CRB OPINION
CASE NO. 6547 CRB-6-24-7
CLAIM NO. 601098795
COMPENSATION REVIEW BOARD
WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
JUNE 20, 2025
RAFAL JASINSKI
CLAIMANT-APPELLEE
v.
BUDNEY OVERHAUL & REPAIR, LTD.
EMPLOYER
and
THE HARTFORD
INSURER
RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS
and
RESPONDENT-APPELLEE
APPEARANCES:
The claimant was represented by Martin McQuillan, Esq., Januszewski, McQuillan & DeNigris, L.L.P., P.O. Box 150, New Britain, CT 06050.
Respondents Budney Overhaul & Repair, Ltd., and The Hartford were represented by Frank Ancona, Esq., Law Offices of David J. Mathis, One Hartford Plaza, T2, Hartford, CT 06155. At proceedings below, Robert F. Weber, Jr., Esq., Weber, Carrier, Chace, L.L.P., 24 Cedar Street, New Britain, CT 06052, also appeared for Budney Overhaul & Repair, Ltd.[1]
At proceedings below, respondent Second Injury Fund was represented by Cynthia Sheppard, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, 165 Capitol Avenue, Hartford, CT 06106.[2]
This Petition for Review from the June 18, 2024 Finding and Award of Daniel E. Dilzer, Administrative Law Judge acting for the Sixth District, was heard on October 25, 2024 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of Chief Administrative Law Judge Stephen M. Morelli and Administrative Law Judges David W. Schoolcraft and Shanique D. Fenlator.[3]
OPINION
STEPHEN M. MORELLI, CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE. The respondents have petitioned for review from the June 18, 2024 Finding and Award of Daniel E. Dilzer, Administrative Law Judge acting for the Sixth District (decision). We find no error and accordingly affirm the decision.
At formal proceedings, the administrative law judge identified as the issue for determination whether an injury sustained by the claimant in the course of his employment also arose out of the employment as contemplated by General Statutes § 31‑275 (1).[4] The administrative law judge made the following factual findings which are pertinent to our review. On July 6, 2022, the claimant, who had been employed by the respondent employer as a milling machine operator since May 2020, arrived at work at 6:00 a.m. Later that morning, he was standing at his workstation, which consisted of a milling machine on a concrete floor and a rubber mat for him to stand on, when he sustained a fall. At trial, he testified that just before the fall, he was holding an impact wrench which he dropped into a container of coolant near his machine. When he bent down and put his hand into the coolant to retrieve the wrench, he suddenly felt dizzy, became frightened, and stood up. Although he does not remember what happened afterward, he testified that prior to the fall, the facility felt “hot” and he believed the climate control system was “broken.” February 14, 2024 Transcript, p. 15. He also stated that the thermostat near his workstation indicated that the temperature inside the facility was eighty-four degrees.
Tadeusz Hyjek, a coworker of the claimant, witnessed the incident. He testified that he saw the claimant standing upright in front of the milling machine with his hands at his sides and then saw him fall backwards, hitting the back of his head on the floor. The claimant lost consciousness. Another coworker, Anthony Biondo, testified that the coolant into which the wrench had fallen was not toxic, has very little odor, and, on the date of injury, primarily consisted of water. Brian Lepage, also a coworker of the claimant, testified that the facility in which the claimant worked was climate-controlled and the climate control systems were functioning properly on the date of injury.
The claimant was transported to The Hospital of Central Connecticut by ambulance; the narrative history taken by the ambulance attendant reports that the claimant did not know what caused him to fall. At the hospital, the claimant was examined in the emergency department, and the notes from that encounter also indicate that the claimant did not know what caused the fall. The history taken during a trauma surgery consult states: “This is a 57 yr old male patient who was working this morning when he started not feeling well. He started not feeling well and he fell backwards hitting his head. He was unable to describe how he was feeling except for unwell.” Claimant’s Exhibit D, p. 23. While at the emergency department, the claimant suffered three seizures within one hour of the fall. The claimant was subsequently admitted to the hospital with the diagnosis of a subdural hematoma, a subarachnoid hemorrhage, a contusion of the right frontal lobe, and an occipital/suboccipital skull fracture. See id., pp. 32, 49.
On September 1, 2022, the claimant presented to Mayer Hasbani, a neurologist. The physician’s initial office consultation note of that date states that the claimant did “not remember the incident well but he felt dizzy and fainted on his back.” Claimant’s Exhibit F. Neither party submitted evidence explaining what caused the claimant to fall or evidence that the claimant was suffering from a personal medical condition which caused him to fall.
In view of the foregoing testimony and evidentiary submissions, the administrative law judge, having found the claimant’s testimony credible, determined that on July 6, 2022, the claimant sustained a compensable injury when he fell at his workstation. The trier stated that the fall “was not idiopathic in nature, but instead unexplained,” Conclusion, ¶ D, and further concluded that the respondents had failed to rebut the presumption of compensability which arises when a claimant sustains an injury in an unexplained fall that occurs “at a time and place where his duties require him to be.”[5] Id. The respondents were ordered to accept compensability of the claim, with future hearings to be conducted if necessary to determine any indemnity and/or medical treatment due to the claimant pursuant to the decision.
The respondents filed a motion to correct which was denied in its entirety, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the respondents argue that the decision of the administrative law judge was “whimsical,” lacking in any factual basis, and erroneous as a matter of law. Appellants’ Brief, p. 5. More specifically, they contend: (1) the evidentiary record did not provide an adequate basis for the inference that the fall occurred as a result of the claimant’s job duties, increased risk, or any other workplace factor; (2) the trier erred in concluding that the claimant sustained an unexplained, rather than idiopathic, fall; (3) the trier erroneously “allowed the claimant a presumption of compensability when the concept … was rejected by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Clements v. Aramark, 339 Conn. 402 (2021),” id., 6, and is not “permitted by the Workers’ Compensation Act,” id.; (4) the trier’s invocation of the presumption of compensability violated the respondents’ right to due process; and (5) the trier erroneously denied the respondents’ motion to correct. We find none of these claims of error meritorious.
The standard of deference we are obliged to apply to a trier’s findings and legal conclusions is well-settled.
[T]he role of this board on appeal is not to substitute its own findings for those of the trier of fact. Dengler v. Special Attention Health Services, Inc., 62 Conn. App. 440, 451 (2001). The trial commissioner’s role as factfinder encompasses the authority to determine the credibility of the evidence, including the testimony of witnesses and the documents introduced into the record as exhibits. Burse v. American International Airways, Inc., 262 Conn. 31, 37 (2002); Tartaglino v. Dept. of Correction, 55 Conn. App. 190, 195, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 929 (1999). If there is evidence in the record to support the factual findings of the trial commissioner, the findings will be upheld on appeal. Duddy v. Filene’s (May Department Stores Co.), 4484 CRB-7-02-1 (October 23, 2002); Phaiah v. Danielson Curtain (C.C. Industries), 4409 CRB-2-01-6 (June 7, 2002). This board may disturb only those findings that are found without evidence, and may also intervene where material facts that are admitted and undisputed have been omitted from the findings. Burse, supra; Duddy, supra. We will also overturn a trier’s legal conclusions when they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts, or where they are the product of an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from the facts. Burse, supra; Pallotto v. Blakeslee Prestress, Inc., 3651 CRB-3-97-7 (July 17, 1998).
McMahon v. Emsar, Inc., 5049 CRB-4-06-1 (January 16, 2007).
We begin with the respondents’ challenge to the compensability of the claimant’s injury on the basis that the evidentiary record did not demonstrate that the fall occurred as a result of his employment. The respondents contend that the finding of compensability was therefore erroneous because “[t]he claimant did not prove that his fall can proximately be connected to a workplace condition, that a workplace condition substantially contributed to the fall, or that a workplace condition placed the claimant at a greater risk from a fall.” Appellants’ Brief, p. 9.
It is well-settled that the “traditional concepts of proximate cause furnish the appropriate analysis for determining causation in workers’ compensation cases,” Dixon v. United Illuminating Co., 57 Conn. App. 51, 60 (2000), and “the test for determining whether particular conduct is a proximate cause of an injury [is] whether it was a substantial factor in producing the result.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Paternostro v. Arborio Corp., 56 Conn. App. 215, 222 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 928 (2000), quoting Hines v. Davis, 53 Conn. App. 836, 839 (1999). The injury “must be the result of the employment and flow from it as the inducing proximate cause. The rationale mind must be able to trace the resultant personal injury to a proximate cause set in motion by the employment and not by some other agency, or there can be no recovery.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 545-46 (1988), quoting Madden’s Case, 222 Mass. 487, 495 (1916).
In order to establish the requisite causal connection between the employment and the injury, a claimant “must demonstrate that the claimed injury (1) arose out of the employment, and (2) in the course of the employment….” Sapko v. State, 305 Conn. 360, 371 (2012), quoting Daubert v. Naugatuck, 267 Conn. 583, 589 (2004). As such, “[t]here must be a conjunction of the two requirements, ‘in the course of the employment’ and ‘out of the employment’ to permit compensation. The former relates to the time, place and circumstance of the accident, while the latter refers to the origin and cause of the accident.” Stakonis v. United Advertising Corporation, 110 Conn. 384, 389 (1930). “An injury is said to arise out of the employment when (a) it occurs in the course of the employment and (b) is the result of a risk involved in the employment or incident to it or to the conditions under which it is required to be performed.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Clements v. Aramark Corp., supra, 339 Conn. at 411‑12, quoting Labadie v. Norwalk Rehabilitation Services, Inc., 274 Conn. 219, 228 (2005). “An injury arises in the course of the employment when it takes place (a) within the period of the employment, (b) at a place where the employee may reasonably be, and (c) while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties of the employment or doing something incidental to it.” Id.
Although the evidentiary record in the present matter clearly demonstrates that the claimant’s injury occurred during the course of his employment, we recognize that it does not provide a prima facie basis for the inference that his injury arose out of the employment; i.e., that the claimant’s workplace conditions or job duties constituted a substantial contributing factor to the fall or the associated injury. The only explanation for the incident offered by the claimant was that the workspace felt “hot” because the air‑conditioning “had been broken for quite some time” and a thermostat located near his workspace indicated that the temperature inside the facility was eighty‑four degrees Fahrenheit. February 14, 2024 Transcript, p. 15. This theory was called into question by the testimony offered by Lepage, the “overhaul side and repair” manager for the respondent employer, who testified that the facility, including the claimant’s workspace, is climate‑controlled on a year-round basis and, as of the date of the injury, he was not aware of any issues with the maintenance or functioning of the air‑conditioning unit. April 9, 2024 Transcript, p. 13. In addition, Biondo, the quality director for the respondent employer, testified that the coolant into which the claimant dropped the wrench has no odor, does not require the wearing of gloves when handling, and, on the date of injury, had been diluted to the correct concentration per the regular maintenance schedule.
However, the trier’s finding of compensability in the present matter was not predicated on the inference that the claimant’s injury was caused by a specific employment responsibility or workplace condition. Rather, the trier concluded that the claimant experienced an unexplained workplace fall for which the respondents failed to rebut the presumption of compensability as contemplated by Saunders v. New England Collapsible Tube Co., 95 Conn. 40 (1920). In Saunders, our Supreme Court reviewed the superior court’s reversal of a finding and award on behalf of a claimant who was fatally injured in an elevator mishap. The Supreme Court noted that “[n]o testimony was offered … that, at the time of her injuries, the decedent was about to use the elevator in the course of her employment, or that at this time she had occasion to so use the elevator.” Id., 41. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the award, stating:
There is a natural presumption that one charged with the performance of a duty, and found injured at the place where duty may have required him to be, is injured in the course of and as a consequence of the employment. We think it more likely than otherwise that the decedent was doing her duty when injured, and that this is a reasonable inference to draw in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
Id., 43.
The respondents in the present matter have challenged the application of this presumption, arguing inter alia that the trier erroneously concluded that the claimant sustained an unexplained fall. They point out that “[t]he fall the claimant sustained was no different than a fall that could have happened at home” and “[t]he dizziness he felt was an idiopathic condition … [that was] personal in nature to the claimant and not caused by work exposures.” Appellants’ Brief, p. 10. The respondents further contend that “[t]he compensability test for an ‘unexplained fall’ at ground level is the same test as in the setting of an idiopathic fall.” id., 11, and, as such, “utilizing the precedent set forth in Clements, the clamant must point to a workplace factor that was a substantial contributing factor in causing the fall and injuries or placed the claimant at a greater risk of injury.” Id., 10. The respondents also state that “by definition, an unexplained fall is an idiopathic fall. The labeling is a distinction without a difference.” Id., 11. We are not persuaded by any of these contentions, as we believe the respondents’ interpretation of Clements is fundamentally flawed.
In Clements, our Supreme Court reviewed an appeal brought by a claimant challenging the dismissal of her claim for injuries sustained in a fall at her place of employment. The incident occurred just after she had arrived at the employer’s facility while she was walking between buildings on her way to her workstation. The claimant testified that she hit her head on the ground after becoming lightheaded and then fainting. The commissioner found that the claimant had “a history of cardiac disease, hypertension, hyperlipidemia, hypothyroidism, and an irregular heartbeat …” [as well as] “a family history of coronary disease.”[6] Clements v. Aramark Corp., supra, 339 Conn. at 407, quoting August 4, 2015 Finding and Dismissal of Ernie R. Walker, Commissioner for the Second District, Findings, ¶¶ 17, 18, 21. The court, noting that “[a] treating physician … and hospital records [indicated] that the plaintiff’s syncope likely was cardiac or cardiogenic in etiology,” id., agreed with the trier’s conclusion that the claimant had “suffered a syncopal episode at her place of employment, which caused her to lose consciousness, fall backward and strike her head on the ground.” Id., 404-405. Following a lengthy examination of pertinent precedent, the court ultimately held that the injury sustained by the claimant “did not arise out of her employment because the fall was brought on by a personal medical infirmity unrelated to her employment.” Id., 405.
In conducting its analysis, the Clements court revisited inter alia Savage v. St. Aeden’s Church, 122 Conn. 343 (1937), in which it had reviewed an appeal brought by the respondents challenging the compensability of a fatal injury sustained by a decedent found lying on the floor of a recreation room in the basement of the church rectory where he was employed. The Savage court noted that the decedent:
had apparently fallen backward on the concrete floor and fractured his skull. The commissioner found that the proximate cause of his death was the fracture of his skull upon the concrete floor, and that the cause of his fall was unknown, though he also found that on August 9, 1934, he was suffering from a cystolic murmur at the apex of his heart. He further found that the fatal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment.
Savage v. St. Aeden’s Church, supra, 122 Conn. at 345.
The court, commenting that “an injury arising in the course of employment ordinarily is the result of a risk incidental to that employment,” id., 348, affirmed the compensability of the decedent’s injuries. In so doing, it relied on its prior decision in Gonier v. Chase Companies, Inc., 97 Conn. 46 (1921), wherein the court had affirmed a finding of compensability for fatal injuries sustained by “an employee who had been subject to fainting spells [and] was killed as a result of a fall from a staging upon which he was working.” Savage v. St. Aeden’s Church, supra, 122 Conn. at 346. In Gonier, the court had concluded that the claimant’s “employment brought him upon this scaffolding, from which, if he fell, he was in danger of serious injury. The danger of falling and the liability of resulting injury was a risk arising out of the conditions of his employment.” Gonier v. Chase Companies, Inc., supra, 97 Conn. at 54-55.
However, in Savage, the court summarized the Gonier holding as follows:
Compensation was awarded in the Gonier case not because his employment brought him upon a scaffold, a fall from which would expose him to serious injury, but because the possibility of a fall while engaged in his work was one of the hazards of his employment. The decision would have been the same had the fall been, as in the present case, simply to the floor upon which the employee was standing.
Id., 349-50.
In its review of Savage, the Clements court, citing “a misapplication of our prior precedent,” Clements v. Aramark Corp., supra, 339 Conn. at 428, stated that the ostensible rationale for its affirmance of compensability in Savage was:
not for the reason the plaintiff had advanced, that is, because the church’s concrete floor increased the risk of injury from a fall just as the scaffolding had increased that risk in Gonier. Rather, our conclusion in Savage upholding the commissioner’s decision was predicated on our characterization of Gonier as ‘holding that an injury received in the course of the employment does not cease to be one arising out of the employment merely because some infirmity due to disease has originally set in action the final and proximate cause of the injury. The employer of labor takes his [employee] as he finds him and compensation does not depend [on] his freedom from liability to injury through a constitutional weakness or latent tendency.[7]
Id., 430, quoting Savage v. St. Aeden’s Church, supra, 122 Conn. at 346-47.
However, the Clements court clarified that in Gonier, its affirmance of compensability had in fact been predicated on its conclusion “that [the claimant’s] injuries were compensable because his employment required him to work on scaffolding eleven feet off the ground such that, if he were to fall for any reason at all, including an idiopathic one, he faced a significantly increased risk of injury.” Id., 431; see also Gonier v. Chase Cos., supra, 97 Conn. at 52–55. The Clements court stated that “[a]lthough Savage dictated the Appellate Court’s conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation, we now disavow Savage insofar as we determined in that case that injuries resulting from [an idiopathic fall onto a level surface] arise out of the employment as a matter of law.”[8] Id., 410. The Clements court reversed our Appellate Court’s conclusion relative to compensability in that matter given that the holding was predicated on the notion that “injuries sustained by an employee as a result of an idiopathic fall onto a level surface are compensable as a matter of law, as long as the fall occurred in the course of the employment.” Id., 405.
In its analysis, the Clements court examined decisions from other jurisdictions involving unexplained and idiopathic falls and observed that “injuries sustained as a result of an unexplained fall are compensable in the majority of jurisdictions, primarily because of the remedial purpose of workers’ compensation statutes.” Id., 420. The court stated that “[unexplained fall] cases begin with a completely neutral origin of the mishap, while idiopathic fall cases begin with an origin [that] is admittedly personal and [that] therefore requires some affirmative employment contribution to offset the prima facie showing of personal origin.” (Emphasis in the original; footnotes omitted.) Id., 421, quoting 1 L. Larson & T. Robinson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law (2019) § 9.01 [1], pp. 9‑2 through 9‑3.
The court elaborated as follows:
An idiopathic fall is one that is brought on by a purely personal condition unrelated to the employment, such as heart attack or seizure. ... Idiopathic [falls] are generally noncompensable absent evidence the workplace contributed to the severity of the injury. ... The idiopathic fall doctrine is based on the notion that an idiopathic injury does not stem from an accident, but is brought on by a condition particular to the employee that could have manifested itself anywhere. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 420, quoting Barnes v. Charter 1 Realty, 411 S.C. 391, 395–96 (2015).
The court further explained that “the case law generally distinguishes between two types of idiopathic falls, namely, those that result in injuries unrelated to workplace conditions, and those in which workplace conditions contribute to the harm by increasing the risk of resultant injuries.” Id., 421–22.
Thus, under the majority view, if an employee is injured from a fall onto a level floor caused by a personal medical infirmity unrelated to the employment, and the conditions of that employment did not increase the risk or severity of the injuries, so that the fall would have occurred in the same manner and with a similar result if it had occurred outside of the employment, the causal relationship between the employment and the injury is insufficient to support a finding that the latter arose out of the former. In other words, in such circumstances, although the floor is a but for cause of the employee’s injuries, it is not a proximate cause of those injuries. (Emphasis in the original.)
Id., 425–26.
In light of the distinction between unexplained and idiopathic falls drawn by the Clements court, we reject the respondents’ premise that there is no salient difference between the two classifications. Moreover, in the present matter, the evidentiary record demonstrates, and the administrative law judge so found, that the claimant repeatedly informed his medical providers that he had no history of fainting spells or seizures and he was unaware of any physical condition which might have caused the fall. At trial, he testified that he did not know what had caused him to fall, denied that he was feeling unwell just prior to the incident, and stated that he did not become dizzy until he bent down to retrieve the wrench from the container of coolant. In addition, Hyjek, a maintenance worker for the respondent employer, corroborated in part the claimant’s recollection of events through his testimony that he witnessed the claimant fall straight backwards from a standing position onto the concrete floor in front of his machine.
Our review of the record similarly indicates that the medical reports fail to provide an explanation for the claimant’s fall. The narrative history prepared by the ambulance technician reports that the claimant told the paramedics he did not know why he fell and he denied experiencing any symptoms or health conditions which might have caused the accident. See Claimant’s Exhibit C. The emergency department notes repeatedly state that the claimant was not able to explain why he had suddenly felt unwell or why he had fallen. See Claimant’s Exhibit D, pp. 7, 9, 23, 33, 49; see also Respondents’ Exhibit 2, pp. 38, 44, 62. In addition, although the reports provided by Hasbani, the claimant’s treating neurologist, repeatedly reference the workplace incident, they also fail to provide an explanation for why the fall occurred.
Thus, while we recognize that the respondents would have preferred that the trier determine that the momentary dizziness experienced by the claimant just prior to the incident was idiopathic in origin, it was well within his discretion to conclude that the evidentiary record did not provide a basis for such an inference. “[I]t is … immaterial that the facts permit the drawing of diverse inferences. The [trier] alone is charged with the duty of initially selecting the inference which seems most reasonable and his choice, if otherwise sustainable, may not be disturbed by a reviewing court.” Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 540 (1988), quoting Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280, 287 (1935).
The respondents also contend that “[t]here is no presumption of compensability simply because the claimant was at work. If so, the presumption is rebuttable, although again, such a presumption is not permitted per Clements.” Appellants’ Brief, p. 11. As such, they argue that the trier “allowed an impermissible presumption of compensability and in essence created a new statutory scheme.” Id., 13. We are not persuaded.
We note at the outset that relatively early in its analysis, the Clements court stated:
Consistent with the liberality with which the act is to be construed, this court held more than one century ago, in Saunders, that, when an employee is injured at a place where her duties required her to be, or where she might properly have been while performing those duties, there is a presumption, albeit a rebuttable one, that the injury occurred during the course of her employment and arose out of it. (Footnote omitted.)
Clements v. Aramark Corp., supra, 339 Conn. at 417.
The court explained that “the presumption is one resting on common experience and inherent probability [that] as such ceases to have force when countervailing evidence is produced, although the facts [that] gave rise to it remain in the case.” Id., 418, quoting Labbe v. American Brass Co., 132 Conn. 606, 611–12 (1946). The court also observed, in its prelude to an examination of relevant case law from other jurisdictions, that it was “not alone in applying such a presumption [of compensability] in cases involving injuries from unexplained causes and, in particular, injuries from unexplained falls.” Id., 419.
In its review of Connecticut precedent, the Clements court referenced Reeves v. John A. Dady Corp., 95 Conn. 627 (1921), wherein it had affirmed the denial of benefits to the widow of a decedent who sustained fatal injuries at his workplace after he fainted and fell out of a second‑story window. The court noted that in Reeves, it had determined that the presumption of compensability was rebutted by the commissioner’s findings “that the decedent had not proceeded to the doorway for any work-related reason and that his idiopathic fall was not otherwise brought about by his employment.” Clements v. Aramark Corp., supra, 339 Conn. at 418. The court also observed that in Reeves, it had stated:
If there were no direct evidence of the cause of his injury and death, it might be inferred that he went there for some purpose connected with his employment. Saunders v. New England Collapsible Tube Co., 95 Conn. 40. On this record, however, that inference is rebutted by the uncontested finding that he went to the doorway for a purpose not connected with his employment, and that he fell through it because he fainted away while standing there. It is also found that his faintness was not due to any conditions connected with his employment and not due to any disability which he brought to his employment.
Reeves v. John A. Dady Corp., supra, 95 Conn. at 629.
In a footnote to this reference, the Clements court remarked that the Reeves court had:
concluded that the employee’s widow was not entitled to compensation because the evidence established that the employee had no legitimate work related reason to be standing in the second floor doorway when he fainted and fell. … For present purposes, we need not express a view as to the merits of that determination; rather, we cite Reeves merely as an example of the applicability of the rebuttable presumption that we recognized in Saunders. (Internal citation omitted.)
Clements v. Aramark Corp., supra, 339 Conn. at 419 n.11.
The Clements court also referenced a prior decision by our Appellate Court affirming the denial of benefits to the widow of a decedent whose body was discovered at the foot of a cliff on the employer’s premises where he had fallen after consuming a considerable quantity of cream ale. In Allen v. Northeast Utilities, 6 Conn. App. 498, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 810 (1986), our Appellate Court stated:
The import of [the rebuttable presumption recognized by] Saunders and its progeny leads to the conclusion that without evidence to the contrary, the fact that [an employee] is found deceased at his or her place of employment will support a finding that the injury arose out of and was a consequence of the employment. ... The ... burden [of the plaintiff, the decedent’s widow] was to establish by competent evidence that the death for which compensation was sought arose out of and in the course of the employment. ... Although she may have received the benefit of the presumption, the facts introduced by [the decedent’s employer] provide[d] sufficient evidence from which the trier could reasonably conclude that the [employer] satisfied its burden of proving the contrary, and we will not override the commissioner in deciding that factual issue. (Citations omitted.)
Allen v. Northeast Utilities, supra, 6 Conn. App. at 502-503.
Finally, in its review of Savage v. St. Aeden’s Church, 122 Conn. 343 (1937), the Clements court noted that “the plaintiff argued that the commissioner reasonably could have concluded that [the decedent] ‘lost his balance putting on overalls’ for no discernible reason and, therefore, that the presumption of compensability recognized in Saunders v. New England Collapsible Tube Co., supra, 95 Conn. 40, should apply.” Clements v. Aramark Corp., supra, 339 Conn. at 429, quoting Savage v. St. Aeden’s Church, Conn. Supreme Court Records & Briefs, December Term, 1936, Pt. 2, Plaintiff’s Brief p. 179 (“[i]t is submitted that a presumption arose in favor of the claimant after the presentation of her case, which became conclusive when [the defendant] rested without offering evidence [to rebut it]”). The Clements court observed:
In Savage, however, the commissioner rejected the employer’s contention that Savage’s fall was caused by an idiopathic condition, finding instead that the cause was unknown and, therefore, that the injuries were compensable because the employer had not rebutted the presumption, established by this court in Saunders v. New England Collapsible Tube Co., supra, 95 Conn. 40, that Savage’s injuries arose out of his employment. … So long as the record fairly supported the commissioner’s finding, which it clearly did, that finding was unassailable on appeal. (Emphasis in the original.)
Clements v. Aramark Corp., supra, 339 Conn. at 432-33.
The Clements court also explained that in Savage, it had “reasoned that it was immaterial whether the cause of Savage’s fall was unknown – which, as the commissioner properly found, made his injuries compensable under Saunders – or the result of a heart attack, which, we concluded, also gave rise to a compensable injury.” Id., 433.
As the foregoing recitation indicates, the Clements court made repeated references to Saunders and the presumption of compensability in its analysis and at no point did the court appear to question the continuing viability of the doctrine. As such, although we agree with the respondents that the Clements court did reject the concept “that injuries sustained as a result of an idiopathic fall to a level floor are per se compensable if they occur in the course of employment,” (emphasis added) id., 449, we find no merit in the defendants’ overly expansive assertion that “there is not a presumption of compensability for an unexplained fall on ground level. To allow such a presumption, would … obviate the arising out of test that is necessary to establish a case of compensability.”[9] Appellants’ Brief, p. 11.
Having established, contrary to the respondents’ representations, the continuing viability of the Saunders presumption of compensability, we turn next to the inquiry into whether the findings of the administrative law judge provided a reasonable basis for his conclusion that the injury sustained by the claimant in the unexplained fall was compensable because the respondents failed to successfully rebut the presumption. We note at the outset that the testimony offered by claimant was found credible by the trier, and it is not within our purview to reverse that determination, given that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is “uniquely and exclusively the province of the trial commissioner.” Smith v. Salamander Designs, Ltd, 5205 CRB‑1‑07-3 (March 13, 2008), citing Berube v. Tim’s Painting, 5068 CRB‑3‑06‑3 (March 13, 2007).
In addition, as discussed previously herein, the medical reports submitted into evidence similarly fail to demonstrate that the claimant’s fall was caused by a medical condition. In light of the totality of the evidence, the administrative law judge attributed the claimant’s injury to an unexplained fall for which the respondents failed to successfully rebut the presumption of compensability. We believe this determination was well within his discretion and is not subject to reversal by this board. “As with any discretionary action of the trial court, appellate review requires every reasonable presumption in favor of the action, and the ultimate issue for us is whether the trial court could have reasonably concluded as it did.” Biro v. Hill, 231 Conn. 462, 465 (1994).
Moreover, given that the record demonstrates that neither the claimant nor the respondents’ witnesses were able to offer an explanation for the fall, and the medical reports are similarly devoid of same, we find the present matter is factually distinguishable from Reeves, Allen, and Clements, in which the presumption of compensability was successfully rebutted.[10] As such, we find no error in the trier’s conclusion that the injuries sustained by the claimant as a result of an unexplained workplace fall arose out of and in the course of the employment in light of the respondents’ failure to rebut the presumption of compensability.
“The question of [whether the employment proximately caused the injury] ... belongs to the trier of fact because causation is essentially a factual issue. ... It becomes a conclusion of law only when the mind of a fair and reasonable [person] could reach only one conclusion; if there is room for a reasonable disagreement the question is one to be determined by the trier as a matter of fact.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) [Sapko v. State, 305 Conn. 360, 373 (2012), quoting Stewart v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 234 Conn. 597, 611 (1995).] “If supported by evidence and not inconsistent with the law, the ... [c]ommissioner’s inference that an injury did or did not arise out of and in the course of employment is conclusive. No reviewing court can then set aside that inference because the opposite one is thought to be more reasonable; nor can the opposite inference be substituted by the court because of a belief that the one chosen by the ... [c]ommissioner is factually questionable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) [Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, supra, 207 Conn. at 539–40, quoting Del Vecchio v. Bowers, supra, 296 U.S. at 287.]
Clements v. Aramark Corp., supra, 339 Conn. at 433.
The respondents have also asserted, somewhat inexplicably, that the decision in this matter violated their right to due process because the trier’s application of the presumption of compensability required them “to defend a claim without notice and opportunity to address a specific allegation of what workplace factor caused the claimant’s fall.” Appellants’ Brief, pp. 6‑7. The respondents contend that “[i]n allowing the claimant a presumption of compensability where none is allowed, the judge placed an unpermitted and significant burden on the respondents to defend a claim that was asserted without any specific allegation that would on its face satisfy proximate cause.” Appellants’ Brief, p. 12. The respondents argue that the trier therefore violated the respondents’ due process rights because the decision failed to “provide … fair notice of what is alleged to be work‑related and in essence changed the statutory scheme post the date of loss.” Id. We disagree.
It is axiomatic that:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. … The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information … and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance …. But if, with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case, these conditions are reasonably met, the constitutional requirements are satisfied. (Internal citations omitted.)
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1950).
In light of this summation, we are unable to discern a basis, either in fact or in law, for this claim of error. This is particularly so given that our review of the record indicates that respondents’ counsel, at formal proceedings held on April 9, 2024, made the following statement:
It remains our position that the claimant has not sustained his burden of proof and established a prima facie case. Counsel maintains that it’s a presumption of compensability. I disagree with that position based on Clements; however, if the court were to disagree with me, I’d say it’s a [rebuttable] presumption. So I have two witnesses to address any or some of the potential presumptions that may be raised in a proposed finding or brief based on the claimant’s testimony when he was here last time.
April 9, 2024 Transcript, pp. 4-5.
In light of these remarks by counsel, it may be reasonably inferred that the administrative law judge and the litigants were well aware that the applicability of the presumption of compensability was in dispute. Moreover, as we have previously discussed, at no point in Clements, to which the respondents liberally cited in their brief, did the court state or imply that the presumption was no longer viable. On the contrary, the court’s assessment of the merits of the challenges to compensability for both the Clements claimant and the claimants in the other cases it reviewed clearly implicated the presumption and the degree to which the court considered the respondents’ efforts to rebut the presumption to have been successful.
As the respondents accurately point out, it is well‑established that a claimant in a workers’ compensation claim generally “bears the burden of proof, not only with respect to whether an injury was causally connected to the workplace, but that such proof must be established by competent evidence.” (Emphasis in the original.) Dengler v. Special Attention Health Services, Inc., 62 Conn. App 440, 447 (2001), quoting Keenan v. Union Camp Corp., 49 Conn. App. 280, 282 (1998). “‘Competent evidence’ does not mean any evidence at all. It means evidence on which the trier properly can rely and from which it may draw reasonable inferences.” Id., 451. We recognize that the successful invocation of the presumption of compensability essentially affords an injured claimant the opportunity to prevail in the absence of such proof. Nevertheless, in light of the trier’s decision to apply the rebuttable presumption, which our Supreme Court has deemed “equivalent to prima facie proof of a fact,” Fish v. Fish, 285 Conn. 24, 46 n.21 (2008), quoting Schult v. Schult, 40 Conn. App. 675, 684 (1996), aff’d, 241 Conn. 767 (1997), the claimant, by operation of law, was relieved of the burden of proving “that a workplace condition substantially contributed to the fall, or that a workplace condition placed the claimant at a greater risk from a fall.” Appellants’ Brief, p. 9. Given that we find no merit in the respondents’ assertions that the presumption is no longer viable or that the administrative law judge erroneously applied the presumption to the factual circumstances in the present matter, we affirm the administrative law judge’s decision that the claimant sustained a compensable injury arising out of and in the course of his employment as contemplated by § 31‑275 (1).[11]
There is no error; the June 18, 2024 Finding and Award of Daniel E. Dilzer, Administrative Law Judge acting for the Sixth District, is accordingly affirmed.
Administrative Law Judges David W. Schoolcraft and Shanique D. Fenlator concur in this Opinion.
[1] In correspondence to the compensation review board dated July 18, 2024, Attorney Weber indicated that the employer was fully adopting Attorney Ancona’s brief on behalf of both the employer and the insurer and would not be filing a separate brief.
[2] In correspondence to the compensation review board dated September 12, 2024, Attorney Sheppard indicated that the fund was relying on and adopting the positions taken by the respondent employer and would not be submitting a brief or participating in oral argument.
[3] We note that one motion for extension of time was granted during the pendency of this appeal.
[4] General Statutes § 31-275 (1) provides in relevant part: “‘Arising out of and in the course of his employment’ means an accidental injury happening to an employee or an occupational disease of an employee originating while the employee has been engaged in the line of the employee’s duty in the business or affairs of the employer upon the employer’s premises, or while engaged elsewhere upon the employer’s business or affairs by the direction, express or implied, of the employer ....”
[5] “A rebuttable presumption is equivalent to prima facie proof of a fact and can be rebutted only by the opposing party’s production of sufficient and persuasive contradictory evidence that disproves the fact that is the subject of the presumption. ... A presumption requires that a particular fact be deemed true until such time as the proponent of the invalidity of the fact has, by the particular quantum of proof required by the case, shown by sufficient contradictory evidence, that the presumption has been rebutted.” (Citation omitted.) Fish v. Fish, 285 Conn. 24, 46 n.21 (2008), quoting Schult v. Schult, 40 Conn. App. 675, 684 (1996), aff’d, 241 Conn. 767 (1997).
[6] Effective October 21, 2021, the Connecticut legislature directed that the phrase “administrative law judge” be substituted when referencing a workers’ compensation commissioner. See Public Acts 2021, No. 18, § 1.
[7] The Clements court also stated that in Savage v. St. Aeden’s Church, 122 Conn. 343 (1937), it had “misapplied” its prior reasoning in Hartz v. Hartford Faience Co., 90 Conn. 539 (1916), wherein the court had held that “injuries from whatever derivation do not arise out of the employment merely because they occur in the course of it; they arise out of the employment, rather, only if the circumstances or requirements attendant to the employment, acting on the condition of the employee, proximately cause the injuries.” Clements v. Aramark Corp., 339 Conn. 402, 433 (2021). The Clements court noted that in Hartz, the court had held: “Whatever predisposing physical condition may exist, if the employment is the immediate occasion of the injury, it arises out of the employment because it develops within it.” Hartz v. Hartford Faience Co., supra, 90 Conn. at 543. The Clements court explained that “[i]n Savage, however, the court omitted the next several sentences from this court’s decision in Hartz, in which we made clear that the term ‘occasion of the injury’ means the cause of the injury, not merely the time or place of the injury.” (Emphasis in the original.) Clements v. Aramark Corp., supra, 339 Conn. at 435; see also Hartz v. Hartford Faience Co., supra, 90 Conn. at 543-44. (“When the exertion of the employment acts upon the weakened condition of the body of the employee, or upon an employee predisposed to suffer injury in such way that a personal injury results, the injury must be said to arise out of the employment. An employee may be suffering from heart disease, aneurism, hernia, as was Mr. Hartz, or other ailment, and the exertion of the employment may develop his condition in such a manner that it becomes a personal injury.”)
[8] The Clements court further remarked that “although we remain confident that we reached the right result in Savage [v. St. Aeden’s Church, 122 Conn. 343 (1937)], we now conclude that we did so on the basis of reasoning that was not necessary to the proper outcome of the case. Moreover, the rationale underlying our decision in Savage, which was predicated on a misapplication of our prior precedent, is out of step with modern day workers’ compensation jurisprudence relating to injuries stemming from idiopathic causes.” Clements v. Aramark Corp., 339 Conn. 402, 428 (2021).
[9] In making this assertion, the respondents appear to be referring to the Clements court’s remark that, “were we to follow our reasoning in Savage and to conclude that injuries sustained as a result of an idiopathic fall to a level floor are per se compensable if they occur in the course of employment, we would virtually be eliminating, for such cases, the arising out of prong of the test.” (Emphasis added.) Clements v. Aramark Corp., 339 Conn. 402, 449 (2021).
[10] We also note that the present matter is factually distinguishable from Post v. Raytheon Technologies/Pratt & Whitney, 6524 CRB-8-23-12 (September 6, 2024), appeal pending, A.C. 48047 (September 23, 2024), in which this board affirmed the dismissal of a claim for injuries sustained in a workplace fall by a claimant who suffered from a chronic footdrop condition which was unrelated to her employment. In view of a medical opinion, deemed credible by the administrative law judge, allowing for the reasonable inference that the claimant’s fall was idiopathic in origin, we affirmed the trier’s conclusion that the respondents had successfully rebutted the presumption of compensability.
[11] The respondents have claimed that the administrative law judge’s denial of their motion to correct also constituted error. Our review of the proposed corrections indicates that the respondents were merely reiterating arguments made at trial which ultimately proved unavailing. As such, we find no error in the trier’s decision to deny the respondents’ motion to correct. See D’Amico v. Dept. of Correction, 73 Conn. App. 718, 728 (2002), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 933 (2003).