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This is in response to the letter from Representative Shawn T. Johnston dated February 4, 2000, inquiring whether the Governor can enter into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Veterans Memorial Casino Organization to allow it to operate high stakes bingo1 in Connecticut.
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Ms. Nancy Wyman, State Comptroller, 2000-024 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut
You have asked two related questions about the State Employee Campaign for Charitable Giving (the "campaign"), which is an annual campaign "to raise funds from state employees for charitable and public health, welfare, environmental, conservation and services purposes." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 5-262(a)(3). Specifically, you ask whether the State Employee Campaign Committee (the "Committee") may prohibit a federation1 from participating in the campaign if one or more of the federation's member agencies solicits from state employees during the designated campaign period other than through the campaign. You have also asked whether the Committee may require a federation that seeks to participate in the campaign to certify to the Committee that it will refrain from soliciting charitable contributions from state employees during the designated campaign period other than through the campaign.
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In your letter dated April 27, 2000 you requested a formal opinion as to whether the chairman of a council of government has the authority to sign on behalf of all the chief elected officials of a workforce investment area an agreement by which the council of government will administer and oversee federal Workforce Investment Act funds and activities.
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You have asked whether the expenditure of state funds to pay for costs related to the nursing home strike, including the cost of mobilizing the National Guard and the expedited payment to nursing home operators of the cost of replacement workers, would violate any state or federal labor laws.
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This will acknowledge and reply to your request of November 28, 2001 for an advisory opinion as to whether the State has the authority to consolidate workforce development regions pursuant to the federal Workforce Investment Act and, if so, what criteria must be satisfied before such consolidation is approved. You also ask whether a workforce development board which has demonstrated adequate fiscal capability and achieved satisfactory performance results can be forced to change its current service area or method of operation.
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You have requested our advice as to the required number of State Marshals in each county pursuant to the provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 6-38. Specifically, you have requested a formal opinion of the Attorney General as to "whether the Commission has the discretion to determine whether to fill these vacancies or whether the Commission is required [to] fill all vacancies in every county up to the statutory maximum."
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This letter is in response to your request for a formal legal opinion as to whether Peter Ellef, the current chairman of the Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority ("CRRA""), is serving in that capacity without having received the necessary legislative approval.
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This office previously responded to an inquiry concerning the authority of a Special Deputy Sheriff to serve a capias. At that time we provided an informal advice to the effect that the "better practice" was for a regular Deputy Sheriff to serve the capias, but that a Special Deputy Sheriff could assist, and suggested that it would be advisable to obtain legislative clarification with respect to what authority a Special Deputy Sheriff had. During the period since that informal advice the issue of what authority a Special Deputy Sheriff had in connection with serving a capias has continued to arise. Accordingly, you have asked us to issue a formal opinion on this question. We have carefully considered the relevant legal authorities.
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This letter responds to yours of December 29, 1999, in which you ask this office for a formal opinion regarding the applicability and effect of Sections 26 and 45 of Public Act 99-2, June Special Session on tobacco settlement monies. Specifically, you have asked for an opinion "concerning whether Section 45 alters, in any way, the express provisions of Section 26 and, if so, the nature and extent to which it does."
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This is in response to your request for an opinion on whether the two-store limit rule in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-48a bars the issuance of a package store permit to Jaimax, Inc. for premises at 701 North Colony Road, Wallingford, CT.
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This is in response to your request for a formal opinion of the Attorney General regarding the ability of the Department of Public Health ("Department") to access information contained in the personnel files of employees of institutions licensed by the Department. The Department's inspectors have recently been refused access to institutional employee personnel files when conducting inspections at a hospital. The hospital asserted that unless the Department issued an "administrative summons", the records could not be released unless consent of the employee was obtained. You also asked whether such information would be subject to release by the Department pursuant to a Freedom of Information request.
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John P. Burke, Department of Banking, 2000-006 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut
You have asked for our opinion as to whether Section 36a-158(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes violates the Commerce Clause of the Unites States Constitution or the Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal constitutions as to an out-of-state state-chartered bank that wishes to establish an automated teller machine ("ATM") in this state.
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In your letter dated August 31, 2000, you asked whether the state can recover interest from the United States Postal Service as a result of the late delivery of certified mail containing tax returns and $140 million in tax payments. In analyzing this issue, it must be noted that any action against the United States Postal Service is, in fact, an action against the United States.
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You have asked for an interpretation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 26-3 as regards DEP's authority to take any animal by whatever means reasonably necessary to carry out its functions, even if the means DEP intends to use is contrary to another statutory provision.