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  • Commissioner Armstrong & Commissioner Spada, Department of Correction & Department of Public Safety, 2003-003 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    Your staff has asked whether persons convicted of violating Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-73a, Fourth Degree Sexual Assault, under Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a-8 (Accessory), 53a-48 (Conspiracy), or 53a-49 (Attempt) are required to register pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-251. That statute requires registration of persons convicted of a "nonviolent sexual offense," defined as persons convicted of violating Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-73a.

  • The Honorable James Amann, State Capitol, 2003-002 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This letter is in response to your request for a formal legal opinion as to the proper construction of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-44a, which governs the appointment of the Judicial Selection Commission, given an internal inconsistency in the statute created by the recent reapportionment of Connecticut's congressional districts.

  • Susan G. Townsley, Division of Special Revenue, 2003-018 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This is in response to your request for an opinion on certain issues concerning the repeal of the games of chance statutes.1 These statues, until they were repealed, allowed Las Vegas Nights charitable gambling in the state. The repealer, enacted during the January 6, 2003 Special Session in 2003 Conn. Pub. Acts (Jan. 6 Spec. Sess.) 03-1, terminated this type of gambling effective January 7, 2003 in an effort to prevent federal allowance of more Indian casinos in Connecticut.

  • Susan G. Townsley, Division of Special Revenue, 2003-011 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This is in response to your request for an opinion concerning the continuing legality of the use of merchandise prize wheels at bazaars in Connecticut in the wake of the repeal of the statutes authorizing Las Vegas Nights charitable gambling and the use of money wheels at bazaars. The repealer, enacted during the January 6, 2003 Special Session in 2003 Conn. Pub. Acts (Jan. 6 Spec. Sess.) 03-1, terminated these types of gambling effective January 7, 2003.

  • Susan G. Townsley, Division of Special Revenue, 2003-006 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have requested an opinion regarding two issues related to charitable gaming events to be held at Foxwoods Casino ("Foxwoods"). Foxwoods is owned and operated by the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe (the "Tribe"), a federally recognized Indian tribe. The Tribe conducts gaming at Foxwoods, which is located on the Tribe's federal reservation, pursuant to Gaming Procedures authorized by federal law.

  • Linda Spoonster Schwatz, RN, DrPh, FAAN, Department of Veterans' Affairs, 2003-016 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    Your office has requested a formal opinion regarding whether the Department of Veterans' Affairs (hereinafter "DVA") has properly amended its Veterans' Benefits Guide (hereinafter "Guide") to reflect recent changes in the law.

  • William J. Sudol, State Teachers' Retirement Board, 2003-009 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have requested advice regarding the Early Retirement Incentive Program (ERIP) enacted in 2003 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 03-02. This retirement program was extended by the legislature to state employees who are members of the State Teachers' Retirement System (TRS or the system) in 2003 Conn. Spec. Acts No. 03-02.

  • Marc S. Ryan, Secretary, Office of Policy and Management, 2000-026 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have written to this office seeking an interpretation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §12-63c(a), a statutory provision concerning the procedure local tax assessors are to employ in the valuation of commercial and industrial property used "primarily for purposes of producing rental income." Specifically, you ask whether the term "primarily" as used in this provision means "that more than 50% of the area of the structure is used for the purpose of producing rental income, or does 'primarily' mean that more than 50% of the income from the property is a result of rental income?" You posed a second question that stated: "If the second interpretation is correct, would gross or net income be used to determine the primary purpose?"

  • Jeffrey Garfield, Esq., Elections Enforcement Commission, 2000-020 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked what regulatory authority the Elections Enforcement Commission ("EEC") has with respect to alleged violations of Conn. Gen. Stat. §2-30a(b), which provides in relevant part: "No expenditure of state funds shall be made to influence electors to vote for or against any such proposed constitutional amendment."

  • Honorable Valerie F. Lewis, Department of Higher Education, 2000-011 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    In your communication of December 27, 1999, you state that the Board of Trustees for the Community-Technical Colleges ("Board of Trustees") had voted earlier in 1999 to change its name and the names of each of its twelve colleges by reducing "regional community-technical college(s)" to "community college" in each title. You state that the Board of Trustees' action was based upon a "yearlong public relations study." On behalf of the Board of Governors for Higher Education ("Board of Governors") you asked whether the approval of the Board of Governors pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §10a-6 and/or of the General Assembly is required to effect legally these name changes.

  • Honorable Senator M. Adela Eads, State Capitol, 2000-017 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    I reviewed the questions that you have presented to me as follows: 1. Must an HMO medical plan, the terms and conditions of which contain a custodial care exception, offer a plan to the public, after receiving Department of Insurance approval, that: (a) meets the requirements of CGS 38a-553(c)(10), (b) complies with CGS 38a-478 et seq., as from time to time amended, and Article XXI of the Connecticut Constitution, and (c) does not use rehabilitation or improvement as criteria in determining whether care for disabled persons or persons suffering from biologically-based mental illnesses or nervous conditions is to be considered custodial? 2. Must the external appeal panel, acting pursuant to CGS 38a-478n, when reviewing appeals certified by the Department of Insurance and which construe or involve the custodial care exception (CGS 38a-553(c)(10)) as applied to disabled persons or persons suffering from biologically-based mental illnesses or nervous conditions (CGS 38a-478 et seq., as from time to time amended): (a) apply said CGS 38a-478 et seq. and Article XXI of the State Constitution, and (b) not use rehabilitation or improvement as tests for custodial care?

  • Honorable Patricia A. Wilson-Coker, Department of Social Services, 2000-010 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This office previously responded to an inquiry concerning the authority of a Special Deputy Sheriff to serve a capias. At that time we provided an informal advice to the effect that the "better practice" was for a regular Deputy Sheriff to serve the capias, but that a Special Deputy Sheriff could assist, and suggested that it would be advisable to obtain legislative clarification with respect to what authority a Special Deputy Sheriff had. During the period since that informal advice the issue of what authority a Special Deputy Sheriff had in connection with serving a capias has continued to arise. Accordingly, you have asked us to issue a formal opinion on this question. We have carefully considered the relevant legal authorities.

  • Honorable Kevin B. Sullivan, President Pro Tempore, 2000-004 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This letter responds to yours of December 29, 1999, in which you ask this office for a formal opinion regarding the applicability and effect of Sections 26 and 45 of Public Act 99-2, June Special Session on tobacco settlement monies. Specifically, you have asked for an opinion "concerning whether Section 45 alters, in any way, the express provisions of Section 26 and, if so, the nature and extent to which it does."

  • Honorable Kevin B. Sullivan, Legislative Office Building, 2000-019 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked for advice regarding the legal consequences of the General Assembly's approval of a particular arbitration award. In your letter of May 10, 2000, you explained that the leadership of the General Assembly is considering calling a special session to approve a recent arbitration award between the State of Connecticut and the Administrative and Residual Union P-5 Bargaining Unit (hereinafter "A&R"), pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 5-278(b). Before the General Assembly will be able to convene to approve the award, however, you anticipate that the State will file in the superior court an application to modify or vacate it. You ask, therefore, what effect the General Assembly's approval of the award may have on the State's legal challenge to it.

  • Honorable John P. Burke , Department of Banking , 2000-001 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You recently requested an opinion from this office regarding the following questions: 1. Is the filing of a notice and fee by a federally-registered investment adviser under Section 36b-6(d) or 36b-6(e) of the Connecticut General Statutes, for which a letter of acknowledgment is issued by the Department, considered to be a "license or permit to operate a business in this state" within the meaning of Section 31-286a(b) of the Workers' Compensation Act? 2. Is the filing of an annual notice renewal fee by such an investment adviser under Section 36b-6(e) of the Connecticut General Statutes considered the renewal of a license or permit within the meaning of Section 31-286a(b) of the Act? 3. If the response to either of the foregoing questions is yes, is Section 31-286a(b) of the Act preempted because it exceeds what is reserved to the states under Section 307(a) of NSMIA, viz., the filing by federally-registered investment advisers of any documents filed with the SEC? 4. If it is determined that Section 31-286a(b) of the Act is preempted, will the Department be liable for failure to comply with Section 31-286a(b) if it fails to obtain from federally-registered investment advisers sufficient evidence of current compliance with the workers' compensation insurance coverage requirements of Section 31-284?