The Office of the Attorney General William Tong
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Page 87 of 215
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In your letter of May 12, 1992, you join with Howard G. lger, M.D., Chairman of the Board of Pardons, in seeking our opinion as to the respective authority of the Governor and the Board in the granting of pardons for persons sentenced to death.
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This is in response to your request for opinion pertaining to reimbursement of regulatory costs under the Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 24996 (May 31, 1991) (Procedures). You ask whether the Procedures, which allow you to assess the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe (Tribe) for "reasonable and necessary costs" of regulating and investigating operations at Foxwoods, include reimbursement of indirect as well as direct costs.
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You have asked for an opinion regarding the interpretation of certain provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), originally executed April 25, 1994, between the State of Connecticut and the Mohegan Tribe ("Tribe") which permits the Tribe to operate video facsimile games as long as the Tribe contributes to the State a percentage of the revenue generated from those games in accordance with the terms of the MOU. In particular, a dispute has arisen between the Division of Special Revenue ("Division") and the Tribe concerning how to calculate certain payments.
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You have requested a formal opinion by this office regarding issues presented in Public Act 98-111, Connecticut's most recent "Megan's Law." Public Act 98-111, which becomes effective October 1, 1998, establishes a sexual offender registration system for Connecticut that significantly expands the circumstances under which a convicted sexual offender is required to register with and provide current information to the Department of Public Safety and Connecticut State Police. Failure to register as required is a Class D felony under the act.
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You have asked this office for an opinion regarding whether Conn. Gen. Stat. 20-627 to 20-630 apply to the "Pequot Pharmaceutical Network", a pharmacy owned and operated by the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation on the Mashantucket Pequot Reservation in Ledyard, Connecticut. These statutory provisions regulate "nonresident pharmacies", which are defined as "any pharmacy located outside this state which ships, mails or delivers, in any manner, legend devices or legend drugs . . . into this State." Conn. Gen. Stat. 20-627. Thus, the dispositive question is whether a pharmacy located solely on reservation land situated within the geographical boundaries of the State of Connecticut is "within" the State of Connecticut for purposes of the statute.
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This is in response to your request for an opinion on whether the "revolving door" limitation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-557d(c) applies to you if you resign as Acting Executive Director of the Division of Special Revenue to accept a position as President and Chief Executive Officer of the Connecticut Lottery Corporation (CLC).
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This is in response to your December 2, 1997 request for an opinion regarding the status of state employee home addresses under the state Freedom of Information Act ("FOI Act" or "Act"), Conn. Gen. Stat.
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In 1995, the Commissioners of the Departments of Social Services and Children and Families requested a legal opinion on their ability to share information about families and children, notwithstanding certain statutory client confidentiality restrictions. Both Commissioners indicated that increased sharing of client-specific information would allow their agencies to fulfill their statutory responsibilities more effectively.
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Your department requests clarification of a previously issued opinion regarding the question of whether interior designers, practicing within the scope of services described in Conn. Gen. Stat.
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This is in response to your letter dated June 2, 1998, in which you request our opinion regarding the scope of authority delegated to the State Traffic Commission ("Commission") to establish speed limits on multiple lane, limited access state highways. More specifically, you ask whether or not the Commission has the authority to establish a speed limit above fifty-five (55) miles per hour but less than the sixty-five (65) miles per hour maximum speed limit set forth in Conn. Public Acts No. 98-181, Sec. 1.
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I have reviewed your December 23, 1997 request for our opinion on whether local registrars of voters are required by law to supply the Social Security numbers of voters to the State Jury Administrator to assist the Administrator in the preparation of the master jury list. According to your letter, the legislature mandated the disclosure of this information in Public Act 97-200 as a means to properly and more precisely compile lists of potential jurors.
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This letter is in response to your request, on behalf of the Waterbury Financial Planning and Assistance Board ("WFPAB"), for a formal legal opinion on three questions concerning the appointment of a 2002 Charter Revision Commission for the City of Waterbury.
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John G. Rowland, State Capitol, 2002-012 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut
You have asked for my opinion regarding the constitutionality of House Bill No. 5346, which would impose a one year moratorium on the construction of any electric power line or gas pipeline across Long Island Sound.
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Joseph D. D'Alesio, Judicial Branch, 2002-007 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut
You have requested an opinion regarding an amendment to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-215, relating to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund. The purpose of that fund is to provide compensation and services for the victims of crimes.
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This letter responds to the June 25, 2002 letter from Ann Stravalle-Schmidt, CRRA Director of Legal Services, seeking our opinion on several questions concerning the Separation Agreement between CRRA and former CRRA President Robert E. Wright that was approved by the previous CRRA Board of Directors. In particular, Stravalle-Schmidt asked: (1) whether the previous Board had the authority to enter into the agreement; (2) whether the language of ¶7 of the agreement — the provision concerning indemnification and reimbursement for legal expenses — was legally permissible; and (3) whether ¶7 of the agreement is enforceable against CRRA.