2000 Formal Opinions

Page 2 of 3

  • Honorable Nancy Wyman, State Comptroller, 2000-008 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked this Office for an opinion regarding the administration of health insurance benefits for retired state employees receiving workers' compensation payments. In your request, you mention a 1984 Attorney General's opinion [Op. Atty. Gen. No. 84-93, July 24, 1984] that advised the Comptroller that retired state employees receiving workers' compensation payments "must have health insurance maintained at the level provided for active state employees." You also cite a Comptroller policy dated September 16, 1985, which is based on the Attorney General's opinion.

  • Honorable Patricia A. Wilson-Coker, Department of Social Services, 2000-010 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This office previously responded to an inquiry concerning the authority of a Special Deputy Sheriff to serve a capias. At that time we provided an informal advice to the effect that the "better practice" was for a regular Deputy Sheriff to serve the capias, but that a Special Deputy Sheriff could assist, and suggested that it would be advisable to obtain legislative clarification with respect to what authority a Special Deputy Sheriff had. During the period since that informal advice the issue of what authority a Special Deputy Sheriff had in connection with serving a capias has continued to arise. Accordingly, you have asked us to issue a formal opinion on this question. We have carefully considered the relevant legal authorities.

  • Honorable Senator M. Adela Eads, State Capitol, 2000-017 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    I reviewed the questions that you have presented to me as follows: 1. Must an HMO medical plan, the terms and conditions of which contain a custodial care exception, offer a plan to the public, after receiving Department of Insurance approval, that: (a) meets the requirements of CGS 38a-553(c)(10), (b) complies with CGS 38a-478 et seq., as from time to time amended, and Article XXI of the Connecticut Constitution, and (c) does not use rehabilitation or improvement as criteria in determining whether care for disabled persons or persons suffering from biologically-based mental illnesses or nervous conditions is to be considered custodial? 2. Must the external appeal panel, acting pursuant to CGS 38a-478n, when reviewing appeals certified by the Department of Insurance and which construe or involve the custodial care exception (CGS 38a-553(c)(10)) as applied to disabled persons or persons suffering from biologically-based mental illnesses or nervous conditions (CGS 38a-478 et seq., as from time to time amended): (a) apply said CGS 38a-478 et seq. and Article XXI of the State Constitution, and (b) not use rehabilitation or improvement as tests for custodial care?

  • Honorable Valerie F. Lewis, Department of Higher Education, 2000-011 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    In your communication of December 27, 1999, you state that the Board of Trustees for the Community-Technical Colleges ("Board of Trustees") had voted earlier in 1999 to change its name and the names of each of its twelve colleges by reducing "regional community-technical college(s)" to "community college" in each title. You state that the Board of Trustees' action was based upon a "yearlong public relations study." On behalf of the Board of Governors for Higher Education ("Board of Governors") you asked whether the approval of the Board of Governors pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §10a-6 and/or of the General Assembly is required to effect legally these name changes.

  • Jeffrey Garfield, Esq., Elections Enforcement Commission, 2000-020 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked what regulatory authority the Elections Enforcement Commission ("EEC") has with respect to alleged violations of Conn. Gen. Stat. §2-30a(b), which provides in relevant part: "No expenditure of state funds shall be made to influence electors to vote for or against any such proposed constitutional amendment."

  • John P. Burke, Department of Banking, 2000-006 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked for our opinion as to whether Section 36a-158(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes violates the Commerce Clause of the Unites States Constitution or the Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal constitutions as to an out-of-state state-chartered bank that wishes to establish an automated teller machine ("ATM") in this state.

  • Joxel Garcia, M.D., Commissioner, Department of Public Health, 2000-031 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This is in response to your request for a formal opinion of the Attorney General regarding the ability of the Department of Public Health ("Department") to access information contained in the personnel files of employees of institutions licensed by the Department. The Department's inspectors have recently been refused access to institutional employee personnel files when conducting inspections at a hospital. The hospital asserted that unless the Department issued an "administrative summons", the records could not be released unless consent of the employee was obtained. You also asked whether such information would be subject to release by the Department pursuant to a Freedom of Information request.

  • Marc S. Ryan, Secretary, Office of Policy and Management, 2000-013 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    Your letter of March 16, 2000, asks whether the South Central Regional Council of Governments ("SCRCOG") is a "political subdivision of the State" for purposes of applying for and receiving a "Brownfields" grant under a program funded by the federal Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA").

  • Marc S. Ryan, Secretary, Office of Policy and Management, 2000-026 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have written to this office seeking an interpretation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §12-63c(a), a statutory provision concerning the procedure local tax assessors are to employ in the valuation of commercial and industrial property used "primarily for purposes of producing rental income." Specifically, you ask whether the term "primarily" as used in this provision means "that more than 50% of the area of the structure is used for the purpose of producing rental income, or does 'primarily' mean that more than 50% of the income from the property is a result of rental income?" You posed a second question that stated: "If the second interpretation is correct, would gross or net income be used to determine the primary purpose?"

  • Mr. Charles P. Watras, Bradley International Airport Commission, 2000-005 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This is in response to your letter dated January 19, 2000, in which you request our opinion on whether the Department of Transportation ("DOT") has the authority to enter into major contracts regarding development at Bradley International Airport ("BIA") when the Bradley International Airport Commission ("Commission") believes that DOT has failed to fully cooperate with the Commission in accordance with the provisions of subsection (b) of Section 15-101s of the Connecticut General Statutes.

  • Mr. Marc S. Ryan, Office of Policy and Management, 2000-016 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked this office for our opinion as to the exact conditions under which the Waterbury Budget Advisory Council ceases to exist and whether Waterbury's positive fund balances for Fiscal Years 97, 98, and 99 trigger the sunset provisions. An interpretation of the method of dissolution (i.e., a vote of the WBAC members on dissolution) would also be welcomed.

  • Ms. Cynthia Watts-Elder, CHRO Executive Director, 2000-002 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This is in response to a request for advice from the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (hereinafter CHRO) which asked this office to consider the following questions: 1. Is the Criminal Justice Commission required to comply with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-68(a) which requires state agencies to file affirmative action plans with the CHRO? 2. Is the Criminal Justice Commission required to cooperate with the Division of Criminal Justice by providing information and support necessary to allow the Division of Criminal Justice to meet its responsibilities to file and implement an affirmative action plan pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-68?

  • Ms. Mary Ann Hanley, Office of Workforce Competitiveness, 2000-018 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    In your letter dated April 27, 2000 you requested a formal opinion as to whether the chairman of a council of government has the authority to sign on behalf of all the chief elected officials of a workforce investment area an agreement by which the council of government will administer and oversee federal Workforce Investment Act funds and activities.

  • Ms. Nancy Wyman, State Comptroller, 2000-024 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked two related questions about the State Employee Campaign for Charitable Giving (the "campaign"), which is an annual campaign "to raise funds from state employees for charitable and public health, welfare, environmental, conservation and services purposes." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 5-262(a)(3). Specifically, you ask whether the State Employee Campaign Committee (the "Committee") may prohibit a federation1 from participating in the campaign if one or more of the federation's member agencies solicits from state employees during the designated campaign period other than through the campaign. You have also asked whether the Committee may require a federation that seeks to participate in the campaign to certify to the Committee that it will refrain from soliciting charitable contributions from state employees during the designated campaign period other than through the campaign.

  • Philip E. Austin, University of Connecticut, 2000-032 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    Watershed lands are among Connecticut’s most precious natural resources -- a legacy for future generations that we have a responsibility to preserve and protect. Besides their vital role in protecting the purity of the state’s water supplies, the natural beauty of these lands, undisturbed and tranquil, provides a refuge and respite from development and commercialism. These pristine lands are irreplaceable; once developed they are forever lost.