The Office of the Attorney General William Tong
Search Results
Page 109 of 217
-
This letter is in response to your letter of March 12, 1992, in which you requested our opinion on the following issue: Is there any lawful basis upon which a municipality may refuse to meet the requirements of a state law when compliance with the law will result in costs to the municipality which are not reimbursed or otherwise borne by the state?
-
We are in receipt of a letter dated December 3, 1991, from the Commission's Administrator, John C. Ford, with an attached letter dated October 21, 1991, from Dr. Roger J. Harris. The issue on which you seek our guidance is whether the Commission must conduct an administrative hearing on the individual's application based upon the oral surgeon's letter dated October 21, 1991, which your agency interprets as a request for such a hearing.
-
By letter of February 4, 1992. you requested an opinion of the Attorney General on the State's ability to pursue statutory support obligations against the community (non-institutionalized) spouse of an institutionalized Medicaid patient, in view of certain provisions contained in the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA), Pub.L. 100-360.
-
This letter is in response to your request of June 2, 1992 for our opinion concerning the licensing of pharmacies which are owned by physicians.
-
This is in reply to your request for our opinion of whether the Central Connecticut State University Alumni Association, Inc. (hereinafter "the Association") is a "foundation" as defined by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-37e(2). Foundation status would subject the Association to the requirements of Chapter 47 of the General Statutes (Conn. Gen. Stat. §§4-37e - 4-37i), including possibly full audits by the State Auditors.
-
In your letter of November 25, 1991, you request our guidance concerning the issue of personal liability of state officials in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358 (1991). To better respond to the issues posed in your letter, we have framed your inquiry as follows: 1. How does the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Hafer v. Melo affect a state official's exposure to personal liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acts performed as part of his official duties? 2. Under what circumstances will the state provide for the defense as well as indemnification of a state official when sued personally pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acts taken in the course of the performance of his official duties?
-
This will respond to your request for an opinion of the Attorney General concerning political activity of commissioners of the Public Utility Control Authority. The provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-5 provide that a commissioner may be removed for: "Misconduct, material neglect of duty, incompetence in the conduct of his office, or active participation in political management or campaigns by any commissioner.... In particular you ask whether the following two scenarios present violations: attendance at dinners, or social events (1) in connection with financial contributions to political parties or candidates of such political parties for public office; or (2) in connection with the affairs of the political parties or their candidates, without regard to any financial contributions.
-
In your letter of May 12, 1992, you join with Howard G. lger, M.D., Chairman of the Board of Pardons, in seeking our opinion as to the respective authority of the Governor and the Board in the granting of pardons for persons sentenced to death.
-
By letter dated April 8, 1992, you requested our advice on the obligations of the department of public safety under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-196. You are specifically concerned with the provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-196 which deals with the issuance of renewal certificates for elevators. You advise us that it is the practice of your department to issue a renewal certificate upon receipt of the appropriate fee and to subsequently inspect the elevator as required by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-195. You ask us whether the practice, as you have described it, is consistent with the provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-196.
-
I am writing in response to your request for an advisory opinion regarding the imposition of sales and use taxes on certain utility companies' purchases of goods to be installed in state facilities in performance of energy conservation measures mandated by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16a-37a and 1991 Conn. Pub. Act No. 91-6 (June Spec. Sess.).
-
You have requested our advice on whether the provisions of the Connecticut Fire Safety Code, the Connecticut State Building Code and Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-315, with regards to automatic fire extinguishing systems, preempt the field so as to preclude local ordinances on the subject.
-
This is in response to your December 2, 1997 request for an opinion regarding the status of state employee home addresses under the state Freedom of Information Act ("FOI Act" or "Act"), Conn. Gen. Stat.
-
In 1995, the Commissioners of the Departments of Social Services and Children and Families requested a legal opinion on their ability to share information about families and children, notwithstanding certain statutory client confidentiality restrictions. Both Commissioners indicated that increased sharing of client-specific information would allow their agencies to fulfill their statutory responsibilities more effectively.
-
Your department requests clarification of a previously issued opinion regarding the question of whether interior designers, practicing within the scope of services described in Conn. Gen. Stat.
-
This is in response to your letter dated June 2, 1998, in which you request our opinion regarding the scope of authority delegated to the State Traffic Commission ("Commission") to establish speed limits on multiple lane, limited access state highways. More specifically, you ask whether or not the Commission has the authority to establish a speed limit above fifty-five (55) miles per hour but less than the sixty-five (65) miles per hour maximum speed limit set forth in Conn. Public Acts No. 98-181, Sec. 1.