CRB OPINION
CASE NO. 6540 CRB-5-24-4
CLAIM NO. 300124808
COMPENSATION REVIEW BOARD
WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
JULY 2, 2025
VINCENT W. QUINN
CLAIMANT-APPELLANT
v.
REA MAGNET WIRE COMPANY, INC.
EMPLOYER
and
SENTRY INSURANCE A MUTUAL COMPANY
INSURER
RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES
APPEARANCES:
The claimant was represented by Jon D. Berman, Esq., Berman & Russo, 819 Clark Street, South Windsor, CT 06074.
The respondents were represented by Maribeth M. McGloin, Esq., Strunk Dodge Aiken Zovas, L.L.C., 200 Corporate Place Suite 100, Rocky Hill, CT 06067. At the time of oral argument, Attorney McGloin was with Williams Law Firm, L.L.C.
This Petition for Review from the March 4, 2024 Finding and Dismissal and the April 1, 2024 Motion for Articulation of William J. Watson III, Administrative Law Judge acting for the First District, was heard September 27, 2024 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of Chief Administrative Law Judge Stephen M. Morelli and Administrative Law Judges David W. Schoolcraft and Soline M. Oslena.[1]
OPINION
STEPHEN M. MORELLI, CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE. The claimant has appealed from a March 4, 2024 Finding and Dismissal (finding) in which Administrative Law Judge William W. Watson III concluded that, although the claimant experienced a temporary ischemic event as a result of work stress, he did not sustain a work-related physical injury or a compensable mental injury on December 5, 2019. The claimant argued that the medical evidence he presented established that he had sustained a physical injury to his heart as a result of a stressful event at work; the remedial intervention of inserting a stent was compensable; and that his subsequent mental disability was a compensable sequalae to this event. The respondents argued that the medical evidence did not establish that the claimant sustained a physical injury as a result of stress at work and, in the absence of a physical injury, our statutes do not allow an award for a mental disability.
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the administrative law judge could have reasonably found that the claimant’s employment did not result in a physical injury and that the stent procedure was due to cardiac conditions unrelated to the claimant’s employment. Therefore, we affirm the administrative law judge’s Finding and Dismissal where he found that neither the claimant’s stent procedure nor his mental condition were compensable.
The administrative law judge set forth three principal issues for consideration: First, was the claimant’s ischemic event on December 5, 2019, a compensable physical injury that arose out of and in the course of employment? Second, if the claimant’s cardiac condition on December 5, 2019, was a compensable physical injury, was it a significant contributing factor in his need for a stent procedure? Third, was the claim for psychiatric injuries a compensable sequalae of a physical injury? See Issues from March 4, 2024 Finding and Dismissal.
The administrative law judge reached the following factual findings which are relevant to the aforementioned three issues. The claimant worked for the respondent from 1999 to 2019 operating a taping machine that put insulating tape on electromagnetic wire. See Findings, ¶ 2. He was responsible for setting and adjusting the speed of the machines. See Findings, ¶ 3. The respondent’s plant manager, Joseph DePaola, testified that it had been determined that the plant needed to increase production and that the taping machines were being operated at a slower pace than their capacities. See Findings, ¶ 4. After DePaola became plant manager in July of 2019, a review by a consultant established a new standard wherein the machines would be run at 1800 rpm (revolutions per minute). DePaola testified the claimant was present at meetings to discuss the new protocol. See Findings, ¶ 5. Additionally, a key lock was installed which required the supervisor to be notified if the operator wished to operate the machines at a slower pace. See Findings, ¶ 6. DePaola testified that the average speed at which the claimant had been operating his machines was between 400-800 rpm and he was upset when he was directed to increase that speed. See Findings, ¶ 7. DePaola also testified that the machines could be safely run at 1800 rpm and would shut off if the tape broke, the wire had a burr, or if it ran out of wire. See Findings, ¶ 8.
The claimant was advised on October 16, 2019, that he was not running his machines at the standard speed of 1800 rpm. His supervisor, Seth Sharp, gave him a document entitled “Verbal Warning” that directed him to increase his speed. Findings, ¶ 9. The document warned the claimant that further violations could lead to termination of employment. Sharp testified that, when the claimant saw this document, he was very upset and fell down on the floor. On December 5, 2019, the claimant arrived at work and took a picture of the control panel on his machines, which included the key lock, to send to his union representative. Later that morning, Sharp and another supervisor viewed the claimant’s machines, noticed it was not running at the prescribed 1800 rpm speed, and instructed the claimant to increase its speed. The claimant, however, was unwilling to comply with that instruction. See Findings, ¶ 11.
The claimant testified at the hearing that, during the discussion with Sharp, he indicated he believed he would be injured running the machines at the prescribed speed. He also stated his belief that, were he to refuse the order, he would be let go. See Findings, ¶ 12. He also testified that he began to have chest pain during his discussion with Sharp and that he told Sharp he did not feel well and had to see a doctor. He clocked out from work and had his adult children take him to the office of his treating cardiologist, Christopher Loscalzo. See Findings, ¶ 13. While at Loscalzo’s office, the claimant underwent an EKG. The claimant testified that he was told he was having a heart attack and began fearing for his life. He was given nitroglycerin and transported to Yale-New Haven Hospital Emergency Department and subsequently admitted. The claimant testified that Loscalzo later told him he did not have a heart attack. See March 9, 2023 Transcript, p. 57.
Loscalzo testified at a deposition regarding the circumstances of the claimant’s hospitalization. See Findings, ¶ 14. He stated that he was at another office when the claimant arrived at his Guilford office on December 5, 2019. He reviewed his records and stated the claimant presented with discomfort in his chest and left arm and, after an EKG showed abnormalities, the claimant was brought to the emergency room and was ultimately admitted to the hospital. While at Yale-New Haven, the claimant went to a catheterization lab and had an angiogram due to his complaints. The claimant was found to have a 60 to 70 percent stenosis of his left anterior descending artery and, as this was deemed enough to limit blood flow, a stent was placed in this artery. See Claimant’s Exhibit A, p. 32. Loscalzo opined that the claimant’s chest discomfort on December 5, 2019, was due to ischemic changes caused by emotional stress, which raised his heart rate and caused increased demand for blood flow and which, when combined with the arterial narrowing, could result in inadequate blood flow and chest discomfort. See Findings, ¶ 15. At his deposition, Loscalzo clarified that he believed the claimant was under emotional stress on December 5, 2019, which led to the symptoms that caused him to be evaluated at the hospital. Loscalzo could not state with any certainty, however, that the emotional stress caused additional narrowing of the artery.[2] Loscalzo also confirmed the claimant did not have a stroke or heart attack. See Findings, ¶ 16.[3] Based on an evaluation of the claimant’s troponin levels, Loscalzo opined that on the day of the incident, the claimant did not sustain any damage to his heart muscle. As a result, Loscalzo opined that the ischemic episode did not cause physical or permanent injury to the claimant’s heart. He also testified that the stent procedure was neither a surgery nor a physical injury. See Claimant’s Exhibit A, p. 77.
Both parties presented evidence from expert witnesses regarding the December 5, 2019 incident. The claimant’s expert, Sunil Rao, a North Carolina cardiologist, who never treated the claimant, but was engaged to review the available records, testified at a deposition that the claimant presented on the day of the ischemic event with coronary artery disease. See Findings, ¶ 17. He testified that the 60-70 percent narrowing of the left anterior descending artery was significant and that this blockage was reducing blood flow and was the reason the claimant experienced angina and chest pain when his heart rate was elevated. See Findings, ¶ 18. Based on the claimant’s troponin levels on December 5, 2019, Rao opined that the claimant did not have a heart attack on that date and that the decision to place the stent in the claimant’s artery was due to the restricted blood flow in the constricted artery. Rao further testified that, in his opinion, the claimant did not sustain any permanent damage to his heart as a result of the symptoms he experienced on December 5, 2019. See Findings, ¶ 19. Instead, Rao testified that the narrowing of the blood vessel was due to cholesterol plaque. See Findings, ¶ 20. Rao was unable to opine on whether the claimant’s blockage occurred on December 5, 2019, or if it was pre-existing. Rao also did not offer an opinion regarding whether the claimant’s employment was a substantial contributing factor to his need for treatment on December 5, 2019. See Findings, ¶ 17.
The respondents presented opinions from Martin Krauthamer, a cardiologist who performed a records review. At his deposition, Krauthamer discussed the events of December 5, 2019, and opined that the electrocardiogram performed in Loscalzo’s office revealed the claimant’s heart muscle was not getting enough oxygen and additional follow-up was necessary. See Findings, ¶ 21. Krauthamer stated if the claimant felt he was under stress, this would raise his heart rate and his blood pressure, and the heart would need to work harder, thereby requiring more oxygen. This situation, when coupled with the narrowed artery, could create a situation in which a piece of the heart muscle downstream may not have been getting enough oxygen. See Findings, ¶ 22. Krauthamer further testified, though, that the narrowing of the artery was due to atherosclerotic coronary artery disease resulting from plaque buildup, which predated the December 5, 2019 episode. See Findings, ¶ 23. He also opined that the claimant’s need for a stent was due to the preexisting arterial narrowing. See Findings, ¶ 26.[4]
As to the impact of emotional stress on the claimant’s heart on December 5, 2019, Krauthamer opined it could have been a substantial contributing factor to the symptoms the claimant experienced. See Findings, ¶ 24. He explained the lack of blood to the heart muscle was ischemia, which caused chest pain and a change on a cardiogram. Krauthamer stated this episode was transient and that, based on his troponin levels, the claimant did not experience a heart attack, or suffer any heart muscle damage. Krauthamer, therefore, testified the claimant did not sustain a physical injury on December 5, 2019. See Findings, ¶ 25.
Based on this record, the administrative law judge found that the claimant’s testimony as to the events of December 5, 2019, was credible and that stress was a substantial contributing factor for the initial evaluation and testing after that incident. The administrative law judge did not find the opinions of the experts supported a finding that work-related stress was a substantial contributing factor for the claimant’s need for a stent. The administrative law judge concluded that all the experts, including Rao, opined that the claimant sustained no physical damage to his heart on December 5, 2019. He also concluded that Rao did not offer a persuasive opinion that the need for the stent procedure was the result of the transient symptoms. The administrative law judge concluded the claimant had not met his burden of establishing he sustained a physical personal injury that arose in and out of the course of his employment on December 5, 2019. He also did not find that the stent procedure was compensable. In the absence of a compensable physical injury, the claimant also did not meet the legal standard necessary to establish that his psychiatric condition was compensable.[5]
The claimant filed three post judgment motions. A motion for reconsideration sought to have the administrative law judge determine the claimant sustained compensable injuries based on the terms of General Statutes § 31-275 (16) (A)[6] and the precedent in Driscoll v. General Nutrition Corp., 252 Conn. 215 (2000) and Doe v. Stamford, 241 Conn. 692 (1997). A motion for articulation focused on having the administrative law judge expound upon his reasoning for finding the claimant credible as to suffering ischemia, but determining the impact of this ischemia was not a compensable physical injury. Finally, a motion to correct was filed seeking wholesale changes to the finding, including the addition of the claim for mental injuries as a result of a work‑related injury and an award of benefits for both physical injuries and depression as a sequela of said injuries. All three motions were denied in their entirety. The claimant then pursued this appeal.
On appeal, we generally extend deference to the decisions made by the administrative law judge. “As with any discretionary action of the trial court, appellate review requires every reasonable presumption in favor of the action, and the ultimate issue for us is whether the trial court could have reasonably concluded as it did.” Daniels v. Alander, 268 Conn. 320, 330 (2004), quoting Burton v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1, 54 (2003). The Compensation Review Board cannot retry the facts of the case and may only overturn the findings of the administrative law judge if they are without evidentiary support, contrary to the law, or based on unreasonable or impermissible factual inferences. See Kish v. Nursing and Home Care, Inc., 248 Conn. 379, 384 (1999) and Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 539 (1988).
The central question in this appeal is whether conclusion H, wherein the administrative law judge determined that “the Claimant has not met his burden of proof that he suffered a physical personal injury with respect to his heart that arose out of or in the scope of his employment with the Respondent on December 5, 2019” is reasonable in light of the legal precedent governing this issue and the medical evidence on the record. (Emphasis in original.) This tribunal has previously addressed a similar question in Biasetti v. Stamford, 5320 CRB-7-08-2 (February 19, 2009), aff’d, 123 Conn. App. 372 (2010), cert. denied, 298 Conn. 929 (2010).
In Biasetti, the claimant was a police officer who injured his knee when he tripped over a guardrail during a gun battle with an assailant. He subsequently alleged that he suffered from post‑traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) due to that injury. The claimant in Biasetti argued that his PTSD claim was similar to the injury deemed compensable in Driscoll, supra. The claimant in Driscoll, however, was physically assaulted, while Biasetti’s PTSD was caused by the stress of the event and not by his knee injury. The finder of fact concluded that the claimant’s knee injury was not the cause of his PTSD and dismissed his claim. That decision was ultimately affirmed by our Appellate Court. See Biasetti v. Stamford, 123 Conn. App. 372, 378-80 (2010).[7]
In the present case, the administrative law judge found that the claimant had not sustained any physical injury on December 5, 2019. He also determined that the claimant’s alleged mental condition was not the sequela of a physical injury. These facts, if supported by the record, would clearly distinguish this case from Driscoll, as well as many other cases cited by the claimant, in which the claimant was physically injured. See David v. Beloff Billiards, 4843 CRB-4-04-8 (August 15, 2005) and Bilsky v. Ansonia Copper & Brass, 4703 CRB-5-03-8 (August 23, 2004).
We have reviewed the medical evidence as set forth above that was credited by the administrative law judge and find that it supports his conclusion that the cardiac episode the claimant experienced on December 5, 2019, did not result in a physical injury. See Conclusion, ¶ H.
The claimant argued that this conclusion was not consistent with the weight of the evidence and that the ischemic episode he sustained was sufficient to constitute a physical injury. It is clear that, after the dispute with his supervisors over his work performance, the claimant experienced anxiety and chest pain and this appears to have created transitory ischemia and cardiac discomfort. We have not been presented with any compelling precedent that stress induced pain of this nature is, as a matter of law, a “physical injury.” The claimant cited our precedent in Sullo v. State/Judicial Branch, 4796 CRB-1-04-3, 4831 CRB-1-04-7, 4978 CRB-1-05-7 (September 8, 2006), to our attention and argues that it mandates reversing the finding in this case. Upon review of Sullo, we are not persuaded.
In Sullo, the trier of fact accepted the position of the treating physician that the claimant’s emotional stress at work caused “the worsening and exacerbation of his heart disease” and caused “higher blood pressure and adrenaline levels” which resulted in a physical injury to his heart muscle. Id. In the present case, the administrative law judge credited evidence that the events of December 5, 2019, did not cause any physical damage to the claimant’s heart and did not cause a myocardial infarction. (Emphasis added.) See Claimant’s Exhibit I, pp. 31-32; see also Respondent’s Exhibit 4, pp. 32, 34. We note that in Chesler v. Derby, 96 Conn. App. 207 (2006), cert. denied, 280 Conn. 909 (2006), the claimant sustained a fatal heart attack after a stressful meeting at work. While the respondents argued that the claimant had not sustained a physical injury that caused his demise, the Appellate Court concluded “[a] fatal heart attack is most definitely a physical impairment” and affirmed the trier’s finding of compensability. Id., 213. In their decision, the Appellate Court affirmed this tribunal’s analysis in Chesler v. Derby, 4823 CRB-4-04-6 (July 15, 2005), where we pointed out “[o]ur Supreme Court has also spoken on this issue, and has acknowledged that a categorical line has been drawn between cases in which mental stressors give rise to a distinct physical injury ‘such as a heart attack or stroke,’ and cases in which a mental ailment produces somatic symptoms that are merely a manifestation of stress. Biasetti v. Stamford, 250 Conn. 65, 79 (1999).” Id. “The fatal heart attack was a physical injury, and the plain language of clause (iii)[8] does not preclude recovery for stress related physical injuries.” Chesler v. Derby, 96 Conn. App. 207, 216 (2006), cert. denied, 280 Conn. 909 (2006). In the absence of evidence that the claimant herein sustained the same type of injury as we found compensable in Sullo and Chesler, we are unwilling to extend our precedent to cover cardiac episodes that do not result in similar physical injury.
As the administrative law judge did not find the claimant’s cardiac episode of December 5, 2019, was a physical injury, we find no error in the determination that the stent procedure performed on that date was not compensable. There was sufficient evidence in the record to support that finding. We have extensively reviewed the substance of Loscalzo and Krauthamer’s testimony and conclude that Conclusions E and I are supported by medical evidence in the record.[9] It was reasonable to find that the proximate cause of the stent was the narrowing of the claimant’s artery due to preexisting coronary artery disease.
We turn to the claim for mental injuries as a sequalae to a physical injury. As noted previously, the administrative law judge determined the claimant had not sustained a physical injury. In the absence of a physical injury, our statute does not allow mental injuries to be compensable. While the claimant disputes the conclusion that he did not sustain such a physical injury, we have long held that if “this board is able to ascertain a reasonable diagnostic method behind the challenged medical opinion, we must honor the trier’s discretion to credit that opinion above a conflicting diagnosis.” Strong v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 4563 CRB-1-02-8 (August 25, 2003). As we find the administrative law judge could reasonably rely upon expert opinions in the record for his conclusions, we must respect those conclusions.
Notwithstanding that black-letter standard in the law, the claimant argues that various precedents make it clear that, on policy grounds, this case represents what should be deemed a compensable injury. Having reviewed these cases, we find all can be distinguished on the law or on the facts and, therefore, we find them unpersuasive on this issue. The claimant’s reliance on Doe, supra, is misplaced. That case involved a situation in which a police officer was exposed to HIV during the course of his employment and our Supreme Court concluded this constituted an “injury” under our statutes. Doe, supra, 696-98. Subsequent thereto, this board discussed exposure to harmful agents in Woodmansee v. Milford, 5768 CRB-4-12-7 (December 18, 2013), in which we stated “[a]s we pointed out in Chappell v. Pfizer, Inc., 5139 CRB-2-06-10 (November 19, 2007), aff’d, 115 Conn. App. 702 (2009); we have treated workplace exposure to harmful agents in a far different manner than other injuries not so clearly associated with one’s occupation.” We do not, however, find precedent concerning unique occupational injuries compelling in regard to ubiquitous injuries such as cardiac distress.
While the claimant’s citation of two cases in which we found cardiac injuries compensable, Hart v. Federal Express Corporation, 5897 CRB-2-13-11 (November 12, 2014), aff’d, 321 Conn. 1 (2016) and McDonough v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 46, 184 CRD 2–82 (April 1, 1986), 204 Conn. 104 (1987), are more pertinent to the issues herein, we find that both cases are readily distinguishable from the matter before us. In Hart, the trial commissioner found that the claimant had an asymptomatic subclinical heart condition but that the events at work on September 15, 2009 resulted in a significant aggravation of that condition and the need for long-term, post-hospital treatment, medication, and monitoring.[10] Similarly, in McDonough, the trial commissioner found Pembroke’s opinion that work stress was a factor that accelerated the claimant’s asymptomatic cardiac condition such that she needed immediate and ongoing treatment to be credible. In both cases, our Supreme Court found those decisions to be reasonable. In McDonough, our Supreme Court noted that the standard of causation in workers’ compensation cases was generally reliant on medical opinions. “Heart stress cases differ only in degree from other compensation cases involving causation in myriad differing fact patterns. Only the factual nuances and difficulties of expert medical testimony distinguish such cases.” Id., 118.
In the present case, the administrative law judge found the medical evidence he deemed worthy of reliance did not support a finding that the claimant’s work-related stress was a substantial contributing factor in causing the narrowing of the artery or need for the stent procedure. See Conclusion, ¶ E. Thus, unlike the claimants in Hart and McDonough, the claimant in the current case did not meet his burden of proof that the work stress was the proximate cause of an aggravation of his pre-existing condition or his need for surgery.
Finally, the claimant argues that our recent decision in Buchanan v. East Hartford, 6488 CRB-6-22-10 (November 3, 2023), appeal pending, A.C. 47085 (November 9, 2023), evinces support for a more lenient approach to compensating claimants who have sustained a physical/mental injury. This misstates our opinion. We reversed the decision of the administrative law judge in Buchanan because this board determined that the claimant had sustained a physical injury which was the self-inflicted gunshot. It is easy to distinguish Buchanan from the current case wherein the administrative law judge determined that the claimant did not sustain a physical injury.
We also identify no error from the administrative law judge’s denial of the claimant’s post-judgment motions. As for the motion to correct, the trial judge has wide discretion to determine what evidence is material and probative to his findings and conclusions and he is under no obligation to adopt the claimant’s position. See D’Amico v. Dept. of Correction, 73 Conn. App. 718, 728 (2002), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 933 (2003); Brockenberry v. Thomas Deegan d/b/a Tom’s Scrap Metal, Inc., 5429 CRB˗5˗09˗2 (January 22, 2010), aff’d, 126 Conn. App. 902 (2011) (per curiam); and Liano v. Bridgeport, 4934 CRB-4-05-4 (April 13, 2006). As to the motion for reconsideration, we conclude it was appropriately denied as the administrative law judge properly applied the law in the present matter. Finally, with respect to the motion for articulation, we have previously held that issues related to causation are generally straightforward and not issues “where the trial court’s decision contains some ambiguity or deficiency reasonably susceptible of clarification ....” Biehn v. Bridgeport, 5232 CRB‑4‑07‑6 (September 11, 2008), appeal withdrawn, A.C. 30336 (March 9, 2011), quoting Alliance Partners, Inc. v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 263 Conn. 191, 204 (2003), citing Miller v. Kirschner, 225 Conn. 185, 208 (1993). We do not find this finding ambiguous and do not believe any articulation would be warranted.
There is no error, we affirm the March 4, 2024 Finding and Dismissal of William J. Watson III, Administrative Law Judge acting for the First District.
Administrative Law Judges David W. Schoolcraft and Soline M. Oslena concur in this Opinion.
[1] We note that two motions for extension of time were granted during the pendency of this appeal.
[2] When asked if the claimant’s work created the need for the stent procedure, Loscalzo testified that he was unable to offer a causation opinion. See Claimant’s Exhibit A, pp. 37-38, 73.
[3] At his deposition, Loscalzo recounted that the claimant’s left anterior descending artery in September showed signs of plaque buildup, but his stress test that day went well. See Claimant’s Exhibit A, pp. 25-27. Later in the deposition, Loscalzo wondered if this test was “falsely normal or negative” and testified that the plaque buildup constituted coronary artery disease. Id., p. 33. Loscalzo also testified a review of the claimant’s medical records suggests that the claimant had been suffering from coronary artery disease for an extended period prior to December 5, 2019, and the claimant’s prior hospitalization on September 11, 2019, had revealed calcium buildup causing the claimant to be put on statins. See id., pp. 35-36.
[4] Krauthamer opined that the claimant’s employment was unrelated to the need for a stent procedure. See Respondent’s Exhibit 2, p. 3; see also Respondent’s Exhibit 4, p. 32. At his deposition, Krauthamer discussed the claimant having had a 60 or 70 percent preexisting narrowing of the left anterior descending artery. See Respondent’s Exhibit 4, pp. 40-48.
[5] General Statutes § 31-275 (B) (ii) (I) states: “‘Personal injury’ or ‘injury’ shall not be construed to include: (ii) A mental or emotional impairment, unless such impairment (I) arises from a physical injury or occupational disease.”
[6] General Statutes § 31-275 (16) (A) states: “‘Personal injury’ or ‘injury’ includes, in addition to accidental injury that may be definitely located as to the time when and the place where the accident occurred, an injury to an employee that is causally connected with the employee’s employment and is the direct result of repetitive trauma or repetitive acts incident to such employment, and occupational disease.”
[7] In Biasetti v. Stamford, 123 Conn. App. 372, 378-80 (2010), our Appellate Court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in a prior case involving this claimant regarding similar issues, see Biasetti v. Stamford, 250 Conn. 65 (1999), where the court made clear that subsequent to the 1993 revision of Chapter 568 a physical injury was a condition precedent to awarding benefits under our Act. Id., 74-80.
[8] General Statutes § 31-275 (16) (B) (iii) states: “‘Personal injury’ or ‘injury’ shall not be construed to include: (iii) A mental or emotional impairment that results from a personnel action, including, but not limited to, a transfer, promotion, demotion or termination.”
[9] We note that Loscalzo’s opinion here differed from the claimant’s expert, Rao, who opined that “there is no evidence that he [the claimant] had pre-existing coronary artery disease.” Claimant’s Exhibit I, pp. 18˗19. We also note that the administrative law judge did not find Rao credible on the issue of what caused the claimant to need a stent. See Conclusion, ¶ G.
[10] Effective October 21, 2021, the Connecticut legislature directed that the phrase “administrative law judge” be substituted when referencing a workers’ compensation commissioner. See Public Acts 2021, No. 18, § 1.