CRB OPINION
CASE NO. 6551 CRB-6-24-8
CLAIM NO. 100219052
COMPENSATION REVIEW BOARD
WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
AUGUST 8, 2025
PAUL WEST
CLAIMANT-APPELLANT
v.
CITY OF HARTFORD
EMPLOYER
and
PMA COMPANIES
INSURER
RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES
APPEARANCES:
The claimant was represented by Alexander T. Taubes, Esq., 470 James Street, Suite 007, New Haven, CT 06513.
The respondents were represented by James L. Pomeranz, Esq., McGann, Bartlett & Brown, L.L.C., 111 Founders Plaza, Suite 1201, East Hartford, CT 06108.
This Petition for Review from the August 12, 2024 Finding and Dismissal of Toni M. Fatone, Administrative Law Judge acting for the First District, was heard January 31, 2025 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of Chief Administrative Law Judge Stephen M. Morelli and Administrative Law Judges Peter C. Mlynarczyk and David W. Schoolcraft.
OPINION
STEPHEN M. MORELLI, CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE. The claimant has petitioned for review of the August 12, 2024 Finding and Dismissal of Toni M. Fatone, Administrative Law Judge acting for the First District (decision). We find no error and accordingly affirm the decision.
At formal hearing proceedings, the administrative law judge identified the issues for determination to be (1) whether the claimant sustained a compensable injury pursuant to General Statutes § 54-1f (b)[1] on May 3, 2019; and (2) whether the claimant was temporarily disabled from all work as a result of the injury sustained on that date. The administrative law judge made the following factual findings which are pertinent to our review. At all times relevant hereto, the claimant was an employee of the City of Hartford Police Department. See Findings, ¶¶ 2, 3. Prior to the May 3, 2019 incident, the claimant had been out-of-work since April 2019 due to anxiety, depression, headaches, and sleep problems that he attributed to a hostile work environment. See Findings, ¶ 11.
On May 3, 2019, an incident, which involved his sister and another woman, occurred outside of the claimant’s home in Windsor while he was off duty. See Findings, ¶ 4. The claimant testified that he exited his home with a small puppy in his hands with the thought that he would de-escalate the situation with the use of verbal commands. He did not expect the situation to “blow up the way it did.” Findings, ¶ 6. As the situation escalated, a young man who was in the back seat exited the vehicle and struck the claimant over the head with a baseball bat. See Findings, ¶ 5.
The claimant was taken to Hartford Hospital, where he was treated for a right forehead laceration, neck pain, and post-concussion symptoms. See Claimant’s Exhibit N. Subsequent to his discharge from Hartford Hospital, the claimant was treated for headaches, insomnia, anxiety, and depression by his primary care physician, Irina A. Muni. Muni had treated the claimant for the same symptoms prior to the May 3, 2019 incident. See Claimant’s Exhibit P. Muni testified that the May 3, 2019 injury aggravated the claimant’s pre-existing anxiety and depression, but that his disability was related to his psychiatric condition that was not related to that incident. See Respondents’ Exhibit 10, p. 20. Muni further testified that the claimant was out of work due to his anxiety and depression from the hostile work environment and not because of any brain injury. See Findings, ¶¶ 12, 14. The claimant was also evaluated by Inam U. Kureshi, a neurologist, on June 5, 2019, and was found to be neurologically intact despite symptoms associated with post-concussion syndrome. See Respondents’ Exhibit 16. A neuropsychological evaluation was performed by Nicole M. Barcelos, Psy.D. Barcelos diagnosed the claimant with an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood. She opined that his symptoms were the result of his underlying psychiatric condition and other psychosocial factors since psychometric testing did not reveal any evidence to suggest any organic neurological damage or impairment. Barcelos encouraged the claimant to develop a plan to return to work in some capacity as she believed it would help with his mood and self-esteem. See Claimant’s Exhibit I.
On April 19, 2022, the claimant underwent a respondents’ medical examination (RME) with Stephen R. Conway, a neurologist. Conway opined that the claimant had a normal physical examination and that there “was no reason [the claimant] cannot resume his former employment because of cognitive deficits or headaches due to his May 3, 2019 [injury.]” Findings, ¶ 19 quoting Respondent’s Exhibit 6, p. 11. Conway further opined that there “is also no clear permanent partial disability attributable to a neurological disorder related to the May 3, 2019 incident.” Id. Based on his findings, Conway opined that “the claimant’s injury of May 3, 2019 was not a substantial contributing factor to any ongoing problems which had all pre-existed.” Findings, ¶ 22 citing Respondent’s Exhibit 6, pp. 10-11.
Evidence entered into the record included the police report from the May 3, 2019 incident; home video surveillance of the incident taken from the claimant’s neighbors; the Hartford Police Department Unusual Occurrence Report associated with the May 3, 2019 incident; and the Hartford Police Department Code of Conduct. Additionally, the administrative law judge was provided transcripts of the deposition testimony from David Blezard, the Windsor police officer who investigated the incident; Jason Thody, the Chief of Police for the City of Hartford; and Robert Ford, the Deputy Chief of Police for the City of Hartford. With respect to Blezard’s testimony, the administrative law judge found his testimony credible and persuasive that there were numerous discrepancies between the claimant’s statements and the video surveillance and that the claimant had made false statements during the course of the investigation. See Findings, ¶ 25 and Order, ¶ F.
Although the administrative law judge found the claimant to be credible, she did not find his testimony to be persuasive with respect to him acting as a police officer while off duty on May 3, 2019. Instead, the administrative law judge held that the claimant’s testimony indicated that he did not expect a fight or a felony to occur since his intention was to diffuse the event. See Findings, ¶ 8. As to Blezard’s testimony, the administrative law judge noted that he found numerous discrepancies between the claimant’s statements and the neighborhood videos, including the absence of the puppy the claimant alleged to be holding and the allegation that the claimant was forced to jump out of the way of the assailant’s car. Furthermore, she found Muni’s opinion that the claimant’s ongoing disability was not related to the head injury as credible and persuasive. The opinions of Conway and Barcelos were also found to be credible and persuasive. Consequently, the administrative law judge held that the claimant did not meet his burden of proof that he sustained a compensable injury that arose out and in the course of his employment on May 3, 2019, and dismissed the claims for both medical treatment and indemnity benefits.
The claimant filed a petition for review of the decision on August 22, 2024. He set forth multiple theories of error on the part of the administrative law judge. His primary reason for appeal was that the administrative law judge did not properly apply General Statutes § 54-1f (b). He also argued that the administrative law judge (1) erroneously relied upon his pre-existing condition; (2) failed to correctly apply the significant contributing factor test; (3) gave too much weight to the opinions of Conway, while not giving enough weight to the opinions of Muni; (4) failed to consider the totality of the circumstances; (5) came to contradictory conclusions because she found the claimant’s testimony credible but not persuasive; (6) should not have relied upon the “prejudicial” testimony of Blezard; (7) failed to apply a presumption of compensability that should be afforded to police officers; and (8) did not provide an adequate analysis of her conclusions regarding causation. The claimant, however, did not file either a motion to correct nor a motion for articulation.
In response to the claimant’s contentions, the respondents argued that General Statutes § 54-1f (b) was inapplicable in this instance because the claimant was involved in a personal, family dispute and he had no expectation of a felony having been, or about to be committed. Furthermore, they argued that the claimant’s position regarding § 54‑1f (b) distorted the purpose and intent of that statute. The respondents further argued that the administrative law judge had discretion assessing the credibility of the medical experts with respect to causation and disability, especially in light of the claimant’s total disability status prior to May 3, 2019. Finally, the respondents argued that, since the claimant failed to file either a motion to correct or a motion for articulation, the facts found by the administrative law judge must stand. We find the arguments of the respondents more persuasive and, therefore, affirm the administrative law judge’s decision.
The standard of deference we are obliged to apply to a trier’s findings and legal conclusions is well settled.
[T]he role of this board on appeal is not to substitute its own findings for those of the trier of fact. Dengler v. Special Attention Health Services, Inc., 62 Conn. App. 440, 451 (2001). The trial commissioner’s role as factfinder encompasses the authority to determine the credibility of the evidence, including the testimony of witnesses and the documents introduced into the record as exhibits. Burse v. American International Airways, Inc., 262 Conn. 31, 37 (2002); Tartaglino v. Dept. of Correction, 55 Conn. App. 190, 195, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 929 (1999). If there is evidence in the record to support the factual findings of the trial commissioner, the findings will be upheld on appeal. Duddy v. Filene’s (May Department Stores Co.), 4484 CRB-7-02-1 (October 23, 2002); Phaiah v. Danielson Curtain (C.C. Industries), 4409 CRB-2-01-6 (June 7, 2002). This board may disturb only those findings that are found without evidence, and may also intervene where material facts that are admitted and undisputed have been omitted from the findings. Burse, supra; Duddy, supra. We will also overturn a trier’s legal conclusions when they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts, or where they are the product of an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from the facts. Burse, supra; Pallotto v. Blakeslee Prestress, Inc., 3651 CRB-3-97-7 (July 17, 1998).
McMahon v. Emsar, Inc., 5049 CRB-4-06-1 (January 16, 2007).[2]
First, we note that the claimant did not file either a motion to correct or a motion for articulation. Administrative Regulations § 31-301-4 sets forth the requirements regarding motions to correct.[3] As we have long held, absent a motion to correct, “we must accept the validity of the facts found by the trial commissioner, and this board is limited to reviewing how the commissioner applied the law.” Crochiere v. Board of Education, 227 Conn. 333, 347 (1993) and Corcoran v. Amgraph Packaging, Inc., 4819 CRB-2-04-6, 4948 CRB-2-05-5 (July 26, 2006). As to motions for articulation, Administrative Regulations § 31-301-3 speaks to what should be contained within a decision.[4] If an appellant does not believe that the administrative law judge’s decision adequately explains her decision on a specific issue, it is incumbent upon him to file a motion for articulation in order to seek appropriate review by the court so that there is an adequate record upon which appellate review can be made. See Cable v. Bic Corp., 270 Conn. 433, 442 (2004). Given that the claimant did not file either motion, we are bound by the record as it stands.
We will now address the merits of this appeal based upon the record before us. In order for an injury to be compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, the claimant must prove that his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment.[5] To be compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, “a personal injury sustained by an employee must arise both (1) out of and (2) in the course of his employment. General Statutes § 31-284 (a). ‘Speaking generally, an injury arises out of an employment when it occurs in the course of the employment and as a proximate cause of it.”’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hart v. Federal Express Corp., 321 Conn. 1, 20 (2016) quoting Blakeslee v. Platt Bros. & Co., 279 Conn. 239, 244-45 (2006). Furthermore, “when an employee has a preexisting, asymptomatic medical condition, and that condition is aggravated by injuries sustained during the course of his employment and thereafter becomes symptomatic and necessitates treatment, the injury is deemed to have arisen out of the employment and is compensable.” Hart, supra, 20.
The claimant’s primary argument was that the administrative law judge misapplied the law with respect to whether his actions on May 3, 2019, arose out of and in the course of his employment since they occurred while he was fulfilling his duty as a police officer despite his status of being off duty and/or in a different jurisdiction at the time of the incident. In support of that contention, the claimant argued that General Statutes § 54‑1f (b), as well as the Hartford Police Department’s Code of Conduct, should have been found to be conclusive with respect to the nature of his involvement as a police officer on the date of his injury since he was intervening in a dispute as a trained police officer and the police standards indicate that a police officer is on duty twenty‑four hours per day, seven days per week. The claimant cited Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063 (2006) and Graham v. City of New York, 770 N.Y.S.2d 92 (2003), to illustrate that a police officer is “on duty” whenever he is exercising his police authority.
The administrative law judge in the current case considered this argument and rejected it because she found that, although the claimant was credible, he was not persuasive that he was acting within his authority as a police officer, rather than as a private citizen, when a domestic dispute occurred outside of his home on May 3, 2019. She specifically noted that the claimant’s testimony indicated that he did not expect a fight or felony to occur. See Findings, ¶ 8. She further found that the boy who hit the claimant told the police that he heard the claimant’s mother yell for the claimant to get his gun, that he thought his aunt was going to get killed, and he never heard the claimant say he was a police officer. It was also noted that the juvenile was never prosecuted. See Findings, ¶ 26.
In assessing the applicability of General Statutes § 54-1f (b), we looked to case law involving off-duty police officers for guidance. Bucci v. Bridgeport, 227 Conn. App. 593 (2024), involved a civil action against the municipal police department for the failure of one of its off-duty police officers to intervene, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-1f, in a situation in which another police officer drove while under the influence of alcohol and caused an accident. The Appellate Court affirmed the granting of the motion for summary judgement in favor of the defendant because it agreed with the trial court’s reasoning that “[the plaintiff’s] argument would dissolve the distinction between an employee’s official and unofficial acts because under her reasoning all personal and private activities, no matter how attenuated from the employer’s legitimate business concerns, could be labeled as official duties.” Id., 610. The Appellate Court further noted their decision in State v. Ramirez, 61 Conn. App. 865, 871, cert. denied, 265 Conn. 903 (2001), which stated that “[t]he test is whether the [police officer] is acting within that compass or is engaging in a personal frolic of his own.” Bucci, supra, 611. It is, therefore, clear that whether a police officer is engaging in his authority as a police officer versus the actions of a civilian is a question of fact to be decided by the factfinder. In the current matter, the administrative law judge acted within her authority in assessing credibility and making a determination that the claimant’s actions on May 3, 2019, were personal in nature.
We also looked at other cases in which an off-duty police officer took actions outside of his jurisdiction and whether those actions were considered to have occurred within the scope of his employment. In Allen v. Shoppes at Buckland Hills, LLC, 206 Conn. App. 284 (2021), the plaintiff, an off-duty police officer from East Granby, suffered physical injuries when he attempted to stop what he believed was a serious crime at the Buckland Hills Mall in Manchester. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the jury instructions were wrong because General Statutes § 54-1f imposed an affirmative duty, rather than restrictions, on off-duty police officers to intervene in potentially criminal activity. The Appellate Court found no error in the jury charge which read,
In addition to the obligation to exercise reasonable care of a reasonably prudent person, the plaintiff also had the obligations of an East Granby police officer. As this incident took place in Manchester, special circumstances must exist to authorize the plaintiff to exercise his police powers: one, he must have started a pursuit in East Granby that continued to another jurisdiction, and there is no evidence that such was the case here; two, he must be responding to a medical emergency, and there is no evidence of that here; three, he must be asked by another police agency to assist in police activity; or four, he must reasonably believe that a felony is being or has been committed.
Emphasis added. Id., 299-300.
Similarly, in State v. Kowal, 31 Conn. App. 669 (1993), the Appellate Court held that a reasonable and articulable suspicion of a felony offense was sufficient to allow a Derby police officer to follow a potentially drunk driver into Shelton to make an arrest.
As in Bucci, supra, these decisions regarding the nature of a police officer’s actions, either on duty or off duty, were left to the factfinders. The administrative law judge in the current matter, after hearing testimony from multiple witnesses and being presented with the neighborhood video surveillance, determined that the claimant was not acting in his capacity as a police officer. We will not disturb those findings on appeal.
The claimant also argued that there should be a presumption of compensability afforded to all police officers. We find no support for such a presumption in either the statute or the case law. In fact, Ducharme v. Putnam, 161 Conn. 135 (1971), specifically denies such presumptions on constitutional grounds. In Ducharme, the Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of General Statutes § 7-433a, the original Heart and Hypertension Act, that provided a presumption of compensability for police officers and firefighters who developed heart disease or hypertension. The Court held that General Statutes § 7‑433a was unconstitutional,
because it provides an exclusive public emolument or privilege and results in a denial of equal protection of the law and because the conclusive presumption contained in that statute results in a denial to the defendants of equal protection of the laws and deprives them of property without due process of law.
Id., 137.
The claimant in the current case has not cited to any legislation that provides a constitutional presumption, a “bonus” to police officers, or a rebuttable presumption to police officers. We, therefore, find this argument to be without merit.
While the administrative law judge dismissed the claim based on the injuries not arising out of or in the course of the claimant’s employment, she also concluded that his post-concussive symptoms did not result in him being temporarily totally disabled or suffering any neuropsychological impairment. With respect to these conclusions, the claimant argued that the administrative law judge (1) failed to consider the totality of the circumstances; (2) erroneously relied upon his pre-existing condition when assessing, not only the compensability of his claim, but also his entitlement to indemnity benefits and medical treatment; (3) failed to appropriately apply the substantial contributing factor test; (4) should have afforded more weight to the opinions of Muni than to those of Conway; (5) there was an inherent contradiction in the administrative law judge’s finding that his testimony was credible but not persuasive; and (6) inappropriately relied upon the testimony of Blezard. All of these arguments go to the discretion of the administrative law judge in receiving evidence into the record, weighing the evidence, and assigning credibility. It has long been the standard that the administrative law judge is the sole trier of facts and that her findings must stand unless they are based on impermissible inferences or an incorrect application of the law. See DiNuzzo v. Dan Perkins Chevrolet Geo, Inc., 99 Conn. App. 336, 342 (2007). Furthermore, the Court held that it was not whether a witness was credible, but whether there were sufficient subordinate facts in the record to support the administrative law judge’s findings and conclusions. See id., 344.
As discussed above, there was sufficient evidence in the record in the current matter to support the findings and conclusions of the administrative law judge. Pursuant to General Statutes § 31-298[6], the administrative law judge had authority and discretion to accept the proffered evidence and to assign credibility to the various witnesses. She was under no obligation to believe one medical expert over another medical expert. She was also within her discretion to credit the testimony of the investigating officer, whose deposition transcript was admitted into the record absent any objection by claimant’s counsel. See June 21, 2023 Transcript, p. 19. Similarly, the police report and the surveillance video were both admitted into evidence without objection. See March 23, 2021 Transcript, p. 13 and August 22, 2023 Transcript, p. 4. Any current claim that this evidence should not have been considered due to its alleged prejudicial nature is, therefore, disingenuous. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that the administrative law judge did not consider the totality of the circumstances when rendering her decision. On the contrary, the administrative law judge made specific findings with respect to the testimony of the various witnesses as well as to documentary evidence upon which she relied. Since there is no indication that the administrative law judge misapplied the law to the facts found, this board will not disturb her conclusions.
There is no error. We affirm the August 12, 2024 Finding and Dismissal of Toni M. Fatone, Administrative Law Judge acting for the First District.
Administrative Law Judges Peter C. Mlynarczyk and David W. Schoolcraft concur in this opinion.
[1] General Statutes § 54-1f (b) provides: “Members of the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection or of any local police department or any chief inspector or inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice shall arrest, without previous complaint and warrant, any person who the officer has reasonable grounds to believe has committed or is committing a felony.”
[2] Effective October 21, 2021, the Connecticut legislature directed that the phrase “administrative law judge” be substituted when referencing a workers’ compensation commissioner. See Public Acts 2021, No. 18, § 1.
[3] Administrative regulations § 31-301-4 states, in relevant part, that: “If the appellant desires to have the finding of the commissioner corrected he must, within two weeks after such finding has been filed, unless the time is extended for cause by the commissioner, file with the commissioner his motion for the correction of the finding and with it such portions of the evidence as he deems relevant and material to the corrections asked for . . . .”
[4] Administrative regulations § 31-301-3 states that: “The finding of the commissioner should contain only the ultimate relevant and material facts essential to the case in hand and found by him, together with a statement of his conclusions and the claims of law made by the parties. It should not contain excerpts from evidence or merely evidential facts, nor the reasons for his conclusions. The opinions, beliefs, reasons and argument of the commissioner should be expressed in the memorandum of decision, if any be filed, so far as they may be helpful in the decision of the case.”
[5] General Statutes § 31-275 (1) defines “‘Arising out of and in the course of his employment’ means an accidental injury happening to an employee or an occupational disease of an employee originating while the employee has been engaged in the line of the employee’s duty in the business or affairs of the employer upon the employer’s premises, or while engaged elsewhere upon the employer’s business or affairs by the direction, express or implied, of the employer, provided: (A) (i) For a police officer or firefighter, ‘in the course of his employment’ encompasses such individual’s departure from such individual’s place of abode to duty, such individual’s duty, and the return to such individual’s place of abode after duty.”
[6] General Statutes § 31-298 states, in relevant part, that: “the administrative law judge shall proceed, so far as possible, in accordance with the rules of equity. He shall not be bound by the ordinary common law or statutory rules of evidence or procedure, but shall make inquiry, through oral testimony, deposition testimony or written and printed records, in a manner that is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and carry out the provisions and intent of this chapter.”