee by a federally-registered investment adviser under Section 36b-6(d) or 36b-6(e) of the Connecticut General Statutes, for which a letter of acknowledgment is issued by the Department, considered to be a "license or permit to operate a business in this state" within the meaning of Section 31-286a(b) of the Workers' Compensation Act? 2. Is the filing of an annual notice renewal fee by such an investment adviser under Section 36b-6(e) of the Connecticut General Statutes considered the renewal of a license or permit within the meaning of Section 31-286a(b) of the Act? 3. If the response to either of the foregoing questions is yes, is Section 31-286a(b) of the Act preempted because it exceeds what is reserved to the states under Section 307(a) of NSMIA, viz., the filing by federally-registered investment advisers of any documents filed with the SEC? 4. If it is determined that Section 31-286a(b) of the Act is preempted, will the Department be liable for failure to comply with Section 31-286a(b) if it fails to obtain from federally-registered investment advisers sufficient evidence of current compliance with the workers' compensation insurance coverage requirements of Section 31-284?

  • Honorable Kevin B. Sullivan, Legislative Office Building, 2000-019 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked for advice regarding the legal consequences of the General Assembly's approval of a particular arbitration award. In your letter of May 10, 2000, you explained that the leadership of the General Assembly is considering calling a special session to approve a recent arbitration award between the State of Connecticut and the Administrative and Residual Union P-5 Bargaining Unit (hereinafter "A&R"), pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 5-278(b). Before the General Assembly will be able to convene to approve the award, however, you anticipate that the State will file in the superior court an application to modify or vacate it. You ask, therefore, what effect the General Assembly's approval of the award may have on the State's legal challenge to it.

  • Honorable Kevin B. Sullivan, President Pro Tempore, 2000-004 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This letter responds to yours of December 29, 1999, in which you ask this office for a formal opinion regarding the applicability and effect of Sections 26 and 45 of Public Act 99-2, June Special Session on tobacco settlement monies. Specifically, you have asked for an opinion "concerning whether Section 45 alters, in any way, the express provisions of Section 26 and, if so, the nature and extent to which it does."

  • Honorable Nancy Wyman, Office of the Comptroller, 2000-007 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked our opinion on whether a firefighter injured in the line of duty on April 5, 1997 is eligible for benefits from the Connecticut State Firefighters Association under the provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 3-123, as amended by Public Act 98-263.

  • Honorable Nancy Wyman, State Comptroller, 2000-008 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked this Office for an opinion regarding the administration of health insurance benefits for retired state employees receiving workers' compensation payments. In your request, you mention a 1984 Attorney General's opinion [Op. Atty. Gen. No. 84-93, July 24, 1984] that advised the Comptroller that retired state employees receiving workers' compensation payments "must have health insurance maintained at the level provided for active state employees." You also cite a Comptroller policy dated September 16, 1985, which is based on the Attorney General's opinion.

  • Honorable Patricia A. Wilson-Coker, Department of Social Services, 2000-010 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This office previously responded to an inquiry concerning the authority of a Special Deputy Sheriff to serve a capias. At that time we provided an informal advice to the effect that the "better practice" was for a regular Deputy Sheriff to serve the capias, but that a Special Deputy Sheriff could assist, and suggested that it would be advisable to obtain legislative clarification with respect to what authority a Special Deputy Sheriff had. During the period since that informal advice the issue of what authority a Special Deputy Sheriff had in connection with serving a capias has continued to arise. Accordingly, you have asked us to issue a formal opinion on this question. We have carefully considered the relevant legal authorities.

  • Honorable Senator M. Adela Eads, State Capitol, 2000-017 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    I reviewed the questions that you have presented to me as follows: 1. Must an HMO medical plan, the terms and conditions of which contain a custodial care exception, offer a plan to the public, after receiving Department of Insurance approval, that: (a) meets the requirements of CGS 38a-553(c)(10), (b) complies with CGS 38a-478 et seq., as from time to time amended, and Article XXI of the Connecticut Constitution, and (c) does not use rehabilitation or improvement as criteria in determining whether care for disabled persons or persons suffering from biologically-based mental illnesses or nervous conditions is to be considered custodial? 2. Must the external appeal panel, acting pursuant to CGS 38a-478n, when reviewing appeals certified by the Department of Insurance and which construe or involve the custodial care exception (CGS 38a-553(c)(10)) as applied to disabled persons or persons suffering from biologically-based mental illnesses or nervous conditions (CGS 38a-478 et seq., as from time to time amended): (a) apply said CGS 38a-478 et seq. and Article XXI of the State Constitution, and (b) not use rehabilitation or improvement as tests for custodial care?

  • Honorable Valerie F. Lewis, Department of Higher Education, 2000-011 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    In your communication of December 27, 1999, you state that the Board of Trustees for the Community-Technical Colleges ("Board of Trustees") had voted earlier in 1999 to change its name and the names of each of its twelve colleges by reducing "regional community-technical college(s)" to "community college" in each title. You state that the Board of Trustees' action was based upon a "yearlong public relations study." On behalf of the Board of Governors for Higher Education ("Board of Governors") you asked whether the approval of the Board of Governors pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §10a-6 and/or of the General Assembly is required to effect legally these name changes.

  • Jeffrey Garfield, Esq., Elections Enforcement Commission, 2000-020 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked what regulatory authority the Elections Enforcement Commission ("EEC") has with respect to alleged violations of Conn. Gen. Stat. §2-30a(b), which provides in relevant part: "No expenditure of state funds shall be made to influence electors to vote for or against any such proposed constitutional amendment."

  • John P. Burke, Department of Banking, 2000-006 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked for our opinion as to whether Section 36a-158(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes violates the Commerce Clause of the Unites States Constitution or the Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal constitutions as to an out-of-state state-chartered bank that wishes to establish an automated teller machine ("ATM") in this state.