The Office of the Attorney General William Tong
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You have written to this office seeking an interpretation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §12-63c(a), a statutory provision concerning the procedure local tax assessors are to employ in the valuation of commercial and industrial property used "primarily for purposes of producing rental income." Specifically, you ask whether the term "primarily" as used in this provision means "that more than 50% of the area of the structure is used for the purpose of producing rental income, or does 'primarily' mean that more than 50% of the income from the property is a result of rental income?" You posed a second question that stated: "If the second interpretation is correct, would gross or net income be used to determine the primary purpose?"
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You have asked what regulatory authority the Elections Enforcement Commission ("EEC") has with respect to alleged violations of Conn. Gen. Stat. §2-30a(b), which provides in relevant part: "No expenditure of state funds shall be made to influence electors to vote for or against any such proposed constitutional amendment."
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In your communication of December 27, 1999, you state that the Board of Trustees for the Community-Technical Colleges ("Board of Trustees") had voted earlier in 1999 to change its name and the names of each of its twelve colleges by reducing "regional community-technical college(s)" to "community college" in each title. You state that the Board of Trustees' action was based upon a "yearlong public relations study." On behalf of the Board of Governors for Higher Education ("Board of Governors") you asked whether the approval of the Board of Governors pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §10a-6 and/or of the General Assembly is required to effect legally these name changes.
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I reviewed the questions that you have presented to me as follows: 1. Must an HMO medical plan, the terms and conditions of which contain a custodial care exception, offer a plan to the public, after receiving Department of Insurance approval, that: (a) meets the requirements of CGS 38a-553(c)(10), (b) complies with CGS 38a-478 et seq., as from time to time amended, and Article XXI of the Connecticut Constitution, and (c) does not use rehabilitation or improvement as criteria in determining whether care for disabled persons or persons suffering from biologically-based mental illnesses or nervous conditions is to be considered custodial? 2. Must the external appeal panel, acting pursuant to CGS 38a-478n, when reviewing appeals certified by the Department of Insurance and which construe or involve the custodial care exception (CGS 38a-553(c)(10)) as applied to disabled persons or persons suffering from biologically-based mental illnesses or nervous conditions (CGS 38a-478 et seq., as from time to time amended): (a) apply said CGS 38a-478 et seq. and Article XXI of the State Constitution, and (b) not use rehabilitation or improvement as tests for custodial care?
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This office previously responded to an inquiry concerning the authority of a Special Deputy Sheriff to serve a capias. At that time we provided an informal advice to the effect that the "better practice" was for a regular Deputy Sheriff to serve the capias, but that a Special Deputy Sheriff could assist, and suggested that it would be advisable to obtain legislative clarification with respect to what authority a Special Deputy Sheriff had. During the period since that informal advice the issue of what authority a Special Deputy Sheriff had in connection with serving a capias has continued to arise. Accordingly, you have asked us to issue a formal opinion on this question. We have carefully considered the relevant legal authorities.
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This letter responds to yours of December 29, 1999, in which you ask this office for a formal opinion regarding the applicability and effect of Sections 26 and 45 of Public Act 99-2, June Special Session on tobacco settlement monies. Specifically, you have asked for an opinion "concerning whether Section 45 alters, in any way, the express provisions of Section 26 and, if so, the nature and extent to which it does."
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You have asked for advice regarding the legal consequences of the General Assembly's approval of a particular arbitration award. In your letter of May 10, 2000, you explained that the leadership of the General Assembly is considering calling a special session to approve a recent arbitration award between the State of Connecticut and the Administrative and Residual Union P-5 Bargaining Unit (hereinafter "A&R"), pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 5-278(b). Before the General Assembly will be able to convene to approve the award, however, you anticipate that the State will file in the superior court an application to modify or vacate it. You ask, therefore, what effect the General Assembly's approval of the award may have on the State's legal challenge to it.
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You recently requested an opinion from this office regarding the following questions: 1. Is the filing of a notice and fee by a federally-registered investment adviser under Section 36b-6(d) or 36b-6(e) of the Connecticut General Statutes, for which a letter of acknowledgment is issued by the Department, considered to be a "license or permit to operate a business in this state" within the meaning of Section 31-286a(b) of the Workers' Compensation Act? 2. Is the filing of an annual notice renewal fee by such an investment adviser under Section 36b-6(e) of the Connecticut General Statutes considered the renewal of a license or permit within the meaning of Section 31-286a(b) of the Act? 3. If the response to either of the foregoing questions is yes, is Section 31-286a(b) of the Act preempted because it exceeds what is reserved to the states under Section 307(a) of NSMIA, viz., the filing by federally-registered investment advisers of any documents filed with the SEC? 4. If it is determined that Section 31-286a(b) of the Act is preempted, will the Department be liable for failure to comply with Section 31-286a(b) if it fails to obtain from federally-registered investment advisers sufficient evidence of current compliance with the workers' compensation insurance coverage requirements of Section 31-284?
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You have asked for our opinion on whether towns can spray for mosquitoes in areas in which the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) does not intend to spray and whether towns can prevent the state from conducting its own spraying program within town boundaries.
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This is in response to your request for an opinion of the Attorney General on your authority to review an application under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-132 concerning the acquisition of The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company and The Standard Fire Insurance Company by The Travelers Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as "the Travelers application") following a decision by Insurance Commissioner George M. Reider, Jr., to recuse himself.
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In your letter of June 5, 1992, you requested our opinion regarding the validity of certain legislation proposed by the Department Of Income Maintenance (DIM). That legislation would require any recipient, or any attorney representing such an individual, who initiates a legal action against a third party for recovery of medical expenses, to report the filing of that suit to the Department of Income Maintenance.
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You have requested our advice on two questions: (1) Whether under Conn.Gen.Stat. § 12-19a(a), a Payment in Lieu of Taxes (P.I.L.O.T.) grant is payable to a town for a correctional facility if such facility is not on the town's assessment list on the preceding October 1? (2) Whether Public Act No. 91-79, applies to towns that conducted revaluations prior to October 1, 1990 and currently are phasing in such revaluations?
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This letter is in response to your memorandum of August 4, 1992, in which you requested our opinion concerning the meaning and enforcement of Conn. Gen. Stat. §3-112. We understand from the correspondence which you provided with your memorandum that you have requested information and documentation from the Department of Revenue Services ("DRS") concerning the agency's processing of state income tax refunds. In particular, you have requested information concerning the numbers of refunds processed, when they were processed, how they were processed and the estimated number of refunds still pending. You have also inquired into possible reasons for any delays including any instructions which the agency may have given or received to delay the refund process or to separate refunds based on their face amount, and any hardware or software problems which may have occurred.
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In your letter of February 27, 1992, you posed the question whether the filing of an annual report by a trustee under mortgage may be waived by the Banking Commissioner.
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Robert Werner, Division Of Special Revenue, 1992-034 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut
You have sought the advice of this office relating to the operation of an off-track betting system in the State of Connecticut. Specifically, you inquire whether, under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-167a(b), the operation of "an OTB betting branch facility in the Hartford Jai Alai Fronton would violate the proscription against locating a 'Facility' within 35 miles of the location of the Teletheater in the Town of Windsor Locks ... ?"