CHAPTER 568*
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
Connecticut General Statutes as amended to January 1, 2023
*See Sec. 38a-470 re liens on workers' compensation awards in favor of insurers, hospital or medical service corporations or employee welfare benefit plans.
Theory of Workmen's Compensation Act. 89 C. 145; Id., 160; 93 C. 428; 105 C. 299; 120 C. 546. Act should be broadly construed to effectuate its purpose. 89 C. 146. It covers injury received out of state under a contract of employment made here. Id., 374; 111 C. 695. Liability rests on contract. Id., 682; 90 C. 220. Statute in force when the injury was received controls. 90 C. 220. One employed in another state but received injury here. 91 C. 524; 92 C. 371. Contracts made elsewhere for work wholly or partly done here considered. 99 C. 457; 103 C. 107. Proceedings for compensation are purely statutory. 101 C. 358. Affecting interstate commerce. 109 C. 97. Underlying purpose to protect employee, even to the extent of rendering nugatory his own agreement. 128 C. 579. Cited. 154 C. 48, 51. No change was made by 1961 act in previously existing determination of when employer is subject to act. 156 C. 276. Payments of awards hereunder should be made only in accordance with express statutory authority. 159 C. 53. Procedural avenue for bringing claims under Sec. 7-433c is Workmen's Compensation Act. 165 C. 615. “Employer”, within the meaning of chapter, entitled to summary judgment when sued by employee who had claimed and been awarded benefits under chapter. 167 C. 621. Cited. 168 C. 84. Lack of a definitive diagnosis does not preclude recovery under act. 175 C. 392; Id., 424. Cited. 176 C. 547; 178 C. 664. Where employee is injured by the negligence of a fellow employee, the sole remedy is under chapter except where the negligence is in the operation of a motor vehicle. 180 C. 469. Where personal injuries sustained in another state, applicable law is the law of the place of the employment relation; discussion of contract choice of law, tort choice of law and workers' compensation choice of law. 182 C. 24. Cited. 185 C. 616; 186 C. 623; 187 C. 53; 189 C. 550. These statutes are not the exclusive remedy for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment where injuries claimed are compensable under Sec. 7-433c. 193 C. 59. Cited. 193 C. 297; 194 C. 139; 196 C. 91. Where case clearly within scope of Workers' Compensation Act, there is no basis for action under Sec. 31-49. Id., 529. Cited. 200 C. 562; 201 C. 632. Meritorious workers' compensation claim by a minor illegally employed when injured not barred by decision permitting common law suit. 203 C. 34. Cited. Id., 324; 204 C. 104; Id., 563; 205 C. 219; 206 C. 242; Id., 495; 207 C. 88; Id., 420; Id., 665; 208 C. 576. Court declined to create exception to fellow employee rule of act. Id., 589. Cited. Id., 709; 209 C. 59; Id., 219; 210 C. 423; Id., 580; Id., 626; 212 C. 138; Id., 427. Does not apply to members of judiciary. 213 C. 54. Cited. 214 C. 181; Id., 189; Id., 394; Id., 552; 215 C. 206; 216 C. 29; Id., 237; 217 C. 42; Id., 50; 218 C. 9; Id., 19; Id., 46. Application of law to workers' firm out of state discussed. Id., 181. Cited. Id., 531; 219 C. 28. Public policy prohibiting double recovery discussed. Id., 439. Cited. Id., 581; Id., 674; 220 C. 721; 221 C. 29; Id., 41; Id., 336; Id., 465; 222 C. 78; Id., 744; Id., 769; 223 C. 336; Id., 492; 224 C. 8; Id., 382; 225 C. 165; 226 C. 282; Id., 404; Id., 508; Id., 569. Plaintiff's estate entitled to permanent partial disability award; judgment of Appellate Court in 26 CA 469 reversed. 227 C. 261. Cited. Id., 333; 228 C. 1; Id., 358; Id., 401; 229 C. 99; 231 C. 287; Id., 370; Id., 381. Judgment of Appellate Court in 33 CA 695 reversed and case remanded for further proceedings. Id., 469. Cited. Id., 529; Id., 690; 232 C. 91; Id., 311; Id., 758; Id., 780; 233 C. 14; Id., 251; 234 C. 51; 235 C. 185; Id., 778; 236 C. 330. A medical provider does not have standing before commission to initiate a claim in absence of claim by injured employee for benefits under act. 237 C. 1. Cited. Id., 490; 238 C. 285; Id., 637; 239 C. 19; Id., 408; Id., 676; 240 C. 788; 241 C. 170; Id., 282; Id., 692; 242 C. 255; Id., 375; Id., 432; Id., 570; 243 C. 66. Purpose of Workers' Compensation Act. 245 C. 66. Act to be construed broadly in order to serve its remedial purpose. 252 C. 641. Collateral estoppel applies to bar employer and its insurers from contesting cause of employee's death in action under Workers' Compensation Act which was preceded by judgment under the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, where same burden of proof applied in both proceedings. 255 C. 762. State Workers' Compensation Act has concurrent jurisdiction with federal Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act over claims involving injuries sustained on navigable waters when employer and employee are locally based, employment contract was performed locally, injury occurred on state's territorial waters and employer required to secure compensation for land-based injuries sustained by employees. 283 C. 129. Superseding cause doctrine applies to certain cases under act. 305 C. 360. A workers' compensation insurer may maintain a common-law equitable subrogation action against a third-party tortfeasor who is liable for injuries sustained by an employee. 323 C. 254. Employer collaterally estopped from challenging employee's eligibility for benefits under the act where administrative law judge in federal proceeding applied a substantial factor standard in finding of compensability under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 330 C. 231. Permanent disability benefits mature only after the degree of permanency has been fixed by way of an award or an agreement between the parties sufficient to establish a binding meeting of the minds. 331 C. 672.
Cited. 1 CA 58; Id., 264; 2 CA 255; 3 CA 40; Id., 162; Id., 246; Id., 450; Id., 547; 5 CA 369; 6 CA 60; Id., 265; 7 CA 19; Id., 142; Id., 296; Id., 575; 11 CA 391; 12 CA 138; 13 CA 208; 14 CA 178; 15 CA 84. Relationship of benefits awards under federal and state compensation laws arising from same injury discussed. Id., 615. Cited. 16 CA 65; Id., 121; Id., 437; Id., 660; Id., 676; 19 CA 273; 21 CA 9; judgment reversed, see 218 C. 46; Id., 20; Id., 107; Id., 610; 22 CA 88; 22 CA 539; judgment reversed, see 219 C. 439; 23 CA 325; 24 CA 234; Id., 362; Id., 719; Id., 739; 25 CA 350; Id., 492; 26 CA 194; 27 CA 800; 28 CA 113; Id., 226; Id., 660; 29 CA 249; Id., 441; Id., 618; 30 CA 295; Id., 630; Id., 729; 32 CA 16; Id., 595; 33 CA 99; Id., 667; 34 CA 521; Id., 708; 36 CA 150; Id., 635; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 330; 37 CA 392; Id., 835; 38 CA 1; Id., 73; 39 CA 28; 40 CA 278; Id., 409; 41 CA 430; Id., 664; 42 CA 147; Id., 200; Id., 542; Id., 803; 44 CA 1; Id., 771; 45 CA 324; Id., 441; 46 CA 298; Id., 596; Id., 699; Id., 712. Workers' Compensation Act does not permit double compensation. 49 CA 66. Employer not required to prove existence and breach of an independent legal duty in seeking indemnification from third party under circumstances of case; act should be broadly construed but its remedial purpose cannot transcend its statutorily defined jurisdictional boundaries. 53 CA 72. Board properly found that commissioner could reconsider prior findings and that the record supported conclusions. Id., 671. One purpose of workers' compensation statute is the avoidance of two independent compensations for an injury. 57 CA 406. Chapter imposes a form of strict liability on employer. Id., 472. Workers' Compensation Act discussed re whether employee's injury occurred within the scope of employment. 58 CA 109. Compensation Review Board derives its authority from Workers' Compensation Act, which grants no authority to board to open a decision. 86 CA 880. The legislature did not intend to impose on employer the double burden of back wages and workers' compensation payments for the same period of unemployment. 115 CA 306. Because insurer otherwise complied with statutory notice requirements set forth in Workers' Compensation Act, its cancellation of workers' compensation policy was effective at the time employee was injured. 121 CA 144. Re conflict of law, when Connecticut was plaintiff's residence and place of employment contract's formation, Connecticut law may be applied to claim for workers' compensation benefits. 124 CA 215. Claimant did not establish a significant relationship between Connecticut and the decedent's employment relationship with his employer as required for a claim under act where decedent was a salesman whose sales territory was outside Connecticut. 132 CA 794. A stipulated settlement agreement, even when prepared by defendant, is unenforceable under act unless signed by both parties and approved by commissioner. 149 CA 725.
Cited. 9 CS 471. Minor employed in violation of child-labor statute is entitled to workmen's compensation. 12 CS 304. Employee's return to work does not relieve employer from liability under act. Id., 453. Cited. 23 CS 55. Cases under act are on a different basis than actions between ordinary litigants. 31 CS 331. Cited. 38 CS 331. Where plaintiff brought action under both this statute and Sec. 7-433c, he was not required to assume greater burden of proving compensability under this statute. Id., 359. Cited. 39 CS 102; Id., 250; 40 CS 165; Id., 253; 41 CS 115; Id., 326; 42 CS 168; 44 CS 510. Employer's motion for summary judgment denied under substantial certainty doctrine where employer failed to provide money carrier with bullet-proof vest despite employer's mandate that employees wear such vests. 47 CS 30.
Table of Contents
Workers’ Compensation Act — Part A I
Workers’ Compensation Commission. Compensation Commissioners.
Sec. 31-275c. Officers of fraternal organizations.
Sec. 31-277. Salary of administrative law judges. Longevity payments.
Sec. 31-278. Powers and duties of administrative law judges.
Sec. 31-279a. Booklet to be distributed explaining act.
Sec. 31-279b. Repealed. Notice of availability of coverage under act. Content. Posting.
Sec. 31-280a. Advisory Board of the Workers' Compensation Commission.
Sec. 31-280b. Compensation Review Board.
Sec. 31-281. Repealed. Designation of commissioner to act in another district.
Sec. 31-282. Successor may complete acts when administrative law judge dies.
Sec. 31-283. Annual pension upon retirement of administrative law judge.
Sec. 31-283a. Rehabilitation programs for employees suffering compensable injuries.
Sec. 31-283d. Adjustment of salary of certain retired administrative law judges.
Sec. 31-283e. Election of retirement benefits.
Sec. 31-283f. Statistical Division.
Sec. 31-283h. Repealed. Financing of Division of Worker Education.
Workers’ Compensation Act — Part A II
Employers’ Liability.
Sec. 31-284c. Complaints of violations. Hearing. Findings and award. Appeal.
Sec. 31-285. Substitute systems of compensation.
Sec. 31-286. Certificate of employer's compliance.
Sec. 31-287. Provisions required in liability insurance policies.
Sec. 31-289. Disposition of fines and penalties.
Sec. 31-289a. Civil action to recover civil penalties. Privileged assignment for trial.
Sec. 31-289b. Civil action to enjoin noncomplying employer from conducting business in the state.
Sec. 31-290. Obligations not to be evaded.
Sec. 31-290a. Discharge or discrimination prohibited. Right of action.
Sec. 31-290b. Repealed. Penalty for false statement.
Sec. 31-290c. Fraudulent claim or receipt of benefits. Penalties.
Sec. 31-290d. Workers' compensation fraud unit.
Workers’ Compensation Act — Part B
Workers’ Compensation.
Sec. 31-291. Principal employer, contractor and subcontractor.
Sec. 31-291a. Method of computing workers' compensation premiums for construction contractors.
Sec. 31-292. Liability of employer for worker lent to or employed by another.
Sec. 31-293a. No right against fellow employee; exception.
Sec. 31-294. Repealed. Notice of injury and of claim for compensation.
Sec. 31-294a. Eligibility for podiatric care.
Sec. 31-294b. Report of injury to employer. Notice of claim form provided by commission.
Sec. 31-294d. Medical and surgical aid. Hospital, ambulatory surgical center and nursing service.
Sec. 31-294f. Medical examination of injured employee. Medical reports.
Sec. 31-294g. State employee notice of claim for compensation.
Sec. 31-294l. Firefighters claim due to cancer diagnosis. Record.
Sec. 31-296. Voluntary agreements.
Sec. 31-296a. Discontinuance or reduction of payments under oral agreements.
Sec. 31-297. Hearing of claims.
Sec. 31-297a. Informal hearings.
Sec. 31-298. Conduct of hearings.
Sec. 31-298a. Repealed. Use of medical panel. Duties of commissioner and panel. Appeal. Regulations.
Sec. 31-299. Prior statements of parties as evidence at hearings before administrative law judges.
Sec. 31-299b. Initial liability of last employer. Reimbursement.
Sec. 31-300. Award as judgment. Interest. Attorney's fee. Procedure on discontinuance or reduction.
Sec. 31-301. Appeals to the Compensation Review Board. Payment of award during pendency of appeal.
Sec. 31-301a. Decision of Compensation Review Board.
Sec. 31-301b. Appeal of decision of Compensation Review Board.
Sec. 31-301c. Costs of appeal. Interest added to award affirmed on appeal.
Sec. 31-302. Payment of compensation. Commutation into monthly, quarterly or lump sums.
Sec. 31-303. Day when compensation payments become due. Penalty for late payments.
Sec. 31-304. Repealed. Destruction of agreement.
Sec. 31-305. Repealed. Medical examinations.
Sec. 31-306. Death resulting from accident or occupational disease. Dependents. Compensation.
Sec. 31-306b. Written notice of potential eligibility for death benefits.
Sec. 31-307. Compensation for total incapacity.
Sec. 31-307a. Cost-of-living adjustment in compensation rates.
Sec. 31-307b. Benefits after relapse from recovery. Recurrent injuries.
Sec. 31-307c. Compensation under agreements or awards effected prior to October 1, 1953.
Sec. 31-308. Compensation for partial incapacity.
Sec. 31-308a. Additional benefits for partial permanent disability.
Sec. 31-308b. Repealed. Dependency allowance.
Sec. 31-310a. Average weekly wage of supernumerary policemen and volunteer police officers.
Sec. 31-310b. Average weekly wage of General Assembly member.
Sec. 31-310c. Average weekly wage of worker with an occupational disease.
Sec. 31-311. Replacement of artificial aids.
Sec. 31-314. Allowance for advance payments.
Sec. 31-315. Modification of award or voluntary agreement.
Sec. 31-317. Repealed. Claims against the state.
Sec. 31-318. Action for minor or mentally incompetent person.
Sec. 31-319. Repealed. Fees to be approved.
Sec. 31-320. Exemption and preference of compensation.
Sec. 31-321. Manner of serving notices.
Sec. 31-322. Repealed. Injuries received in interstate commerce.
Sec. 31-323. Attachments to secure payment of compensation.
Sec. 31-324. Reservation of cases for the Appellate Court.
Sec. 31-325. Acknowledgment by employees having certain physical conditions.
Sec. 31-326. Proceedings against delinquent insurance companies or employers.
Sec. 31-327. Award of fees and expenses.
Workers’ Compensation Act — Part C
Employers’ Mutual Insurance.
Sec. 31-328. Mutual associations authorized.
Sec. 31-329. Approval by Insurance Commissioner.
Sec. 31-332. Policies. Number of members required.
Sec. 31-333. Officers and voting.
Sec. 31-335. Premium rates. Reserve notes.
Sec. 31-338. Bylaws and regulations.
Sec. 31-339. Appeals to Superior Court.
Workers’ Compensation Act — Part D
Workers’ Compensation Insurance.
Sec. 31-340. Insurer directly liable to employee or dependent.
Sec. 31-341. Notice to insurer.
Sec. 31-342. Award; enforcement.
Sec. 31-343. Certain defenses not available against employee or dependent.
Sec. 31-344. When representations avoid policy.
Sec. 31-344a. Workers' Compensation Administration Fund established.
Sec. 31-345a. Deductibles in workers' compensation coverage. Approval of Insurance Commissioner.
Sec. 31-346. Damages for material misstatements.
Sec. 31-347. Experience in compensation insurance.
Sec. 31-348. Compensation insurance companies to report their risks.
Sec. 31-348a. Compensation insurers to reduce premiums.
Workers’ Compensation Act — Part E
Second Injury Fund.
Sec. 31-349a. Powers of investigators in the office of the State Treasurer.
Sec. 31-349c. Controverted issues of previous disability. Physician panel established.
Sec. 31-349d. Treasurer to solicit proposals for the managing of Second Injury Fund claims.
Sec. 31-349e. Advisory board for the Second Injury Fund.
Sec. 31-349f. Condition of the Second Injury Fund. Report to the Governor and General Assembly.
Sec. 31-349h. Transfer of claims. Claims not transferred.
Sec. 31-349i. Cost-saving methodologies.
Secs. 31-350 and 31-351. Repealed. Notice to commissioner of second injury. Hearings; awards.
Sec. 31-352. Enforcement of liability of third person.
Sec. 31-353. Voluntary agreements and stipulated settlements; approval.
Sec. 31-354. Second Injury Fund contributions. Duties and powers of State Treasurer.
Sec. 31-354a. Assistant administrators of the Second Injury Fund.
Sec. 31-354b. Finance account within Second Injury Fund. Subaccounts. Duties of State Treasurer.
Sec. 31-355a. Collection of moneys owed to the Second Injury Fund. Tax warrants. Lien. Foreclosure.
WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION.
COMPENSATION COMMISSIONERS. EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY
I
WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION.
COMPENSATION COMMISSIONERS
Sec. 31-275. Definitions. As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise provides:
(1) “Arising out of and in the course of his employment” means an accidental injury happening to an employee or an occupational disease of an employee originating while the employee has been engaged in the line of the employee's duty in the business or affairs of the employer upon the employer's premises, or while engaged elsewhere upon the employer's business or affairs by the direction, express or implied, of the employer, provided:
(A) (i) For a police officer or firefighter, “in the course of his employment” encompasses such individual's departure from such individual's place of abode to duty, such individual's duty, and the return to such individual's place of abode after duty;
(ii) For an employee of the Department of Correction, (I) when responding to a direct order to appear at his or her work assignment under circumstances in which nonessential employees are excused from working, or (II) following two or more mandatory overtime work shifts on consecutive days, “in the course of his employment” encompasses such individual's departure from such individual's place of abode directly to duty, such individual's duty, and the return directly to such individual's place of abode after duty;
(iii) Notwithstanding the provisions of clauses (i) and (ii) of this subparagraph, the dependents of any deceased employee of the Department of Correction who was injured in the course of his employment, as defined in this subparagraph, on or after July 1, 2000, and who died not later than July 15, 2000, shall be paid compensation on account of the death, in accordance with the provisions of section 31-306, retroactively to the date of the employee's death. The cost of the payment shall be paid by the employer or its insurance carrier which shall be reimbursed for such cost from the Second Injury Fund as provided in section 31-354 upon presentation of any vouchers and information that the Treasurer may require;
(B) A personal injury shall not be deemed to arise out of the employment unless causally traceable to the employment other than through weakened resistance or lowered vitality;
(C) In the case of an accidental injury, a disability or a death due to the use of alcohol or narcotic drugs shall not be construed to be a compensable injury;
(D) For aggravation of a preexisting disease, compensation shall be allowed only for that proportion of the disability or death due to the aggravation of the preexisting disease as may be reasonably attributed to the injury upon which the claim is based;
(E) A personal injury shall not be deemed to arise out of the employment if the injury is sustained: (i) At the employee's place of abode, and (ii) while the employee is engaged in a preliminary act or acts in preparation for work unless such act or acts are undertaken at the express direction or request of the employer;
(F) For purposes of subparagraph (C) of this subdivision, “narcotic drugs” means all controlled substances, as designated by the Commissioner of Consumer Protection pursuant to subsection (c) of section 21a-243, but does not include drugs prescribed in the course of medical treatment or in a program of research operated under the direction of a physician or pharmacologist. For purposes of subparagraph (E) of this subdivision, “place of abode” includes the inside of the residential structure, the garage, the common hallways, stairways, driveways, walkways and the yard;
(G) The Workers' Compensation Commission shall adopt regulations, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54, to implement the provisions of this section and shall define the terms “a preliminary act”, “acts in preparation for work”, “departure from place of abode directly to duty” and “return directly to place of abode after duty” on or before January 1, 2006.
(2) “Commission” means the Workers' Compensation Commission.
(3) “Administrative law judge” means the administrative law judge who has jurisdiction in the matter referred to in the context.
(4) “Compensation” means benefits or payments mandated by the provisions of this chapter, including, but not limited to, indemnity, medical and surgical aid or hospital and nursing service required under section 31-294d and any type of payment for disability, whether for total or partial disability of a permanent or temporary nature, death benefit, funeral expense, payments made under the provisions of section 31-284b, 31-293a or 31-310, or any adjustment in benefits or payments required by this chapter.
(5) “Date of the injury” means, for an occupational disease, the date of total or partial incapacity to work as a result of such disease.
(6) “Dependent” means a member of the injured employee's family or next of kin who was wholly or partly dependent upon the earnings of the employee at the time of the injury.
(7) “Dependent in fact” means a person determined to be a dependent of an injured employee, in any case where there is no presumptive dependent, in accordance with the facts existing at the date of the injury.
(8) “Disfigurement” means impairment of or injury to the beauty, symmetry or appearance of a person that renders the person unsightly, misshapen or imperfect, or deforms the person in some manner, or otherwise causes a detrimental change in the external form of the person.
(9) (A) “Employee” means any person who:
(i) Has entered into or works under any contract of service or apprenticeship with an employer, whether the contract contemplated the performance of duties within or without the state;
(ii) Is a sole proprietor or business partner who accepts the provisions of this chapter in accordance with subdivision (10) of this section;
(iii) Is elected to serve as a member of the General Assembly of this state;
(iv) Is a salaried officer or paid member of any police department or fire department;
(v) Is a volunteer police officer, whether the officer is designated as special or auxiliary, upon vote of the legislative body of the town, city or borough in which the officer serves;
(vi) Is an elected or appointed official or agent of any town, city or borough in the state, upon vote of the proper authority of the town, city or borough, including the elected or appointed official or agent, irrespective of the manner in which he or she is appointed or employed. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed as affecting any existing rights as to pensions which such persons or their dependents had on July 1, 1927, or as preventing any existing custom of paying the full salary of any such person during disability due to injury arising out of and in the course of his or her employment;
(vii) Is a member of the armed forces of the state while in the performance of military duty, whether paid or unpaid for such military duty, in accordance with the provisions of section 27-17, 27-18 or 27-61; or
(viii) Is elected to serve as a probate judge for a probate district established in section 45a-2.
(B) “Employee” shall not be construed to include:
(i) Any person to whom articles or material are given to be treated in any way on premises not under the control or management of the person who gave them out;
(ii) One whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's trade or business;
(iii) A member of the employer's family dwelling in his house; but, if, in any contract of insurance, the wages or salary of a member of the employer's family dwelling in his house is included in the payroll on which the premium is based, then that person shall, if he sustains an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, be deemed an employee and compensated in accordance with the provisions of this chapter;
(iv) Any person engaged in any type of service in or about a private dwelling provided he is not regularly employed by the owner or occupier over twenty-six hours per week;
(v) An employee of a corporation who is a corporate officer and who elects to be excluded from coverage under this chapter by notice in writing to his employer and to the administrative law judge; or
(vi) Any person who is not a resident of this state but is injured in this state during the course of his employment, unless such person (I) works for an employer who has a place of employment or a business facility located in this state at which such person spends at least fifty per cent of his employment time, or (II) works for an employer pursuant to an employment contract to be performed primarily in this state.
(10) “Employer” means any person, corporation, limited liability company, firm, partnership, voluntary association, joint stock association, the state and any public corporation within the state using the services of one or more employees for pay, or the legal representative of any such employer, but all contracts of employment between an employer employing persons excluded from the definition of employee and any such employee shall be conclusively presumed to include the following mutual agreements between employer and employee: (A) That the employer may accept and become bound by the provisions of this chapter by immediately complying with section 31-284; (B) that, if the employer accepts the provisions of this chapter, the employee shall then be deemed to accept and be bound by such provisions unless the employer neglects or refuses to furnish immediately to the employee, on his or her written request, evidence of compliance with section 31-284 in the form of a certificate from the administrative law judge, the Insurance Commissioner or the insurer, as the case may be; (C) that the employee may, at any time, withdraw his or her acceptance of, and become released from, the provisions of this chapter by giving written or printed notice of his or her withdrawal to the chairperson and to the employer, and the withdrawal shall take effect immediately from the time of its service on the chairperson and the employer; and (D) that the employer may withdraw his or her acceptance and the acceptance of the employee by filing a written or printed notice of his or her withdrawal with the chairperson and with the employee, and the withdrawal shall take effect immediately from the time of its service on the chairperson and the employee. The notices of acceptance and withdrawal to be given by an employer employing persons excluded from the definition of employee and the notice of withdrawal to be given by the employee, as provided in this subdivision, shall be served upon the chairperson, employer or employee, in accordance with section 31-321. In determining the number of employees employed by an individual, the employees of a partnership of which he is a member shall not be included. A person who is the sole proprietor of a business may accept the provisions of this chapter by notifying the chairperson, in writing, of his or her intent to do so. If such person accepts the provisions of this chapter he shall be considered to be an employer and shall insure his or her full liability in accordance with subdivision (2) of subsection (b) of section 31-284. Such person may withdraw his or her acceptance by giving notice of his or her withdrawal, in writing, to the chairperson. Any person who is a partner in a business shall be deemed to have accepted the provisions of this chapter and shall insure his or her full liability in accordance with subdivision (2) of subsection (b) of section 31-284, unless the partnership elects to be excluded from the provisions of this chapter by notice, in writing and by signed agreement of each partner, to the chairperson.
(11) “Full-time student” means any student enrolled for at least seventy-five per cent of a full-time student load at a postsecondary educational institution which has been approved by a state-recognized or federally-recognized accrediting agency or body. “Full-time student load” means the number of credit hours, quarter credits or academic units required for a degree from such institution, divided by the number of academic terms needed to complete the degree.
(12) “Medical and surgical aid or hospital and nursing service”, when requested by an injured employee and approved by the administrative law judge, includes treatment by prayer or spiritual means through the application or use of the principles, tenets or teachings of any established church without the use of any drug or material remedy, provided sanitary and quarantine regulations are complied with, and provided all those ministering to the injured employee are bona fide members of such church.
(13) “Member” includes all parts of the human body referred to in subsection (b) of section 31-308.
(14) “Nursing” means the practice of nursing as defined in subsection (a) of section 20-87a, and “nurse” means a person engaged in such practice.
(15) “Occupational disease” includes any disease peculiar to the occupation in which the employee was engaged and due to causes in excess of the ordinary hazards of employment as such, and includes any disease due to or attributable to exposure to or contact with any radioactive material by an employee in the course of his employment.
(16) (A) “Personal injury” or “injury” includes, in addition to accidental injury that may be definitely located as to the time when and the place where the accident occurred, an injury to an employee that is causally connected with the employee's employment and is the direct result of repetitive trauma or repetitive acts incident to such employment, and occupational disease.
(B) “Personal injury” or “injury” shall not be construed to include:
(i) An injury to an employee that results from the employee's voluntary participation in any activity the major purpose of which is social or recreational, including, but not limited to, athletic events, parties and picnics, whether or not the employer pays some or all of the cost of such activity;
(ii) A mental or emotional impairment, unless such impairment (I) arises from a physical injury or occupational disease, (II) in the case of a police officer of the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, an organized local police department or a municipal constabulary, arises from such police officer's use of deadly force or subjection to deadly force in the line of duty, regardless of whether such police officer is physically injured, provided such police officer is the subject of an attempt by another person to cause such police officer serious physical injury or death through the use of deadly force, and such police officer reasonably believes such police officer to be the subject of such an attempt, or (III) in the case of an eligible individual as defined in section 31-294k, is a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress injury as defined in section 31-294k that meets all the requirements of section 31-294k. As used in this clause, “in the line of duty” means any action that a police officer is obligated or authorized by law, rule, regulation or written condition of employment service to perform, or for which the police officer or firefighter is compensated by the public entity such officer serves;
(iii) A mental or emotional impairment that results from a personnel action, including, but not limited to, a transfer, promotion, demotion or termination; or
(iv) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (B)(i) of this subdivision, “personal injury” or “injury” includes injuries to employees of local or regional boards of education resulting from participation in a school-sponsored activity but does not include any injury incurred while going to or from such activity. As used in this clause, “school-sponsored activity” means any activity sponsored, recognized or authorized by a board of education and includes activities conducted on or off school property and “participation” means acting as a chaperone, advisor, supervisor or instructor at the request of an administrator with supervisory authority over the employee.
(17) “Physician” includes any person licensed and authorized to practice a healing art, as defined in section 20-1, and licensed under the provisions of chapters 370, 372 and 373 to practice in this state.
(18) “Podiatrist” means any practitioner of podiatry, as defined in section 20-50, and duly licensed under the provisions of chapter 375 to practice in this state.
(19) “Presumptive dependents” means the following persons who are conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee: (A) A wife upon a husband with whom she lives at the time of his injury or from whom she receives support regularly; (B) a husband upon a wife with whom he lives at the time of her injury or from whom he receives support regularly; (C) any child under the age of eighteen, or over the age of eighteen but physically or mentally incapacitated from earning, upon the parent with whom he is living or from whom he is receiving support regularly, at the time of the injury of the parent; (D) any unmarried child who has attained the age of eighteen but has not attained the age of twenty-two and who is a full-time student, upon the parent with whom he is living or from whom he is receiving support regularly, provided, any child who has attained the age of twenty-two while a full-time student but has not completed the requirements for, or received, a degree from a postsecondary educational institution shall be deemed not to have attained the age of twenty-two until the first day of the first month following the end of the quarter or semester in which he is enrolled at the time, or if he is not enrolled in a quarter or semester system, until the first day of the first month following the completion of the course in which he is enrolled or until the first day of the third month beginning after such time, whichever occurs first.
(20) “Previous disability” means an employee's preexisting condition caused by the total or partial loss of, or loss of use of, one hand, one arm, one foot or one eye resulting from accidental injury, disease or congenital causes, or other permanent physical impairment.
(21) “Scar” means the mark left on the skin after the healing of a wound or sore, or any mark, damage or lasting effect resulting from past injury.
(22) “Second disability” means a disability arising out of a second injury.
(23) “Second injury” means an injury, incurred by accident, repetitive trauma, repetitive acts or disease arising out of and in the course of employment, to an employee with a previous disability.
(1949 Rev., S. 7416; 1949, S. 3037d; 1958 Rev., S. 31-139; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 1; 1967, P.A. 842, S. 1; 1969, P.A. 289; 556, S. 1; 696, S. 1; 806, S. 1; 1972, P.A. 281, S. 2; P.A. 77-614, S. 163, 610; P.A. 78-324, S. 3; P.A. 79-113; 79-540, S. 1; P.A. 80-124, S. 1; 80-284, S. 1; 80-414, S. 1; 80-482, S. 201, 348; 80-483, S. 95, 186; P.A. 82-398, S. 1; P.A. 84-320, S. 1, 6; P.A. 85-420, S. 1, 4; P.A. 88-184, S. 1, 3; 88-364, S. 50, 123; P.A. 91-32, S. 1, 41; 91-339, S. 1; P.A. 92-31, S. 1, 7; P.A. 93-228, S. 1, 35; P.A. 95-79, S. 117, 189; 95-262, S. 2, 3; P.A. 96-180, S. 104, 166; P.A. 97-205, S. 1; P.A. 99-102, S. 41; P.A. 01-208, S. 2, 3; June 30 Sp. Sess. P.A. 03-6, S. 146(c); P.A. 04-189, S. 1; P.A. 05-208, S. 4; 05-230, S. 1; 05-236, S. 2; P.A. 11-51, S. 134; 11-128, S. 2; P.A. 12-126, S. 1; P.A. 13-25, S. 4; P.A. 19-17, S. 1; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; 21-107, S. 1; P.A. 22-89, S. 1.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1967 act redefined “commission” as seven rather than five commissioners, added exception in definition of “dependent” and redefined “employer” as those employing one or more rather than two or more persons; 1969 acts redefined “arising out of and in the course of his employment” to include special provision re policemen and firemen, redefined “physician” to include those practicing a healing art and duly licensed rather than those practicing as chiropractors, added definition of “podiatrist”, redefined “occupational disease” to include diseases resulting from exposure to or contact with radioactive materials and specified “regularly” employed in Subdiv. (d) of definition of “employer”; 1972 act included persons elected as members of the general assembly in definition of “employee”; P.A. 77-614 made insurance department a division within the department of business regulation with insurance commissioner as its head, effective January 1, 1979; P.A. 78-324 included volunteer police officers in definition of “employee”; P.A. 79-113 divided section into Subsecs. and redefined “employee” and “employer” to include provisions re persons who are sole proprietors or partners in a business; P.A. 79-540 redefined “commission” to raise number of commissioners to eight and defined “compensation review division”; P.A. 80-124 substituted “causally” for “casually” in Subsec. (8); P.A. 80-284 inserted new Subsec. (13) defining “full-time student” and renumbered former Subsec. (13) accordingly; P.A. 80-414 redefined “commission” and “compensation review division” to reflect increase in number of commissioners to nine; P.A. 80-482 reinstated insurance department and deleted reference to abolished department of business regulation; P.A. 80-483 made technical correction; P.A. 82-398 defined “income”, including within it all forms of remuneration to an individual from his employment; P.A. 84-320 amended Subsecs. (2) and (3) to increase the number of commissioners to ten; P.A. 85-420 amended Subdivs. (2) and (3) to increase the number of commissioners to eleven; P.A. 88-184 redefined “commission” and “compensation review division” to reflect an increase in number of commissioners to thirteen; P.A. 88-364 made a technical change in Subsec. (5); P.A. 91-32 replaced existing definitions with Subdivs. (1) to (22), inclusive; P.A. 91-339 redefined “commission” in Subsec. (2), deleted definition of “compensation review division” in former Subsec. (5), deleted reference to Sec. 31-308b from renumbered Subsec. (6), added new Subsec. (8) defining “disfigurement” and added new Subsec. (21) defining “scar”, renumbering as necessary; P.A. 92-31 redefined “compensation” to delete dependency allowances; P.A. 93-228 redefined “arising out of and in the course of his employment”, “employee”, “employer” and “personal injury” in Subdivs. (1), (9), (10) and (16), respectively, added definition of “narcotic drugs” in Subdiv. (1), and deleted definitions of “significant disfigurement” and “significant scar” in Subdivs. (8) and (21), respectively, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 95-79 redefined “employer” in Subdiv. (10) to include a limited liability company, effective May 31, 1995; P.A. 95-262 amended Subdiv. (1) to redefine “arising out of and in the course of his employment” to exclude as a personal injury, any injury sustained at the employee's place of abode while the employee is engaged in a preliminary act or acts in preparation for work unless at the express direction or request of the employer, to define “place of abode” and to require the Workers' Compensation Commission to adopt regulations and to define “a preliminary act” and “acts in preparation for work”, effective July 6, 1995 (Revisor's note: The phrase “the Workers Compensation Commissioner shall adopt regulations” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “the Workers Compensation Commission shall adopt regulations” to correct an apparent clerical error in the reference to “Commissioner”); P.A. 96-180 amended Subdivs. (9) and (10) to make technical changes, effective June 3, 1996; P.A. 97-205 amended Subdiv. (16)(B) to define “personal injury” and “school-sponsored activity”; P.A. 99-102 amended Subdiv. (17) by deleting obsolete reference to chapter 371; P.A. 01-208 amended Subdiv. (1) by making technical changes throughout, designating existing Subpara. (A) as Subpara. (A)(i), adding Subpara. (A)(ii) re dependents of certain deceased employees of the Department of Correction and designating portions of existing Subpara. (E) as Subparas. (F) and (G), effective July 13, 2001; June 30 Sp. Sess. P.A. 03-6 replaced Commissioner of Consumer Protection with Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer Protection, effective July 1, 2004; P.A. 04-189 repealed Sec. 146 of June 30 Sp. Sess. P.A. 03-6, thereby reversing the merger of the Departments of Agriculture and Consumer Protection, effective June 1, 2004; P.A. 05-208 amended Subdiv. (16)(B)(ii) to exempt mental or emotional impairment of police officer arising from use of or subjection to deadly force from general mental or emotional impairment exclusion from definition of “personal injury” or “injury” and made technical changes throughout Subdiv. (16); P.A. 05-230 amended Subdiv. (1)(A) by adding new clause (ii) defining “in the course of his employment” for employees of Department of Correction, redesignating existing clause (ii) as clause (iii) and making a conforming change therein, and amended Subdiv. (1)(G) by requiring Workers' Compensation Commission to define “departure from place of abode directly to duty” and “return directly to place of abode after duty” by regulation on or before January 1, 2006; P.A. 05-236 amended Subdiv. (9)(A) by making technical changes in clause (vi) and adding clause (vii) to redefine “employee” to include members of the National Guard or other armed forces of the state called to active duty by Governor while performing active duty service, effective July 1, 2005; pursuant to P.A. 11-51, “Department of Public Safety” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection” in Subdiv. (16)(B)(ii), effective July 1, 2011; P.A. 11-128 added Subdiv. (9)(A)(viii) to redefine “employee” to include a person elected to serve as probate judge for a probate district established in Sec. 45a-2, effective July 1, 2011; P.A. 12-126 amended Subdiv. (16) to redefine “personal injury” or “injury”, effective June 15, 2012, and applicable to any claim filed after that date; P.A. 13-25 amended Subdiv. (9)(A)(vii) to change “officer or enlisted person” to “member”, delete reference to National Guard and replace provision re called to active duty by Governor with provision re performance of military duty, whether paid or unpaid; P.A. 19-17 amended Subdiv. (16) by redefining “personal injury” or “injury”, effective July 1, 2019; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “Commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “Administrative law judge” in Subdiv. (3) and “commissioner” and “compensation commissioner” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” in Subdivs. (3), (9)(B)(v), (10) and (12), effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 21-107 redefined “personal injury” in Subdiv. (16), effective June 30, 2021; P.A. 22-89 amended Subdiv. (10) to change references to “administrative law judge” to “chairperson”, to delete “either by personal presentation or by registered or certified mail”, to add reference to Sec. 31-321, and made technical changes, effective May 24, 2022.
See Sec. 31-294h re extent of benefits for mental or emotional impairment of police officers.
Dependent: Dependency is a question of fact. 89 C. 152; 95 C. 165; Id., 674. Father without income is dependent on minor though his earnings did not exceed the cost of his support. 90 C. 258; 105 C. 423. Cited. 91 C. 231; 106 C. 235; 130 C. 658; 131 C. 202; 132 C. 171. Adult son able to support his family is not a dependent of his father. 92 C. 458. Employee's mistress is not a dependent but illegitimate children are. 93 C. 423. Wife living with husband is presumably supported by him and not dependent of 11-year-old son. 95 C. 166. Father who adds son's wages to invested capital is not dependent. Id., 676. Sister held dependent who relied on decedent's earnings though his contributions were voluntary and not enforceable. 96 C. 303. Sister held dependent though not living with decedent. 97 C. 113. Employee: A sheriff is not an employee of the state though it pays him a salary; contract of employment implied. 89 C. 684. Employee distinguished from independent contractor. 90 C. 447; 95 C. 421; 96 C. 636; 105 C. 545; 107 C. 146. Musicians for a dance on defendant's premises engaged from an orchestra leader held defendant's employees. 92 C. 407. Newspaper reporter is an employee. 94 C. 159. Formerly policemen and firemen were not employees. Id., 403. One doing personal service to a corporation officer in hope of a tip not an employee of either the corporation or the officer. Id., 490. Consideration of whether or not one illegally employed is within the act. 95 C. 166. Employee distinguished from city officer. 96 C. 560. Firemen and policemen included in 1921. 102 C. 340. Tree warden is officer in supervisory duties and employee when performing manual labor. Id., 573. Burden is on claimant to show that he is employee. 105 C. 551. “Employer” includes one working for another in return for prior assistance from the other. 102 C. 474. “Outworker” does not include treasurer taking clerical work home to complete. 105 C. 520. “Personal injury” is a localized abnormal condition of the body directly and contemporaneously caused by accident. 91 C. 162. Erysipelas caused by frost bite due to employment is compensable. 90 C. 131. Also sunstroke from heat of the work. 93 C. 153; Id., 315. Under 1919 act, the injury need not be located at a definite time and place. 98 C. 652. A weakened condition making him susceptible to disease and injury. Id; 102 C. 10. Weakened resistance is injury only if incapacitating disease results; 1921 act broadly interpreted as to resulting diseases. 103 C. 98; Id., 707; 104 C. 718. These decisions seem to be overthrown by 1927 amendment; “occupational disease” was not compensable in original act. 90 C. 349; 91 C. 158. “Arising out of and in the course of his employment”: The definition given in present act overthrows expressions in some of the earlier cases; first defined. 90 C. 120. Causal connection must exist between the employment and the injury. Id., 119; Id., 309; 92 C. 387. Sufficient if employment creates condition from which the injury arose. 93 C. 587; 100 C. 392. This definition developed. 92 C. 276; 93 C. 315; 104 C. 712; 105 C. 517; Id., 698. That employee does work for his employer not strictly required does not put him out of the “course of his employment”; injuries held compensable received while returning to work after temporary stoppage. 92 C. 84. Resting on the premises waiting for his turn of work. Id., 277. Being transported to work by employer. Id., 91; 93 C. 85; 103 C. 564; 107 C. 505; 108 C. 630. Driving his own car on employer's business. 98 C. 548. When injury received on the highway is compensable. 105 C. 518; 107 C. 168. Foreman employed on the highway stepping across the road to speak to a friend. 93 C. 52. Stopping at a company store on the way home. Id., 59. Lightning stroke while park laborer was under a tree for shelter. 94 C. 12. Employer's pistol fired by a curious office boy. Id., 264. Stones thrown at employer's glass which employee was trying to protect. Id., 381. Following usual path over railroad tracks. 95 C. 412. Fall from scaffold where he worked though due to vertigo. 97 C. 46. Crossing tracks to get food for employer's dog. 98 C. 289. Traveling salesman injured in hotel fire. Id., 758. Injury by an insane fellow workman on the premises. 100 C. 377. Policeman going along the highway to police station. 102 C. 342. Hotel manager driving thief away from refrigerator. 103 C. 761. Insanity and suicide resulting from close application to library work. 107 C. 60. Compensation refused in the following cases: fighting with a fellow employee. 92 C. 386. Employee, sent by defendant to a doctor, took short cut across railroad tracks and was killed. 96 C. 343. Taking own route home from work though the company paid traveling expenses. Id., 355; 105 C. 518. Injury caused by smoking against orders in toilet. 104 C. 334. Injury from playful push by a visitor. 105 C. 397. Sleeping by permission in employer's barn. Id., 701. Doing work for oneself on employer's machine during the rest hour. 107 C. 517. Washing car sometimes used in employer's business. Id., 646. Scarlet fever contracted while in hospital for treatment of compensable injury. 108 C. 148. Claim to compensation must be based on more than speculation and conjecture. 146 C. 505. When an activity may be an incident of employment. 147 C. 267. “Aggravation of a preexisting disease” may be a personal injury. 90 C. 544. This term defined. 97 C. 552. Apportionment of the award is not made in case of death. 103 C. 705. Mere susceptibility is not a preexisting disease and “injury” means compensable injury. Id., 726. Syphilis “lighted up” by fall was compensable. 104 C. 365. Tuberculosis aggravated by employee doing any work, but not by the particular employment, not compensable. Id., 711. Aliter, when it is directly caused by the employment. Id., 726; 105 C. 656. Action denied when excitement aroused in a corporation manager by the result of a prosecution in court “lighted up” angina pectoris. 108 C. 493. Causal connection between factory conditions and grippe held too uncertain. 106 C. 365. Employer has burden of proof that preexisting disease contributed to the disability. 103 C. 731; 107 C. 66. Preexisting disease due to former employment by defendant is no mitigation. 107 C. 67. Cited. 110 C. 227; 112 C. 462; 114 C. 30; Id., 136; 125 C. 189; 127 C. 395. Minor illegally employed is covered. 131 C. 157. Employee or independent contractor. 121 C. 127; 123 C. 320; 124 C. 433; 126 C. 379. Trade or business and causal defined. 118 C. 367; 119 C. 224; 129 C. 44. Part or process of trade or business, but injury did not occur in, on or about premises under control of respondent. 125 C. 109. Statute does not require that time be fixed by stopwatch or the place by a mathematical point. 119 C. 44. What constitutes occupational disease. 118 C. 29; 128 C. 499. Tuberculosis not an occupational disease. 121 C. 664. Distinction between employee and independent contractor. 124 C. 433. Status of F.E.R.A. employee. 123 C. 504. Status of relief worker. 126 C. 265. Child employed in violation of law entitled to compensation. 111 C. 229. Meaning of “accidental injury”. 128 C. 608; 131 C. 572; 132 C. 118; Id., 479. Unusual susceptibility of linotypist. 128 C. 499. Employee killed on property not under control of employer. 130 C. 1; 131 C. 244. Previous condition of employee immaterial. 123 C. 192; 129 C. 532. Injury must arise out of employment and be causally traceable to it. 109 C. 378; Id., 473; 115 C. 446; 116 C. 297; 119 C. 1; Id., 170; Id., 248; Id., 694; 122 C. 343; overruled in part, see 339 C. 402; 123 C. 327; 124 C. 355; 129 C. 240; Id., 669; 130 C. 11; 133 C. 78; Id., 614. When bodily injury arises through weakened resistance, entitled to compensation. 110 C. 248; 129 C. 532. Injury from (pneumonia) weakened resistance does not entitle to compensation. 111 C. 188. Meaning of “through weakened resistance and lowered vitality”. 116 C. 186. Litigation neurosis not compensable. Id., 229. Apportionment for aggravation applied to death cases. 114 C. 389; 121 C. 71. Apportionment for aggravation of disease applies only to occupational disease. 130 C. 401. Deviation from employment. 132 C. 606. Domestic away from employer's house. 131 C. 334; Id., 341. Situation in which employee sought gasoline rations for the mutual benefit of employer and employee. 132 C. 563. Transportation provided by employer. 125 C. 238. Construction of “aggravation of preexisting syphilitic disease”. 122 C. 353. Where premises were under defendant's control, plaintiff held to be a subagent and employee. 134 C. 462. Plaintiffs injured by horseplay held not compensable. Id., 672. Commissioner's conclusion that claimant was employee of police department sustained. 136 C. 361. An employer may by his dealing with an employee annex to the actual performance of the work, as an incident of the employment, the going to or departure from work. 137 C. 134. Cited. Id., 486. If one employee assaults another to gratify his feeling of anger, the resulting injury does not arise out of the employment. Id., 626. Definitions of independent contractor restated. 138 C. 317. Plaintiff not on payroll, but paid by quantity, who used his own equipment and occasionally bought supplies for which he was reimbursed, was employee and not independent contractor, since defendant had general control of work. 148 C. 624. An employee seeking workmen's compensation has burden of proving that he sustained an injury, not merely in the course of his employment, but arising out of, that is, caused by, his employment. 150 C. 328. Cited. 154 C. 1, 4. Causal connection between employee's disability and his work must be established for him to be entitled to compensation. Id., 48, 52. Findings of fact by hearing commissioner that claimant was injured while using elevator in premises he was cleaning which he had expressly been forbidden to use would not be disturbed and conclusion claimant was not injured in course of his employment sustained. 155 C. 214. Benefits under Workmen's Compensation Act are payable only to claimants who have been dependents of employee whose injury or death is basis of award. 156 C. 245. “Employer” is one customarily using services of two or more employees and employee who was temporarily sole employee is still to be kept covered under act. Id., 276. Volunteer firemen are not included in definition of employee in statute. 159 C. 53. Cited. 162 C. 148; 163 C. 221; 165 C. 338, 340. “Injury”, as used in the Workmen's Compensation Act, includes an injury to employee which is causally connected with his employment and is the direct result of repetitive trauma or acts incident to such employment. 168 C. 413. Cited. 175 C. 392; Id., 424; 178 C. 371; Id., 664; 179 C. 501; Id., 662; 182 C. 24; 186 C. 623; 187 C. 53; 196 C. 91; 204 C. 104; 207 C. 420; 208 C. 589; 213 C. 54; 214 C. 394; Id., 552; 221 C. 29; 223 C. 336; 226 C. 508; 227 C. 333; Id., 930; 229 C. 587; 231 C. 287; 237 C. 490; 239 C. 19; Id., 676; 242 C. 570. Injury sustained by discharged employee while retrieving personal belongings compensable as injury sustained in the course of employment. 244 C. 502. In accord with prior cases, determination of whether injury arose out of and in the course of employment is a question of fact for commissioner; the “right to control” test cannot coexist with the “relative nature of work” test; court affirmed use of “right to control” test. 245 C. 613. Aggravation of preexisting psychiatric condition due to work-related physical injury may be a sufficiently distinct and identifiable injury constituting an impairment arising from a compensable work-related physical injury. 258 C. 137. When read in conjunction with Sec. 31-293a, statute plainly states that emotional distress not arising from physical injury is not compensable through workers' compensation. 265 C. 21. Question of whether injuries resulted from incident that occurred in course of employment is a separate and distinct question from whether injuries arose out of employment; if supported by evidence and not inconsistent with the law, commissioner's inference that injury did or did not arise out of and in the course of employment is conclusive. 267 C. 583. In-home health care worker comes within traveling employee exception to “coming and going rule”, and injury sustained during travel from her home to home of patient is injury “arising out of and in the course of his employment”. 274 C. 219. Compensation review board improperly concluded that workers' compensation commissioner lacked jurisdiction over claim because the injury occurred on navigable waters of the United States and, therefore, federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over the claim under Art. III, Sec. 2 and Art. I, Sec. 8 of U.S. Constitution and Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 USC section 901 et seq.; state has concurrent jurisdiction with federal government over claims involving injuries incurred on navigable waters when the employer and employee are locally based, the employment contract is performed within the state and partly on land, the injury took place on state's territorial waters and the employer was required under the state act to secure compensation for any land-based injuries incurred by employee. 283 C. 1. Apportionment or proportional reduction of benefits appropriate when respondent employer is able to prove that disability has resulted from combination of two concurrently developing disease processes, one that is nonoccupational and the other that is occupational in nature, and conditions of claimant's occupation have no influence on development of nonoccupational disease. 284 C. 479. Savage v. St. Aeden's Church, 122 C. 343, is overruled insofar as it concluded that an employee is entitled to compensation as a matter of law when, during the course of his or her employment, the employee is injured due to idiopathic fall onto level floor. In addition, any previous suggestion that an injury is not compensable unless caused by a hazard unique or distinctive to the employment is disavowed. 339 C. 402.
Cited. 3 CA 16; Id., 370; 5 CA 369; 18 CA 614; 21 CA 610; 24 CA 234; 25 CA 599; 27 CA 800; 28 CA 226; 32 CA 595; 38 CA 1; 41 CA 430; 42 CA 803; 44 CA 397. Based on facts presented, plaintiff's injury was compensable when sustained during a basketball game organized by supervisors during working hours. 91 CA 345. Injured personal care assistant who worked 25.75 hours per week not employee because did not work 26 hours per work as required by Subdiv. (9) definition of employee. 108 CA 581. The term “employer” does not include the U.S. Postal Service because the federal government has not expressly consented to the jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Act. 111 CA 821; judgment affirmed, see 296 C. 426. Plaintiff's asthma was an occupational disease because his employment was more likely to cause this disease than would other kinds of employment carried on under same conditions. 115 CA 702. Police officer's injuries while driving his children to day care before his shift were compensable because police officers are “portal-to-portal” employees and he was traveling his usual route to work when collision occurred. 157 CA 822. Although the definition of “occupational disease” may be derived from workers' compensation law, it does not follow that the term applies only to workers' compensation claims brought against one's own employer; clauses in asbestos liability insurance contracts that exclude coverage for occupational disease do not bar coverage only for occupational disease claims brought by a policyholder's own employees, but also apply to complainants who developed occupational disease while using the policyholder's products in the course of working for another employer. 171 CA 61; judgment affirmed, see 333 C. 343. Although the personal infirmity that caused plaintiff to fall backward and hit her head on the ground at her place of employment did not arise out of her employment, the resultant injuries that were caused by her head hitting the ground at her workplace did arise out of her employment. 182 CA 224; judgment reversed, see 339 C. 402.
When the life expectancy of the decedent is less than the term covered by the award. 2 CS 30. Compensation is allowed only when the preexisting disease is aggravated by the injury; it does not include the situation where the injury is made more serious because of the preexisting disease. 6 CS 256. Plaintiff injured while being transported to place of employment by employer on day before her salary began was within the course of her employment. Id., 288. Heart condition is not necessarily inconsistent with the occurrence of an accident within the concept of statute. 7 CS 5. One who reported to a municipal station after each snowfall for employment in snow removal work was not an employee under act until he was hired. 12 CS 313. Cited. 13 CS 417. Enlargement of plaintiff's heart not a “personal injury”. 14 CS 131. Cited. 15 CS 324. Distinction drawn between “special hazards” test and “arising out of and in the course of his employment”. 20 CS 202. Injury sustained as result of playing basketball at company club held not to have arisen out of and in the course of employment. 24 CS 262. Cited. 37 CS 836; 38 CS 324; 39 CS 408.
Former Subsec. (b):
“Employment of casual nature” defined. 90 C. 451; 92 C. 407; 105 C. 594; 107 C. 363. Police duty is not, though on theater assignment. 102 C. 342. Washing windows in defendant's factory is not. 107 C. 192. This exception not to be construed strictly against employee. Id., 364.
Former Subsec. (c):
Employee of partnership not barred because the son lived in the house of a partner. 91 C. 380.
Subdiv. (1):
Compensation for aggravation of plaintiff's post-traumatic stress disorder is not limited by apportionment provisions of Subpara. (D). 259 C. 29. The term “place of abode”, as used in Subpara. (A), does not include the public street. 324 C. 14.
Special policeman appointed pursuant to Sec. 29-18 is not a policeman for purposes of Subpara. (A) if he has limited authority to arrest or to carry weapons, was not issued a state vehicle, was not entitled to travel pay, and lacked training required of police officers. 60 CA 707. Subpara. (C): Intoxication of the employee, as cause of injury, is not a jurisdictional fact requiring the claimant to prove the lack thereof, but an affirmative defense to be proved by the employer. 136 CA 258. Although police officers enjoy “portal to portal” coverage under act, officer's slip and fall on patch of ice in his driveway did not occur in the course of employment. 143 CA 313. Because defendant concedes that plaintiff's preexisting condition was not occupational, defendant is not entitled to apportionment of plaintiff's disability to aggravation of preexisting condition attributable to work injury under Subpara. (D). 164 CA 41.
Subdiv. (5):
Cited. 193 C. 59; 203 C. 34. Subpara. (D): Work in construction of barn on premises of private residence not in excess of 26 hours a week is excluded from provisions of Workers' Compensation Act. 219 C. 674. Cited. 228 C. 401.
Subdiv. (9):
Cited. 225 C. 165. Term “employee” encompasses illegal alien, thus claim for work-related injury by illegal alien was within jurisdictional confines of Workers' Compensation Act. 244 C. 781. In order to be “regularly employed” pursuant to Subpara. (B)(iv), a person must work more than 26 hours per week during majority of the 52 weeks preceding date of his or her injury. 265 C. 816. Subpara. (A): Member of a single-member limited liability company may be an “employee” of the company if the member performed services for the company and was subject to the hazards of the company's business. 331 C. 289.
Cited. 29 CA 249. The 52 week period used in 265 Conn. 816 is not a reasonable time period to determine if claimant was regularly employed by respondent, and commissioner properly examined the 11 week period of employment to determine what the usual practice was between respondent and claimant. 180 CA 355.
Subdiv. (10):
Joint venture between two nonprofit organizations may be an employer under Workers' Compensation Act. 252 C. 641. “Public corporation” signifies corporations organized for a public purpose such as municipalities and counties and “within the state” means those that are organized and existing pursuant to the laws of this state, therefore U.S. Postal Service is not an employer for purposes of section and Workers' Compensation Act. 296 C. 426. A single-member limited liability company is not required to elect to accept the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act in order for its member to be covered, rather, the member may be covered automatically as an employer. 331 C. 289.
Subdiv. (16):
Subpara. (A): Exposures to two potentially fatal infectious diseases are compensable injuries under the act. 241 C. 692. Subpara. (B)(ii): Although plaintiff police officer suffered an occupational disease pursuant to Subdiv. (15), his post-traumatic stress disorder is excluded from coverage under this Subdiv. because it did not arise from a physical injury. 250 C. 65. Legislative intent of Subdiv. states that mental anguish resulting from sexual assault would be compensable under workers' compensation. 252 C. 215. Pursuant to Subpara. (A), three types of injuries fall within definition of “personal injury” and are covered by the act: Accidental injuries, repetitive trauma injuries and occupational diseases. Id., 596. When aggravation of a preexisting psychiatric condition is direct consequence of a work-related physical injury, aggravation of the psychiatric condition is, itself, a sufficiently distinct and identifiable injury to constitute “mental or emotional impairment” that “arises from” compensable work-related physical injury under Subpara. (B)(ii). 259 C. 29. Subpara. (B): Tort actions for emotional injuries that are not compensable under act are not barred by exclusivity provisions of act. Id., 729.
Cited. 45 CA 707. Decedent's stress-related fatal heart attack was a compensable personal injury and thus recovery of death benefits was not precluded by terms of statutory provision. 96 CA 207. The social-recreational exception was intended to eliminate coverage under act for injuries that occurred while employee was engaged in voluntary sporting activities or in an act for his or her relaxation or enjoyment on employer's premises, such as power walking, even when there was employer approval or acquiescence. 112 CA 492. Term “arises from” in Subpara. (B)(ii) requires a causal relationship between a physical injury or occupational disease and a claimed mental impairment in order for the mental impairment to be compensable under act. 123 CA 372.
Subdiv. (19):
Cited. 226 C. 569. Entitlement to permanent partial disability benefits for a presumptive dependent of a deceased employee vests when the deceased employee reaches maximum medical improvement and does not require that the employee make an affirmative request for such benefits. 299 C. 185.
Secs. 31-275a and 31-275b. District defined; continuation of commissioners in office. Workers' compensation districts. Sections 31-275a and 31-275b are repealed.
(April, 1964, P.A. 3, S. 3; 1969, P.A. 662, S. 1, 2; 1972, P.A. 190; June, 1972, P.A. 1, S. 7; P.A. 79-376, S. 34, 35; P.A. 84-320, S. 3, 6; P.A. 91-32, S. 2, 41; 91-339, S. 53–55.)
Sec. 31-275c. Officers of fraternal organizations. The officer of a fraternal corporation who receives a salary of less than one hundred dollars per year shall not be considered an employee under section 31-275.
(1969, P.A. 806, S. 2.)
Sec. 31-275d. Term “administrative law judge” substituted for “workers' compensation commissioner”, “compensation commissioner” and “commissioner”. (a)(1) Wherever the words “workers' compensation commissioner”, “compensation commissioner” or “commissioner” are used to denote a workers' compensation commissioner in the following sections of the general statutes, the words “administrative law judge” shall be substituted in lieu thereof: 4-186, 5-170, 5-192h, 17b-341, 19a-641, 28-14, 29-4a, 31-275, 31-276, 31-277, 31-278, 31-279, 31-280, 31-280a, 31-280b, 31-282, 31-283, 31-283d, 31-283e, 31-283f, 31-284c, 31-286, 31-286a, 31-286b, 31-288, 31-289a, 31-290a, 31-293, 31-294b, 31-294c, 31-294d, 31-294e, 31-294f, 31-296, 31-296a, 31-297, 31-297a, 31-298, 31-299, 31-299a, 31-299b, 31-300, 31-301, 31-301c, 31-301d, 31-302, 31-306, 31-306b, 31-307a, 31-308, 31-308a, 31-310, 31-312, 31-313, 31-315, 31-316, 31-318, 31-321, 31-323, 31-326, 31-327, 31-329, 31-341, 31-342, 31-343, 31-349, 31-349b, 31-349c, 31-353, 31-355, 38a-470, 38a-500, 38a-527, 46b-231, 51-49, 51-49a, 51-49b, 51-49c, 51-49d, 51-49g, 51-49h, 51-49i, 51-49j, 51-50, 51-50a, 51-50b, 51-51, 51-51h, 51-51i, 51-51k, 51-51l, 51-51m, 51-51n, 51-51o, 51-51p, 51-51q, 51-51r, 51-51s, 51-63 and 52-149a.
(2) Wherever the words “workers' compensation commissioner”, “compensation commissioner” or “commissioner” are used to denote a workers' compensation commissioner in any public act of the 2021 session, the words “administrative law judge” shall be substituted in lieu thereof.
(b) The Legislative Commissioners' Office shall, in codifying said sections of the general statutes pursuant to subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section or any public act of the 2021 session pursuant to subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section, make such technical, grammatical and punctuation changes as are necessary to carry out the purposes of this section.
(P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
Sec. 31-276. Workers' Compensation Commission. Administrative law judges. Nomination by Governor. Appointment by General Assembly. Terms of office. Removal. Selection of chairman.(a) There shall be a Workers' Compensation Commission to administer the workers' compensation system. There shall be sixteen administrative law judges. On or before the date of the expiration of the term of each administrative law judge or upon the occurrence of a vacancy in the office of any administrative law judge for any reason, the Governor shall nominate a competent person to fill that office. Subsequent to July 1, 1993, each person nominated by the Governor to serve as an administrative law judge shall have been a member in good standing of the Connecticut bar for at least five years preceding the nomination, provided the Governor shall not be precluded from renominating an individual who has previously served as an administrative law judge. The administrative law judges shall, upon nomination by the Governor, be appointed by the General Assembly as prescribed by law. They shall serve for a term of five years, but may be removed by impeachment. The Governor shall from time to time select one of the sixteen administrative law judges to serve as chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission at the pleasure of the Governor. The administrative law judge selected by the Governor to be chairperson shall have previously served as an administrative law judge in this state for at least one year.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, on and after October 1, 1988, any administrative law judge whose term expires on December thirty-first shall continue to serve until the next succeeding March thirty-first.
(c) Each nomination made by the Governor to the General Assembly for an administrative law judge shall be referred, without debate, to the committee on the judiciary, which shall report thereon within thirty legislative days from the time of reference, but no later than seven legislative days before the adjourning of the General Assembly. Each appointment by the General Assembly of an administrative law judge shall be by concurrent resolution. The action on the passage of each such resolution in the House and in the Senate shall be by vote taken on the electrical roll-call device. No resolution shall contain the name of more than one nominee. The Governor shall, within five days after he has notice that any nomination for an administrative law judge made by him has failed to be approved by the affirmative concurrent action of both houses of the General Assembly, make another nomination to such office.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 4-19, no vacancy in the position of an administrative law judge shall be filled by the Governor when the General Assembly is not in session unless, prior to such filling, the Governor submits the name of the proposed vacancy appointee to the committee on the judiciary. Within forty-five days, the committee on the judiciary may, upon the call of either chairperson, hold a special meeting for the purpose of approving or disapproving such proposed vacancy appointee by majority vote. The Governor shall not administer the oath of office to such proposed vacancy appointee until the committee has approved such proposed vacancy appointee. If the committee determines that it cannot complete its investigation and act on such proposed vacancy appointee within such forty-five-day period, it may extend such period by an additional fifteen days. The committee shall notify the Governor in writing of any such extension. Failure of the committee to act on such proposed vacancy appointee within such forty-five-day period or any fifteen-day extension period shall be deemed to be an approval.
(e) Each administrative law judge shall be sworn to a faithful performance of his duties. After notice and public hearing the Governor may remove any administrative law judge for cause and the good of the public service. Each administrative law judge shall devote his full time to the duties of his office and shall not be otherwise gainfully employed.
(1949 Rev., S. 7435; 1958 Rev., S. 31-140; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 2; April, 1964, P.A. 3, S. 1; February, 1965, P.A. 577, S. 1; 1969, P.A. 662, S. 3; 1971, P.A. 639, S. 2; P.A. 80-414, S. 2; P.A. 83-353, S. 2; P.A. 84-320, S. 2, 6; 84-546, S. 154, 173; P.A. 85-420, S. 2, 4; P.A. 87-301; P.A. 88-125; 88-184, S. 2, 3; P.A. 91-339, S. 2, 55; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 91-12, S. 50, 55; P.A. 92-176, S. 1, 2; P.A. 93-228, S. 2, 35; P.A. 94-193, S. 2; May 25 Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-1, S. 29, 130; P.A. 96-72, S. 1, 2; P.A. 07-29, S. 1; P.A. 10-32, S. 104; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; P.A. 22-89, S. 5.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1964 act revised districts along other than congressional district lines; 1965 act raised number of commissioners from 5 to 7, consisting of one for each of the six congressional districts and one at-large commissioner; 1969 act raised number of commissioners to 8 and revised districts to be those created under Sec. 31-275b rather than congressional districts; 1971 act required commissioners to devote full time to duties of office; P.A. 80-414 increased number of commissioners to 9, created position of chairman of the board and specified his qualifications and appointment procedure; P.A. 83-353 amended Subsec. (a) to provide that the governor shall “nominate” rather than “appoint” the commissioners, added Subsec. (b) re the procedure for appointment by the general assembly and added Subsec. (c) re the procedure for the nomination and appointment of commissioners to fill vacancies while the general assembly is not in session, deleting prior provision whereby governor was solely responsible for filling vacancies; P.A. 84-320 amended Subsec. (a) to provide for 10 commissioners, and to provide that the commissioner from the new eighth district shall be nominated by the governor on or before January 1, 1985; P.A. 84-546 made technical change, referring to “houses” rather than “branches” of the general assembly; P.A. 85-420 amended Subsec. (a) to increase the number of at-large commissioners from one to two; P.A. 87-301 revised Subsec. (a) by eliminating references to specific appointments of commissioners commencing January first and July first and rewording appointment provisions, adding provision re appointment by general assembly as prescribed by law and removal by impeachment; P.A. 88-125 inserted new Subsec. (b) to specify that term of any commissioner on and after October 1, 1988, whose term expires on December thirty-first shall continue to serve until next succeeding March thirty-first; and relettered remaining Subsecs.; P.A. 88-184 amended Subsec. (a) to provide for 13 commissioners, including 4 commissioners at large, and to provide that the 2 commissioners at large shall be nominated by the governor on or before October 1, 1988; P.A. 91-339 amended Subsec. (a) by adding provisions re workers' compensation commission, changing number of commissioners from 13 to 14, deleting provisions re district and at large commissioners and the chairman of the board of compensation commissioners, adding requirement that not less than two commissioners reside in each U.S. congressional district and adding provisions re selection of the chairman of the workers' compensation commission; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 91-12 amended Subsec. (a) by changing the required period that the chairman must serve as a compensation commissioner prior to selection by the governor from three years to two years; P.A. 92-176 amended Subsec. (a) to provide that the commissioner selected to be chairman shall have served as a compensation commissioner for at least one year, rather than two years; P.A. 93-228 amended Subsec. (a) to increase the number of workers' compensation commissioners from 14 to 16 and to provide that persons nominated as commissioners shall have been members of the Connecticut bar for at least five years, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 94-193, effective October 1, 1994, and May 25 Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-1, effective July 1, 1994, both made a technical correction in Subsec. (a) by amending a provision changing the number of workers' compensation commissioners from 14 to 16 which was omitted from P.A. 93-228; P.A. 96-72 amended Subsec. (a) to eliminate the requirement that not less than two commissioners reside in each United States congressional district, effective May 8, 1996; P.A. 07-29 amended Subsec. (d) to increase from 10 to 45 days the time period after submission of nomination that judiciary committee is authorized to hold a special meeting, prohibit the Governor administering the oath of office to an appointee until committee has approved such appointee, authorize committee to extend the 45-day period by an additional 15 days if committee cannot complete investigation and act within the 45-day period, require committee to notify the Governor in writing of extension and replace “such ten-day period” with “such forty-five day period or any fifteen-day extension period”, effective July 1, 2007; P.A. 10-32 made a technical change in Subsec. (b), effective May 10, 2010; pursuant to P.A. 21-18,”commissioner” and “compensation commissioner” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” and “workers' compensation commissioners” and “commissioners” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judges” throughout, effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 22-89 made technical changes in Subsecs. (a) and (d), effective May 24, 2022.
See Sec. 31-278 re powers and duties of commissioners.
Commissioner is not a court; some of his acts are quasi-judicial and some wholly administrative. 89 C. 148. Appointment of commissioner unaffected by subsequent resignation of Governor. 133 C. 687.
Cited. 14 CS 421.
Sec. 31-276a. Commissioners and commission to be within Labor Department for administrative purposes only. Section 31-276a is repealed, effective October 1, 2021.
(P.A. 77-614, S. 481, 610; P.A. 79-376, S. 36; P.A. 21-18, S. 8.)
Sec. 31-277. Salary of administrative law judges. Longevity payments. (a) Each administrative law judge shall, during his first year of service as an administrative law judge, receive an annual salary of six thousand dollars less than the highest step level of a Superior Court judge; during his second year of service as an administrative law judge, each administrative law judge shall receive an annual salary of five thousand dollars less than the highest step level of a Superior Court judge; during his third year of service as an administrative law judge, he shall receive an annual salary of four thousand dollars less than the highest step level of a Superior Court judge; during his fourth year of service as an administrative law judge, he shall receive an annual salary of three thousand dollars less than the highest step level of a Superior Court judge; during his fifth year of service as an administrative law judge, he shall receive an annual salary of two thousand dollars less than the highest step level of a Superior Court judge; and during his sixth year of service as an administrative law judge, he shall receive an annual salary of one thousand dollars less than the highest step level of a Superior Court judge, together with his necessary clerical, office and travel expenses as approved by the Comptroller; and the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission shall receive in addition ten thousand dollars annually. Each administrative law judge shall devote his entire time to the duties of his office and shall not be otherwise gainfully employed.
(b) Each administrative law judge, who has completed not less than ten years of service as an administrative law judge, or other state service or service as an elected officer of the state, or any combination of such service, shall receive semiannual longevity payments based on service completed as of the first day of July and the first day of January of each year as follows:
(1) An administrative law judge who has completed ten or more years but less than fifteen years of service shall receive one-quarter of three per cent of the annual salary payable under subsection (a) of this section.
(2) An administrative law judge who has completed fifteen or more years but less than twenty years of service shall receive one-half of three per cent of the annual salary payable under subsection (a) of this section.
(3) An administrative law judge who has completed twenty or more years but less than twenty-five years of service shall receive three-quarters of three per cent of the annual salary payable under subsection (a) of this section.
(4) An administrative law judge who has completed twenty-five or more years of service shall receive three per cent of the annual salary payable under subsection (a) of this section.
(1949 Rev., S. 3600; 1951, 1955, S. 1969d; 1958 Rev., S. 31-141; 1959, P.A. 428, S. 1; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 3; February, 1965, P.A. 331, S. 45; 1969, P.A. 696, S. 2; P.A. 76-436, S. 621, 681; P.A. 79-540, S. 10, 11; P.A. 84-399, S. 12, 17; P.A. 91-32, S. 3, 41; P.A. 93-379, S. 7, 8; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 00-1, S. 38, 46; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; P.A. 22-89, S. 6.)
History: 1959 act raised commissioners' salary from $13,500 to $15,000; 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1965 act increased commissioners' salary to $17,500; 1969 act replaced specific salary with provision calling for salaries “in an amount equal to that paid to a judge of the court of common pleas”; P.A. 76-436 called for salaries of $6,000 less than the “highest step level of a superior court judge”, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 79-540 replaced single salary figure with schedule of salaries fixed according to years of service; P.A. 84-399 amended section by adding Subsec. (b) re longevity payments; P.A. 91-32 deleted obsolete references to July 1, 1979, and made technical changes; P.A. 93-379 amended Subsec. (b) to permit credit for longevity purposes for other state service or service as an elected official of the state or any combination of service, effective June 30, 1993; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 00-1 amended Subsec. (a) to increase additional compensation of chairman from $1,000 annually to $10,000 annually, effective July 1, 2000; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 22-89 made a technical change, effective May 24, 2022.
See Sec. 51-47 re salaries of judges.
Sec. 31-278. Powers and duties of administrative law judges. Each administrative law judge shall, for the purposes of this chapter, have power to summon and examine under oath such witnesses, and may direct the production of, and examine or cause to be produced or examined, such books, records, vouchers, memoranda, documents, letters, contracts or other papers in relation to any matter at issue as he may find proper, and shall have the same powers in reference thereto as are vested in magistrates taking depositions and shall have the power to order depositions pursuant to section 52-148. He shall have power to certify to official acts and shall have all powers necessary to enable him to perform the duties imposed upon him by the provisions of this chapter. Each administrative law judge shall hear all claims and questions arising under this chapter in the district to which the administrative law judge is assigned and all such claims shall be filed in the district in which the claim arises, provided, if it is uncertain in which district a claim arises, or if a claim arises out of several injuries or occupational diseases which occurred in one or more districts, the administrative law judge to whom the first request for hearing is made shall hear and determine such claim to the same extent as if it arose solely within his own district. If an administrative law judge is disqualified or temporarily incapacitated from hearing any matter, or if the parties shall so request and the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission finds that it will facilitate a speedier disposition of the claim, he shall designate some other administrative law judge to hear and decide such matter. The Superior Court, on application of an administrative law judge or the chairperson or the Attorney General, may enforce, by appropriate decree or process, any provision of this chapter or any proper order of an administrative law judge or the chairperson rendered pursuant to any such provision. Any administrative law judge, after ceasing to hold office as such administrative law judge, may settle and dispose of all matters relating to appealed cases, including correcting findings and certifying records, as well as any other unfinished matters pertaining to causes theretofore tried by him, to the same extent as if he were still such administrative law judge.
(1949 Rev., S. 7436; 1958 Rev., S. 31-142; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 4; February, 1965, P.A. 577, S. 2; 1969, P.A. 662, S. 4; 1971, P.A. 339; P.A. 73-152; P.A. 76-80, S. 1, 3; P.A. 80-414, S. 4; P.A. 81-472, S. 65, 159; P.A. 82-289, S. 2; P.A. 84-320, S. 4, 6; P.A. 91-339, S. 4, 55; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; P.A. 22-89, S. 7.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1965 act added exceptions to residency requirement, established sixth district office in New Britain and revised list of towns which serve as hearing locations; 1969 act deleted references to “congressional” districts, established seventh district office in Stamford and revised list of towns which serve as hearing locations; 1971 act deleted exceptions to residency requirement which had existed for fourth district commissioner and which had stated that at-large commissioner must reside in a town of the state, added proviso re jurisdiction in cases where there is uncertainty as to district in which claim arises, allowed designation of other than usual commissioner to hear claims if parties request it and commissioner finds it will aid speedy disposition; P.A. 73-152 revised list of towns which serve as hearing locations; P.A. 76-80 empowered commissioners “to order depositions pursuant to section 52-148”; P.A. 80-414 added provision re board chairman's maintenance of an office; P.A. 81-472 made technical changes; P.A. 82-289 referred to Norwich as a town rather than as a city; P.A. 84-320 provided that the commissioner for the eighth district shall maintain an office in Middletown, and that hearings in the district shall be held in Middletown; P.A. 91-339 deleted provisions re commissioners residing in assigned districts and requirements re office locations and changed certain references to “commission” to read “chairman”, effective July 1, 1992; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” and “compensation commissioner” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 22-89 made technical changes, effective May 24, 2022.
See Sec. 31-276 re compensation commissioners' nomination, appointment, terms of office, removal, etc.
Commissioner has jurisdiction only in his own district unless local commissioner is “disqualified or incapacitated”; cannot act by consent of parties. 99 C. 236. Powers of commissioners are purely statutory. 108 C. 33. Contract made in this state, to be performed in another state, governed by our law. 111 C. 696. No jurisdiction to determine rights between employer and two insurance companies. 113 C. 504; 120 C. 503. When acting commissioner is disqualified, commissioner in whose district accident occurred has jurisdiction to name commissioner to act further. 118 C. 29. Cited. 129 C. 594; 132 C. 172; 133 C. 668; 218 C. 46; 232 C. 758. Section does not give commissioner subject matter jurisdiction over insurance coverage issues that require application of laws other than provisions of Workers' Compensation Act. 248 C. 754. Because of the use of “may” instead of “shall”, commissioners are permitted, not required, to continue to hear cases subsequent to their retirement. 251 C. 153.
Cited. 16 CA 138; 21 CA 9; judgment reversed, see 218 C. 46; 22 CA 539; judgment reversed, see 219 C. 439; 24 CA 234; 29 CA 249; 31 CA 819; 34 CA 673; 36 CA 150. The language of the statute does not confer jurisdiction on the commissioner to pierce the corporate veil of a defendant employer. 204 CA 665.
Former commissioner who heard the case originally had authority to hear it upon remand after appeal. 14 CS 302. Cited. 39 CS 321.
Sec. 31-279. Notice of availability of compensation. Uniform system for determination of degree of physical impairment. Employer-sponsored plan for medical care and treatment. Indemnification of medical advisory panel members. (a) The chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission shall adopt regulations, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54, specifying the minimum information to be contained in a notice of the availability of compensation which shall be posted in the workplace by each employer subject to the provisions of this chapter pursuant to subsection (f) of section 31-284.
(b) The chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission shall, not later than July 1, 1991, adopt regulations, in accordance with chapter 54, to create a uniform system to be used by medical professionals in determining the degree of physical impairment of persons receiving compensation under this chapter.
(c) (1) Any employer or any insurer acting on behalf of an employer, may establish a plan, subject to the approval of the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission under subsection (d) of this section, for the provision of medical care that the employer provides for treatment of any injury or illness under this chapter. Each plan shall contain such information as the chairperson shall require, including, but not limited to:
(A) A listing of all persons who will provide services under the plan, along with appropriate evidence that each person listed has met any licensing, certification or registration requirement necessary for the person to legally provide the service in this state;
(B) A listing of all pharmacies that will provide services under the plan, to which the employer, any insurer acting on behalf of the employer, or any other entity acting on behalf of the employer or insurer shall make direct payments for any prescription drug prescribed by a physician participating in the plan;
(C) A designation of the times, places and manners in which the services will be provided;
(D) A description of how the quality and quantity of medical care will be managed; and
(E) Such other provisions as the employer and the employees may agree to, subject to the approval of the chairperson.
(2) The election by an employee covered by a plan established under this subsection to obtain medical care and treatment from a provider of medical services who is not listed in the plan shall suspend the employee's right to compensation, subject to the order of the administrative law judge.
(d) Each plan established under subsection (c) of this section shall be submitted to the chairperson for his approval at least one hundred twenty days before the proposed effective date of the plan and each approved plan, along with any proposed changes therein, shall be resubmitted to the chairperson every two years thereafter for reapproval. The chairperson shall approve or disapprove such plans on the basis of standards established by the chairperson in consultation with a medical advisory panel appointed by the chairperson. Such standards shall include, but not be limited to: (1) The ability of the plan to provide all medical and health care services that may be required under this chapter in a manner that is timely, effective and convenient for the employees; (2) the inclusion in the plan of all categories of medical service and of an adequate number of providers of each type of medical service in accessible locations to ensure that employees are given an adequate choice of providers; (3) the provision in the plan for appropriate financial incentives to reduce service costs and utilization without a reduction in the quality of service; (4) the inclusion in the plan of fee screening, peer review, service utilization review and dispute resolution procedures designed to prevent inappropriate or excessive treatment; and (5) the inclusion in the plan of a procedure by which information on medical and health care service costs and utilization will be reported to the chairperson in order for him to determine the effectiveness of the plan.
(e) Any person who serves as a member of the medical advisory panel, appointed by the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, shall be deemed to be a state officer or employee for purposes of indemnification and defense under section 5-141d.
(1949 Rev., S. 7437; September, 1957, P.A. 11, S. 13; 1958 Rev., S. 31-143; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 5; 1967, P.A. 842, S. 2; 1969, P.A. 556, S. 3; P.A. 90-116, S. 1; P.A. 91-32, S. 4, 41; 91-339, S. 5, 55; P.A. 93-228, S. 3, 35; P.A. 95-240; P.A. 01-85, S. 1, 3; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; P.A. 22-89, S. 8.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1967 act added provisions re commissioners' duties to maintain approved list of practicing physicians, surgeons and dentists, etc.; 1969 act added podiatrists to approved list; P.A. 90-116 added provision concerning regulations creating a uniform system for determination of the degree of physical impairment; P.A. 91-32 added provisions re notice of availability of compensation and made technical changes; P.A. 91-339 deleted provisions re adoption of rules by the commissioners, designated provisions re notice of availability of compensation as Subsec. (a) and authorized the chairman to adopt regulations governing, deleted provisions re list of physicians, surgeons, podiatrists and dentists, designated provisions re uniform system for determination of degree of physical impairment as Subsec. (b) and authorized the chairman to adopt regulations governing, deleted provisions re annual report of commissioner to the governor and added Subsecs. (c) to (e), inclusive, re employer-sponsored plans for medical care and treatment; P.A. 93-228 amended Subsec. (c) to delete requirement that employer-sponsored plans for medical care and treatment by employers with fifty or more employees include designation of labor-management safety committee and to prohibit employees from receiving compensation for treatment outside such plans, deleting provisions which had specified conditions permitting care and treatment by outside providers and deleted Subsec. (e) re compensation for treatment by practitioners not listed in employer-sponsored plans, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 95-240 added Subsec. (e) re indemnification of members of the medical advisory panel; P.A. 01-85 amended Subsec. (c) by dividing existing provisions into Subdivs. (1)(A) and (1)(C) to (E) and Subdiv. (2), adding Subdiv. (1)(B) re direct payments to pharmacies and making technical changes, effective January 1, 2002; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” in Subsec. (c)(2), effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 22-89 made technical changes, effective May 24, 2022.
Cited. 219 C. 439.
Cited. 29 CA 249.
Sec. 31-279a. Booklet to be distributed explaining act. The chairman of the Workers' Compensation Commission shall prepare, publish and distribute an illustrated booklet explaining, in informal and readily understandable language, employee benefits and responsibilities under the Workers' Compensation Act. The chairman shall prepare, publish and distribute revisions to such booklet whenever changes in the workers' compensation law necessitate such revision.
(P.A. 73-421; P.A. 79-376, S. 37; P.A. 92-31, S. 2, 7.)
History: P.A. 79-376 replaced “workmen's compensation” with “workers' compensation”; P.A. 92-31 substituted “chairman of workers' compensation commission” for “workers' compensation commissioners”.
Sec. 31-279b. Notice of availability of coverage under act. Content. Posting.Section 31-279b is repealed.
(P.A. 75-223; P.A. 79-376, S. 38; P.A. 91-32, S. 40, 41.)
Sec. 31-280. Chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission. Powers and duties. Budget. Report of expenses. (a) There shall continue to be a chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission selected by the Governor as provided in section 31-276. The chairperson may not hear any matter arising under this chapter, except appeals brought before the Compensation Review Board and except as provided in subdivision (14) of subsection (b) of this section. The chairperson shall prepare the forms used by the commission, shall have custody of the insurance coverage cards, shall prepare and keep a list of self-insurers, shall prepare the annual report to the Governor and shall publish, when necessary, bulletins showing the changes in the compensation law, with annotations to the Connecticut cases. The chairperson shall be provided with sufficient staff to assist him in the performance of his duties. The chairperson may, within available appropriations, appoint acting administrative law judges on a per diem basis from among former administrative law judges or qualified members of the bar of this state. Any acting administrative law judge appointed under this subsection shall be paid on a per diem basis in an amount to be determined by the Commissioner of Administrative Services, subject to the provisions of section 4-40, and shall have all the powers and duties of administrative law judges. The Workers' Compensation Commission shall not be construed to be a commission or board subject to the provisions of section 4-9a.
(b) The chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission shall:
(1) Establish workers' compensation districts and district offices within the state, assign administrative law judges to the districts to hear all matters arising under this chapter within the districts and may reassign administration law judges once each year, except that when there is a vacancy, illness or other emergency, or when unexpected caseload increases require, the chairperson may reassign administrative law judges more than once each year;
(2) Adopt such rules as the chairperson, in consultation with the advisory board, deems necessary for the conduct of the internal affairs of the Workers' Compensation Commission;
(3) Adopt regulations, in consultation with the advisory board and in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54, to carry out his responsibilities under this chapter;
(4) Prepare and adopt an annual budget and plan of operation in consultation with the advisory board;
(5) Prepare and submit an annual report to the Governor and the General Assembly;
(6) Allocate the resources of the commission to carry out the purposes of this chapter;
(7) Establish an organizational structure and such divisions for the commission, consistent with this chapter, as the chairperson deems necessary for the efficient and prompt operation of the commission;
(8) Establish policy for all matters over which the commission has jurisdiction, including education, statistical support and administrative appeals;
(9) Appoint such supplementary advisory panels as the chairperson deems necessary and helpful;
(10) Establish, in consultation with the advisory board, (A) an approved list of practicing physicians, surgeons, podiatrists, optometrists and dentists from which an injured employee shall choose for examination and treatment under the provisions of this chapter, which shall include, but not be limited to, classifications of approved practitioners by specialty, and (B) standards for the approval and removal of physicians, surgeons, podiatrists, optometrists and dentists from the list by the chairperson;
(11) (A) Establish standards in consultation with the advisory board for approving all fees for services rendered under this chapter by attorneys, physicians, surgeons, podiatrists, optometrists, dentists and other persons;
(B) In consultation with employers, their insurance carriers, union representatives, physicians and third-party reimbursement organizations establish, not later than October 1, 1993, and publish annually thereafter, a fee schedule setting the fees payable by an employer or its insurance carrier for services rendered under this chapter by an approved physician, surgeon, podiatrist, optometrist, dentist and other persons, provided the fee schedule shall not apply to services rendered to a claimant who is participating in an employer's managed care plan pursuant to section 31-279. On and after April 1, 2008, the chairperson shall implement and annually update relative values based on the Medicare resource-based relative value scale and implement coding guidelines in conformance with the Correct Coding Initiative used by the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The conversion to the Medicare resource-based relative value scale shall be revenue-neutral. The fee schedule shall limit the annual growth in total medical fees to the annual percentage increase in the consumer price index for all urban workers. The chairperson may make necessary adjustments to the fee schedule for services rendered under this chapter where there is no established Medicare resource-based relative value. Payment of the established fees by the employer or its insurance carrier shall constitute payment in full to the practitioner, and the practitioner may not recover any additional amount from the claimant to whom services have been rendered;
(C) Issue, not later than October 1, 1993, and publish annually thereafter, guidelines for the maximum fees payable by a claimant for any legal services rendered by an attorney in connection with the provisions of this chapter, which fees shall be approved in accordance with the standards established by the chairperson pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this subdivision;
(12) Approve applications for employer-sponsored medical care plans, based on standards developed in consultation with a medical advisory panel as provided in section 31-279;
(13) Establish procedures for the hiring, dismissing or otherwise disciplining and promoting employees of the commission, subject where appropriate to the provisions of chapter 67;
(14) Control the hearing calendars of the administrative law judges, and if necessary, preside over informal hearings in regard to compensation under the provisions of this chapter in order to facilitate the timely and efficient processing of cases;
(15) Enter into contracts with consultants and such other persons as necessary for the proper functioning of the commission;
(16) Direct and supervise all administrative affairs of the commission;
(17) Keep and maintain a record of all advisory board proceedings;
(18) Assign and reassign a district manager and other staff to each of the commission's district offices;
(19) Collect and analyze statistical data concerning the administration of the Workers' Compensation Commission;
(20) Direct and supervise the implementation of a uniform case filing and processing system in each of the district offices that will include, but not be limited to, the ability to provide data on the number of cases having multiple hearings, the number of postponed hearings and hearing schedules for each district office;
(21) Establish staff development, training and education programs designed to improve the quality of service provided by the commission, including, but not limited to, a program to train district office staff in the screening of hearing requests;
(22) Develop standard forms for requesting hearings and standard policies regarding limits on the number of informal hearings that will be allowed under this chapter, and limits on the number of postponements that will be permitted before a formal hearing is held pursuant to section 31-297;
(23) Develop guidelines for expediting disputed cases;
(24) Establish an ongoing training program, in consultation with the advisory board, designed to assist the administrative law judges in the fulfillment of their duties pursuant to the provisions of section 31-278, which program shall include instruction in the following areas: Discovery, evidence, statutory interpretation, medical terminology, legal decision writing and the purpose and procedures of informal and formal hearings;
(25) Evaluate, in conjunction with the advisory board, the performance of each administrative law judge biannually and, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of section 1-210 and chapter 55, make the performance evaluation of any administrative law judge available only to the Governor, the members of the joint standing committee on the judiciary and the respective administrative law judge prior to any public hearing on the reappointment of any such administrative law judge. Any information disclosed to such persons shall be used by such persons only for the purpose for which it was given and shall not be disclosed to any other person;
(26) (A) In consultation with insurers and practitioners, establish not later than October 1, 1993, and publish annually thereafter, practitioner billing guidelines for employers, workers' compensation insurance carriers and practitioners approved by the chairperson pursuant to subdivision (10) of this subsection. The guidelines shall include procedures for the resolution of billing disputes and shall prohibit a practitioner from billing or soliciting payments from a claimant for services rendered to the claimant under the provisions of this chapter (i) during a payment dispute between the practitioner and the employer or its workers' compensation insurance carrier, or (ii) in excess of the maximum fees established pursuant to subparagraph (B) of subdivision (11) of this subsection;
(B) In consultation with practitioners and insurers, develop not later than July 1, 1994, practice protocols for reasonable and appropriate treatment of a claimant under the provisions of this chapter, based on the diagnosis of injury or illness. The commission shall annually publish the practice protocols for use by approved practitioners, employers, workers' compensation insurance carriers and administrative law judges in evaluating the necessity and appropriateness of care provided to a claimant under the provisions of this chapter;
(C) In consultation with practitioners and insurers, develop not later than July 1, 1994, utilization review procedures for reasonable and appropriate treatment of a claimant under the provisions of this chapter. The chairperson shall annually publish the procedures for use by approved practitioners, employers, workers' compensation insurance carriers and administrative law judges in evaluating the necessity and appropriateness of care provided to a claimant under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) The chairperson, as soon as practicable after April first of each year, shall submit to the Comptroller an estimated budget of expenditures which shall include all direct and indirect costs incurred by the Workers' Compensation Commission for the succeeding fiscal year commencing on July first next. The Workers' Compensation Commission, for the purposes of administration, shall not expend more than the amounts specified in such estimated budget for each item of expenditure except as authorized by the Comptroller. The chairperson shall include in his annual report to the Governor a statement showing the expenses of administering the Workers' Compensation Act for the preceding fiscal year.
(d) The chairperson and the Comptroller, as soon as practicable after August first in each year, shall ascertain the total amount of expenses incurred by the commission, including, in addition to the direct cost of personnel services, the cost of maintenance and operation, rentals for space occupied in state leased offices and all other direct and indirect costs, incurred by the commission and the expenses incurred by the Department of Aging and Disability Services in providing rehabilitation services for employees suffering compensable injuries in accordance with the provisions of section 31-283a, during the preceding fiscal year in connection with the administration of the Workers' Compensation Act and the total noncontributory payments required to be made to the Treasurer towards administrative law judges' retirement salaries as provided in sections 51-49, 51-50, 51-50a and 51-50b. An itemized statement of the expenses as so ascertained shall be available for public inspection in the office of the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission for thirty days after notice to all insurance carriers, and to all employers permitted to pay compensation directly affected thereby.
(1949 Rev., S. 7438; September, 1957, P.A. 11, S. 13; 1958 Rev., S. 31-144; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 6; 1969, P.A. 696, S. 3; 1971, P.A. 366; 639, S. 7; P.A. 77-614, S. 130, 610; P.A. 78-303, S. 32, 136; P.A. 79-376, S. 39; 79-540, S. 2; P.A. 80-414, S. 3; P.A. 90-116, S. 3; P.A. 91-339, S. 6, 55; P.A. 93-228, S. 4, 35; P.A. 97-205, S. 2; P.A. 07-31, S. 1; P.A. 11-61, S. 84, 85; June 12 Sp. Sess. P.A. 12-1, S. 83; P.A. 19-157, S. 82; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; P.A. 22-89, S. 9.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1969 act deleted requirement that chairman publish a digest of compensation decisions and added Subsecs. (b) and (c) re budget and record of expenditures; 1971 acts substituted “disposition” of business for “dispensation” of business in Subsec. (a) and required inclusion of “noncontributory payments required to be made to the treasurer towards commissioners' retirement salaries” as part of expenses incurred under Subsec. (c); P.A. 77-614 transferred power to appoint at-large commissioner from personnel policy board to commissioner of administrative services “subject to the provisions of section 4-40”; P.A. 78-303 specified that commission is not a commission or board subject to Sec. 4-9a in Subsec. (a); P.A. 79-376 replaced “workmen's compensation” with “workers' compensation”; P.A. 79-540 specified that chairman of board of compensation commissioners is also chairman of compensation review division in Subsec. (a); P.A. 80-414 clarified duties of chairman as administrative, granting him powers to control hearing calendars to expedite processing of claims and power to hear matters and required that chairman be provided with sufficient staff to perform his duties in Subsec. (a); P.A. 90-116 amended Subsec. (a) to allow for the appointment of temporary commissioners at the discretion of any commissioner within available appropriations; P.A. 91-339 changed “board of compensation commissioners” to “workers' compensation commission”, deleted provisions re chairman of the compensation review division, added provisions re hearing of matters by the chairman, and deleted provisions re administrative nature of the chairman's duties, commissioners at large and the chairman's control over the hearing calendars of the commissioners in Subsec. (a), added new Subsec. (b) re powers and duties of the chairman of the workers' compensation commission, redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c) and required estimated budget to include all direct and indirect costs incurred by the commission, redesignated existing Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d) and made technical changes; P.A. 93-228 amended Subsec. (b) to apply provisions to optometrists, to require chairman to establish medical fee schedule, attorney fee guidelines, commissioner training program, medical billing guidelines, practice protocols and utilization review procedures, to evaluate commissioners' performance and, when necessary, to preside over informal workers' compensation hearings, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 97-205 amended Subsec. (b)(1) to permit the chairman to reassign compensation commissioners; P.A. 07-31 amended Subsec. (b)(11)(B) by including fees for additional providers in fee schedule and adding provisions re Medicare resource-based relative value scale and coding guidelines used by Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services as bases for fee schedule; P.A. 11-61 amended Subsec. (b)(8) by deleting “rehabilitation” re matter for which chairman shall establish policy and amended Subsec. (d) by adding provision re expenses incurred by Bureau of Rehabilitation Services, effective July 1, 2011 (Revisor's note: In Subsec. (d), “Bureau of Rehabilitation Services” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “Bureau of Rehabilitative Services” to conform with changes made by P.A. 11-44); June 12 Sp. Sess. P.A. 12-1 amended Subsec. (d) by replacing “Bureau of Rehabilitative Services” with “Department of Rehabilitation Services”, effective July 1, 2012; P.A. 19-157 amended Subsec. (d) by replacing “Department of Rehabilitation Services” with “Department of Aging and Disability Services”; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” and “compensation commissioner” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, “commissioners”, “compensation commissioners” and “workers' compensation commissioners” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judges” in Subsecs. (a) and (b) and “commissioners'” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judges'” in Subsec. (d), effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 22-89 made technical changes, effective May 24, 2022.
See Sec. 31-277 re salaries of compensation commissioners.
Cited. 232 C. 758.
Cited. 36 CA 150. Commissioner is authorized to make a determination on case which he has presided over even after he has been transferred to another district. 47 CA 391. Section provides a broad grant of power to chairman to adopt regulations to carry out his responsibilities under act. 55 CA 129.
Sec. 31-280a. Advisory Board of the Workers' Compensation Commission. (a) There shall be an Advisory Board of the Workers' Compensation Commission to advise the chairperson on matters concerning policy for and the operation of the commission. The advisory board shall consist of eight members, who shall be appointed by the Governor, with the advice and consent of the General Assembly. Four of such members shall represent employees and four shall represent employers. One of such members representing employees shall be an individual who has suffered an extensive disability arising out of and in the course of his employment. One of such members representing employers shall be a representative of a major general hospital in the state. On or before January 1, 1992, the Governor shall appoint, and the General Assembly shall confirm, such members of the advisory board as follows: Two shall serve a term of four years from said date, one of whom shall represent employees and one of whom shall represent employers; two shall serve a term of three years from said date, one of whom shall represent employees and one of whom shall represent employers; two shall serve a term of two years from said date, one of whom shall represent employees and one of whom shall represent employers; and two shall serve a term of one year from said date, one of whom shall represent employees and one of whom shall represent employers. Thereafter such members shall be appointed for a term of four years from January first in the year of their appointment. Any vacancy on the advisory board shall be filled for the remainder of the term in the same manner as the original appointment. The chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission shall serve as an ex-officio member of the advisory board without the power to vote.
(b) The appointed members of the advisory board shall select a ninth member who shall be impartial and shall serve as the chairperson of the advisory board. The members of the advisory board shall serve without compensation. Each member shall be reimbursed for expenses necessarily incurred by the member in the performance of his duties. The advisory board shall not be construed to be a board or commission subject to the provisions of section 4-9a. The Workers' Compensation Commission shall provide such staff as is necessary for the performance of the functions and duties of the advisory board.
(c) The advisory board shall meet at least once in each calendar quarter and at such other times as the chairperson or the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission deem necessary. All actions of the advisory board shall require the affirmative vote of six members of the advisory board. The advisory board may bring any matter related to the operation of the workers' compensation system to the attention of the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission. The advisory board may adopt any rules of procedure that the board deems necessary to carry out its duties under this chapter.
(d) The advisory board shall submit its written recommendations concerning the reappointment of each administrative law judge to the Governor and the General Assembly not later than three months before the expiration of the term of the administrative law judge.
(P.A. 91-339, S. 3, 55; P.A. 21-18, S. 1, 2; P.A. 22-89, S. 10.)
History: P.A. 21-18 amended Subsec. (c) by changing “twice” to “once” and pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” and “compensation commissioner” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” in Subsec. (d), effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 22-89 made technical changes in Subsecs. (a) to (c), effective May 24, 2022.
Sec. 31-280b. Compensation Review Board. (a) There shall be a Compensation Review Board within the Workers' Compensation Commission. The chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission shall serve as chief of the Compensation Review Board and shall have responsibility for the operation of the board. On or before January 1, 1992, the chairperson shall appoint a chief clerk of the Compensation Review Board under the provisions of chapter 67 who shall be responsible to the chairperson for the efficient operation of the board.
(b) The board shall review appeals of decisions made by administrative law judges pursuant to this chapter. The chief shall annually select two administrative law judges to sit with him to hear such appeals for a term of one year, except that no administrative law judge may sit in review of an award or decision rendered by him. The chief may select a third administrative law judge to sit on the board if one of the board members is disqualified or temporarily incapacitated from hearing the matter under review.
(c) No administrative law judge except the chief may serve as a member of the Compensation Review Board for more than one year during the term for which he was appointed.
(P.A. 91-339, S. 7, 55; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; P.A. 22-89, S. 11.)
History: Pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” and “compensation commissioner” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” and “compensation commissioners” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judges” in Subsecs. (b) and (c), effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 22-89 made technical changes in Subsec. (a), effective May 24, 2022.
Sec. 31-281. Designation of commissioner to act in another district.Section 31-281 is repealed.
(1949 Rev., S. 7439; 1958 Rev., S. 31-145; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 7; P.A. 91-339, S. 53, 55.)
Sec. 31-282. Successor may complete acts when administrative law judge dies. If any administrative law judge dies before the final settlement of any matter in which he had been acting in his official capacity, his successor in office may continue such matter to its completion.
(1949 Rev., S. 7440; 1958 Rev., S. 31-146; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 8; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “compensation commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021.
Sec. 31-283. Annual pension upon retirement of administrative law judge. Any administrative law judge, in the state service as such administrative law judge twenty or more years in the aggregate, who leaves such service because of failure of reappointment, or because of abolition of his position, shall, during the remainder of his life, receive an annual pension payable from the General Fund equal to fifty per cent of his average annual salary for the five years next preceding his retirement. The administrative law judges may continue to contribute to the State Employees Retirement Fund and shall be entitled to general retirement rights under chapter 66. The acceptance of the pension herein provided for shall be in lieu of all benefits under the State Employees Retirement Act, and any administrative law judge accepting a pension under this section shall not be entitled to the return of any payments made by him to the State Employees Retirement Fund.
(1949 Rev., S. 3601; 1958 Rev., S. 31-147; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 9; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “compensation commissioner” and “commissioner” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” and “compensation commissioners” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judges”, effective October 1, 2021.
Sec. 31-283a. Rehabilitation programs for employees suffering compensable injuries. (a) The Department of Aging and Disability Services shall provide rehabilitation programs for employees with compensable injuries within the provisions of this chapter, which injuries prevented such employees from performing their customary or most recent work. The Commissioner of Aging and Disability Services shall establish rehabilitation programs which shall best suit the needs of such employees and shall make the programs available in convenient locations throughout the state. After consultation with the Labor Commissioner, the Commissioner of Aging and Disability Services may establish fees for the programs, so as to provide the most effective rehabilitation programs at a minimum rate. In order to carry out the provisions of this section, the Commissioner of Aging and Disability Services shall adopt regulations, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54, and, subject to the provisions of chapter 67, provide for the employment of necessary assistants.
(b) The Commissioner of Aging and Disability Services shall be authorized to (1) enter into agreements with other state or federal agencies to carry out the purposes of this section and expend money for that purpose, and (2) on behalf of the state of Connecticut, develop matching programs or activities to secure federal grants or funds for the purposes of this section and may pledge or use funds supplied from the administrative costs fund, as provided in section 31-345, to finance the state's share of the programs or activities.
(1967, P.A. 569, S. 1; P.A. 79-376, S. 40; P.A. 85-133, S. 1; P.A. 91-32, S. 4, 41; 91-339, S. 8, 55; P.A. 95-265, S. 1, 7; P.A. 96-216, S. 1, 5; P.A. 11-44, S. 47; June 12 Sp. Sess. P.A. 12-1, S. 84; P.A. 17-202, S. 86; P.A. 19-157, S. 83.)
History: P.A. 79-376 replaced “workmen's compensation” with “workers' compensation”; P.A. 85-133 required that the commission adopt regulations on or before October 1, 1986, concerning the operations of the division of workers' rehabilitation; P.A. 91-32 designated existing section as Subsec. (a), made technical changes and added Subsecs. (b) and (c), re method of financing cost of rehabilitation division and re director's powers; P.A. 91-339 amended Subsec. (a) by requiring that the director be appointed by the chairman of the workers' compensation commission, that the chairman approve the establishment of fees and that the director report to the chairman, and by authorizing the chairman to adopt regulations, deleted Subsec. (b), redesignated Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (b) and made technical changes; P.A. 95-265 amended Subsec. (a) by eliminating the Division of Workers Rehabilitation and the full-time salaried director, transferring to Workers Compensation Commission chairman the authority to establish rehabilitation programs, and to cap funds appropriated for rehabilitation program to no more than $550,000 and made technical corrections in Subsec. (b), effective July 1, 1995; P.A. 96-216 amended Subsec. (a) to make a technical correction concerning approval of the chairman before establishing fees and removed the limitation on the amount of funds used as grants to implement the section, effective June 4, 1996; P.A. 11-44 replaced “Workers' Compensation Commission” with “Bureau of Rehabilitative Services” and replaced “chairman” with “director of the Bureau of Rehabilitative Services” and “director”, effective July 1, 2011; June 12 Sp. Sess. P.A. 12-1 replaced “Bureau of Rehabilitative Services” with “Department of Rehabilitation Services” and replaced references to director of Bureau of Rehabilitative Services with “Commissioner of Rehabilitation Services”, effective July 1, 2012; P.A. 17-202 amended Subsec. (a) by replacing “employees suffering compensable injuries” with “employees with compensable injuries”, replacing “which injuries disabled them” with “which injuries prevented such employees”, and replaced “injured employees” with “such employees”; P.A. 19-157 replaced “Department of Rehabilitation Services” with “Department of Aging and Disability Services” and “Commissioner of Rehabilitation Services” with “Commissioner of Aging and Disability Services”.
Cited. 223 C. 376.
Secs. 31-283b and 31-283c. Financing of division and programs. Agreements with other state or federal agencies.Sections 31-283b and 31-283c are repealed.
(1967, P.A. 569, S. 2, 3; 1971, P.A. 335; 1972, P.A. 294, S. 33; P.A. 77-119, S. 2; P.A. 79-376, S. 41; P.A. 81-469, S. 4, 8; P.A. 85-189, S. 2; P.A. 91-32, S. 40, 41; 91-339, S. 52, 55.)
Sec. 31-283d. Adjustment of salary of certain retired administrative law judges. On July 1, 1971, the retirement salary of each person retired prior to July 1, 1965, under the provisions of section 31-283 or any predecessor statute shall be increased in the amount of that percentage of the monthly retirement salary being paid to him on June 30, 1967, which was provided under section 5-162b for members of the state employees retirement system who retired in the same year as such person. On July 1, 1972, and annually thereafter, the retirement salary of each such person shall be adjusted to reflect increases or decreases in the Consumer Price Index in the same manner and to the same extent that the retirement salary of persons retired under chapter 66 is adjusted under section 5-162c.
(1971, P.A. 639, S. 1.)
Sec. 31-283e. Election of retirement benefits.Any administrative law judge holding such office on July 1, 1971, may elect to be included within the provisions of sections 51-49, 51-50, 51-50a and 51-50b or to continue to be subject to the provisions of section 31-283.
(1971, P.A. 639, S. 8; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: Pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “compensation commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021.
Sec. 31-283f. Statistical Division. (a) A Statistical Division shall be established within the Workers' Compensation Commission. The division shall compile and maintain statistics concerning occupational injuries and diseases, voluntary agreements, status of claims and administrative law judges' dockets.
(b) Sufficient funding for the establishment and maintenance of the Workers' Compensation Statistical Division shall be supplied from the Administrative Costs Fund, as provided in section 31-345.
(P.A. 81-407, S. 1–5; P.A. 91-339, S. 9, 55; P.A. 21-18, S. 1, 3.)
History: P.A. 91-339 amended Subsec. (a) by adding provisions re full-time director and deleted Subsecs. (c) and (d) which had required formation of plan for efficient use of statistical division in compiling information and had established an advisory panel; P.A. 21-18 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting provisions re director of the Statistical Division and pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioners'” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judges'” in Subsec. (a), effective October 1, 2021.
Sec. 31-283g. Education services for employees concerning the prevention of occupational diseases and injuries. The Workers' Compensation Commission shall provide, in convenient locations throughout the state, education services to employees concerning the prevention of occupational diseases and injuries, training for nonmanagement employees in workers' compensation procedures and substantive rights, information to employers concerning known and suspected workplace hazards and training and information for medical professionals in workers' compensation procedures, standards and requirements. The chairperson shall be provided with sufficient staff to assist him in the performance of his duties. The chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission may adopt regulations, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54, to implement the provisions of this section.
(P.A. 82-94, S. 1, 3; P.A. 90-116, S. 4; P.A. 91-32, S. 6, 41; 91-339, S. 10, 55; P.A. 95-265, S. 2, 7; P.A. 22-89, S. 12.)
History: P.A. 82-94, S. 1, effective July 1, 1983; P.A. 90-116 added the provision of training and information for medical professionals in workers' compensation among the division's responsibilities; P.A. 91-32 designated existing section as Subsec. (a), made technical changes and added Subsec. (b) re method of financing costs of division of worker education; P.A. 91-339 added requirement that the director report to the chairman of the workers' compensation commission, deleted Subsec. (b) re method of financing division operating expenses and programs and made technical changes; P.A. 95-265 eliminated the Division of Worker Education and the full-time salaried director, effective July 1, 1995; P.A. 22-89 made technical changes, effective May 24, 2022.
Sec. 31-283h. Financing of Division of Worker Education. Section 31-283h is repealed.
(P.A. 82-94, S. 2, 3; P.A. 85-189, S. 3; P.A. 91-32, S. 40, 41; 91-339, S. 52, 55.)
WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION.
COMPENSATION COMMISSIONERS. EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY
II
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY
Sec. 31-284. Basic rights and liabilities. Civil action to enjoin noncomplying employer from entering into employment contracts. Notice of availability of compensation. (a) An employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section shall not be liable for any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment or on account of death resulting from personal injury so sustained, but an employer shall secure compensation for his employees as provided under this chapter, except that compensation shall not be paid when the personal injury has been caused by the wilful and serious misconduct of the injured employee or by his intoxication. All rights and claims between an employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees, or any representatives or dependents of such employees, arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter, provided nothing in this section shall prohibit any employee from securing, by agreement with his employer, additional compensation from his employer for the injury or from enforcing any agreement for additional compensation.
(b) Each employer who does not furnish to the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission satisfactory proof of his solvency and financial ability to pay directly to injured employees or other beneficiaries compensation provided by this chapter shall insure his full liability under this chapter, other than his liability for assessments pursuant to sections 31-345 and 31-354 in one of the following ways: (1) By filing with the Insurance Commissioner in form acceptable to him security guaranteeing the performance of the obligations of this chapter by the employer; or (2) by insuring his full liability under this part, exclusive of any liability resulting from the terms of section 31-284b, in any stock or mutual companies or associations that are or may be authorized to take such risks in this state; or (3) by any combination of the methods provided in subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection as he may choose, subject to the approval of the Insurance Commissioner. If the employer fails to comply with the requirements of this subsection, an employee may bring an action against such employer for damages on account of personal injury sustained by such employee arising out of and in the course of his employment or on account of death resulting from personal injury so sustained, except that there shall be no liability under this section to an individual on the part of the employer if such individual held himself out to the employer as an independent contractor and the employer, in good faith, relied on that representation as well as other indicia of such status and classified such individual as an independent contractor. In case of an alleged noncompliance with the provisions of this subsection, a certificate of noncompliance under oath, by the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission, shall constitute prima facie evidence of noncompliance.
(c) Each employer who does not furnish to the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission satisfactory proof of his solvency and financial ability to pay directly to the State Treasurer the assessments required in sections 31-345 and 31-354 shall insure his full liability for the assessments in one of the following ways: (1) By filing with the Insurance Commissioner in form acceptable to him security guaranteeing the payment of the assessments by the employer; (2) by insuring his full liability for the assessments in any stock or mutual companies or associations that are or may be authorized to take such risks in this state; or (3) by any combination of the methods provided in subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection as he may choose, subject to the approval of the Insurance Commissioner. The payment of the assessments required under sections 31-345 and 31-354 is a condition of doing business in this state and failure to pay the assessments, when due, shall result in the denial of the privilege of doing business in this state or to self-insure under subsections (b) and (c) of this section. If the liability for the assessments is insured, the insurance shall be by endorsement to a policy meeting all of the requirements of the Insurance Commissioner, or by a separate policy insuring the liability for the assessments, and otherwise meeting all of the requirements of the Insurance Commissioner. In the case of any employer who files acceptable security guaranteeing the liability for the assessments, failure to pay the assessments, when due, shall result in the denial of the privilege to self-insure under subsections (b) and (c) of this section.
(d) Any employer to whom a certificate of self-insurance has been issued pursuant to this section who fails or is unable to pay any compensation mandated by the provisions of this chapter, thereby requiring payment from the Second Injury Fund pursuant to section 31-355, shall be prohibited from self-insuring his liability under this chapter for a period of ten years from the date of the payment. The employer shall be required during the ten-year period to insure his full liability under this part, exclusive of any liability resulting from the terms of section 31-284b, in any stock or mutual companies or associations that are or may be authorized to take such risks in this state. Failure to so insure his liability shall result in the denial of the privilege of doing business in this state.
(e) Whenever an employer fails to comply with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section, the Attorney General may bring a civil action in the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford to enjoin the employer, until such time as he fully complies with such requirements, from entering into any contracts of employment as a result of which he will employ additional employees.
(f) Each employer subject to the provisions of this chapter shall post, in a conspicuous place, a notice of the availability of compensation, in type of not less than ten-point boldface. The notice shall contain, at a minimum, the information required by regulations adopted pursuant to section 31-279.
(1949 Rev., S. 7417, 7418, 7419, 7453, 7461; 1949, S. 3038d, 3050d; 1958 Rev., S. 31-148, 31-149, 31-150, 31-180, 31-189; 1959, P.A. 580, S. 1–3, 15, 17, 20, 21; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 10; 1967, P.A. 842, S. 4; P.A. 77-614, S. 163, 610; P.A. 80-482, S. 202, 348; P.A. 82-398, S. 2; P.A. 85-184, S. 2; 85-189, S. 1; 85-349, S. 1; P.A. 86-165; 86-403, S. 64, 132; P.A. 88-230, S. 1, 12; P.A. 90-98, S. 1, 2; P.A. 91-32, S. 7, 41; 91-339, S. 11, 55; P.A. 93-142, S. 4, 7, 8; P.A. 95-220, S. 4–6; P.A. 96-65, S. 1; 96-216, S. 2, 5; P.A. 22-89, S. 13.)
History: 1959 act increased fine from $100 to $250, required that fines be paid over to second injury and assurance fund or its successor and replaced references to specific sections, parts, etc. with references to chapter; 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1967 act added proviso protecting employee's right to secure additional benefits from employer in Subsec. (a); P.A. 77-614 placed insurance commissioner within the department of business regulation and made insurance department a division within that same department, effective January 1, 1979; P.A. 80-482 reinstated insurance division as an independent department with commissioner as its head following abolition of department of business regulation; P.A. 82-398 excluded liability resulting from terms of Sec. 31-284b in Subsec. (b)(2); P.A. 85-184 amended Subsec. (b) to require that proof of solvency be filed by employers with the board of compensation commissioners, rather than with an individual commissioner; P.A. 85-189 added Subsec. (c), which establishes the liability of employers for the assessments required for the various funds under workers' compensation, and permits the purchasing of insurance for such liabilities; P.A. 85-349 added Subsec. (d), which prohibits employers from self-insuring their workers' compensation liability for 10 years if payment from the second injury fund has been required; P.A. 86-165 added Subsec. (e), empowering the attorney general to bring a civil action to enjoin any employer who doesn't comply with the issuance requirements of the section from entering into new employment contracts; P.A. 86-403 made technical change in Subsec. (c); P.A. 88-230 replaced “judicial district of Hartford-New Britain” with “judicial district of Hartford”, effective September 1, 1991; P.A. 90-98 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1991, to September 1, 1993; P.A. 91-32 made technical changes and added Subsec. (f) re notice of the availability of compensation; P.A. 91-339 changed “board of compensation commissioners” to “chairman of the workers' compensation commission” and made technical changes; P.A. 93-142 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1993, to September 1, 1996, effective June 14, 1993; P.A. 95-220 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1996, to September 1, 1998, effective July 1, 1995; P.A. 96-65 amended Subsec. (a) to exempt employers who comply with the requirements of Subsec. (b) from liability and amended Subsec. (b) to allow an employee to bring an action against an employer who fails to comply with the subsection, replacing provision imposing $1,000 fine; P.A. 96-216 amended Subsec. (b) to change the penalty for an employer from a fine to the penalties in Subsecs. (c) and (d) of Sec. 31-288, effective June 4, 1996, but failed to take effect, P.A. 96-65 having deleted the penalty provision in its entirety; P.A. 22-89 made technical changes in Subsecs. (b) and (c), effective May 24, 2022.
Employee seeking workmen's compensation has burden of proving that he sustained an injury, not merely in the course of his employment, but arising out of, that is, caused by his employment. 150 C. 328. Burden of proving injury sustained in course of employment on claimant. 151 C. 430. Cited. 153 C. 410; 156 C. 280, 281. Persons employed by board of education deemed town employees. 164 C. 65. Summary judgment for defendant employer sustained where plaintiff employee, injured while parking his car in the employees parking lot by a fellow employee driving the employer's truck, had claimed and been paid benefits pursuant to Workmen's Compensation Act. 167 C. 621. Cited. 169 C. 646; 175 C. 174. To be compensable, injury must, inter alia, occur while employee is reasonably fulfilling duties of employment or engaged in activity incidental to it; activity is incidental if regularly engaged in on employer's premises within period of employment, with employer's approval and acquiescence. 176 C. 547. Cited. 178 C. 371; 179 C. 662; 183 C. 508; 185 C. 616; 189 C. 671; Id., 701. Court declined to extend an exception to statute to include injuries to employees resulting from “intentional” or “wilful” or “reckless” violation by employees of safety standards established pursuant to federal and state laws such as OSHA. 196 C. 91. Cited. 203 C. 34; 204 C. 104; 206 C. 495; 212 C. 138; Id., 427; Id., 814; 219 C. 439; 221 C. 465; 223 C. 336; 229 C. 99; 237 C. 1; 238 C. 285; 242 C. 255. Maximum $10,000 penalty imposed on first-time offender who failed to obtain workers' compensation insurance coverage for single employee within first 2 weeks of employee's engagement deemed excessive. 244 C. 781. Purpose. 245 C. 66. Exculpatory agreements in the employment context violate Connecticut public policy. 280 C. 494. Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that defendants intended to injure him or that they knew or believed that his injury was substantially certain to occur as a result of their conduct, including their violation of certain safety and labor regulations. 300 C. 733. Employee of municipal animal control district created under Sec. 7-330 was employee of member municipalities because member municipalities created, controlled and wholly funded the district, therefore act provided the exclusive remedy for employee's injuries. 304 C. 462.
Cited. 3 CA 16; Id., 547; 5 CA 193. By granting immunity to employees from loss of consortium suits, statute does not violate due process clause of federal or state constitutions. Id., 369. Cited. 7 CA 296; 10 CA 618; 15 CA 615; 16 CA 660. Bars receipt of uninsured motorist's benefits by plaintiff in receipt of workers' compensation benefits from same circumstances. 19 CA 169. Cited. 24 CA 739; 25 CA 492; judgment reversed, see 222 C. 744. Does not bar employee in receipt of compensation benefits from also obtaining uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits reduced by compensation benefits paid or payable. Id., 651; judgment reversed, see 222 C. 769. Cited. 27 CA 800; 30 CA 630; 34 CA 521; 44 CA 1; 46 CA 346. Section, absent an exception, bars plaintiff from claiming underinsured motorist coverage under his employer's policy despite fact that he is a named insured. 87 CA 416.
Cited. 27 CS 280. Action in negligence, against insurer of employer who has paid compensation to plaintiff employee for failure of insurer to inspect dangerous machinery in shop, is precluded by merger of identities of employer and insurer and policy of workmen's compensation acts. 28 CS 1. Cited. 30 CS 126. An employer cannot be sued as a joint tortfeasor by a third party whom his employee is suing for negligence, absent a separate contractual relation with third party. 31 CS 322. The Workmen's Compensation Act is not a bar to indemnity where such a right can be predicated on some legal relationship between the third party and employer giving rise to a duty on the part of the employer to the third party which is either contractually or tortiously breached. 32 CS 96. Cited. 38 CS 359; Id., 607; 39 CS 408; 42 CS 168.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 176 C. 320; 179 C. 215. Personal injuries are compensable under workers' compensation when incurred while walking from employer-furnished transportation to employer-furnished lodging. Id., 501. Cited. 189 C. 550; 196 C. 529. Did not bar plaintiff administrator's wrongful death action where minor illegally hired in violation of public policy; 131 C. 157 overruled to the extent inconsistent. 203 C. 34. Cited. Id., 324; 205 C. 219; 208 C. 589; 209 C. 59; 218 C. 531; 220 C. 721; 221 C. 356. Construing uninsured motorist coverage as “exception” to workers' compensation act is irreconcilable with language of section; judgment of Appellate Court in 25 CA 492 reversed. 222 C. 744. Section bars work-related claim for uninsured motorist benefits under insurance policy procured by employer including employer's personal automobile liability insurance; judgment of Appellate Court in 25 CA 651 reversed. Id., 769. Cited. Id., 775; 223 C. 917; 226 C. 282; Id., 404; 227 C. 333; 234 C. 51; 235 C. 790. Employee not barred from recovering uninsured motorist coverage benefits against employer's insurer in regard to accident occurring prior to effective date of P.A. 93-297. 238 C. 285. Cited. 240 C. 694. Limitation on remedies under tort law is appropriate trade-off for benefits provided by workers' compensation. 252 C. 215. Tort actions for emotional injuries that are not compensable under act are not barred by exclusivity provisions of act. 259 C. 729. Cause of action in tort against insurer for bad faith processing of compensation claim barred by exclusivity provision of section, and remedies are limited to those afforded under Secs. 31-288(b) and 31-300. 273 C. 487. Plaintiff's assertion that intentional tort exception to section was applicable because defendant intentionally failed to correct several dangerous conditions which led to death of employee who was struck and killed after being sent to cut grass under roller coaster failed because evidence was not sufficient to establish intent to create an injury-causing situation. 277 C. 113. Assignment of plaintiff's CUTPA action to an estate would transform the action into a wrongful death action that is barred by the exclusivity provision of Workers' Compensation Act. 289 C. 1. When personal injury or death is compensable under Workers' Compensation Act, action for negligent infliction of bystander emotional distress is barred by exclusivity provision of section. 322 C. 335. Substantial certainty exception to the exclusivity provision requires employer conduct that so obviously and intentionally creates a danger to the employee that the employer cannot be believed if it denies that it knew the consequences were certain to follow. 327 C. 764.
Cited. 2 CA 363; 3 CA 40; 6 CA 60; 28 CA 660; 32 CA 16; 45 CA 324; 46 CA 699. Employee is barred from bringing negligence claim against employer. 52 CA 1. Court applied standard of “substantial causative factor” to the affirmative defense of wilful and serious misconduct, declining to apply a standard of “sole proximate cause”. 56 CA 215. Exception to exclusive remedy provision of Subsec. did not apply where plaintiff's complaint did not allege that city of New Haven intended to injure plaintiff or that the city directed or authorized city employee to injure plaintiff. 92 CA 558. Defendants' ordering deceased employees to enter oxygen-deficient manhole without safety equipment did not constitute wilful misconduct because plaintiffs failed to establish substantial certainty of decedents' deaths or that defendants knew of dangers of confined space entry. 100 CA 781. Although exclusivity provision speaks solely in terms of employers, the Supreme Court has extended provision's protection in the context of the workers' compensation claims process to insurers and third party administrators, therefore plaintiff's action against “independent third party” is barred. 122 CA 230. Intoxication of the employee as cause of injury remains, as it has for nearly 100 years, an affirmative defense with the burden of proof resting on the employer. 136 CA 258.
Not a bar to an action for indemnification by a bailee against an employer where the action is based on breach of a warranty of fitness under the bailment contract. 32 CS 210. Cited. Id., 213. Breach of an independent duty is sufficient to overcome the defense based on the Workmen's Compensation Act. Id., 214. In absence of special relationship, workmen's compensation is the exclusive remedy against an employer. 35 CS 268. Cited. 38 CS 324; 39 CS 250. Police officer struck by uninsured motorist while directing traffic in course of his employment was not “occupying” a motor vehicle for purposes of Sec. 38a-336(f) and is therefore limited to workers' compensation benefits. 51 CS 326; judgment affirmed, see 117 CA 656.
Sec. 31-284a. State contracting with private insurance carrier. Duties and powers of Commissioner of Administrative Services. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 4a-19 and 4a-20 to the contrary, the Commissioner of Administrative Services shall solicit proposals from any management firm engaged in the business of administering workers' compensation claims, or from any authorized mutual insurance company or stock company or subsidiary thereof writing workers' compensation or employer's liability insurance in this state, for the purposes of administering the workers' compensation claims filed against the state, or of insuring the state's full liability under workers' compensation and administering such claims. The commissioner may, at said commissioner's discretion, reject any or all of such proposals if they are deemed to be inadequate to effectively serve the needs of the state concerning workers' compensation.
(b) The Commissioner of Administrative Services may exclude from participation in the state workers' compensation managed care program any medical provider found, through a systematic program of utilization review, to exceed generally accepted standards of the scope, duration or intensity of services rendered to patients with similar diagnostic characteristics.
(c) The Commissioner of Administrative Services shall have sole responsibility for establishing procedures for all executive branch agencies participating in the state of Connecticut workers' compensation program, except that all mandatory subjects of collective bargaining pertaining to modified or alternative duty shall continue to be governed by the provisions of chapter 68.
(P.A. 81-469, S. 1, 8; P.A. 93-228, S. 5, 35; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 04-2, S. 29; P.A. 12-205, S. 23; P.A. 15-182, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 93-228 added Subsec. (b) re commissioner of administrative services' regulatory power and designated existing language as Subsec. (a), effective July 1, 1993; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 04-2 amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes and to delete provision re S.A. 81-22, and added Subsec. (c) to vest Commissioner of Administrative Services with sole authority for establishing procedures for executive branch agencies re state workers' compensation program, except mandatory collective bargaining re modified or alternative duty, effective July 1, 2004; P.A. 12-205 amended Subsec. (b) to delete provision re adoption of regulations establishing fees payable by the state, effective July 1, 2012; P.A. 15-182 amended Subsec. (b) to delete provision re state not to make payment to facility owned in whole or in part by referring practitioner, effective July 1, 2015.
Cited. 220 C. 915; Id., 920.
Sec. 31-284b. Employer to continue insurance coverage or welfare plan payments for employees eligible to receive workers' compensation. Use of Second Injury Fund. (a) In order to maintain, as nearly as possible, the income of employees who suffer employment-related injuries, any employer who provides accident and health insurance or life insurance coverage for any employee or makes payments or contributions at the regular hourly or weekly rate for full-time employees to an employee welfare plan, shall provide to the employee equivalent insurance coverage or welfare plan payments or contributions while the employee is eligible to receive or is receiving compensation pursuant to this chapter, or while the employee is receiving wages under a provision for sick leave payments for time lost due to an employment-related injury. As used in this section, “income” means all forms of remuneration to an individual from his employment, including wages, accident and health insurance coverage, life insurance coverage and employee welfare plan contributions and “employee welfare plan” means any plan established or maintained for employees or their families or dependents, or for both, for medical, surgical or hospital care benefits.
(b) An employer may provide such equivalent accident and health or life insurance coverage or welfare plan payments or contributions by: (1) Insuring his full liability under this section in any stock or mutual companies or associations that are or may be authorized to take such risks in this state; (2) creating an injured employee's plan as an extension of any existing plan for working employees; (3) self-insurance; or (4) by any combination of the methods provided in subdivisions (1) to (3), inclusive, of this subsection that he may choose.
(c) In the case of an employee welfare plan, an employer may provide equivalent protection by making payments or contributions for such hours of contributions established by the trustees of the employee welfare plan as necessary to maintain continuation of such insurance coverage when the amount is less than the amount of regular hourly or weekly contributions for full-time employees.
(d) In any case where compensation payments to an individual for total incapacity under the provisions of section 31-307 continue for more than one hundred four weeks, the cost of accident and health insurance or life insurance coverage after the one-hundred-fourth week shall be paid out of the Second Injury Fund in accordance with the provisions of section 31-349.
(e) Accident and health insurance coverage may include, but shall not be limited to, coverage provided by insurance or directly by the employer for the following health care services: Medical, surgical, dental, nursing and hospital care and treatment, drugs, diagnosis or treatment of mental conditions or alcoholism, and pregnancy and child care.
(P.A. 82-398, S. 3; P.A. 86-403, S. 99, 132; P.A. 91-32, S. 8, 41; 91-339, S. 12.)
History: P.A. 86-403 made technical change in Subsec. (b), substituting “mutual” for “municipal” companies; P.A. 91-32 added definition of “income” to Subsec. (a) and made technical changes; P.A. 91-339 changed “employee welfare fund” to “employee welfare plan”, added a definition of the latter term in Subsec. (a) and deleted the reference to Sec. 31-53 in Subsec. (a).
Cited. 214 C. 552; 219 C. 439; 223 C. 376. Court found no legislative intent to mandate transfer of liability for section's benefits to the fund as “compensation” under Sec. 31-349 in case of employee with preexisting impairment. 231 C. 287.
Cited. 16 CA 660. Dependents' benefits are part of workers' income to be maintained by employer. 24 CA 234. Cited. 40 CA 409; 44 CA 397. Board incorrectly interpreted section as requiring city to continue insurance coverage for plaintiff and his family once plaintiff's compensation payments under Sec. 7-433c ended; definition of “compensation” in Sec. 31-293 inapplicable to section as it existed on date of plaintiff's injury; payments by city for plaintiff's medical care did not constitute compensation payment required by statute or regulation and did not trigger benefits under section. 61 CA 9.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 214 C. 394.
Term “compensation payments” as used in Subsec. as it existed on date of plaintiff's injury does not include payments for medical care after the indemnity compensation period has ceased. 61 CA 9. Term “compensation payments” as used in Subsec. does not include payments for medical care after the indemnity compensation period has ceased; plaintiff accordingly was not entitled to benefits pursuant to section. 81 CA 339.
Subsec. (b):
Authorizes employer to meet its workers' compensation obligations under chapter by enumerated methods, including self-insurance. 247 C. 442.
Sec. 31-284c. Complaints of violations. Hearing. Findings and award. Appeal. Any employee eligible to receive or receiving workers' compensation may file a complaint alleging violation of the provisions of section 31-284b with the administrative law judge. The administrative law judge shall hold a hearing in accordance with the provisions of sections 31-297 and 31-298. After the hearing, the administrative law judge shall send to each party a written copy of his findings and award in accordance with the provisions of section 31-300. The provisions of section 31-300 concerning finality of the award and an execution issued upon the award shall be applicable to an award made pursuant to this section. Any appeal of an award of the administrative law judge under this section shall be taken in accordance with the provisions of section 31-301. The administrative law judge, in awarding benefits for temporary and permanent partial and total disability, shall require the provision of equivalent insurance coverage or contribution to an employee welfare plan, as provided in section 31-284b, for the period of the injured employee's eligibility to receive benefits under this chapter.
(P.A. 82-398, S. 5; P.A. 91-339, S. 13; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 91-339 required the commissioner to send each party a written copy of his findings and changed “employee welfare fund” to “employee welfare plan”; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” and “workers' compensation commissioner” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021.
Sec. 31-285. Substitute systems of compensation.With the approval of the state Insurance Commissioner, any employer may enter into an agreement with his employees to provide a system of compensation, benefit and insurance in lieu of the compensation and insurance provided by this chapter. No such substitute system shall be approved unless it confers benefits upon injured employees at least equivalent to the benefits provided by this chapter, nor shall any such substitute system be approved which contains an obligation of employees to join in it as a condition of employment unless it contains equitable provision for the withdrawal of employees from it and the distribution of its assets. If any such system requires contributions from employees, it shall not be approved unless it confers benefits in addition to those provided under this chapter at least commensurate with such contributions. The Insurance Commissioner, having given his approval of such substitute system, shall have over it all the jurisdiction given him by sections 38a-14 and 38a-17 over insurance companies. He may withdraw his approval upon reasonable notice to the employer and order a distribution of the assets, subject to the right of any party in interest to take an appeal to the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford.
(1949 Rev., S. 7452; 1958 Rev., S. 31-179; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 25; P.A. 77-614, S. 163, 610; P.A. 78-280, S. 6, 127; P.A. 80-482, S. 203, 348; P.A. 88-230, S. 1, 12; P.A. 90-98, S. 1, 2; P.A. 93-142, S. 4, 7, 8; P.A. 95-220, S. 4–6.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 77-614 made insurance department a division within the department of business regulation with insurance commissioner as its head, effective January 1, 1979; P.A. 78-280 replaced “Hartford county” with “judicial district of Hartford-New Britain”; P.A. 80-482 reinstated insurance division as independent department with insurance commissioner as its head following abolition of department of business regulation; P.A. 88-230 replaced “judicial district of Hartford-New Britain” with “judicial district of Hartford”, effective September 1, 1991; P.A. 90-98 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1991, to September 1, 1993; P.A. 93-142 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1993, to September 1, 1996, effective June 14, 1993; P.A. 95-220 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1996, to September 1, 1998, effective July 1, 1995.
Cited. 169 C. 646.
Cited. 23 CS 298.
Sec. 31-286. Certificate of employer's compliance. Any employer who has complied with the provisions of section 31-285 by entering into an agreement with his employees to provide a system of compensation, benefit and insurance in lieu of the compensation and insurance provided by this chapter, which agreement has been approved by the Insurance Commissioner, or any employer who has complied with the provisions of section 31-284 by filing with the Insurance Commissioner security guaranteeing the performance of his obligation under this chapter or by insuring his full liability or by a combination of the two last-named methods approved by the Insurance Commissioner, may file, in the office of the administrative law judge who may have jurisdiction in case of injury, a certificate of the Insurance Commissioner stating that such substitute system has been approved or that such security guaranteeing the performance of the obligations of this chapter has been filed with and accepted by the Insurance Commissioner or that a combination of the methods stated in section 31-284 has been approved. Any employer who has insured his full liability may file a certificate, in the manner prescribed in section 31-348, setting forth such fact and stating the date of expiration of such insurance, which certificate shall thereupon become a part of the records of the office of such administrative law judge.
(1949 Rev., S. 7462; 1958 Rev., S. 31-182; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 42; P.A. 77-614, S. 163, 610; P.A. 80-482, S. 204, 348; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 77-614 made insurance department a division within the department of business regulation with commissioner as its head, effective January 1, 1979; P.A. 80-482 restored insurance division as independent department and abolished department of business regulation; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” and “compensation commissioner” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021.
Sec. 31-286a. Insurance requirements for contractors on public works projects and renewals of state business licenses. (a) Notwithstanding any provision of any general statute, special act, charter or ordinance, neither the state, or its agents, nor any political subdivision of the state, or its agents, may enter into any contract on or after October 1, 1986, for the construction, remodeling, refinishing, refurbishing, rehabilitation, alteration or repair of any public works project before receiving from each of the other parties to such contract (1) sufficient evidence of compliance with the workers' compensation insurance and self-insurance requirements of subsection (b) of section 31-284, and (2) a current statement from the State Treasurer that, to the best of his knowledge and belief, as of the date of the statement, the particular party was not liable to the state for any workers' compensation payments made pursuant to section 31-355, except that any sole proprietor who is a party to such contract shall not be subject to the provisions of this section, provided such sole proprietor (A) does not utilize any subcontractor in performing such contract, (B) is not acting as a principal employer, (C) has not accepted the provisions of chapter 568 in accordance with subdivision (10) of section 31-275, and (D) has liability insurance in lieu of workers' compensation insurance.
(b) On and after October 1, 1986, no state department, board or agency may renew a license or permit to operate a business in this state unless the applicant first presents sufficient evidence of current compliance with the workers' compensation insurance coverage requirements of section 31-284.
(c) This section shall not be construed to create any liability on the part of the state or any political subdivision thereof to pay workers' compensation benefits or to indemnify the Second Injury Fund, any employer or any insurer who pays workers' compensation benefits.
(d) For purposes of this section, “sufficient evidence” means (1) a certificate of self-insurance issued by an administrative law judge pursuant to section 31-284, (2) a certificate of compliance issued by the Insurance Commissioner pursuant to section 31-286, (3) a certificate of insurance issued by any stock or mutual insurance company or mutual association authorized to write workers' compensation insurance in this state or its agent, or (4) in lieu of a physical certificate of insurance being presented for the issuance or renewal of licenses and permits issued by the Department of Consumer Protection, the Department of Public Health or the Office of Early Childhood, the entrance by the applicant on the renewal form of the name of the insurer, insurance policy number, effective dates of coverage, and a certification that the same is truthful and accurate.
(P.A. 86-87; P.A. 91-207, S. 2, 9; P.A. 09-104, S. 1; P.A. 10-9, S. 9; P.A. 11-242, S. 18; P.A. 14-39, S. 67; P.A. 16-73, S. 1; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 91-207 made a technical change to fund's name in Subsec. (c); P.A. 09-104 amended Subsec. (d) by adding Subdiv. (4) re entrance of specified information on Department of Consumer Protection license or permit renewal form in lieu of presentation of physical certificate of insurance and by making technical changes, effective June 2, 2009; P.A. 10-9 amended Subsec. (d)(4) to change “renewals” to “the issuance or renewal” of licenses and permits, effective May 5, 2010; P.A. 11-242 amended Subsec. (d)(4) by adding reference to Department of Public Health; P.A. 14-39 amended Subsec. (d)(4) by adding reference to Office of Early Childhood, effective July 1, 2014; P.A. 16-73 amended Subsec. (a) by adding provision re exception for sole proprietor who is a party to contract; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “workers' compensation commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” in Subsec. (d), effective October 1, 2021.
Sec. 31-286b. Proof of workers' compensation coverage prior to issuance of building permit, condition. (a) Prior to issuing a building permit pursuant to section 29-263 to any person other than a sole proprietor or property owner unless such sole proprietor or property owner is acting as a general contractor or principal employer, a local building official shall require proof of workers' compensation coverage for all employees, as defined in section 31-275, who are employed by an employer, as defined in said section, who are engaged to perform services on the site of the construction project for which the permit was issued.
(b) As used in subsection (a) of this section, “proof of workers' compensation coverage” means (1) a written certificate of insurance provided by the general contractor or principal employer, (2) a certificate from the administrative law judge indicating that the general contractor or principal employer has properly chosen not to obtain workers' compensation coverage pursuant to section 31-275, or (3) if a property owner or sole proprietor intends to act as a general contractor or principal employer, a written certificate of insurance or a sworn notarized affidavit, which he shall provide, stating that he will require proof of workers' compensation insurance for all those employed on the job site in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. A local building official shall require proof of workers' compensation coverage only at the time of the general contractor's or principal employer's initial application.
(P.A. 95-277, S. 7, 19; P.A. 96-216, S. 4, 5; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 95-277 effective July 1, 1995; P.A. 96-216 made existing language Subsec. (a) and excepted certain sole proprietors and property owners from proof requirements and removed $100,000 limitation and property owner certification requirement and added Subsec. (b), defining “proof of workers' compensation coverage”, effective June 4, 1996; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “Workers' Compensation Commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” in Subsec. (b), effective October 1, 2021.
Sec. 31-287. Provisions required in liability insurance policies.No policy of insurance against liability under this chapter, except as provided in section 31-284, shall be made unless the same covers the entire liability of the employer thereunder and contains an agreement by the insurer that, as between the employee and the insurer, notice or knowledge of the occurrence of injury by the insured shall be deemed notice or knowledge by the insurer, that jurisdiction of the insured for the purposes of this chapter shall be jurisdiction of the insurer and the insurer shall in all things be bound by and subject to the findings, awards and judgments rendered against such insured; and also that, if the insured becomes insolvent or is discharged in bankruptcy during the period that the policy is in operation, or the compensation, or any part of it, is due and unpaid or if an execution upon a judgment for compensation is returned unsatisfied, an injured employee or other person entitled to compensation under the provisions of this chapter may enforce his claim to compensation against the insurer to the same extent that the insured could have enforced his claim against such insurer had he paid compensation.
(1949 Rev., S. 7454; 1958 Rev., S. 31-181; 1959, P.A. 580, S. 16; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 41.)
History: 1959 act revised applicability re employer's insurance by reducing number of regular employees from three to two and replaced references to specific sections and parts with references to chapter; 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions.
Cited. 113 C. 515; 114 C. 27; 116 C. 221. No reformation of policy where no mistake shown. 120 C. 503. Cited. 125 C. 31. Statute has no application to employer liability imposed by special bonus legislation unrelated to traditional workers' compensation concepts. 178 C. 664.
Cited. 37 CA 835.
Cited. 28 CS 4.
Sec. 31-288. Additional liability. Penalty for undue delay, noncompliance with insurance requirements and for defrauding workers' compensation insurance carrier. Notice of penalty to Attorney General and State Treasurer. Payment. Civil action for nonpayment. (a) If an employer wilfully fails to conform to any other provision of this chapter, he shall be fined not more than two hundred fifty dollars for each such failure.
(b) (1) Whenever through the fault or neglect of an employer or insurer, the adjustment or payment of compensation due under this chapter is unduly delayed, such employer or insurer may be assessed by the administrative law judge hearing the claim a civil penalty of not more than one thousand dollars for each such case of delay, to be paid to the claimant. (2) Whenever either party to a claim under this chapter has unreasonably, and without good cause, delayed the completion of the hearings on such claim, the delaying party or parties may be assessed a civil penalty of not more than five hundred dollars by the administrative law judge hearing the claim for each such case of delay. Any appeal of a penalty assessed pursuant to this subsection shall be taken in accordance with the provisions of section 31-301.
(c) Whenever an investigator in the investigations unit of the office of the State Treasurer, whether initiating an investigation at the request of the custodian of the Second Injury Fund, the Workers' Compensation Commission, or an administrative law judge, finds that an employer is not in compliance with the insurance and self-insurance requirements of subsection (b) of section 31-284, such investigator shall issue a citation to such employer requiring him to obtain insurance and fulfill the requirements of said section and notifying him of the requirement of a hearing before the administrative law judge and the penalties required under this subsection. The investigator shall also file an affidavit advising the administrative law judge of the citation and requesting a hearing on such violation. The administrative law judge shall conduct a hearing, after sufficient notice to the employer and within thirty days of the citation, wherein the employer shall be required to present sufficient evidence of his compliance with said requirements. Whenever the administrative law judge finds that the employer is not in compliance with said requirements he shall assess a civil penalty of not less than five hundred dollars per employee or five thousand dollars, whichever is less and not more than fifty thousand dollars against the employer.
(d) In addition to the penalties assessed pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, the administrative law judge shall assess an additional penalty of one hundred dollars for each day after the finding of noncompliance that the employer fails to comply with the insurance and self-insurance requirements of subsection (b) of section 31-284. Any penalties assessed under the provisions of this subsection shall not exceed fifty thousand dollars in the aggregate.
(e) The chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission shall notify the State Treasurer and the Attorney General of the imposition of any penalty, the date it was imposed, the amount and whether there has been an appeal of said penalty. Any civil penalty order issued pursuant to subsection (c) or (d) of this section shall state that payment shall be made to the Second Injury Fund of the State Treasurer, and that failure to pay within ninety days may result in civil action to double the penalty. The State Treasurer shall collect any penalty owed, and if the penalty is not paid within ninety days, the State Treasurer shall notify the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission and the Attorney General so that civil action may be brought pursuant to section 31-289. Any appeal of a penalty assessed pursuant to the provisions of subsections (c) and (d) of this section shall be taken in accordance with the provisions of section 31-301. The chairperson shall adopt regulations for the administrative law judges to use in setting fines which shall require the administrative law judges to take into account the nature of the employer's business and his number of employees.
(f) When any employer knowingly and wilfully fails to comply with the insurance and self-insurance requirements of subsection (b) of section 31-284, such employer, if he is an owner, in the case of a sole proprietorship, a partner, in the case of a partnership, a principal, in the case of a limited liability company or a corporate officer, in the case of a corporation, shall be guilty of a class D felony.
(g) Any employer who (1) has failed to meet the requirements of subsection (b) or (c) of section 31-284, or (2) with the intent to injure, defraud or deceive any insurance company insuring the liability of such employer under this chapter or the state of Connecticut because of failure to pay workers' compensation assessments in accordance with the provisions of section 31-345 or Second Injury Fund assessments in accordance with the provisions of section 31-354, (A) knowingly misrepresents one or more employees as independent contractors, or (B) knowingly provides false, incomplete or misleading information to such company concerning the number of employees, for the purpose of paying a lower premium on a policy obtained from such company, shall be guilty of a class D felony and shall be subject to a stop work order issued by the Labor Commissioner in accordance with section 31-76a.
(1961, P.A. 491, S. 11; P.A. 84-299, S. 1; P.A. 86-174, S. 1; P.A. 93-228, S. 6, 35; 93-419, S. 7, 9; P.A. 95-277, S. 1, 19; P.A. 96-267, S. 26; P.A. 07-80, S. 2; 07-89, S. 1; P.A. 10-12, S. 2; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; P.A. 22-89, S. 14.)
History: P.A. 84-299 added Subsec. (b), providing for penalties of up to $500 for each case by a party of undue delay in the completion of hearings or the adjustment or payment of compensation; P.A. 86-174 added Subsec. (c), establishing a civil penalty to be assessed against employers who don't comply with the insurance requirements of Sec. 31-284; P.A. 93-228 added Subsec. (d) to provide that employer which defrauds its workers' compensation insurance carrier for the purpose of paying a lower premium is guilty of a class D felony, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 93-419 made technical changes in Subsec. (b), effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 95-277 amended Subsec. (c) to provide for specific procedures, penalties and hearings associated with the failure of an employer to comply with insurance and self-insurance requirements, to make assessment of civil penalty mandatory, to impose minimum penalty of not less than $500 per employee or $5,000 whichever is less and to increase maximum penalty from $10,000 to $50,000, inserted new Subsecs. (d) re additional penalty after the noncompliance finding, (e) re monthly transfer of penalty funds by the chairman of the Workers' Compensation Commission to the custodian of the Second Injury Fund, appeal procedure and regulations to use in setting fines, and (f) classifying knowing and wilful violations as a class D felony and relettered the existing Subsecs. (d) to (f), effective July 1, 1995; P.A. 96-267 amended Subsec. (e) to require the chairman to notify the State Treasurer and Attorney General when penalties are imposed and when penalties are not paid within 90 days to give notice of the prescribed method of payment and to give notice of potential double penalties for nonpayment; P.A. 07-80 amended Subsec. (b) by increasing penalty for undue delay of payment or adjustment of compensation by employer or insurer and making technical changes; P.A. 07-89 amended Subsec. (g) by extending penalty under subsection to failure to meet requirements of Sec. 31-284(b), subjecting violators to stop work order and making technical changes; P.A. 10-12 amended Subsec. (g) by adding reference to Sec. 31-284(c) in Subdiv. (1) and by adding “or the state of Connecticut because of failure to pay workers' compensation assessments in accordance with the provisions of section 31-345 or Second Injury Fund assessments in accordance with the provisions of section 31-354” in Subdiv. (2); pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” and “commissioners” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” and “administrative law judges” respectively throughout, effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 22-89 made technical changes in Subsec. (e), effective May 24, 2022.
See Sec. 52-570e re action for damages resulting from violation of chapter.
Cited. 7 CA 142.
Subsec. (b):
Subdiv. (2): Imposing a sanction on plaintiff's counsel who was late for a hearing violated plaintiff's right to fundamental fairness since commissioner did not conduct a hearing on the matter nor did she provide plaintiff with a meaningful opportunity to be heard thereon and therefore the record is bereft of any evidence to support the imposition of the sanction. 130 CA 280.
Sec. 31-289. Disposition of fines and penalties.Violations under section 31-284 and subsection (a) of section 31-288 shall be prosecuted in the appropriate court. Any fines or penalties collected under the provisions of sections 31-284 and 31-288 shall be paid over to the Second Injury Fund or its successor.
(1961, P.A. 491, S. 12; P.A. 84-299, S. 2; P.A. 91-207, S. 3, 9.)
History: P.A. 84-299 provided that penalties collected pursuant to “subsection (a)” of section 31-288 shall be paid into the second injury and compensation assurance fund; P.A. 91-207 made a technical change in fund's name.
Sec. 31-289a. Civil action to recover civil penalties. Privileged assignment for trial. (a) If any civil penalty imposed pursuant to any provision of this chapter is not paid within ninety days of its imposition by an administrative law judge, or within ninety days of the final disposition of an appeal, as the case may be, the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission shall immediately notify the Attorney General of such failure to pay. Upon such notification, the Attorney General may bring a civil action in the name of the state of Connecticut in the superior court for the judicial district where the administrative law judge imposed the civil penalty, to recover double the amount of the civil penalty together with reasonable attorney's fees and costs as taxed by the court. Any recovery under this section shall be disbursed in the same manner as recoveries pursuant to section 31-355.
(b) An affidavit sworn to or affirmed by the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission, or by the administrative law judge who imposed the civil penalty referred to in the affidavit, stating the name of the administrative law judge who imposed the civil penalty, the amount of the civil penalty, the name of the violator against whom the civil penalty was imposed, whether or not an appeal was taken, the disposition of the appeal and whether or not the penalty was paid, shall constitute prima facie proof of the facts contained in the affidavit. Copies of the records of the Workers' Compensation Commission, or of any administrative law judge, certified by said chairperson or by the administrative law judge having custody of the records, containing the name of the administrative law judge who imposed a civil penalty, the amount of the civil penalty, the name of the violator against whom the civil penalty was imposed, whether or not an appeal was taken, the disposition of the appeal and whether or not the penalty was paid, shall constitute prima facie proof of the facts contained in the records.
(c) Civil actions pursuant to this section shall be privileged in their assignment for trial.
(P.A. 86-174, S. 2; P.A. 91-339, S. 14, 55; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; P.A. 22-89, S. 15.)
History: P.A. 91-339 changed “board of compensation commissioners” to “workers' compensation commission” and changed “workers' compensation commissioner” to “commissioner”; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” and “workers' compensation commissioner” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” throughout, effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 22-89 made technical changes, effective May 24, 2022.
Sec. 31-289b. Civil action to enjoin noncomplying employer from conducting business in the state.Whenever an employer wilfully fails to comply with the requirements of this chapter, the Attorney General may bring a civil action in the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford to enjoin the employer from conducting business in this state until the employer fully complies with the requirements of this chapter.
(P.A. 88-230, S. 1, 12; P.A. 90-98, S. 1, 2; P.A. 93-142, S. 4, 7, 8; 93-228, S. 27, 35; P.A. 95-220, S. 4–6; P.A. 96-267, S. 27.)
History: P.A. 93-228 effective July 1, 1993. (Revisor's note: P.A. 88-230, P.A. 90-98 and P.A. 93-142 authorized substitution of “judicial district of Hartford” for “judicial district of Hartford-New Britain” in public acts of the 1993 session of the general assembly, to take effect September 1, 1996); P.A. 95-220 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1996, to September 1, 1998, effective July 1, 1995; P.A. 96-267 deleted the word “repeatedly” which modified “fails to comply”.
Sec. 31-290. Obligations not to be evaded. No contract, expressed or implied, no rule, regulation or other device shall in any manner relieve any employer, in whole or in part, of any obligation created by this chapter, except as herein set forth.
(1949 Rev., S. 7455; 1958 Rev., S. 31-183; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 43.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions.
Cited. 128 C. 579; 157 C. 545. Exculpatory agreements in the employment context violate Connecticut public policy. 280 C. 494.
Sec. 31-290a. Discharge, discipline or discrimination prohibited. Misinformation or dissuasion prohibited. Right of action. (a) No employer who is subject to the provisions of this chapter shall: (1) Discharge or cause to be discharged, or in any manner discipline or discriminate against any employee because the employee has filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits or otherwise exercised the rights afforded to him pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, or (2) deliberately misinform or deliberately dissuade an employee from filing a claim for workers' compensation benefits or, on or after October 1, 2021, a claim for payment of benefits from the Connecticut Essential Workers COVID-19 Assistance Fund.
(b) Any employee who is so discharged, disciplined or discriminated against or who has been deliberately misinformed or deliberately dissuaded from filing a claim for workers' compensation benefits or a claim for payment of benefits from the Connecticut Essential Workers COVID-19 Assistance Fund may either: (1) Bring a civil action in the superior court for the judicial district where the employer has its principal office for the reinstatement of his previous job, payment of back wages and reestablishment of employee benefits to which he would have otherwise been entitled if he had not been discriminated against or discharged and any other damages caused by such discrimination or discharge. The court may also award punitive damages. Any employee who prevails in such a civil action shall be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs to be taxed by the court; or (2) file a complaint with the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission alleging violation of the provisions of subsection (a) of this section. Upon receipt of any such complaint, the chairperson shall select an administrative law judge to hear the complaint, provided any administrative law judge who has previously rendered any decision concerning the claim shall be excluded. The hearing shall be held in the workers' compensation district where the employer has its principal office. After the hearing, the administrative law judge shall send each party a written copy of his decision. The administrative law judge may award the employee the reinstatement of his previous job, payment of back wages and reestablishment of employee benefits to which he otherwise would have been eligible if he had not been discriminated against or discharged. Any employee who prevails in such a complaint shall be awarded reasonable attorney's fees. Any party aggrieved by the decision of the administrative law judge may appeal the decision to the Appellate Court.
(P.A. 84-300, S. 1, 2; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 21-2, S. 290; P.A. 22-89, S. 16.)
History: Pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” in Subsec. (b), effective October 1, 2021; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 21-2 amended Subsec. (a) by making technical changes and designating existing Subsec. (a) as Subdiv. (1) and adding a reference to discipline therein, adding Subdiv. (2) regarding deliberately misinforming or dissuading an employee from filing a claim for workers' compensation benefits or a claim for benefits under the Connecticut Essential Workers COVID-19 Assistance Fund and amended Subsec. (b) by adding a provision re any employee who is disciplined or who has been deliberately misinformed or dissuaded from filing a claim for workers' compensation benefits or a claim for benefits under the Connecticut Essential Workers COVID-19 Assistance Fund, effective June 23, 2021; P.A. 22-89 made technical changes in Subsec. (b), effective May 24, 2022.
See Sec. 31-900 re applicable definitions.
Cited. 216 C. 40; 219 C. 1; 221 C. 356; 226 C. 475. Employer does not violate section when it discharges employee solely on the basis that employee, who claims a continued inability to work, fails to return to work following a compensable injury despite having been cleared to do so by his or her treating physician. 258 C. 724. Plaintiff failed to establish prima facie case of employment discrimination under statute by failing to present sufficient evidence that she had exercised any rights afforded to her under act and by lack of evidence in the record to support commissioner's finding that the principal or vice principal knew that plaintiff was exercising her rights or that they intended to discriminate against her for exercising her rights. 270 C. 751. Doctrine of absolute immunity does not bar an employee's claim under section that is predicated solely on the employer's act of filing a retaliatory counterclaim. 310 C. 616.
Cited. 24 CA 362; 28 CA 660; 33 CA 490; 34 CA 708; 40 CA 577; 43 CA 1. Reaffirmed prior rulings that plaintiff has burden of proving discrimination by a fair preponderance of the evidence. 52 CA 570. Where plaintiff offered no evidence to raise an inference of discrimination and failed to present a genuine issue of material fact as to the reason for termination, trial court properly found that a trier of fact could not find discriminatory intent as required under statute. 64 CA 263. Plaintiff must present sufficient evidence that there was a causal connection between the exercise of his right to workers' compensation benefits and the termination of his employment; statute does not create liability for all torts and does not create a statutory basis for the abrogation of governmental immunity as to other torts. 108 CA 710. Commissioner not required to hold a hearing on party's motion to open a finding and award levied in accordance with provisions of section. 139 CA 687. It suffices that the employer set forth one legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's discharge, and the court is not required to examine every reason or explanation set forth by the employer. 143 CA 351. A claim under section premised solely on litigation misconduct and not involving conduct outside of the judicial process may not be brought prior to termination of the underlying litigation. 158 CA 176.
Subsec. (a):
Section contains no requirement that any particular word be used in terminating an employee's employment; standard for proof of a retaliatory discharge. 49 CA 66.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 219 C. 314; 232 C. 91.
Cited. 41 CA 116. In making award under Subsec., commissioner required to make “due allowance” under Sec. 31-314 for any sum paid by employer. 49 CA 66. Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by consent and therefore a stipulation between plaintiff and defendant cannot deprive commissioner of jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim. Id., 114.
Sec. 31-290b. Penalty for false statement. Section 31-290b is repealed.
(P.A. 85-602, S. 1, 4; P.A. 90-244, S. 2.)
Sec. 31-290c. Fraudulent claim or receipt of benefits. Penalties.(a) Any person or his representative who makes or attempts to make any claim for benefits, receives or attempts to receive benefits, prevents or attempts to prevent the receipt of benefits or reduces or attempts to reduce the amount of benefits under this chapter based in whole or in part upon (1) the intentional misrepresentation of any material fact including, but not limited to, the existence, time, date, place, location, circumstances or symptoms of the claimed injury or illness or (2) the intentional nondisclosure of any material fact affecting such claim or the collection of such benefits, shall be guilty of a class C felony if the amount of benefits claimed or received, including but not limited to, the value of medical services, is less than two thousand dollars, or shall be guilty of a class B felony if the amount of such benefits exceeds two thousand dollars. Such person shall also be liable for treble damages in a civil proceeding under section 52-564.
(b) Any person, including an employer, who intentionally aids, abets, assists, promotes or facilitates the making of, or the attempt to make, any claim for benefits or the receipt or attempted receipt of benefits under this chapter by another person in violation of subsection (a) of this section shall be liable for the same criminal and civil penalties as the person making or attempting to make the claim or receiving or attempting to receive the benefits.
(P.A. 90-244.)
No indication that legislature intended statute authorizing penalties for workers' compensation fraud to encompass sanctions against employees for misrepresentations on employment applications. 244 C. 781.
Cited. 45 CA 324. Section does not afford a private right of action; rather, it confers on individuals the right to bring an action for statutory theft under Sec. 52-564. 138 CA 93.
Sec. 31-290d. Workers' compensation fraud unit. (a) There shall be a workers' compensation fraud unit within the office of the Chief State's Attorney in the Division of Criminal Justice. The unit, under the supervision of the Chief State's Attorney, may, upon receipt of a complaint, at the request of the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission or on its own initiative, investigate cases of alleged fraud involving any claim for benefits, any receipt or payment of benefits, or the insurance or self-insurance of liability under sections 31-275 to 31-355a, inclusive. Upon conclusion of the investigation, the Chief State's Attorney shall take appropriate action to enforce the laws of this state.
(b) The workers' compensation fraud unit shall submit a quarterly report detailing its activities to the chairperson and the Advisory Board of the Workers' Compensation Commission and to the Insurance Commissioner.
(c) The cost of the workers' compensation fraud unit shall be appropriated by the General Assembly as an expense of the Workers' Compensation Commission and shall be paid from the Workers' Compensation Administration Fund established under section 31-344a. The unit shall not engage in nor be assigned any duties or responsibilities other than those authorized by or necessary to carry out the provisions of this section.
(P.A. 92-173; P.A. 00-211, S. 2; P.A. 22-89, S. 17.)
History: P.A. 00-211 amended Subsec. (b) to require quarterly reports to be submitted to the Insurance Commissioner; P.A. 22-89 made technical changes in Subsecs. (a) and (b), effective May 24, 2022.
No indication that legislature intended statutes authorizing penalties for workers' compensation fraud to encompass sanctions against employees for misrepresentations on employment applications. 244 C. 781.
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
*Cited. 242 C. 375.
Secs. 31-291 to 31-355a cited. 15 CA 381; 21 CA 270; judgment reversed, see 218 C. 19.
Sec. 31-291. Principal employer, contractor and subcontractor. When any principal employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part for him by a contractor, or through him by a subcontractor, and the work so procured to be done is a part or process in the trade or business of such principal employer, and is performed in, on or about premises under his control, such principal employer shall be liable to pay all compensation under this chapter to the same extent as if the work were done without the intervention of such contractor or subcontractor. The provisions of this section shall not extend immunity to any principal employer from a civil action brought by an injured employee or his dependent under the provisions of section 31-293 to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death occurring on or after May 28, 1988, unless such principal employer has paid compensation benefits under this chapter to such injured employee or his dependent for the injury or death which is the subject of the action.
(1949 Rev., S. 7423; 1958 Rev., S. 31-154; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 13; P.A. 88-226, S. 1, 2.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 88-226 added the provision limiting the immunity for principal employers.
Section makes each one of a chain of contractors liable to the employee; he need not sue his immediate employer first. 99 C. 353. One who lets out by contract the construction of an entire building is not a “principal employer”; aliter, if he gives out parts to different contractors. 101 C. 34. Conditions to liability of principal employer. 106 C. 113; 107 C. 191. General contractor liable for death of employee of subcontractor; both may be held jointly liable. 109 C. 39. General contractor may recover from subcontractor sum which he has been compelled to pay under act to an employee of the latter. 110 C. 221. Question of whether one is a principal employer is largely one of degree and fact. 114 C. 126. Collection of rubbish part of business of city. Id., 546. Cited. 118 C. 368; 119 C. 224. Principal employer liable for compensation cannot be sued at common law. 122 C. 188. Independent contractor not subject to control of employer. 123 C. 320. Cited. 124 C. 230. When one is an employee and not a contractor. Id., 409; Id., 433. Principal employer not liable for compensation as injury did not occur on premises under its control, although work was part or process of trade or business. 125 C. 109; Id., 728. Cited. Id., 265. Independent contractor not servant at time of injury. 126 C. 379. Relationship of principal employer and contractor did not exist. 127 C. 316; 132 C. 81. Work held not “part or process of” employer's trade or business. 129 C. 44; Id., 636. Cited. Id., 593. Work not done in, on or about premises under control of defendant. 130 C. 256. Work held “part or process of” employer's trade or business. Id., 385. Cited. 131 C. 246; 134 C. 468; 135 C. 500. No distinction between “contractor” and “independent contractor” as used in section. Id., 294. Emphasis is on area rather than actual control of implements which caused accident. 136 C. 529. Work not a part or process in trade or business of defendant. Id., 698. Cited. 138 C. 77. If work is of such a character that it ordinarily or appropriately would be performed by principal employer's own employees in the furtherance of his business, or as an essential part in the maintenance thereof, it is a part or process of his work. Id., 569. Work held not a part or process in trade or business of principal employer. Id., 646. Special purpose of section is to protect employees of minor contractors against irresponsibility of immediate employers by making principal contractor liable where three conditions of statute are met. 154 C. 611. Cited. 166 C. 298; 189 C. 701. Not unconstitutional within provisions of Art. I, Sec. 1 of the Connecticut Constitution. 212 C. 427. Cited. 226 C. 508. Injured employee of a subcontractor may sue general contractor if employee can establish contractor's liability to employee under case law. 264 C. 509. “Paid” means to bear a cost, rather than simply transfer money; “Paid compensation benefits” requires principal employer to demonstrate that it bore the cost of all of workers' compensation benefits to injured employee to obtain statutory immunity from civil actions. 322 C. 291.
Cited. 6 CA 60; 10 CA 261; 15 CA 806. Purpose; specific meaning of “control”. 48 CA 449. Municipalities can be held to be liable as principal employers under section, and may be held liable as principal employers when the injured employees of their uninsured contractors or subcontractors qualify for such benefits under section. 183 CA 612; judgment affirmed, see 336 C. 592.
Where employee's injuries are compensable, it is improper under statute for the court or commissioner to determine question of liability between employer, contractor and subcontractor defendants. 1 CS 78. Remodeling and installing fixtures as a “part or process in the trade or business” of a department store discussed. 9 CS 429. Where a third person was permitted to conduct a nonprofit cafeteria for the convenience of employees, the cafeteria was not “a part or process in the trade or business” of the employer. 12 CS 203. To satisfy statute, work must be carried on in some defined physical area within observation of principal employer affording opportunity, by sufficient oversight, to prevent or minimize danger. 27 CS 281. Cited. 30 CS 330; 42 CS 168.
Sec. 31-291a. Method of computing workers' compensation premiums for construction contractors.On or before July 1, 1996, the rating organization licensed pursuant to section 38a-672 shall file with the Insurance Commissioner a method of computing workers' compensation premiums which does not discriminate against or penalize employers in the construction industry solely because they pay higher wages than other employers to workers in the same job classification. Such method shall grant premium credits to construction contractors (1) who have workers' compensation insurance policies in which at least fifty per cent of the premium is attributable to construction classifications and (2) whose experience modification is unity or less as of July 1, 1996. Such credits shall apply to workers' compensation insurance policies issued or renewed on or after July 1, 1996.
(P.A. 95-262, S. 1, 3.)
History: P.A. 95-262 effective July 6, 1995.
Sec. 31-291b. Method of computing workers' compensation premiums for volunteer staff of municipality or volunteer ambulance service. On or before October 1, 2009, the rating organization licensed pursuant to section 38a-672 shall file with the Insurance Commissioner a method of calculating workers' compensation premiums for volunteer staff which does not base such premium calculation primarily on the number of ambulances owned by the municipality or volunteer ambulance service. Such method shall be based primarily on ambulance usage and shall apply to workers' compensation insurance policies issued or renewed on or after October 1, 2009. Ambulance usage shall be determined by the estimated number of calls responded to annually. For purposes of this section, “municipality or volunteer ambulance service” means a volunteer organization or municipality licensed by the Commissioner of Public Health to transport patients.
(P.A. 09-88, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 09-88 effective June 2, 2009.
Sec. 31-292. Liability of employer for worker lent to or employed by another.When the services of a worker are temporarily lent or let on hire to another person by the person with whom the worker has entered into a contract of service, the latter shall, for the purposes of this chapter, be deemed to continue to be the employer of such worker while he is so lent or hired by another.
(1949 Rev., S. 7424; 1958 Rev., S. 31-155; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 14; P.A. 79-376, S. 42.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 79-376 substituted “worker” for “workmen”.
Loaned employee when loanee had right of control. 114 C. 143. Employee of contractor collecting rubbish for city is not loaned employee. Id., 546. Construction of section. 121 C. 640.
Section is meant to address an employer's liability for workers' compensation coverage in instances where the employee may not be working for the employer at the time of injury. 147 CA 380.
Cited. 22 CS 163.
Sec. 31-293. Liability of third persons to employer and employee. Limitations on liability of architects and engineers. Limitations on liability of insurers, self-insurance service organizations and unions relating to safety matters. (a) When any injury for which compensation is payable under the provisions of this chapter has been sustained under circumstances creating in a person other than an employer who has complied with the requirements of subsection (b) of section 31-284, a legal liability to pay damages for the injury, the injured employee may claim compensation under the provisions of this chapter, but the payment or award of compensation shall not affect the claim or right of action of the injured employee against such person, but the injured employee may proceed at law against such person to recover damages for the injury; and any employer or the custodian of the Second Injury Fund, having paid, or having become obligated to pay, compensation under the provisions of this chapter may bring an action against such person to recover any amount that he has paid or has become obligated to pay as compensation to the injured employee. If the employee, the employer or the custodian of the Second Injury Fund brings an action against such person, he shall immediately notify the others, in writing, by personal presentation or by registered or certified mail, of the action and of the name of the court to which the writ is returnable, and the others may join as parties plaintiff in the action within thirty days after such notification, and, if the others fail to join as parties plaintiff, their right of action against such person shall abate unless the employer, insurance carrier or Second Injury Fund gives written notice of a lien in accordance with this subsection. In any case in which an employee brings an action against a party other than an employer who failed to comply with the requirements of subsection (b) of section 31-284, in accordance with the provisions of this section, and the employer is a party defendant in the action, the employer may join as a party plaintiff in the action. The bringing of any action against an employer shall not constitute notice to the employer within the meaning of this section. If the employer and the employee join as parties plaintiff in the action and any damages are recovered, the damages shall be so apportioned that the claim of the employer, as defined in this section, shall take precedence over that of the injured employee in the proceeds of the recovery, after the deduction of reasonable and necessary expenditures, including attorneys' fees, incurred by the employee in effecting the recovery. If the action has been brought by the employee, the claim of the employer shall be reduced by one-third of the amount of the benefits to be reimbursed to the employer, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, which reduction shall inure solely to the benefit of the employee, except that such reduction shall not apply if the reimbursement is to the state of Connecticut or a political subdivision of the state including a local public agency, as the employer, or the custodian of the Second Injury Fund. The rendition of a judgment in favor of the employee or the employer against the party shall not terminate the employer's obligation to make further compensation which the administrative law judge thereafter deems payable to the injured employee. If the damages, after deducting the employee's expenses as provided in this subsection, are more than sufficient to reimburse the employer, damages shall be assessed in his favor in a sum sufficient to reimburse him for his claim, and the excess shall be assessed in favor of the injured employee. No compromise with the person by either the employer or the employee shall be binding upon or affect the rights of the other, unless assented to by him. For the purposes of this section, the claim of the employer shall consist of (1) the amount of any compensation which he has paid on account of the injury which is the subject of the suit, and (2) an amount equal to the present worth of any probable future payments which he has by award become obligated to pay on account of the injury. The word “compensation”, as used in this section, shall be construed to include incapacity payments to an injured employee, payments to the dependents of a deceased employee, sums paid out for surgical, medical and hospital services to an injured employee, the burial fee provided by subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 31-306, payments made under the provisions of sections 31-312 and 31-313, and payments made under the provisions of section 31-284b in the case of an action brought under this section by the employer or an action brought under this section by the employee in which the employee has alleged and been awarded such payments as damages. Each employee who brings an action against a party in accordance with the provisions of this subsection shall include in his complaint (A) the amount of any compensation paid by the employer or the Second Injury Fund on account of the injury which is the subject of the suit, and (B) the amount equal to the present worth of any probable future payments which the employer or the Second Injury Fund has, by award, become obligated to pay on account of the injury. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, when any injury for which compensation is payable under the provisions of this chapter has been sustained under circumstances creating in a person other than an employer who has complied with the requirements of subsection (b) of section 31-284, a legal liability to pay damages for the injury and the injured employee has received compensation for the injury from such employer, its workers' compensation insurance carrier or the Second Injury Fund pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, the employer, insurance carrier or Second Injury Fund shall have a lien upon any judgment received by the employee against the party or any settlement received by the employee from the party, provided the employer, insurance carrier or Second Injury Fund shall give written notice of the lien to the party prior to such judgment or settlement.
(b) When an injury for which compensation is payable under the provisions of this chapter is determined to be the result of a motor vehicle accident or other accident or circumstance in which a third person other than the employer was negligent and the claim is subrogated by the employer or its workers' compensation insurance carrier, the insurance carrier shall provide a rate adjustment to the employer's workers' compensation policy to reflect the recovery of any compensation paid by the insurance carrier prior to subrogation.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, no construction design professional who is retained to perform professional services on a construction project, or any employee of a construction design professional who is assisting or representing the construction design professional in the performance of professional services on the site of the construction project, shall be liable for any injury on the construction project for which compensation is payable under the provisions of this chapter, unless responsibility for safety practices is specifically assumed by contract. The immunity provided by this subsection to any construction design professional shall not apply to the negligent preparation of design plans or specifications. For the purposes of this subsection “construction design professional” means (1) any person licensed as an architect under the provisions of chapter 390, (2) any person licensed, or exempted from licensure, as an engineer under the provisions of chapter 391, or (3) any corporation organized to render professional services through the practice of either or both of such professions in this state.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, the furnishing of or the failure to furnish safety inspections or safety advisory services (1) by an insurer incident to providing workers' compensation insurance to an employer, (2) pursuant to a contract providing for safety inspections or safety advisory services between an employer and a self-insurance service organization incident to providing workers' compensation related services or (3) by a union representing employees of the employer, shall not subject the insurer or self-insurance service organization or their agents or employees, or the union, its members or the members of its safety committee, to third party liability for damages for injury, death or loss resulting therefrom unless the liability arises from a breach of a duty of fair representation of its members by a union. The immunity from liability extended under this subsection shall not be extended to any insurer or self-insurance service organization other than where the immunity is incident to the provision of workers' compensation insurance or workers' compensation related services.
(1949 Rev., S. 7425; 1949, 1951, S. 3040d; 1958 Rev., S. 31-156; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 15; 1967, P.A. 692, S. 4; 842, S. 27; P.A. 86-266, S. 1; P.A. 90-145; P.A. 91-32, S. 9, 41; 91-191, S. 2, 3; P.A. 93-228, S. 7, 35; P.A. 96-65, S. 2; P.A. 11-205, S. 1; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1967 acts allowed employer to be party plaintiff in cases where employee brings an action against a third party, specified that bringing action against employer does not constitute notice and increased burial fee from $500 to $1,000; P.A. 86-266 added Subsec. (b), limiting the civil liability of certain architects, engineers and their employees for injuries compensable under workers' compensation which occur on construction projects; P.A. 90-145 added Subsec. (c) concerning limitations on the liability of insurers, self-insurance service organizations and unions in relation to safety inspections and safety advisory services; P.A. 91-32 made technical changes; P.A. 91-191 amended the definition of “compensation” in Subsec. (a) to include payments made under Sec. 31-284b in certain cases; P.A. 93-228 amended Subsec. (a) to specify required contents of employees' complaints against third parties and to give employers liens on judgments or settlements paid by third parties to employees, added new Subsec. (b) to prohibit insurers from adjusting employers' workers' compensation insurance rates if payments made by insurers will be recovered from negligent third party, and redesignated existing Subsecs. (b) and (c) as (c) and (d), respectively, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 96-65 amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes for consistency and to include references to the custodian of the Second Injury Fund and employers who fail to comply with Sec. 31-284(b); P.A. 11-205 amended Subsec. (a) to add provision re right of action of parties that do not join as parties plaintiff to abate “unless the employer, insurance carrier or Second Injury Fund gives written notice of a lien in accordance with this subsection” and add provision re reduction of claim of employer by one-third of amount of benefits to be reimbursed to the employer if action has been brought by employee, effective July 1, 2011; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” in Subsec. (a), effective October 1, 2021.
If employee settles with tortfeasor, employer may accept the settlement and have credit for the amount received. 92 C. 398. Right of an insurer to recover from tortfeasor who has settled with employee direct. 101 C. 200. Form of judgment in suit by both employee and employer against tortfeasor; “reasonable attorney's fee” may be nothing. 104 C. 507. That employer was “subsidiary” of third party not a defense. 112 C. 510. Cited. 114 C. 130. Injured person who receives compensation may still sue doctor for malpractice. 115 C. 563. Where employer pays compensation in death case, he is entitled to reimbursement out of judgment obtained by administratrix from third party. 116 C. 91. Cited. 123 C. 514; 124 C. 230. Statute applied where employee injured by fellow employee. 125 C. 293. Cited. 128 C. 521; 129 C. 637; 132 C. 545. Liability for compensation after judgment against third party. Id., 671. Cited. 133 C. 448. Not necessary to make administratrix of deceased employee a party; employer's rights discussed. 136 C. 670. Cited. 143 C. 77. Contains no exception for a situation wherein employer is reimbursed from a judgment obtained against a third party tortfeasor. 144 C. 322. Cited. 150 C. 211. Employer's time to intervene does not begin to run until notice of the action is given to him. 154 C. 708. By stipulation approved by commissioner, employer effectively released “any further claims under the Workmen's Compensation Act” including right to recover from third parties. 157 C. 538. Cited. 160 C. 482. No standing to appeal on behalf of plaintiff's employer's participation. 163 C. 365. Cited. 176 C. 622; 181 C. 321; 182 C. 24; 183 C. 508; 192 C. 460; 193 C. 59; Id., 297; 204 C. 485; 208 C. 589. Notice in compliance with statute need not include information re right of intervention and legal consequences of failure to intervene within statutory time period. 216 C. 533. Employer entitlement to a credit for unknown future benefits against the net proceeds of a third party recovery discussed. 218 C. 19. Cited. Id., 46; Id., 531; 219 C. 439; 222 C. 744. Third party tortfeasor may not raise the negligence of employer as a special defense when employer has intervened in personal injury action as party plaintiff in order to secure his statutory right to reimbursement of workers' compensation benefits. Id., 775. Cited. 224 C. 382; 225 C. 915. Notice under section does not require specific reference to employment relationship. 230 C. 100. Cited. Id., 914; 232 C. 918; 233 C. 251; 236 C. 330; 241 C. 170; 242 C. 375. In order for abatement provision to be invoked, notice given pursuant to section must comport with both the statutory requirements and the due process clause. Id., 432. Section authorizes injured employee to seek recovery from third party, other than employer, for work-related injuries caused by that third party. 247 C. 442. City employer's right to intervene in employee's negligence action against physician is incorporated into Sec. 7-433c pursuant to this section. 253 C. 429. Relevant figure for determining whether to award interest under Sec. 52-192a is amount of the jury verdict, not amount of the postapportionment judgment rendered pursuant this section. 264 C. 314.
Cited. 3 CA 450; 9 CA 194; 11 CA 391; 15 CA 381; 16 CA 138; 18 CA 614; 21 CA 9; judgment reversed, see 218 C. 46; Id., 270; judgment reversed, see 218 C. 19; 22 CA 539; judgment reversed, see 219 C. 439; 24 CA 531; Id., 719; Id., 739; 25 CA 492; judgment reversed, see 222 C. 744; 29 CA 618; 33 CA 422; 34 CA 521; 36 CA 635; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 330; 37 CA 423. Because employer and its compensation insurance carrier did not bring action pursuant to section, they were not entitled to a credit and were obligated to pay plaintiff's hospital bill. 42 CA 200. Cited. 46 CA 712. Section does not entitle employer to make a claim against any benefits that might be due to an employee under uninsured motorist provisions of employer's policy. 53 CA 452. Definition of “compensation” inapplicable to Sec. 31-284b as it existed on date of plaintiff's injury. 61 CA 9. State does not waive its right to sovereign immunity and subject itself to a counterclaim when intervening pursuant to statute when state's claim is derivative, depends on injured plaintiff recovering against defendant and does not enlarge defendant's liability or try to establish that defendant is liable to the state. 65 CA 418. Section does not confer authority on commissioner to dictate the appropriate terms of third party settlement allocations and employer lacks statutory aggrievement to challenge such allocation. 138 CA 812.
Since the right is a substantive one, it does not matter that the exact method prescribed by section has not been followed. 4 CS 5. Plaintiff employer is required to join as coplaintiff and if he does not, his right of action abates. 5 CS 108. Cited. 6 CS 152. Purpose of statute is fulfilled if the rights of employer as well as employees are determined in one action and an allowance of a motion by employer to join as a codefendant does not constitute a judgment or settle a question of fact. 9 CS 68. Right of employer is not one for a wrong done to employee but one conferred by statute. 10 CS 508. Statute requires that employee give employer formal notice; it is not enough that employer has knowledge of the existence of a pending action. 12 CS 325. Available only to employer who has paid or is obligated to make payments under act. 17 CS 69. Defendant employer and its insurer are not required to intervene in employee's representative's suit against the tortfeasor within the 1-year statutory period. 20 CS 30. Where employer brings action against third person within time limited by statute and employee, within 30 days after institution of suit, has moved to join, fact that motion was filed more than year after tortious act took place would not defeat motion. 23 CS 106. Cited. 27 CS 383. Demurrer to complaint sustained in third party action by employee against employer's insurance carrier; duties under act merge identities of employer and his insurer. 28 CS 1. Cited. 30 CS 126. Statute contains no authorization for suit against employee; time limitation, within which right must be enforced, is limitation of liability itself and not of remedy alone. 33 CS 661. “Shall abate” provision does not apply to employee's entire cause of action but only to extent it has previously been prosecuted by employer; not required that defense be by plea in abatement. 35 CS 60. Comparative negligence of employee is a defense in an action by employer against a third party. 36 CS 137. Cited. Id., 317. Comparative negligence apportionment between employer and employee of sums received from third party; public policy discussed. 39 CS 222.
Cited. 40 CS 165.
Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 671.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 211 C. 133; 217 C. 631. Employer credit to extent of third party recovery may be awarded by workers' compensation commission. 218 C. 46. Cited. 221 C. 465; 224 C. 8. Sec. 13a-149 does not bar employer from seeking reimbursement under this section. 231 C. 370. Cited. Id., 381. Language of section does not indicate that service must have been completed before notice can be sent; judgment of Appellate Court in 36 CA 635 reversed. 236 C. 330. Does not apply to uninsured motorist coverage. 242 C. 375. Cited. Id., 432. Applicable statute of limitations on underlying claim is tolled if employer receives notice of an employee's timely filed action against a third party tortfeasor and intervenes within 30-day period prescribed by statute. 246 C. 156. Employer has cause of action under section that is separate and distinct from that of its injured employee. 247 C. 442. “Compensation” in section includes sums paid pursuant to voluntary settlement agreement authorized by Sec. 31-296. 259 C. 325. Term “injury”, as used in Subsec., does not encompass the harm alleged by plaintiff in his legal malpractice action because it is unrelated to plaintiff's work; “third person” to which Subsec. refers is person in whom a legal liability has been created to pay damages for the employee's work-related injury; “third person”, as used in Subsec., refers to the actual tortfeasor who caused the work-related injury. 269 C. 507. Subsec. does not confer standing on an employer to challenge the allocation of proceeds of a settlement between its injured employee and the third party tortfeasor. 292 C. 86. Employer that pays workers' compensation benefits to injured employee is entitled to reimbursement for those payments from “any damages” that employee may recover from the third party tortfeasor, including an award that consists solely of noneconomic damages; “compensation” includes loss of use payments, because public policy is that third party tortfeasor, and not the employer, shall be primarily responsible for bearing economic loss resulting from tortfeasor's negligence. 294 C. 357. Scope of employer's lien is coextensive with employer's claim under Subsec., and includes credit for unknown, future workers' compensation benefits in the amount of net proceeds that injured employee recovers from third party tortfeasor. 297 C. 391. Whether plaintiff voluntarily relinquished its legal rights by assenting to settlement is a question of fact for trial court to decide, and plaintiff's proposed distribution of settlement proceeds does not decide that issue by itself. 301 C. 405. The one-third portion of an employer's recovery that inures solely to the employee's benefit is not subject to the moratorium, and, as a result, the employer does not receive a credit against later arising benefits for such portion paid to the employee. 329 C. 564.
Cited. 22 CA 27; judgment reversed, see 217 C. 631; 30 CA 263; Id., 801; 41 CA 664. Trial court improperly concluded that “reasonable and necessary expenditures” recoverable under Subsec. are the same as the enumerated fees and costs recoverable from an opposing party in a civil action; Subsec. leaves it to the discretion of the court to determine which expenditures are reasonable and necessary. 134 CA 112.
In the absence of evidence that employer was misled or otherwise prejudiced by notice delivered to employer that incorrectly stated employer's name, notice satisfied statutory due process requirement that employees bringing actions for certain injuries “immediately notify” their employers of their lawsuits. 49 CS 412.
Sec. 31-293a. No right against fellow employee; exception. If an employee or, in case of his death, his dependent has a right to benefits or compensation under this chapter on account of injury or death from injury caused by the negligence or wrong of a fellow employee, such right shall be the exclusive remedy of such injured employee or dependent and no action may be brought against such fellow employee unless such wrong was wilful or malicious or the action is based on the fellow employee's negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle as defined in section 14-1. For purposes of this section, contractors' mobile equipment such as bulldozers, powershovels, rollers, graders or scrapers, farm machinery, cranes, diggers, forklifts, pumps, generators, air compressors, drills or other similar equipment designed for use principally off public roads are not “motor vehicles” if the claimed injury involving such equipment occurred at the worksite on or after October 1, 1983. No insurance policy or contract shall be accepted as proof of financial responsibility of the owner and as evidence of the insuring of such person for injury to or death of persons and damage to property by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles required by chapter 246 if it excludes from coverage under such policy or contract any agent, representative or employee of such owner from such policy or contract. Any provision of such an insurance policy or contract effected after July 1, 1969, which excludes from coverage thereunder any agent, representative or employee of the owner of a motor vehicle involved in an accident with a fellow employee shall be null and void.
(1967, P.A. 842, S. 5; 1969, P.A. 696, S. 4; P.A. 83-297; P.A. 84-22, S. 1, 2.)
History: 1969 act clarified provisions re actions against fellow employees and added provisions re insurance policies and contracts; P.A. 83-297 provided that contractor's mobile equipment designed for use principally off public roads are not “motor vehicles” for purposes of this section if the injuries involving the equipment occur at the worksite; P.A. 84-22 made clear that the exclusions from the definition of “motor vehicle” established in P.A. 83-297 apply only to injuries which occur on or after October 1, 1983.
Cited. 167 C. 499; 169 C. 630. Fact that employer worked with plaintiff did not change his status to “fellow employee” to come within statute provisions. 178 C. 371. Employee has no right of action against fellow employee who directed operation of truck's hydraulic hoist since actions did not constitute “the operation of a motor vehicle”. 180 C. 469. Cited. 182 C. 24; 183 C. 508. Specific language of Sec. 4-165 prevails over general language of this statute as applied to fellow state employees. 185 C. 616. Section, which permits an action against a fellow employee for injuries arising out of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle, does not supersede the more specific provisions of Sec. 7-308. 187 C. 53. Term “operation of a motor vehicle” construed as not including activities unrelated to movement of the vehicle. 189 C. 354. Cited. Id., 550; 193 C. 59; 196 C. 91; 203 C. 34; 206 C. 495; 208 C. 589. “Motor vehicle” exception discussed. 215 C. 55. Cited. 220 C. 721; 221 C. 356; 222 C. 744; 237 C. 1; 242 C. 375. Tort actions for emotional injuries that are not compensable under act are not barred by exclusivity provisions of act. 259 C. 729. When read in conjunction with Sec. 31-275, statute plainly states that emotional distress not arising from physical injury is not compensable through workers' compensation. 265 C. 21. Trial court improperly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment because legislature did not intend to create a special hazard exception to the liability created under statute for injuries sustained by employee as a result of another employee's negligent operation of a motor vehicle; discussion of legislative intent of statute; overruled 65 CA 771. 279 C. 177. Unicover insurance policy did not provide umbrella coverage. 285 C. 342.
Cited. 2 CA 174; 3 CA 40. Exception under statute is concerned only with those engaged in any activity related to driving or moving a vehicle or related to a circumstance resulting from the movement of a vehicle. Id., 246. Cited. 7 CA 296; Id., 575; 9 CA 290; 10 CA 18; Id., 618; 20 CA 619; 22 CA 88. Definition of “motor vehicle” for purposes of the exception in section is controlled by Sec. 14-1(a)(47) definition as further refined by Sec. 14-165(i). 30 CA 263. Cited. 41 CA 664. Golf cart not a “motor vehicle” for purposes of the “motor vehicle” exception to exclusivity provision of Workers' Compensation Act. 54 CA 479. Statute does not authorize plaintiff's action against his employer arising out of a fellow employee's negligent operation of a motor vehicle. 56 CA 325. Defendant's operation of a payloader to jump start plaintiff's dump truck did not constitute “operation of a motor vehicle” so as to bring the incident within the exception contained in section. 64 CA 409. Injuries caused by operation of external controls of garbage truck are not caused by operation of motor vehicle and do not fall within exception of exclusive remedy of worker's compensation. 99 CA 464. Container and chassis together constituted a trailer, and because the trailer was a vehicle suitable for transportation of property, was drawn by nonmuscular power, and was suitable for operation on a highway, it constituted a motor vehicle. 126 CA 860. A payloader is the same type of equipment as a bucket loader, as defined in Sec. 14-165, and not a motor vehicle under this section, therefore the motor vehicle exception to the exclusivity of the Workers' Compensation Act does not apply. 156 CA 727.
Cited. 30 CS 233; 36 CS 101; 39 CS 102; 40 CS 165. “Motor vehicle” exception discussed. 41 CS 326. Cited. 41 CS 391; 44 CS 148. Legislature did not treat or intend to treat golf carts differently from any other non-highway-type mechanism for purposes of section. 46 CS 24. Injury occurring from use of motor vehicle at service station did not fall under the motor vehicle exception but rather is attributable to “the special hazards of the work place”. 49 CS 351. Rules of statutory construction did not permit court to extend umbrella coverage based on facts of case. 50 CS 486.
Sec. 31-294. Notice of injury and of claim for compensation.Section 31-294 is repealed.
(1949 Rev., S. 7426, 7442; 1953, 1955, S. 3041d; 1958, S. 31-157, 31-168; 1959, P.A. 387; 580, S. 8; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 16; 1963, P.A. 642, S. 36; 1967, P.A. 842, S. 3; 1969, P.A. 692; P.A. 80-124, S. 5; P.A. 81-472, S. 67, 159; P.A. 82-472, S. 108, 183; P.A. 85-133, S. 2; 85-184, S. 1; P.A. 87-160, S. 1; P.A. 88-357, S. 19; P.A. 89-371, S. 22; P.A. 90-116, S. 5; P.A. 91-32, S. 40, 41.)
Sec. 31-294a. Eligibility for podiatric care. Any recipient of benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act shall be eligible to receive the services of a podiatrist to the same extent that such person is eligible to receive the services of a practicing physician, surgeon or dentist.
(1969, P.A. 556, S. 4; P.A. 79-376, S. 43.)
History: P.A. 79-376 replaced “workmen's compensation” with “workers' compensation”.
Cited. 228 C. 1.
Sec. 31-294b. Report of injury to employer. Notice of claim form provided by commission. (a) Any employee who has sustained an injury in the course of his employment shall immediately report the injury to his employer, or some person representing his employer. If the employee fails to report the injury immediately, the administrative law judge may reduce the award of compensation proportionately to any prejudice that he finds the employer has sustained by reason of the failure, provided the burden of proof with respect to such prejudice shall rest upon the employer.
(b) Once the first report of injury has been submitted to the Workers' Compensation Commission, pursuant to section 31-294c, by the employer, the employer's insurance carrier or the employer's representative, the Workers' Compensation Commission shall provide to the injured employee, not later than five business days after receipt of such notice, a copy of Form 30C, Notice of Claim for Compensation, or any successor form prepared by the Workers' Compensation Commission to help injured employees comply with the notice requirements of section 31-294c. The Workers' Compensation Commission shall provide such form to the injured employee in person or by mail sent to such employee's current address on file with the employer.
(P.A. 91-32, S. 10, 41; P.A. 08-3, S. 1; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 08-3 designated existing provisions as Subsec. (a) and added Subsec. (b) re Workers' Compensation Commission providing Form 30C or successor form to employee following filing of first report of injury; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” in Subsec. (a), effective October 1, 2021.
Cited. 228 C. 1; 237 C. 1.
Employer's first report of injury form and an attorney's letter taken together meet statutory requirement of written notice of claim. 52 CA 194.
Sec. 31-294c. Notice of claim for compensation. Notice contesting liability. Exception for dependents of certain deceased employees. (a) No proceedings for compensation under the provisions of this chapter shall be maintained unless a written notice of claim for compensation is given within one year from the date of the accident or within three years from the first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease, as the case may be, which caused the personal injury, provided, if death has resulted within two years from the date of the accident or first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease, a dependent or dependents, or the legal representative of the deceased employee, may make claim for compensation within the two-year period or within one year from the date of death, whichever is later. Notice of claim for compensation may be given to the employer or any administrative law judge and shall state, in simple language, the date and place of the accident and the nature of the injury resulting from the accident, or the date of the first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease and the nature of the disease, as the case may be, and the name and address of the employee and of the person in whose interest compensation is claimed. An employee of the state shall send a copy of the notice to the Commissioner of Administrative Services. An employee of a municipality shall send a copy of the notice to the town clerk of the municipality in which he or she is employed. An employer, other than the state or a municipality, may opt to post a copy of where notice of a claim for compensation shall be sent by an employee in the workplace location where other labor law posters required by the Labor Department are prominently displayed. In addition, an employer, opting to post where notice of a claim for compensation by an employee shall be sent, shall forward the address of where notice of a claim for compensation shall be sent to the Workers' Compensation Commission and the commission shall post such address on its Internet web site. An employer shall be responsible for verifying that information posted at a workplace location is consistent with the information posted on the commission's Internet web site. If an employee, other than an employee of the state or a municipality, opts to mail to his or her employer the written notice of a claim for compensation required under the provisions of this section, such written notice shall be sent by the employee to the employer in accordance with section 31-321. As used in this section, “manifestation of a symptom” means manifestation to an employee claiming compensation, or to some other person standing in such relation to him that the knowledge of the person would be imputed to him, in a manner that is or should be recognized by him as symptomatic of the occupational disease for which compensation is claimed.
(b) Whenever liability to pay compensation is contested by the employer, he shall file with the administrative law judge, on or before the twenty-eighth day after he has received a written notice of claim, a notice in accord with a form prescribed by the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission stating that the right to compensation is contested, the name of the claimant, the name of the employer, the date of the alleged injury or death and the specific grounds on which the right to compensation is contested. The employer shall send a copy of the notice to the employee in accordance with section 31-321. If the employer or his legal representative fails to file the notice contesting liability on or before the twenty-eighth day after he has received the written notice of claim, the employer shall commence payment of compensation for such injury or death on or before the twenty-eighth day after he has received the written notice of claim, but the employer may contest the employee's right to receive compensation on any grounds or the extent of his disability within one year from the receipt of the written notice of claim, provided the employer shall not be required to commence payment of compensation when the written notice of claim has not been properly served in accordance with section 31-321 or when the written notice of claim fails to include a warning that (1) the employer, if he has commenced payment for the alleged injury or death on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving a written notice of claim, shall be precluded from contesting liability unless a notice contesting liability is filed within one year from the receipt of the written notice of claim, and (2) the employer shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the compensability of the alleged injury or death unless the employer either files a notice contesting liability on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving a written notice of claim or commences payment for the alleged injury or death on or before such twenty-eighth day. An employer shall be entitled, if he prevails, to reimbursement from the claimant of any compensation paid by the employer on and after the date the administrative law judge receives written notice from the employer or his legal representative, in accordance with the form prescribed by the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission, stating that the right to compensation is contested. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, an employer who fails to contest liability for an alleged injury or death on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving a written notice of claim and who fails to commence payment for the alleged injury or death on or before such twenty-eighth day, shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the compensability of the alleged injury or death. If an employer has opted to post an address of where notice of a claim for compensation by an employee shall be sent, as described in subsection (a) of this section, the twenty-eight-day period set forth in this subsection shall begin on the date when such employer receives written notice of a claim for compensation at such posted address.
(c) Failure to provide a notice of claim under subsection (a) of this section shall not bar maintenance of the proceedings if there has been a hearing or a written request for a hearing or an assignment for a hearing within a one-year period from the date of the accident or within a three-year period from the first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease, as the case may be, or if a voluntary agreement has been submitted within the applicable period, or if within the applicable period an employee has been furnished, for the injury with respect to which compensation is claimed, with medical or surgical care as provided in section 31-294d. No defect or inaccuracy of notice of claim shall bar maintenance of proceedings unless the employer shows that he was ignorant of the facts concerning the personal injury and was prejudiced by the defect or inaccuracy of the notice. Upon satisfactory showing of ignorance and prejudice, the employer shall receive allowance to the extent of the prejudice.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a dependent or dependents of a deceased employee seeking compensation under section 31-306 who was barred by a final judgment in a court of law from filing a claim arising out of the death of the deceased employee, whose date of injury was between June 1, 1991, and June 30, 1991, and whose date of death was between November 1, 1992, and November 30, 1992, because of the failure of the dependent to timely file a separate death benefits claim, shall be allowed to file a written notice of claim for compensation not later than one year after July 8, 2005, and the administrative law judge shall have jurisdiction to determine such dependent's claim.
(P.A. 91-32, S. 11, 41; 91-339, S. 47, 55; P.A. 93-228, S. 8, 35; 93-419, S. 8, 9; P.A. 05-230, S. 2; P.A. 16-112, S. 1; P.A. 17-141, S. 1; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; P.A. 22-89, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 91-339 amended Subsec. (b) to change “commissioners” to “chairman of the workers' compensation commission”; P.A. 93-228 amended Subsec. (b) to change the circumstances under which a conclusive presumption of employer liability is established and to allow an employer who successfully contests liability for a claim to recover compensation paid to the claimant, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 93-419 made technical change in Subsec. (b), replacing “commended” with “commenced”, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 05-230 added new Subsec. (d) re jurisdiction of commissioner over specified claim of dependent or dependents of deceased employee, effective July 8, 2005, and applicable to claims pending on or filed on and after that date; P.A. 16-112 amended Subsec. (a) by adding provision re employee of municipality to send copy of notice to town clerk of municipality in which he or she is employed and making a technical change, effective July 1, 2016; P.A. 17-141 amended Subsec. (a) to add provisions re employer, other than the state or a municipality, may post copy of where notice of claim shall be sent in workplace location where other labor law posters are displayed, employer to forward address to Workers' Compensation Commission, employer responsible for verifying information posted at workplace location is consistent with that posted on commission's Internet web site, and if employee mails written notice of claim, notice shall be sent by certified mail, and amended Subsec. (b) to add provision re, if employer has opted to post address of where notice of claim shall be sent, 28 day period shall begin when employer receives written notice of claim; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” throughout, effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 22-89 made technical changes in Subsecs. (a) and (b) and in Subsec. (a) deleted “by certified mail” and added reference to Sec. 31-321, effective May 24, 2022.
Cited. 228 C. 1; 231 C. 529; 232 C. 780; 237 C. 1; 239 C. 19. Workers' compensation legislation is remedial and should be broadly construed to accomplish its humanitarian purpose; where workers' compensation appeal involves issue of statutory construction that has not been subjected to judicial scrutiny, Supreme Court has plenary power to review the administrative decision. 252 C. 596. HIV is an occupational disease for correction officers who are members of emergency response units which are special teams of correction officers that respond to major disturbances and riots, and, therefore plaintiff's notice of claim was timely filed under statute; HIV is peculiar to and distinctively associated with decedent's occupation as a correction officer in an emergency response unit because of the direct causal connection between the specific duties of his employment, which required him to interact with inmates with a high HIV infection rate and in a manner that greatly increased the risk of contracting HIV and the AIDS the decedent contracted. 268 C. 753. Fact that an occupational disease cannot be qualified as such until a causal connection with exposure at employee's workplace can be established compels the conclusion that such a connection is a prerequisite to commencement of the statute of limitations for making a claim for an occupational disease. 280 C. 723. For purposes of section, commissioner must determine whether plaintiff's repetitive trauma injury more closely resembles “an accidental injury” or “occupational disease”. 296 C. 463. For purposes of determining limitation period, claim brought pursuant to Sec. 7-433c was properly treated as one for accidental injury definitely located in time and place, rather than a repetitive trauma injury, because plaintiff failed to present evidence that hypertension was causally connected to employment; formal diagnosis of hypertension or heart disease, communicated to an employee by his or her physician, constitutes the “injury” that triggers the running of the limitation period. 299 C. 265. Evidence that claimant had elevated blood pressure readings, or had been advised by physician to monitor blood pressure, is insufficient to trigger one year filing period under section, rather there must be evidence that claimant knew he or she suffered from hypertension, ordinarily shown by proof claimant was informed of diagnosis by a medical professional. 302 C. 755. Hypertension diagnosis is sufficient to trigger 1-year filing period and prescription of hypertension medication is not required. Id., 767. Board's imposition of 1-year statute of limitations for filing of survivor's benefits improper when a valid claim has previously been filed by either the employee or a representative; plaintiff was not required to file a separate timely notice of claim for survivor's benefits when decedent, during his lifetime, had filed a timely notice of claims for benefits that was accepted and paid. 320 C. 299. An estate is not a legal representative capable of bringing a claim under this section or any other under this chapter. 323 C. 26.
Cited. 38 CA 1; Id., 73; 44 CA 465. Employer's first report of injury form and an attorney's letter taken together meet statutory requirement of written notice of claim. 52 CA 194. Workers' compensation review board properly concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, completion of accident investigation form by defendant's fire department indicating that plaintiff had been transported to the hospital for high blood pressure, plaintiff's filing of first report of injury for high blood pressure with defendant's workers' compensation division and the employer's investigative report prepared by defendant's workers' compensation division for defendant's controller's office constituted “substantial compliance” with notice requirements. 63 CA 570. Does not require that notice of injury by employee include statutory reference. 70 CA 321. Partially completed form 30C, which was not signed by employee and did not include a description of employee's injury, delivered to supervisor was sufficient to trigger employer's responsibility to file form 43; rule of strict compliance is not supported by either the plain language or legislative history. 127 CA 619.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 239 C. 408; 240 C. 788; 242 C. 570. Notice of claim for repetitive trauma injury is sufficient to support a motion to preclude if it provides adequate information as to period of time over which the injury is alleged to have occurred sufficient to allow employer to make timely investigation of the claim. 252 C. 596. Service on employer of amended complaint in third party action and employer's acknowledgment that it “may” become obligated to pay benefits to plaintiff are not sufficient to establish that employer had actual notice of plaintiff's intent to seek survivor's benefits as a result of decedent's death. 265 C. 525. Statute of limitations in Subsec. applies to all potential claims of employee's estate or his dependents and requires that a compensable claim be filed within the applicable limitations period, irrespective of whether initial claim is filed by the employee, the employee's estate after his death, or the decedent employee's dependents; proviso is not a condition precedent for commencement of dependents' claims, but rather a modified limitations period for commencement of such claims. 283 C. 813. Statute of limitations implicates commissioner's subject matter jurisdiction, and a subject matter jurisdictional statute of limitations may not be waived and court may address it sua sponte. 299 C. 800.
Cited. 40 CA 446; 42 CA 803; 44 CA 465; 45 CA 707. “Accident” and “occupational disease” must be read broadly enough so that even an injury that is defined as stemming from repetitive trauma under Sec. 31-275(8) may be deemed to fall into one of the two categories. 56 CA 90. Without timely written notice of claim, commissioner lacks subject matter jurisdiction over such claim. 68 CA 590. Separate notice of claim not required when dependent pursues derivative claim for death benefit. 71 CA 140. If the employee dies within 2 years of the accident or the first manifestation of symptoms of an occupational disease and the employee's dependent is filing a claim for benefits, the dependent has 2 years to file a claim for benefits or has 1 year from the date of the employee's death, whichever is longer. 137 CA 665. Because it was reasonable for Workers' Compensation Commissioner to determine that form 30c was filed on behalf of decedent's widow and sufficiently put defendants on notice of plaintiff's claim for survivor benefits, and because the savings provision of section cautions against arbitrary dismissal of plaintiff's claim, the claim was timely filed and the commissioner had subject matter jurisdiction over it. 150 CA 699. With respect to the notice of claim requirement, the proper inquiry is not whether defendant had notice of plaintiff's injuries and intent to pursue a claim, but rather whether plaintiff met the statutory requirements to give commission jurisdiction over his claim. 156 CA 700.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 241 C. 692. Notice to contest liability must state both date of alleged injury and specific reasons for contesting compensation. 252 C. 596. Compensability, in terms of whether a type of injury falls within scope of act, is a jurisdictional fact that would allow employer to contest liability beyond the time frame allotted by Subsec.; hence, because emotional impairment claimed by plaintiff does not fall within scope of act, commissioner and board initially properly denied plaintiff's motion to preclude defendants from contesting liability. 270 C. 532. P.A. 93-228 did not alter status quo that if employer neither timely pays nor timely contests liability, conclusive presumption of compensability attaches and employer is barred from contesting employee's right to receive compensation on any ground or extent of employee's disability. 286 C. 102. Where payment for claim is not commenced or liability is not contested within the period required by statute, employer cannot challenge proof of claim but commissioner is not barred from further inquiry. 291 C. 537.
Cited. 30 CA 295; 40 CA 446. Employer not precluded from challenging commissioner's subject matter jurisdiction; issue of compensability of an injury does not implicate commissioner's subject matter jurisdiction and, accordingly, statutory presumption of liability cannot be circumvented. 64 CA 1. Does not implicate insurer's right to raise defense of lack of coverage against an employer. 67 CA 361. Conclusive presumption of compensability for a workers' compensation claim under Subsec. is not an unconstitutional denial of employer's right to due process. 127 CA 619. Employer who was making payments for plaintiff's prior injury was precluded from contesting liability on subsequent claim when it failed to file notice to contest liability or commence making payments on subsequent claim for alleged new and separate injury, with a reported date and type of injury different from the earlier claimed injury, and any claim by employer that payment on new claim would result in plaintiff's double recovery should have been raised in a notice to contest liability. 137 CA 324. Sending notice to contest liability to employee by certified mail meets requirements, despite employee's failure to claim it; notice to contest liability stating employee did not suffer an injury which arose out of or in the course of employment is not a general denial and therefore meets requirements for valid notice to contest liability; notice to contest liability form stating date of employee's injury differently than stated by employee on claim form did not render notice insufficient because date of injury stated by employer fell within the time period of claimed repetitive injury stated by employee. 138 CA 826. Employer not deemed conclusively precluded from contesting extent of disability under Subsec. when it was impossible to commence payment of compensation within statutory time period. 145 CA 261. Employer's disclaimer citing “lack of medical evidence” to support causal connection between injury and employment met specific notice requirement. 159 CA 180. The equitable doctrine of laches does not apply to a motion to preclude filed under section and, in the absence of legislative action, there is no recognized time limitation within which an employee must file a motion to preclude. 168 CA 92. “Safe harbor” only applies when employer is contesting extent of employee's injury, and does not apply to employer who is contesting liability; employer contesting liability must strictly comply with filing requirements of Subsec. 190 CA 623. With respect to the commence payment predicate, the initial burden belongs to the employer. 198 CA 854.
Subsec. (c):
Medical care exception does not apply to toll statute of limitations under Sec. 7-433c because plaintiff failed to establish, in keeping with board's time-tested interpretation of Subsec., that employer previously furnished medical care for specific condition or later claimed condition was causally related to timely reported incident for which employer furnished medical care. 304 C. 571.
Employer's insurer's payment of medical bills during 1-year period constituted the furnishing of medical treatment. 47 CA 530. Employee's claim was not time barred because he failed to file notice of claim that specifically referenced all of his injuries. 48 CA 357.
Subsec. (d):
Trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction in concluding that Subsec. constitutes a public emolument in violation of Sec. 1. of state constitution. 299 C. 800.
Sec. 31-294d. Medical and surgical aid. Hospital, ambulatory surgical center and nursing service. (a)(1) The employer, as soon as the employer has knowledge of an injury, shall provide a competent physician, surgeon, physician assistant or advanced practice registered nurse to attend the injured employee and, in addition, shall furnish any medical and surgical aid or hospital and nursing service, including medical rehabilitation services and prescription drugs, as the physician, surgeon, physician assistant or advanced practice registered nurse deems reasonable or necessary. The employer, any insurer acting on behalf of the employer, or any other entity acting on behalf of the employer or insurer shall be responsible for paying the cost of such prescription drugs directly to the provider. If the employer utilizes an approved providers list, when an employee reports a work-related injury or condition to the employer the employer shall provide the employee with such approved providers list within two business days of such reporting.
(2) If the injured employee is a local or state police officer, state marshal, judicial marshal, correction officer, emergency medical technician, paramedic, ambulance driver, firefighter, or active member of a volunteer fire company or fire department engaged in volunteer duties, who has been exposed in the line of duty to blood or bodily fluids that may carry blood-borne disease, the medical and surgical aid or hospital and nursing service provided by the employer shall include any relevant diagnostic and prophylactic procedure for and treatment of any blood-borne disease.
(b) The employee shall select the physician, surgeon, physician assistant or advanced practice registered nurse from an approved list of physicians, surgeons, physician assistants and advanced practice registered nurses prepared by the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission. If the employee is unable to make the selection, the employer shall do so, subject to ratification by the employee or his next of kin. If the employer has a full-time staff physician, physician assistant or advanced practice registered nurse or if a physician, physician assistant or advanced practice registered nurse is available on call, the initial treatment required immediately following the injury may be rendered by that physician, physician assistant or advanced practice registered nurse, but the employee may thereafter select his own physician, physician assistant or advanced practice registered nurse as provided by this chapter for any further treatment without prior approval of the administrative law judge.
(c) The administrative law judge may, without hearing, at the request of the employer or the injured employee, when good reason exists, or on his own motion, authorize or direct a change of physician, surgeon, physician assistant or advanced practice registered nurse or hospital or nursing service provided pursuant to subsection (a) of this section.
(d) (1) The pecuniary liability of the employer for the medical and surgical service required by this section shall be limited to the charges that prevail in the same community or similar communities for similar treatment of injured persons of a like standard of living when the similar treatment is paid for by the injured person. Notwithstanding the provisions of chapter 368z, prior to the date the liability of the employer is established pursuant to subdivision (2) of this subsection, the liability of the employer for hospital service shall be determined exclusively by the provisions of this subdivision and shall remain the amount it actually costs the hospital to render the service, as determined by the administrative law judge, except in the case of state humane institutions, the liability of the employer shall be the per capita cost as determined by the Comptroller under the provisions of section 17b-223. All disputes concerning liability for hospital services in workers' compensation cases shall be filed not later than one year from the date the initial payment for services was remitted, regardless of the date such services were provided, unless any applicable law, rule or regulation establishes a shorter time frame, and shall be settled by the administrative law judge in accordance with this chapter.
(2) Commencing ninety days after the formulas established by the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission have been published pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, unless the employer and hospital or ambulatory surgical center have otherwise negotiated to determine the liability of the employer for hospital or ambulatory surgical center services required by this section, the liability of the employer for hospital or ambulatory surgical center services shall be: (A) If such services are covered by Medicare, limited to the reimbursements listed in such formulas published pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, or (B) if such services are not covered by Medicare, determined by the chairperson, in consultation with employers and their insurance carriers, self-insured employers, hospitals, ambulatory surgical centers, third-party reimbursement organizations and other entities as deemed necessary by the Workers' Compensation Commission.
(e) Not later than January 1, 2015, the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission shall, in consultation with employers and their insurance carriers, self-insured employers, hospitals, ambulatory surgical centers, third-party reimbursement organizations and other entities as deemed necessary by the Workers' Compensation Commission, establish and publish Medicare-based formulas, when available, to set the liability of employers for hospital and ambulatory surgical center services required by this section that are covered by Medicare. After the initial publication of such formulas, the chairperson shall publish such formulas on each January first thereafter.
(f) If the employer fails to promptly provide a physician, surgeon, physician assistant or advanced practice registered nurse or any medical and surgical aid or hospital and nursing service as required by this section, the injured employee may obtain a physician, surgeon, physician assistant or advanced practice registered nurse, selected from the approved list prepared by the chairperson, or such medical and surgical aid or hospital and nursing service at the expense of the employer.
(P.A. 91-32, S. 12, 41; 91-339, S. 48, 55; P.A. 98-160; P.A. 00-99, S. 81, 154; P.A. 01-85, S. 2, 3; P.A. 14-167, S. 1; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 15-5, S. 52, 459; P.A. 19-98, S. 3, 4; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; 21-196, S. 56; P.A. 22-89, S. 18.)
History: P.A. 91-339 amended Subsecs. (b) and (e) to change “commissioners” to “chairman of the workers' compensation commission”; P.A. 98-160 amended Subsec. (a) to provide specific diagnosis and treatment for certain employees exposed in the line of duty to blood or bodily fluids; P.A. 00-99 replaced reference to high sheriff, chief deputy sheriff, deputy sheriff and special deputy sheriff with state marshal and judicial marshal in Subsec. (a), effective December 1, 2000; P.A. 01-85 amended Subsec. (a) by dividing existing provisions into Subdivs. (1) and (2), adding provisions in Subdiv. (1) re furnishing prescription drugs and payment of prescription drug costs directly to provider and making technical changes, effective January 1, 2002; P.A. 14-167 amended Subsec. (d) by designating existing provisions re pecuniary liability of employer as Subdiv. (1) and amending same to add provision re prior to date liability of employer is established pursuant to Subdiv. (2), and by adding Subdiv. (2) re employer liability for hospital or ambulatory surgical center services, added new Subsec. (e) re establishment and publication of Medicare-based formulas to set employer liability for hospital and ambulatory surgical center services and redesignated existing Subsec. (e) as Subsec. (f), effective June 11, 2014; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 15-5 amended Subsec. (d)(1) by adding provisions re notwithstanding Ch. 368z, re exclusive determination of liability and re disputes concerning liability to be filed not later than 1 year from date the initial payment for services was remitted, effective June 30, 2015, and amended Subsec. (a)(1) by adding provision re employer utilization of approved providers list, effective July 1, 2015; P.A. 19-98 amended Subsecs. (a) to (c) and (f) by adding references to advanced practice registered nurses; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” in Subsecs. (b), (c) and (d)(1), effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 21-196 amended Subsec. (a)(1) by adding reference to physician assistants and making a technical change and Subsecs. (b),(c) and (f) by adding references to physician assistants; P.A. 22-89 made technical changes in Subsecs. (b), (d), (e) and (f), effective May 24, 2022.
Cited. 228 C. 1; 237 C. 1; 241 C. 692.
Subsec. (c):
Although workers' compensation commissioner, acting within her discretion under statute, designated a new treating physician for plaintiff, commissioner did not have authority to make specific orders regarding a treatment plan to be imposed on a treating physician without that physician's acquiescence. 94 CA 334.
Subsec. (d):
Since 1997 revision until the effective date of P.A. 14-167, absent a negotiated agreement setting the liability for hospital services rendered pursuant to Sec. 19a-646, a workers' compensation commissioner shall determine an employer's liability for hospital services on the basis of the hospital's filed rates that the hospital is required to charge “any payer” under Sec. 19a-646(b). 315 C. 704.
Sec. 31-294e. Employee's option to obtain medical care at employee's expense. Refusal of employee to accept or obtain reasonable medical care. (a) At his option, the injured employee may refuse the medical and surgical aid or hospital and nursing service provided by his employer and obtain the same at his own expense.
(b) If it appears to the administrative law judge that an injured employee has refused to accept and failed to obtain reasonable medical and surgical aid or hospital and nursing service, all rights of compensation under the provisions of this chapter shall be suspended during such refusal and failure.
(P.A. 91-32, S. 13, 41; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: Pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” in Subsec. (b), effective October 1, 2021.
Cited. 228 C. 1.
Sec. 31-294f. Medical examination of injured employee. Medical reports. (a) An injured employee shall submit himself to examination by a reputable practicing physician or surgeon, at any time while claiming or receiving compensation, upon the reasonable request of the employer or at the direction of the administrative law judge. The examination shall be performed to determine the nature of the injury and the incapacity resulting from the injury. The physician or surgeon shall be selected by the employer from an approved list of physicians and surgeons prepared by the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission and shall be paid by the employer. At any examination requested by the employer or directed by the administrative law judge under this section, the injured employee shall be allowed to have in attendance any reputable practicing physician or surgeon that the employee obtains and pays for himself. The employee shall submit to all other physical examinations as required by this chapter. The refusal of an injured employee to submit himself to a reasonable examination under this section shall suspend his right to compensation during such refusal.
(b) All medical reports concerning any injury of an employee sustained in the course of his employment shall be furnished within thirty days after the completion of the reports, at the same time and in the same manner, to the employer and the employee or his attorney.
(P.A. 91-32, S. 14, 41; 91-339, S. 49, 55; P.A. 96-125; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; P.A. 22-89, S. 19.)
History: P.A. 91-339 amended Subsec. (a) to change “commissioners” to “chairman of the workers' compensation commission”; P.A. 96-125 amended Subsec. (b) by replacing “Any medical reports resulting from an examination requested by an employer or directed by the commissioner under this section” with “All medical reports concerning any injury of an employee sustained in the course of his employment” and by deleting the provision re furnishing of all “other” medical reports; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” in Subsec. (a), effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 22-89 made a technical change in Subsec. (a), effective May 24, 2022.
Cited. 228 C. 1.
Statute provides employer the right to an independent and meaningful medical examination of injured employee. 65 CA 592. Although plain language of statute authorizes physical or mental examinations by reputable practicing physician or surgeon and defendant's vocational rehabilitation expert is not a medical doctor, statute does not limit broad equitable powers of commissioner to act pursuant to the more general provisions that encourage full disclosure and cooperation among the parties during pendency of a claim; workers' compensation review board properly affirmed commissioner's decision to compel plaintiff to undergo vocational rehabilitation examination by a nonphysician selected by defendant, and commissioner did not abuse his discretion in precluding plaintiff from admitting evidence from her vocational rehabilitation expert when she disregarded commissioner's order to submit to examination by defendant's vocational rehabilitation expert. 91 CA 470. Section does not mandate commissioner order a commissioner's examination to resolve conflicting evidence, though nothing in the statute prohibits the commissioner from doing so. 169 CA 103.
Sec. 31-294g. State employee notice of claim for compensation.Whenever the Commissioner of Administrative Services receives a notice of claim for compensation from an employee of the state pursuant to subsection (a) of section 31-294c, the Commissioner of Administrative Services shall send a copy of the notice of claim to the chief executive officer of the state agency, department, board, institution or commission in which the employee works.
(P.A. 91-339, S. 15, 55.)
Cited. 228 C. 1.
Sec. 31-294h. Benefits for police officer suffering mental or emotional impairment arising from use of deadly force or subjection to deadly force in line of duty. Notwithstanding any provision of this chapter, workers' compensation benefits for any police officer, as described in subparagraph (B)(ii)(II) of subdivision (16) of section 31-275, who suffers a mental or emotional impairment arising from such police officer's use of deadly force or subjection to deadly force in the line of duty, shall be limited to treatment by a psychologist or a psychiatrist who is on the approved list of practicing physicians established by the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission pursuant to section 31-280.
(P.A. 05-208, S. 5; P.A. 12-126, S. 2; P.A. 19-17, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 12-126 designated existing provision re police officer as Subdiv. (1) and added Subdiv. (2) re firefighter, effective June 15, 2012, and applicable to any claim filed after that date; P.A. 19-17 replaced “defined in subparagraph (B)(ii)” with “described in subparagraph (B)(ii)(II)”, deleted Subdiv. (2) re firefighter who suffers mental or emotional impairment diagnosed as post-traumatic stress disorder”, deleted Subdiv. (1) designator, and made a technical change, effective July 1, 2019.
Sec. 31-294i. Municipal firefighters and police officers. Employer presumption of liability for cardiac emergencies. For the purpose of adjudication of claims for payment of benefits under the provisions of this chapter to a uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department or a regular member of a paid municipal police department or constable who began such employment on or after July 1, 1996, any condition or impairment of health caused by a cardiac emergency occurring to such member on or after July 1, 2009, while such member is in training for or engaged in fire duty at the site of an accident or fire, or other public safety operation within the scope of such member's employment for such member's municipal employer that results in death or temporary or permanent total or partial disability, shall be presumed to have been suffered in the line of duty and within the scope of such member's employment, unless the contrary is shown by a preponderance of the evidence, provided such member successfully passed a physical examination on entry into service conducted by a licensed physician, physician assistant or advanced practice registered nurse designated by such department which examination failed to reveal any evidence of such condition. For the purposes of this section, “cardiac emergency” means cardiac arrest or myocardial infarction, and “constable” means any municipal law enforcement officer who is authorized to make arrests and has completed Police Officer Standards and Training Council certification pursuant to section 7-294a.
(P.A. 08-61, S. 1; P.A. 19-98, S. 5; P.A. 21-196, S. 57.)
History: P.A. 08-61 effective July 1, 2009; P.A. 19-98 added “or advanced practice registered nurse”; P.A. 21-196 added reference to physician assistant.
Sec. 31-294j. Eligibility of municipal firefighters, police officers, constables and volunteer ambulance service members re benefits for diseases arising out of and in the course of employment.For the purpose of adjudication of claims for payment of benefits under the provisions of this chapter, a uniformed member of a paid municipal or volunteer fire department, a regular member of a paid municipal police department, a constable, as defined in section 31-294i, or a member of a volunteer ambulance service shall be eligible for such benefits for any disease arising out of and in the course of employment, including, but not limited to, hepatitis, meningococcal meningitis, tuberculosis, Kahler's Disease, non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, and prostate or testicular cancer that results in death or temporary or permanent total or partial disability.
(P.A. 10-37, S. 1; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 10-1, S. 55.)
History: June Sp. Sess. P.A. 10-1 made technical changes.
Sec. 31-294k. Benefits for post-traumatic stress injury. Eligibility. (a) As used in this section:
(1) “COVID-19” means the respiratory disease designated by the World Health Organization on February 11, 2020, as coronavirus 2019, and any related mutation thereof recognized by the World Health Organization as a communicable respiratory disease;
(2) “Eligible individual” means a police officer, firefighter, emergency medical services personnel, Department of Correction employee, telecommunicator or health care provider;
(3) “Emergency medical services personnel” has the same meaning as provided in section 20-206jj;
(4) “Firefighter” has the same meaning as provided in section 7-313g;
(5) “Health care provider” means (A) a person employed at a doctor's office, hospital, health care center, clinic, medical school, local health department or agency, nursing facility, retirement facility, nursing home, group home, home health care provider, any facility that performs laboratory or medical testing, pharmacy or any similar institution, or (B) a person employed to provide personal care assistance, as defined in section 17b-706, in or about a private dwelling, provided such person is regularly employed by the owner or occupier of the dwelling for more than twenty-six hours per week;
(6) “In the line of duty” means any action that an eligible individual is obligated or authorized by law, rule, regulation or written condition of employment service to perform, or for which the eligible individual is compensated by the public entity such individual serves, except that, in the case of a volunteer firefighter, such action or service constitutes fire duties, as defined in subsection (b) of section 7-314b;
(7) “Mental health professional” means a board-certified psychiatrist or a psychologist licensed pursuant to chapter 383, who has experience diagnosing and treating post-traumatic stress injury;
(8) “Parole officer” means an employee of the Department of Correction who supervises inmates in the community after their release from prison on parole or under another prison release program;
(9) “Police officer” has the same meaning as provided in section 7-294a, except that “police officer” does not include an officer of a law enforcement unit of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe or the Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut;
(10) “Post-traumatic stress injury” means an injury that meets the diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder as specified in the most recent edition of the American Psychiatric Association's “Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders”;
(11) “Qualifying event” means:
(A) An event occurring in the line of duty on or after July 1, 2019, in which a police officer, parole officer, firefighter, emergency medical services personnel, Department of Correction employee or telecommunicator:
(i) Views a deceased minor;
(ii) Witnesses the death of a person or an incident involving the death of a person;
(iii) Witnesses an injury to a person who subsequently dies before or upon admission at a hospital as a result of the injury and not as a result of any other intervening cause;
(iv) Has physical contact with and treats an injured person who subsequently dies before or upon admission at a hospital as a result of the injury and not as a result of any other intervening cause;
(v) Carries an injured person who subsequently dies before or upon admission at a hospital as a result of the injury and not as a result of any other intervening cause; or
(vi) Witnesses a traumatic physical injury that results in the loss of a vital body part or a vital body function that results in permanent disfigurement of the victim, or
(B) An event arising out of and in the course of employment on or after March 10, 2020, in which an eligible individual who is a health care provider is engaged in activities substantially dedicated to mitigating or responding to the public health and civil preparedness emergencies declared by the Governor on March 10, 2020, or any extension of such emergency declarations, and:
(i) Witnesses the death of a person due to COVID-19 or due to symptoms that were later diagnosed as COVID-19;
(ii) Witnesses an injury to a person who subsequently dies as a result of COVID-19 or due to symptoms that were later diagnosed as COVID-19;
(iii) Has physical contact with and treats or provides care for a person who subsequently dies as a result of COVID-19 or due to symptoms that were later diagnosed as COVID-19; or
(iv) Witnesses a traumatic physical injury that results in the loss of a vital body function of a person due to COVID-19 or due to symptoms that were later diagnosed as COVID-19;
(12) “Telecommunicator” has the same meaning as provided in section 28-30; and
(13) “Witnesses” means, for an eligible individual who is a telecommunicator, hears by telephone or radio while directly responding to an emergency call that constitutes a qualifying event under this section and providing a dispatch assignment.
(b) A diagnosis of post-traumatic stress injury is compensable as a personal injury as described in subparagraph (B)(ii)(III) of subdivision (16) of section 31-275 if a mental health professional examines the eligible individual and diagnoses the individual with a post-traumatic stress injury as a direct result of a qualifying event, provided (1) the post-traumatic stress injury resulted from (A) the eligible individual acting in the line of duty if such individual is a police officer, firefighter, emergency medical services personnel, Department of Correction employee or telecommunicator and, in the case of a firefighter, such firefighter complied with Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act standards adopted pursuant to 29 CFR 1910.134 and 29 CFR 1910.156, or (B) the eligible individual acting the course of employment if such individual is a health care provider, (2) a qualifying event was a substantial factor in causing the injury, and (3) the post-traumatic stress injury did not result from any disciplinary action, work evaluation, job transfer, layoff, demotion, promotion, termination, retirement or similar action of the eligible individual. Any such mental health professional shall comply with any workers' compensation guidelines for approved medical providers, including, but not limited to, guidelines on release of past or contemporaneous medical records.
(c) Whenever liability to pay compensation is contested by the employer, the employer shall file with the commissioner, on or before the twenty-eighth day after the employer has received a written notice of claim, a notice in accordance with a form prescribed by the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission stating that the right to compensation is contested, the name of the claimant, the name of the employer, the date of the alleged injury and the specific grounds on which the right to compensation is contested. The employer shall send a copy of the notice to the employee in accordance with section 31-321. If the employer or the employer's legal representative fails to file the notice contesting liability on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving the written notice of claim, the employer shall commence payment of compensation for such injury on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving the written notice of claim, but the employer may contest the employee's right to receive compensation on any grounds or the extent of the employee's disability within one hundred eighty days from the receipt of the written notice of claim and any benefits paid during the one hundred eighty days shall be considered payments without prejudice, provided the employer shall not be required to commence payment of compensation when the written notice of claim has not been properly served in accordance with section 31-321 or when the written notice of claim fails to include a warning that the employer (1) if the employer has commenced payment for the alleged injury on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving a written notice of claim, shall be precluded from contesting liability unless a notice contesting liability is filed within one hundred eighty days from the receipt of the written notice of claim, and (2) shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the compensability of the alleged injury unless the employer either files a notice contesting liability on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving a written notice of claim or commences payment for the alleged injury on or before such twenty-eighth day. An employer shall be entitled, if the employer prevails, to reimbursement from the claimant of any compensation paid by the employer on and after the date the commissioner receives written notice from the employer or the employer's legal representative, in accordance with the form prescribed by the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission, stating that the right to compensation is contested. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, an employer who fails to contest liability for an alleged injury on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving a written notice of claim and who fails to commence payment for the alleged injury on or before such twenty-eighth day, shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the compensability of the alleged injury. If an employer has opted to post an address of where notice of a claim for compensation by an employee shall be sent, as described in subsection (a) of section 31-294c, the twenty-eight-day period set forth in this subsection shall begin on the date when such employer receives written notice of a claim for compensation at such posted address.
(d) Notwithstanding any provision of this chapter, workers' compensation benefits for any eligible individual for a personal injury described in subparagraph (B)(ii)(III) of subdivision (16) of section 31-275 shall (1) include any combination of medical treatment prescribed by a board-certified psychiatrist or a licensed psychologist, temporary total incapacity benefits under section 31-307 and temporary partial incapacity benefits under subsection (a) of section 31-308, and (2) be provided for a maximum of fifty-two weeks from the date of diagnosis. No medical treatment, temporary total incapacity benefits under section 31-307 or temporary partial incapacity benefits under subsection (a) of section 31-308 shall be awarded beyond four years from the date of the qualifying event that formed the basis for the personal injury. The weekly benefits received by an eligible individual pursuant to section 31-307 or subsection (a) of section 31-308, when combined with other benefits including, but not limited to, contributory and noncontributory retirement benefits, Social Security benefits, benefits under a long-term or short-term disability plan, but not including payments for medical care, shall not exceed the average weekly wage paid to such eligible individual. An eligible individual receiving benefits pursuant to this subsection shall not be entitled to benefits pursuant to subsection (b) of section 31-308 or section 31-308a.
(P.A. 19-17, S. 2; P.A. 21-107, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 19-17 effective July 1, 2019; P.A. 21-107 amended Subsec. (a) by defining “COVID-19” in new Subdiv. (1), defining “eligible individual” in new Subdiv. (2), defining “emergency medical services personnel” in new Subdiv. (3), redesignating existing Subdiv. (1) as Subdiv.(4), defining “heath care provider” in new Subdiv. (5), redesignating existing Subdiv. (2) as Subdiv. (6) and amending the same by redefining “in the line of duty”, redesignating existing Subdiv. (3) as Subdiv. (7), redesignating existing Subdivs. (4) and (5) as Subdivs. (8) and (9), redesignating existing Subdiv. (6) as Subdiv. (10) and amending the same by changing “post-traumatic stress disorder” to “post-traumatic stress injury”, redesignating existing Subdiv. (7) as Subdiv. (11) and amending by the same by redefining “qualifying event”, defining “telecommunicator” in Subdiv. (12), defining “witnesses” in Subdiv. (13), and making other technical and conforming changes, amended Subsec. (b) by replacing references to “disorder” with “injury” throughout, expanding coverage for compensable post-traumatic stress injuries to eligible individuals, adding Subpara. (A) designator in Subdiv. (1) and amending the same by adding provision re police officers, firefighters, emergency medical services personnel, Department of Correction employees and telecommunicators acting in the line of duty, adding Subpara. (B) in Subdiv. (1) re health care providers acting in the course of employment, deleting former Subdiv. (3) and redesignating existing Subdiv. (4) as new Subdiv.(3), and amended Subsec. (d) by replacing “police officer, parole officer or firefighter” with “eligible individual” and by replacing references to “officer or firefighter” with “eligible individual”, effective June 30, 2021.
Sec. 31-294l. Firefighters claim due to cancer diagnosis. Record. The Workers' Compensation Commission shall maintain a record of all workers' compensation claims made by firefighters due to a cancer diagnosis. Not later than January first of each year, the Workers' Compensation Commission shall submit a report summarizing such records to the joint standing committee of the General Assembly having cognizance of matters relating to labor.
(P.A. 22-139, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 22-139 effective May 27, 2022.
Sec. 31-295. Waiting period. When compensation begins. Penalty for late payment of permanent partial disability benefits. (a) No compensation shall be payable for total or partial incapacity under the provisions of this chapter on account of any injury which does not incapacitate the injured employee for a period of more than three days from earning full wages at his customary employment. If the incapacity continues for a period of more than three days but less than seven days, compensation shall begin at the expiration of the first three days of total or partial incapacity. If the incapacity continues for a period of seven days, compensation shall begin from the date of the injury.
(b) The injured employee shall be entitled to full wages for the entire day of the injury and that day shall not be counted as a day of incapacity.
(c) If the employee is entitled to receive compensation for permanent disability to an injured member in accordance with the provisions of subsection (b) of section 31-308, the compensation shall be paid to him beginning not later than thirty days following the date of the maximum improvement of the member or members and, if the compensation payments are not so paid, the employer shall, in addition to the compensation rate, pay interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum on such sum or sums from the date of maximum improvement. The employer shall ascertain at least monthly whether employees are entitled to compensation because of a loss of wages as a result of the injury and, if there is a loss of wages, shall pay the compensation. The chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission shall adopt regulations, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54, for the purpose of assuring prompt payment by the employer or his insurance carrier.
(1949 Rev., S. 7427; 1957, P.A. 451; 1958 Rev., S. 31-158; 1959, P.A. 580, S. 4; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 17; 1967, P.A. 842, S. 6; P.A. 91-32, S. 15, 41; 91-339, S. 16, 55; P.A. 93-228, S. 9, 35; P.A. 22-89, S. 20.)
History: 1959 act divided section into Subsecs. and reduced periods of incapacity used to determine compensation from seven to three days and from ten to seven days; 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1967 act added Subsec. (c) re compensation for permanent disability; P.A. 91-32 made technical changes; P.A. 91-339 amended Subsec. (c) to require the chairman of the workers' compensation commission to adopt regulations; P.A. 93-228 amended Subsec. (c) to increase the interest penalty for late payment of permanent partial disability benefits from 6% to 10% per year, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 22-89 made a technical change in Subsec. (c), effective May 24, 2022.
“Incapacity” defined. 113 C. 710. Cited. 119 C. 560; 241 C. 692.
Cited. 7 CA 142; 16 CA 437; 37 CA 648.
Defendant may not counterclaim against intervening plaintiff employer based on contract between employer and defendant for former to hold latter harmless for personal injury claims. 22 CS 23.
Subsec. (c):
Nothing in Subsec. expressly prohibits plaintiff from receiving incapacity benefits until both legs have reached maximum medical improvement and such result does not undermine purpose of act. 263 C. 328.
Sec. 31-296. Voluntary agreements. (a) If an employer and an injured employee, or in case of fatal injury the employee's legal representative or dependent, at a date not earlier than the expiration of the waiting period, reach an agreement in regard to compensation, such agreement shall be submitted in writing to the administrative law judge by the employer with a statement of the time, place and nature of the injury upon which it is based; and, if such administrative law judge finds such agreement to conform to the provisions of this chapter in every regard, the administrative law judge shall so approve it. A copy of the agreement, with a statement of the administrative law judge's approval, shall be delivered to each of the parties and thereafter it shall be as binding upon both parties as an award by the administrative law judge. The administrative law judge's statement of approval shall also inform the employee or the employee's dependent, as the case may be, of any rights the individual may have to an annual cost-of-living adjustment or to participate in a rehabilitation program administered by the Department of Aging and Disability Services under the provisions of this chapter. The administrative law judge shall retain the original agreement, with the administrative law judge's approval thereof, in the administrative law judge's office and, if an application is made to the superior court for an execution, the administrative law judge shall, upon the request of said court, file in the court a certified copy of the agreement and statement of approval.
(b) Before discontinuing or reducing payment on account of total or partial incapacity under any such agreement, the employer or the employer's insurer, if it is claimed by or on behalf of the injured employee that such employee's incapacity still continues, shall notify the administrative law judge and the employee, in accordance with section 31-321, of the proposed discontinuance or reduction of such payments. Such notice shall specify the reason for the proposed discontinuance or reduction and the date such proposed discontinuance or reduction will commence. No discontinuance or reduction shall become effective unless specifically approved in writing by the administrative law judge. The employee may request a hearing on any such proposed discontinuance or reduction not later than fifteen days after receipt of such notice. Any such request for a hearing shall be given priority over requests for hearings on other matters. The administrative law judge shall not approve any such discontinuance or reduction prior to the expiration of the period for requesting a hearing or the completion of such hearing, whichever is later. In any case where the administrative law judge finds that an employer has discontinued or reduced any payments made in accordance with this section without the approval of the administrative law judge, such employer shall be required to pay to the employee the total amount of all payments so discontinued or the total amount by which such payments were reduced, as the case may be, and shall be required to pay interest to the employee, at a rate of one and one-quarter per cent per month or portion of a month, on any payments so discontinued or on the total amount by which such payments were reduced, as the case may be, plus reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the employee in relation to such discontinuance or reduction.
(c) The employer's or insurer's notice of intention to discontinue or reduce payments shall (1) identify the claimant, the claimant's attorney or other representative, the employer, the insurer, and the injury, including the date of the injury, the city or town in which the injury occurred and the nature of the injury, (2) include medical documentation that (A) establishes the basis for the discontinuance or reduction of payments, and (B) identifies the claimant's attending physician, physician assistant or advanced practice registered nurse, and (3) be in substantially the following form:
IMPORTANT
STATE OF CONNECTICUT WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT THE EMPLOYER OR INSURER INTENDS TO REDUCE OR DISCONTINUE YOUR COMPENSATION PAYMENTS ON .... (date) FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
If you object to the reduction or discontinuance of benefits as stated in this notice, YOU MUST REQUEST A HEARING NOT LATER THAN 15 DAYS after your receipt of this notice, or this notice will automatically be approved.
To request an Informal Hearing, call the Workers' Compensation Commission District Office in which your case is pending.
Be prepared to provide medical and other documentation to support your objection. For your protection, note the date when you received this notice.
(1949 Rev., S. 7444; 1953, S. 3047d; 1958 Rev., S. 31-170; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 18; 1971, P.A. 510, S. 1; P.A. 79-376, S. 44; P.A. 83-114, S. 1; P.A. 84-180, S. 1; P.A. 88-106, S. 1; P.A. 90-116, S. 6; P.A. 07-80, S. 1; P.A. 11-44, S. 48; June 12 Sp. Sess. P.A. 12-1, S. 85; P.A. 19-98, S. 6; 19-157, S. 84; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; 21-196, S. 58; P.A. 22-89, S. 3.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1971 act changed point at which discontinuance is effective from time notices are sent to commissioner to time when specifically approved in writing by commissioner; P.A. 79-376 replaced “workmen's compensation” with “workers' compensation”; P.A. 83-114 provided that the commissioner's statement of approval of a voluntary agreement shall inform the individual as to his rights for an annual cost-of-living adjustment under this chapter; P.A. 84-180 provided that the commissioner's statement of approval inform the employee of his rights to participate in a rehabilitation program; P.A. 88-106 authorized reduction of benefits; P.A. 90-116 provided that notices of discontinuance and reduction shall be made by certified mail, provided for priority hearing on discontinuances and reductions and provided for interest and attorney's fees against the employer in cases of wrongful discontinuance or reduction (Revisor's note: In 2001 the references in this section to the date “19..” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “20..” to reflect the new millennium); P.A. 07-80 divided section into Subsecs. (a), (b) and (c), made technical changes, in Subsec. (b), required notice to specify reasons for proposed discontinuance or reduction of benefits and changed from 10 days to 15 days the time for employee to request hearing and, in Subsec. (c), required specified information in notice and revised form; P.A. 11-44 amended Subsec. (a) by adding provision re rehabilitation program administered by Bureau of Rehabilitative Services, effective July 1, 2011; June 12 Sp. Sess. P.A. 12-1 amended Subsec. (a) by replacing “Bureau of Rehabilitative Services” with “Department of Rehabilitation Services”, effective July 1, 2012; P.A. 19-98 amended Subsec. (c)(2)(B) by adding “or advanced practice registered nurse”; P.A. 19-157 amended Subsec. (a) by replacing “Department of Rehabilitation Services” with “Department of Aging and Disability Services”; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” and “commissioner's” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” and “administrative law judge's” respectively in Subsecs. (a) and (b), effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 21-196 amended Subsec. (c) by adding reference to physician assistants; P.A. 22-89 amended Subsec. (b) to delete “by certified mail” and add reference to Sec. 31-321, effective May 24, 2022.
Agreement for compensation approved by commissioner may be modified by him on facts not made known to him though known to the parties. 95 C. 356. Widow bound by agreement signed by her and late husband. 120 C. 280. Cited. 126 C. 491; 128 C. 578; 151 C. 559. Agreement by which employer waived all further claims under act was binding on him as waiver of his subrogation rights under Sec. 31-293. 157 C. 538. Cited. 159 C. 302; 177 C. 107; 231 C. 287; Id., 469; 233 C. 14; 237 C. 259. Sums paid pursuant to voluntary agreements are “compensation” and recoverable by employers or Second Injury Fund under Secs. 31-293 and 31-352. 259 C. 325.
Cited. 13 CA 208; 21 CA 464; 28 CA 113; 33 CA 490; 36 CA 298; 38 CA 754; 40 CA 36; 44 CA 771; 45 CA 324. Meaning of “voluntary agreement” as used in regulation Sec. 31-296-1 discussed; court was within discretion to deny request to execute voluntary agreement that was not a final settlement. 58 CA 45. Section procedural safeguards, postdeprivation remedies and public interest in providing speedy, effective, inexpensive method for determining workers' compensation claims are sufficient to satisfy due process requirements. 144 CA 413.
Cited. 4 CS 467; 28 CS 5; 42 CS 514.
Sec. 31-296a. Discontinuance or reduction of payments under oral agreements. No employer shall discontinue or reduce payment on account of total or partial incapacity under any oral agreement or in any case where the employer's acceptance of compensability has been conclusively presumed under subsection (b) of section 31-294c because of failure to file a timely notice contesting liability, if it is claimed by or on behalf of the injured person that his incapacity still continues, unless such employer notifies the administrative law judge and the employee of the proposed discontinuance or reduction in the manner prescribed in section 31-296 and the administrative law judge specifically approves such discontinuance or reduction in writing.
(1971, P.A. 510, S. 2; 1972, P.A. 43; P.A. 88-106, S. 2; P.A. 92-31, S. 3, 7; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: 1972 act prohibited discontinuing payments “in any case where the employer's acceptance of compensability has been conclusively presumed ... because of failure to file a timely notice contesting liability”; P.A. 88-106 added the provisions regarding the reduction of benefits; P.A. 92-31 made a technical change; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021.
Cited. 28 CA 113.
Sec. 31-297. Hearing of claims. If an employer and his injured employee, or his legal representative, as the case may be, fail to reach an agreement in regard to compensation under the provisions of this chapter, either party may notify the administrative law judge of the failure. Upon such notice, or upon the knowledge that an agreement has not been reached in a case in which a right to compensation may exist, the administrative law judge shall schedule an early hearing upon the matter, giving both parties notice of time and place not less than ten days prior to the scheduled date; provided the administrative law judge may, on finding an emergency to exist, give such notice as he finds reasonable under the circumstances. If no agreement has been reached within sixty days after the date notice of claim for compensation was received by the administrative law judge, as provided in section 31-294c, a formal hearing shall be scheduled on the claim and held within thirty days after the end of the sixty-day period, except that if an earlier hearing date has previously been scheduled, the earlier date shall prevail. Hearings shall be held, if practicable, in the town in which the injured employee resides; or, if it is not practicable to hold a hearing in the town, in any other convenient place that the administrative law judge may prescribe. Sufficient notice of the hearing may be given to the parties in interest by a brief written statement in ordinary terms of the date, place and nature of the injury upon which the claim for compensation is based.
(1949 Rev., S. 7446; 1958 Rev., S. 31-173; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 19; 1967, P.A. 842, S. 7; P.A. 83-123; P.A. 89-31; P.A. 90-116, S. 9; P.A. 91-32, S. 16, 41; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1967 act divided section into Subsecs., required filing of notice on or before twentieth day after receipt of written notice of claim rather than after “knowledge of alleged injury or death” and specified that employer's failure to file notice contesting liability results in presumption of his acceptance of liability; P.A. 83-123 required that, if no voluntary agreement has been reached within 60 days of the filing of a notice of claim for compensation, a formal hearing on the claim shall be scheduled and held within 30 days of the end of the 60-day period, unless a prior hearing date was previously established; P.A. 89-31 added Subsec. (c), providing a 28-day period for an employer to give notice that he contests a claim for injuries sustained on or after October 1, 1989; P.A. 90-116 provided that the employer's failure to contest shall not constitute a conclusive presumption when the notice has not been properly served or when the notice fails to include a warning concerning the time period to contest liability; P.A. 91-32 made technical changes and deleted Subsecs. (b) and (c) re filing of notice that claim is contested; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021.
10 days' notice does not apply to hearing on motion for extension of time. 109 C. 469. Cited. 159 C. 302. The giving of notice by employer as to the specific grounds on which the right to compensation is contested is a condition precedent to defense of the action. 165 C. 338, 348. Cited. 177 C. 107; 227 C. 333; 239 C. 408.
Cited. 2 CA 365; 13 CA 208; 29 CA 441; 30 CA 320; 40 CA 278.
Cited. 38 CS 331; 39 CS 403.
Subsec. (b):
Applies only to contests of initial liability to pay compensation, not to contests of extent of disability, in requiring filing of a specific defense. 177 C. 107. Inquiry on existence of subject matter jurisdiction proper. 207 C. 420. Preclusion available to one claimant establishes compensability as to all eligible claimants. Id., 665. Cited. 213 C. 54; 218 C. 181; 222 C. 62; 228 C. 535.
Held to be constitutional under both state and federal constitutions. 2 CA 363. Cited. Id., 162; 9 CA 91; Id., 425. Timely filing of a notice of claim under Sec. 31-294 is a precondition to statutory preclusion from contesting liability under this section. 13 CA 276. Cited. 16 CA 676; 19 CA 273; 21 CA 63; Id., 610; 22 CA 515; 25 CA 350. Amendment not to be applied retroactively; date of injury rule applies. 29 CA 441. Amendment applied only prospectively. Id., 654. Cited 30 CA 295; 33 CA 495; 42 CA 147; 45 CA 499. Does not expressly provide for notice to claimants who are not employees or dependents; notice to last-known address of decedent employee, which was also claimants' address, was adequate. 63 CA 1.
Sec. 31-297a. Informal hearings. In any informal hearing held by the administrative law judge or chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission in regard to compensation under the provisions of this chapter, any recommendations made by the administrative law judge or chairperson at the informal hearing shall be reduced to writing and, if the parties accept such recommendations, the recommendations shall be as binding upon both parties as an award by the administrative law judge or chairperson. The administrative law judge or chairperson shall not postpone any such informal hearing if one party fails to attend unless both parties agree to the postponement.
(P.A. 91-339, S. 17, 55; P.A. 93-228, S. 10, 35; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; P.A. 22-89, S. 21.)
History: P.A. 93-228 authorized chairman of workers' compensation commission to preside over informal hearings, effective July 1, 1993; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 22-89 made technical changes, effective May 24, 2022.
Cited. 42 CA 147.
Sec. 31-298. Conduct of hearings. Both parties may appear at any hearing, either in person or by attorney or other accredited representative, and no formal pleadings shall be required, beyond any informal notices that the commission approves. In all cases and hearings under the provisions of this chapter, the administrative law judge shall proceed, so far as possible, in accordance with the rules of equity. He shall not be bound by the ordinary common law or statutory rules of evidence or procedure, but shall make inquiry, through oral testimony, deposition testimony or written and printed records, in a manner that is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and carry out the provisions and intent of this chapter. No fees shall be charged to either party by the administrative law judge in connection with any hearing or other procedure, but the administrative law judge shall furnish at cost (1) certified copies of any testimony, award or other matter which may be of record in his office, and (2) duplicates of audio recordings of any formal hearings. Witnesses subpoenaed by the administrative law judge shall be allowed the fees and traveling expenses that are allowed in civil actions, to be paid by the party in whose interest the witnesses are subpoenaed. When liability or extent of disability is contested by formal hearing before the administrative law judge, the claimant shall be entitled, if he prevails on final judgment, to payment for oral testimony or deposition testimony rendered on his behalf by a competent physician, surgeon or other medical provider, including the stenographic and videotape recording costs thereof, in connection with the claim, the administrative law judge to determine the reasonableness of such charges.
(1949 Rev., S. 7447; 1958 Rev., S. 31-174; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 20; 1967, P.A. 242; 842, S. 8; 1971, P.A. 521; P.A. 85-65; P.A. 91-32, S. 17, 41; P.A. 93-228, S. 11, 35; P.A. 97-106; P.A. 21-18, S. 1, 4.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1967, P.A. 242 added, “and attorney's fees for representation of the claimant at the formal hearing,” in the last sentence before “the commissioner to determine the reasonableness of such charges.” (Held repealed by implication, see 165 C. 338, 349.) 1967, P.A. 842 added reference to contest of extent of liability and entitled claimant to one-fifth of weekly compensation for each day or portion of day he attends a formal hearing if he is not receiving compensation at that time; 1971 act entitled claimant to reimbursement for wages lost because he has been called to appear at conference or informal hearing; P.A. 85-65 required the commissioner to furnish to the parties, at cost, duplicates of audio cassette recordings of any formal hearings; P.A. 91-32 made technical changes and deleted provisions re reimbursement of wages lost by reason of appearance at a conference or informal hearing and provisions re payments made to claimants who prevail on final judgment; P.A. 93-228 added provision allowing use of deposition testimony during workers' compensation hearings, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 97-106 added provisions entitling claimant to payment for medical testimony if he prevails on final judgment; P.A. 21-18 deleted “cassette” and pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021.
See Sec. 52-260 re witness fees.
Admissions by insurance adjuster may be accepted by commissioner. 93 C. 295. Conduct of hearing. 94 C. 9. Burden of proof is on claimant; but may be sustained by reasonable inferences as well as by direct testimony. 95 C. 43. Declarations by decedent. 98 C. 649. Procedure simple and without pleadings. 106 C. 9. Conclusions reached by superintendent at an immediate investigation. Id., 252. Claimant held not to have had an adequate hearing. 107 C. 457. Evidence which commissioner may accept; findings, to be open to attack, must be unreasonable to justify judicial interference. 109 C. 62. Cited. 114 C. 29. Commissioner not bound by rules of evidence. 116 C. 297; 122 C. 360; 133 C. 667. Evidence that workers in other factories under substantially same conditions do not contract disease is admissible. 118 C. 29. Commissioner judge when conflicting medical testimony presented. 123 C. 405; 130 C. 455; 131 C. 484. Evidence as to extent of incapacity from susceptibility to dermatitis necessary to finding of commissioner. 125 C. 140. Commissioner judge of fact. 128 C. 621. Burden of proof rests on claimant. 130 C. 1. Cited. 132 C. 172; 135 C. 504; 136 C. 345. Commissioner not bound by rules of evidence. 138 C. 53. While finding or conclusion of commissioner based on conflicting medical opinions cannot be disturbed, such finding cannot be based on incompetent medical testimony to which objection was seasonably made. 149 C. 118. Opinion of physician based wholly or partly on statements and symptoms related to him by patient on personal examination is inadmissible where examination was made for purpose of qualifying physician to testify as medical expert. Id., 119. Cited. 159 C. 302; 165 C. 338; 199 C. 667; 213 C. 54; 226 C. 508; 237 C. 1. Section addresses the conduct of hearings; does not provide commissioner with any specific jurisdiction over particular types of claims or questions. 248 C. 754. Commissioner has authority to dismiss claim without a hearing on the merits in an appropriate case. 254 C. 60. A commissioner, in managing complex multiparty cases, has the authority under section to dismiss a claim provisionally, and then if necessary, reinstate the dismissed party into the proceedings prior to a final determination of the compensability of the claim and the apportionment of any liability under Sec. 31-299b. 323 C. 720.
Cited. 29 CA 249; 40 CA 278. Commissioners not bound by Daubert standard in determining whether to admit scientific testimony; establishing formal requirements for admissibility of scientific testimony in workers' compensation cases is contrary to spirit of statute. 48 CA 774. Equitable requirements of section do not apply to scheduling of hearings and notice to parties, matters that are specifically addressed in Sec. 31-297. 66 CA 332.
Cited. 38 CS 331.
Sec. 31-298a. Use of medical panel. Duties of commissioner and panel. Appeal. Regulations.Section 31-298a is repealed, effective October 1, 2021.
(P.A. 81-392, S. 1–4; P.A. 91-339, S. 18, 55; P.A. 21-18, S. 8.)
Sec. 31-299. Prior statements of parties as evidence at hearings before administrative law judges. At any hearing before an administrative law judge no written statement, and no oral statement taken by means of tape recorder or any mechanical, electrical or electronic device, concerning the facts out of which the claim arose or affecting such claim, given by either party to the other, or to his agent, attorney or insurer, shall be admissible in evidence unless a copy of the written statement or a transcript of the oral statement, as the case may be, is retained by the party giving such statement or delivered to him at the time such statement was given or within thirty days thereafter. In the case of an oral statement taken by means of tape recorder or other mechanical, electrical or electronic device, the person recording such oral statement shall prepare a full and complete transcript thereof and submit it to the person giving such statement for signature and such transcript must be signed by the employee before such statement may be used at any such hearing.
(1949 Rev., S. 7448; 1958 Rev., S. 31-175; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 21; 1967, P.A. 842, S. 9; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1967 act added provisions re oral statements at hearings; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” and “compensation commissioner” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021.
Cited. 159 C. 302.
Sec. 31-299a. Payments under group medical policy not defense to claim for benefits. Health insurer's duty to pay. Lien. (a) Where an employer contests the compensability of an employee's claim for compensation, proof of payment made under a group health, medical or hospitalization plan or policy shall not be a defense to a claim for compensation under this chapter.
(b) Where an employer contests the compensability of an employee's claim for compensation, and the employee has also filed a claim for benefits or services under the employer's group health, medical, disability or hospitalization plan or policy, the employer's health insurer may not delay or deny payment of benefits due to the employee under the terms of the plan or policy by claiming that treatment for the employee's injury or disease is the responsibility of the employer's workers' compensation insurer. The health insurer may file a claim in its own right against the employer for the value of benefits paid by the insurer within two years from payment of the benefits. The health insurer shall not have a lien on the proceeds of any award or approval of any compromise made by the administrative law judge pursuant to the employee's compensation claim, in accordance with the provisions of section 38a-470, unless the health insurer actually paid benefits to or on behalf of the employee.
(1967, P.A. 842, S. 29; P.A. 84-139, S. 1, 2; P.A. 91-32, S. 18, 41; P.A. 93-228, S. 12, 35; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 84-139 added Subsec. (b), providing that an employer's health insurer may not deny benefits to an otherwise eligible employee because that employee has filed a workers' compensation claim which has been contested; P.A. 91-32 made technical changes; P.A. 93-228 amended Subsec. (b) to allow a health insurer to recover from an employer the value of benefits paid to or on behalf of an employee for an injury compensable under this chapter and to prohibit a health insurer who has not paid benefits to or on behalf of an injured employee from placing a lien on the employee's workers' compensation award, effective July 1, 1993; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” in Subsec. (b), effective October 1, 2021.
Cited. 219 C. 439.
Cited. 22 CA 539; judgment reversed, see 219 C. 439.
Sec. 31-299b. Initial liability of last employer. Reimbursement. If an employee suffers an injury or disease for which compensation is found by the administrative law judge to be payable according to the provisions of this chapter, the employer who last employed the claimant prior to the filing of the claim, or the employer's insurer, shall be initially liable for the payment of such compensation. The administrative law judge shall, within a reasonable period of time after issuing an award, on the basis of the record of the hearing, determine whether prior employers, or their insurers, are liable for a portion of such compensation and the extent of their liability. If prior employers are found to be so liable, the administrative law judge shall order such employers or their insurers to reimburse the initially liable employer or insurer according to the proportion of their liability. Reimbursement shall be made within ten days of the administrative law judge's order with interest, from the date of the initial payment, at twelve per cent per annum. If no appeal from the administrative law judge's order is taken by any employer or insurer within twenty days, the order shall be final and may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment of the Superior Court. For purposes of this section, the Second Injury Fund shall not be deemed an employer or an insurer and shall be exempt from any liability. The amount of any compensation for which the Second Injury Fund would be liable except for the exemption provided under this section shall be reallocated among any other employers, or their insurers, who are liable for such compensation according to a ratio, the numerator of which is the percentage of the total compensation for which an employer, or its insurer, is liable and the denominator of which is the total percentage of liability of all employers, or their insurers, excluding the percentage that would have been attributable to the Second Injury Fund, for such compensation.
(P.A. 81-155, S. 1; P.A. 01-22, S. 2; P.A. 05-199, S. 1; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 01-22 increased time for taking an appeal from order of commissioner from 10 to 20 days; P.A. 05-199 provided that Second Injury Fund not be deemed an employer or insurer and be exempt from liability under section, and that compensation otherwise attributable to fund be reallocated among any other liable employers or insurers according to ratio, effective July 1, 2006; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” and “commissioners” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” and “administrative law judge's” respectively, effective October 1, 2021.
Cited. 231 C. 469; 232 C. 758; 241 C. 282. Application is limited to cases of ongoing repetitive trauma or occupational disease. 263 C. 279. Connecticut Insurance Guarantee Association can be held liable for the obligations of an insolvent workers' compensation insurer that would have been the last insurer on a risk and that result does not conflict with Sec. 38a-845. 302 C. 219. Plain and unambiguous language of section permits an award of interest against a prior insurer if apportionment claim has been submitted to a commissioner after conclusion of formal hearings; existence of an agreement did not deprive commissioner of authority to make a determination as to apportionment liability and to award interest. 313 C. 735.
Cited. 33 CA 695; judgment reversed, see 231 C. 469. Once commissioner concluded that claimant had not suffered a new injury but had suffered complications from first injury, commissioner had authority to order former employer-insurer to reimburse present employer-insurer. 121 CA 400.
Sec. 31-300. Award as judgment. Interest. Attorney's fee. Procedure on discontinuance or reduction. As soon as may be after the conclusion of any hearing, but no later than one hundred twenty days after such conclusion, the administrative law judge shall send to each party a written copy of the administrative law judge's findings and award. The administrative law judge shall, as part of the written award, inform the employee or the employee's dependent, as the case may be, of any rights the individual may have to an annual cost-of-living adjustment or to participate in a rehabilitation program administered by the Department of Aging and Disability Services under the provisions of this chapter. The administrative law judge shall retain the original findings and award in said administrative law judge's office. If no appeal from the decision is taken by either party within twenty days thereafter, such award shall be final and may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment of the Superior Court. The court may issue execution upon any uncontested or final award of an administrative law judge in the same manner as in cases of judgments rendered in the Superior Court; and, upon the filing of an application to the court for an execution, the administrative law judge in whose office the award is on file shall, upon the request of the clerk of said court, send to the clerk a certified copy of such findings and award. In cases where, through the fault or neglect of the employer or insurer, adjustments of compensation have been unduly delayed, or where through such fault or neglect, payments have been unduly delayed, the administrative law judge may include in the award interest at the rate prescribed in section 37-3a and a reasonable attorney's fee in the case of undue delay in adjustments of compensation and may include in the award in the case of undue delay in payments of compensation, interest at twelve per cent per annum and a reasonable attorney's fee. Payments not commenced within thirty-five days after the filing of a written notice of claim shall be presumed to be unduly delayed unless a notice to contest the claim is filed in accordance with section 31-297. In cases where there has been delay in either adjustment or payment, which delay has not been due to the fault or neglect of the employer or insurer, whether such delay was caused by appeals or otherwise, the administrative law judge may allow interest at such rate, not to exceed the rate prescribed in section 37-3a, as may be fair and reasonable, taking into account whatever advantage the employer or insurer, as the case may be, may have had from the use of the money, the burden of showing that the rate in such case should be less than the rate prescribed in section 37-3a to be upon the employer or insurer. In cases where the claimant prevails and the administrative law judge finds that the employer or insurer has unreasonably contested liability, the administrative law judge may allow to the claimant a reasonable attorney's fee. No employer or insurer shall discontinue or reduce payment on account of total or partial incapacity under any such award, if it is claimed by or on behalf of the injured person that such person's incapacity still continues, unless such employer or insurer notifies the administrative law judge and the employee of such proposed discontinuance or reduction in the manner prescribed in section 31-296 and the administrative law judge specifically approves such discontinuance or reduction in writing. The administrative law judge shall render the decision within fourteen days of receipt of such notice and shall forward to all parties to the claim a copy of the decision not later than seven days after the decision has been rendered. If the decision of the administrative law judge finds for the employer or insurer, the injured person shall return any wrongful payments received from the day designated by the administrative law judge as the effective date for the discontinuance or reduction of benefits. Any employee whose benefits for total incapacity are discontinued under the provisions of this section and who is entitled to receive benefits for partial incapacity as a result of an award, shall receive those benefits commencing the day following the designated effective date for the discontinuance of benefits for total incapacity. In any case where the administrative law judge finds that the employer or insurer has discontinued or reduced any such payment without having given such notice and without the administrative law judge having approved such discontinuance or reduction in writing, the administrative law judge shall allow the claimant a reasonable attorney's fee together with interest at the rate prescribed in section 37-3a on the discontinued or reduced payments.
(1949 Rev., S. 7449; 1951, S. 3049d; 1958 Rev., S. 31-176; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 22; 1967, P.A. 692, S. 1; 842, S. 10; P.A. 75-122; P.A. 79-80; P.A. 83-114, S. 2; P.A. 84-180, S. 2; 84-299, S. 3; P.A. 85-64, S. 1, 2; P.A. 88-106, S. 3; P.A. 89-17; 89-316, S. 1; P.A. 91-339, S. 19; P.A. 93-228, S. 13, 35; P.A. 01-22, S. 3; P.A. 11-44, S. 49; June 12 Sp. Sess. P.A. 12-1, S. 86; P.A. 19-157, S. 85; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1967 acts deleted references to “original findings” and specified that claimant may be allowed reasonable attorneys fees where commissioner finds that employer or insurer has unreasonably contested liability; P.A. 75-122 added provisions re procedure for discontinuance of payments; P.A. 79-80 specified that 6% interest applies “in the case of undue delay in adjustments of compensation”, allowed 12% interest where there is undue delay in payments and defined undue delay; P.A. 83-114 provided that the commissioner shall inform the individual, as part of the written award, of his rights to an annual cost-of-living adjustment under this chapter; P.A. 84-180 required the commissioner to inform the employee in the award of his right to participate in a rehabilitation program; P.A. 84-299 provided that payments not made within 35 days after the filing of a claim shall be considered “unduly delayed” unless the claim has been timely contested; P.A. 85-64 required the commissioner to send each party a written copy of his award within 120 days of the conclusion of hearings on the claim; P.A. 88-106 added the provisions regarding reduction of benefits and provided for an award of attorneys' fees in cases of undue delay in adjustments and payments resulting from the fault or neglect of an employer or insurer; P.A. 89-17 increased the rate of interest from 6% to 10% for all cases except cases where payments are discontinued or reduced without notice and approval; P.A. 89-316 changed the rates of allowable interest from specific percentages enacted under P.A. 89-17 to the rate prescribed in Sec. 37-3a; P.A. 91-339 required the commissioner to send to each party a written copy of his findings; P.A. 93-228 added provisions modifying procedures re discontinuances or reductions in workers' compensation benefits, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 01-22 increased time for taking an appeal from the decision of the commissioner from 10 to 20 days and made technical changes for the purpose of gender neutrality; P.A. 11-44 added provision re rehabilitation program administered by Bureau of Rehabilitative Services, effective July 1, 2011; June 12 Sp. Sess. P.A. 12-1 replaced “Bureau of Rehabilitative Services” with “Department of Rehabilitation Services”, effective July 1, 2012; P.A. 19-157 replaced “Department of Rehabilitation Services” with “Department of Aging and Disability Services”; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” and “commissioner's” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” and “administrative law judge's” respectively, effective October 1, 2021.
What the finding should contain. 90 C. 540; 94 C. 262; Id., 627; 96 C. 354; 97 C. 78; 114 C. 393; 117 C. 603. Commissioner may make his memorandum of decision part of the finding. 100 C. 389; 103 C. 104; Id., 428. Prolix and evidential finding criticized. Id., 708. Commissioner must expressly find subordinate facts on which his conclusions rest. 104 C. 463. When award not appealed from, finding becomes final on subsequent hearing for further compensation. 109 C. 599. When award becomes final judgment. 112 C. 370. When it appears claimant may establish claim on retrial, case is remanded. 118 C. 29; 130 C. 1. Motion to erase proper method to raise question whether there was a judgment from which appeal might be taken. 123 C. 103. Finding as to causal connection. Id., 405. Correction of finding. 124 C. 296; 130 C. 423; Id., 478; Id., 482. Finding of incapacity must be based on extent and consequent loss of earning power due to susceptibility due to dermatitis. 125 C. 140. Award may be enforced in same manner as judgment of Superior Court. 126 C. 491. Judgment of Superior Court interlocutory ruling, not final. Id., 522. Cited. 165 C. 338. All appeals since 1972 amendments should be taken from Court of Common Pleas; hence reservation from Superior Court under Sec. 31-324 was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 168 C. 84. Cited. 169 C. 646; 208 C. 576; 212 C. 441; 219 C. 439; 224 C. 441; 237 C. 71; Id., 378. Attorney's fees awarded under section do not constitute “payments due under an award” pursuant to Sec. 31-303, and are not subject to penalty as a late payment thereunder. 260 C. 21.
Where no specific time limit set under statute for finding and award to be made, commissioner does not lose jurisdiction to render decision after certain lapse of time. 2 CA 689. Cited. 7 CA 142; 12 CA 138; 21 CA 464; 22 CA 539; judgment reversed, see 219 C. 439; 26 CA 194; 28 CA 113; 33 CA 667; 39 CA 717; 40 CA 36; 45 CA 324; Id., 499. Plaintiff's conduct constituted an implied waiver of her right to have commissioner's decision vacated for failure to issue decision within time limit. 49 CA 339. Court was within discretion to deny request to execute a voluntary agreement that was not a final settlement; section granted trial court subject matter jurisdiction in matter. 58 CA 45. Finding that employer or insurer acted in an unreasonable manner or caused undue delay is necessary to predicate an order to pay attorney's fees pursuant to statute. 65 CA 592. Where commissioner failed to issue decision within mandatory time period and defendant objected to decision on the day of its eventual issuance, it was held that defendant had not waived any objection to the late issuance since there is no requirement that a party object to a decision prior to its issuance. 72 CA 497. A challenge to commission's jurisdiction when employee and employer have entered into a voluntary agreement does not in itself constitute acting in an unreasonable manner, and a determination otherwise would discourage parties from quickly entering into such agreements. 123 CA 753. Award of “reasonable attorney's fees” issued under section may, at the discretion of commissioner, include fees accrued by paralegals. 152 CA 116.
Award has the force of judgment but execution on plaintiff's award was denied where defendant had action pending in Superior Court to determine whether plaintiff could keep award and retain proceeds from a Massachusetts death action based on same loss. 27 CS 382. Cited. 28 CS 5; 39 CS 386.
Sec. 31-301.Appeals to the Compensation Review Board. Payment of award during pendency of appeal. (a) At any time within twenty days after entry of an award by the administrative law judge, after a decision of the administrative law judge upon a motion or after an order by the administrative law judge according to the provisions of section 31-299b, either party may appeal therefrom to the Compensation Review Board by filing in the office of the administrative law judge from which the award or the decision on a motion originated an appeal petition and five copies thereof. The administrative law judge within three days thereafter shall mail the petition and three copies thereof to the chief of the Compensation Review Board and a copy thereof to the adverse party or parties. If a party files a motion subsequent to the finding and award, order or decision, the twenty-day period for filing an appeal of an award or an order by the administrative law judge shall commence on the date of the decision on such motion.
(b) The appeal shall be heard by the Compensation Review Board as provided in section 31-280b. The Compensation Review Board shall hear the appeal on the record of the hearing before the administrative law judge, provided, if it is shown to the satisfaction of the board that additional evidence or testimony is material and that there were good reasons for failure to present it in the proceedings before the administrative law judge, the Compensation Review Board may hear additional evidence or testimony.
(c) Upon the final determination of the appeal by the Compensation Review Board, but no later than one year after the date the appeal petition was filed, the Compensation Review Board shall issue its decision, affirming, modifying or reversing the decision of the administrative law judge. The decision of the Compensation Review Board shall include its findings, conclusions of law and award.
(d) When any appeal is pending, and it appears to the Compensation Review Board that any part of the award appealed from is not affected by the issues raised by the appeal, the Compensation Review Board may, on motion or of its own motion, render a judgment directing compliance with any portion of the award not affected by the appeal; or if the only issue raised by the appeal is the amount of the average weekly wage for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation, as provided in section 31-310, the administrative law judge shall, on motion of the claimant, direct the payment of the portion of the compensation payable under his award that is not in dispute, if any, pending final adjudication of the disputed portion thereof. In all appeals in which one of the parties is not represented by counsel, and in which the party taking the appeal does not prosecute the case within a reasonable time from the date of appeal, the Compensation Review Board may, of its own motion, affirm, reverse or modify the award.
(e) When an appeal is taken to the Compensation Review Board, the chief clerk thereof shall notify the administrative law judge from whose award the appeal was taken, in writing, of any action of the Compensation Review Board thereon and of the final disposition of the appeal, whether by judgment, withdrawal or otherwise, and shall upon the decision of the appeal, furnish the administrative law judge with a copy of the decision. Whenever any appeal is pending, if it appears to the Compensation Review Board that justice so requires, the Compensation Review Board shall order a certified copy of the evidence for the use of the employer, the employee or both, and the certified copy shall be made a part of the record on the appeal. The procedure in appealing from an award of the administrative law judge shall be the same as the procedure employed in an appeal from the Superior Court to the Supreme Court, where applicable. The chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission shall adopt regulations, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54, to establish rules, methods of procedure and forms as the chairperson deems expedient for the purposes of this chapter.
(f) During the pendency of any appeal of an award made pursuant to this chapter, the claimant shall receive all compensation and medical treatment payable under the terms of the award to the extent the compensation and medical treatment are not being paid by any health insurer or by any insurer or employer who has been ordered, pursuant to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, to pay a portion of the award. The compensation and medical treatment shall be paid by the employer or its insurer.
(g) If the final adjudication results in the denial of compensation to the claimant, and he has previously received compensation on the claim pursuant to subsection (f) and this subsection, the claimant shall reimburse the employer or its insurer for all sums previously expended, plus interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum. Upon any such denial of compensation, the administrative law judge who originally heard the case or his successor shall conduct a hearing to determine the repayment schedule for the claimant.
(1949 Rev., S. 7450; 1958 Rev., S. 31-177; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 23; 1963, P.A. 642, S. 85; 1967, P.A. 692, S. 2; 1972, P.A. 108, S. 6; P.A. 74-183, S. 268, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 231, 681; P.A. 78-280, S. 1, 127; P.A. 79-540, S. 3; P.A. 81-155, S. 2; 81-472, S. 144, 159; P.A. 84-133; P.A. 86-27; 86-56; P.A. 91-32, S. 19, 41; 91-339, S. 20, 55; P.A. 95-277, S. 9, 19; P.A. 01-22, S. 1; P.A. 07-31, S. 2; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; P.A. 22-89, S. 22.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1963 act allowed appeals after commissioner's decision upon a motion and required that appeals be made to court for county where injury occurred rather than county where award was filed, adding provision re court for appeal when injury occurred outside state; 1967 act deleted references to findings of commissioners and specified that appeal procedure is same as for appeals from superior court to supreme court; 1972 act replaced superior court with court of common pleas throughout section, effective September 1, 1972, except that courts with cases pending retain jurisdiction; P.A. 74-183 added references to judicial districts and made appeal procedure same as for appeals from court of common pleas to superior court, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 replaced court of common pleas with superior court and deleted provision re appeal procedure, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 78-280 deleted references to counties; P.A. 79-540 replaced provisions re appeals to superior court with new provisions re appeals to compensation review division; P.A. 81-155 permitted the appeal of orders made by the commissioner according to the provisions of Sec. 31-299b; P.A. 81-472 made technical changes; P.A. 84-133 added Subsec. (b), providing for the payment of compensation and benefits due under an occupational disease award during the pendency of any appeal of such award; P.A. 86-27 provided that compensation and benefits due under any award made pursuant to this chapter shall be paid by the second injury fund during the pendency of any appeal of the award; P.A. 86-56 required the compensation review division to issue its decision on any appeal within one year of the filing of the appeal petition, except that any decision on an appeal pending on October 1, 1986, shall be issued within one year of said date; P.A. 91-32 divided existing Subsec. (a) into Subsecs. (a) to (e), inclusive, divided existing Subsec. (b) into Subsecs. (f) and (g) and made technical changes; P.A. 91-339 changed “compensation review division” to “compensation review board”, changed “chairman” to “chief” of the board, added reference to Sec. 31-380b in Subsec. (b) and authorized the chairman of the workers' compensation commission to adopt regulations in Subsec. (e); P.A. 95-277 amended Subsec. (f) to provide that the compensation and medical treatment of the injured employee be paid by the employer or its insurer rather than Second Injury Fund and, in Subsec. (g) substituted references to “Second Injury Fund” with “employer or its insurer” to reflect the closing of the Second Injury Fund and deleted provision re reimbursement of Second Injury Fund by employer, effective July 1, 1995; P.A. 01-22 amended Subsec. (a) by increasing the time to take an appeal from 10 to 20 days; P.A. 07-31 amended Subsec. (a) by commencing 20-day period for filing appeal, where motion filed subsequent to finding and award, order or decision, on date of decision on motion; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” throughout, effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 22-89 made technical changes in Subsec. (e), effective May 24, 2022.
Appeal does not open the case for trial de novo. 89 C. 143, 150; Id., 370; 92 C. 90. Commissioner's finding is part of the record and may be corrected by the Superior Court in the same manner as the finding of a trial court by the Supreme Court. 90 C. 446; 91 C. 531; 92 C. 90; 93 C. 94; 95 C. 673; 96 C. 634; 98 C. 287; Id., 755; 99 C. 355; 103 C. 429; 104 C. 537; 107 C. 251. Reasons of appeal and answer thereto should be filed in the court. 91 C. 227. What justifies setting award aside. 93 C. 83; 94 C. 9; 96 C. 299. If the court materially alters the finding, it should recommit it to commissioner to decide on the altered facts. 97 C. 77; 106 C. 254. Conclusion of fact based on subordinate facts is reviewable by the court. 100 C. 347; 102 C. 5; Id., 237; Id., 472. There is no appeal from refusal of commissioner to rehear the case or alter his finding. 101 C. 358; 108 C. 161. Where the facts found are too indefinite to support the award, finding should be recommitted to commissioner. 102 C. 238; 106 C. 215; Id., 253; 107 C. 171; Id., 647. Nature of the appeal and correction of finding by Superior Court fully reviewed. 102 C. 514. Court should not set aside award because it differs with commissioner as to preponderance of evidence. 106 C. 109. There is no appeal from an award of commissioner made in compliance with the decision of the Superior Court on a former appeal; appeal must be to the Supreme Court from the Superior Court decision. 108 C. 159. Expense of printing testimony not taxable as costs on appeal. 109 C. 737. Superior Court cannot change finding unless commissioner has found facts without evidence or has reached unreasonable conclusions. 120 C. 606; 121 C. 56; Id., 483; Id., 541; Id., 708; 122 C. 129. When entire transcript may properly be filed; when testimony necessary for proper determination of case is not presented, case remanded for further hearing. 121 C. 274. Motion to erase proper method to raise question whether there was a judgment from which appeal might be taken. 123 C. 103. Cited. 132 C. 209. Where motion to open award is made by party who intends to appeal from award if motion is denied, he may postpone the filing of the appeal until the motion is determined. 134 C. 269. Where commissioner failed to pass upon specific claim potentially decisive of the case, it should be returned for further proceedings. 138 C. 482. Cited. 141 C. 321. Section affects the court to which appeal is taken, not employee's right to compensation; appeal brought to Superior Court after September 1, 1972 was brought to wrong court and Superior Court has no jurisdiction. 169 C. 646. Cited. 179 C. 662; 207 C. 420; 213 C. 54; 217 C. 143; 220 C. 739; 227 C. 333; 231 C. 287; 232 C. 758; 233 C. 14; 235 C. 790; 239 C. 408; 240 C. 788. Provision re payment deadline applies when payment is due under an award by compensation review board. 249 C. 365. 10-day appeal period tolled when aggrieved party establishes that, through no fault of his own, he did not receive notice of commissioner's decision within 10 days of the date it was sent. 250 C. 581. Provision re 10-day period for appeal commences on the date notice is sent to a party's counsel. Id., 592.
Cited. 1 CA 142; 7 CA 142; 11 CA 693; 16 CA 138; 33 CA 695; judgment reversed, see 231 C. 469; 36 CA 150; Id., 298; 38 CA 1; 39 CA 717; 45 CA 199. In matter where the issue was causation of injury, board did not improperly substitute its factual findings for those of commissioner but rather determined that commissioner's finding could not stand without the support of expert medical testimony and properly refused to remand the case for further proceedings. 62 CA 440.
Authority to extend time for taking an appeal. 9 CS 38. Imposes on party seeking order the burden of showing (1) inability to pay and (2) that justice requires the action of commissioner be appealed from. Id., 379. A plea in abatement and not a motion to expunge is appropriate remedy to attack appeal not brought within 10 days. 15 CS 33. Cited. 17 CS 288; 27 CS 410. Amendment of October 1, 1967, applied to pending appeal which was then dismissed for failure to prosecute with due diligence. 24 CS 411. Cited. 38 CS 648.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 206 C. 242; 207 C. 535; 212 C. 441; 228 C. 535; 231 C. 469; 237 C. 1; 241 C. 282. Failure to take an appeal within the 20 day appeal limitation in Subsec. deprives board of subject matter jurisdiction, a defect which may be raised at any time. 299 C. 346. Sec. 31-355(b) is inapplicable for purposes of determining when appeal period begins to run under Subsec. re Second Injury Fund claim because the fund had already been participating in proceedings before Workers' Compensation Commission. Id., 376. Appellate Court improperly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction for lack of a final judgment in matter in which defendant challenged commissioner's initial finding of plaintiff's total disability, but after remand by the board to commissioner, did not challenge commissioner's subsequent findings and award specifying amounts to be paid to plaintiff. 303 C. 238.
Cited. 33 CA 495. Proper interpretation of limitation period contained in section is that 10-day period begins to run on day on which party wanting appeal is sent meaningful notice of commissioner's decision. 36 CA 298. Cited. 37 CA 392; 46 CA 298. 10-day appeal period begins to run on day on which party wanting to appeal is sent meaningful notice of commissioner's decision. 49 CA 1. Notice must be sent directly to plaintiff, not plaintiff's attorney, in order for appeal period to commence. 51 CA 92. Appeal taken from a supplemental order directing the Second Injury Fund to compensate plaintiff is not a timely appeal challenging the findings and awards preceding that order if that appeal was taken outside the mandated 20 days from the issuing of the operative finding and award. 114 CA 58. The time limitation on an appeal from the finding and award of commissioner imposed by Subsec. does not deprive the appellate tribunal of subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. Id., 81; judgment reversed, see 299 C. 346.
Subsec. (c):
It is implicit in statutory authority to reverse a decision of the trial commissioner that board may remand a case for a new hearing; legislature did not intend to impose unstated limitations on review board's discretion to order appropriately adjudicated new hearings. 251 C. 153.
Cited. 34 CA 673.
Subsec. (f):
Should be applied retroactively to all cases not actually transferred to the fund prior to the date provision became effective; concurring opinion based on legislative intent. 243 C. 311.
Sec. 31-301a. Decision of Compensation Review Board. Any decision of the Compensation Review Board, in the absence of an appeal therefrom, shall become final after a period of twenty days has expired from the issuance of notice of the rendition of the judgment or decision.
(P.A. 79-540, S. 4; P.A. 91-339, S. 21, 55.)
History: P.A. 91-339 changed “compensation review division” to “compensation review board”.
Awards become final if and when parties fail to appeal within applicable statutory time period and are not “pending matters” subject to modification based on subsequent changes in law. 244 C. 1.
Cited. 28 CA 113.
Sec. 31-301b. Appeal of decision of Compensation Review Board. Any party aggrieved by the decision of the Compensation Review Board upon any question or questions of law arising in the proceedings may appeal the decision of the Compensation Review Board to the Appellate Court, whether or not the decision is a final decision within the meaning of section 4-183 or a final judgment within the meaning of section 52-263.
(P.A. 79-540, S. 5; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29, S. 15, 82; P.A. 91-339, S. 22, 55; P.A. 09-178, S. 1.)
History: June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29 deleted reference to appellate session of the superior court and included reference to appellate court; P.A. 91-339 changed “compensation review division” to “compensation review board”; P.A. 09-178 added provision re appeal to Appellate Court whether or not decision is a final decision or a final judgment, effective June 30, 2009.
Cited. 193 C. 59; 206 C. 242; 218 C. 181; 219 C. 674; 223 C. 376; 226 C. 569; 227 C. 261; 228 C. 401; Id., 535; 231 C. 287; Id., 469; 235 C. 790; 239 C. 676; 241 C. 282. Awards become final if and when parties fail to appeal within applicable statutory time period and are not “pending matters” subject to modification based on subsequent changes in law. 244 C. 1. Defendant was an aggrieved party for purpose of appeal to Appellate Court. 245 C. 437. In order for decision of review board to be appealable under section, it must be a decision that has the same elements of finality as a final judgment rendered by a trial court. 246 C. 281. Meaning of “any party” discussed. 250 C. 147. Appeal dismissed due to lack of a final judgment in matter that required a remand to worker's compensation commissioner to apportion liability. 282 C. 386. Sec. 1-2z does not overrule prior case law importing a final judgment requirement into this section. Id., 477. Under 2009 revision, Appellate Court improperly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction for lack of a final judgment in matter in which defendant challenged the commissioner's initial finding of plaintiff's total disability, but after remand by the board to the commissioner, did not challenge the commissioner's subsequent findings and award specifying amounts to be paid to plaintiff. 303 C. 238.
Cited. 3 CA 162; Id., 335; Id., 370; 6 CA 45; Id., 498; 13 CA 566; 21 CA 107; 26 CA 194; 28 CA 113; 33 CA 495; Id., 695; 36 CA 298; 37 CA 392; Id., 648; 38 CA 1; 39 CA 653; 41 CA 116; 45 CA 199.
Sec. 31-301c. Costs of appeal. Interest added to award affirmed on appeal. (a) No costs shall be taxed in favor of either party on any such appeal either in the Compensation Review Board or in the Appellate Court, and no party shall be liable to pay any fees or costs in connection therewith, except the record fee on appeal to the Supreme Court; provided, if an appeal is taken to the Appellate Court from a decision of the Compensation Review Board, and such appeal is found by said court to be either frivolous or taken for the purpose of vexation or delay, said court may tax costs in its discretion against the person so taking the appeal.
(b) Whenever an employer or his insurer appeals an administrative law judge's award, and upon completion of the appeal process the employer or insurer loses such appeal, the Compensation Review Board or the Appellate Court, as the case may be, shall add interest on the amount of such award affirmed on appeal and not paid to the claimant during the pendency of such appeal, from the date of the original award to the date of the final appeal decision, at the rate prescribed in section 37-3a.
(P.A. 79-540, S. 6; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29, S. 30, 82; P.A. 84-288; P.A. 89-316, S. 2; P.A. 91-339, S. 23, 55; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29 deleted reference to appellate session of the superior court and added reference to appellate court; P.A. 84-288 added Subsec. (b), which provides that the final arbiter of an appeal on an award shall add 6% interest to the amount of the award which is unpaid and affirmed by his decision; P.A. 89-316 amended Subsec. (b) to change the rate of interest from 6% per annum to the rate “prescribed in section 37-3a”; P.A. 91-339 changed “compensation review division” to “compensation review board”; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner's” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge's” in Subsec. (b), effective October 1, 2021.
Sec. 31-301d. Power of Compensation Review Board re witnesses and production of evidence. Enforcement of order. The Compensation Review Board and each member thereof shall have the same power in summoning and examining witnesses and in requiring production of evidence as is vested in each administrative law judge under section 31-278. The Superior Court, on application of the chief of the Compensation Review Board, may enforce by appropriate decree or process, any provision of this chapter or any proper order of the Compensation Review Board rendered pursuant to any such provision.
(P.A. 79-540, S. 8; P.A. 80-483, S. 96, 186; P.A. 91-339, S. 24, 55; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 80-483 substituted “pursuant to” for “in pursuance of”; P.A. 91-339 changed “compensation review division” to “compensation review board” and “chairman” to “chief” of the board; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021.
Sec. 31-302. Payment of compensation. Commutation into monthly, quarterly or lump sums. Compensation payable under this chapter shall be paid at the particular times in the week and in the manner the administrative law judge may order, and shall be paid directly to the persons entitled to receive them unless the administrative law judge, for good reason, orders payment to those entitled to act for such persons, except that when the administrative law judge finds it just or necessary, the administrative law judge may approve or direct the commutation, in whole or in part, of weekly compensation under the provisions of this chapter into monthly or quarterly payments, or into a single lump sum, which may be paid to the one then entitled to the compensation, and the commutation shall be binding upon all persons entitled to compensation for the injury in question. In any case of commutation, a true equivalence of value shall be maintained, with due discount of sums payable in the future; and, when commutation is made into a single lump sum, (1) the administrative law judge may direct that it be paid to any savings bank, trust company or life insurance company authorized to do business within this state, to be held in trust for the beneficiary or beneficiaries under the provisions of this chapter and paid in conformity with the provisions of this chapter, and (2) the parties, by agreement and with approval of the administrative law judge, may prorate the single lump sum over the life expectancy of the injured employee.
(1949 Rev., S. 7451; 1958 Rev., S. 31-178; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 24; P.A. 91-32, S. 20, 41; P.A. 04-214, S. 1; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 91-32 made technical changes; P.A. 04-214 made a technical change, designated existing provisions re lump sum payments as Subdiv. (1), and added Subdiv. (2) to allow prorating of lump sum payments over life expectancy of injured employee, effective June 3, 2004; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021.
Commutation can be made only when compensation period is definite. 96 C. 674; 98 C. 236; 108 C. 644. When commutation may be made in cases of total or partial incapacity. 120 C. 541. Award commuted into lump sum becomes final judgment. 126 C. 491. Award did not establish existence of a compensable claim. 137 C. 185. Cited. 208 C. 576; 226 C. 569.
Cited. 26 CA 194.
Record of agreement for lump-sum payment improperly excluded in action for damages for injury to person since it would have contradicted plaintiff's statement that at time of injury sued on he was suffering from no other disability. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 371.
Sec. 31-303. Day when compensation payments become due. Penalty for late payments. Payments agreed to under a voluntary agreement shall commence on or before the twentieth day from the date of agreement. Payments due under an award shall commence on or before the twentieth day from the date of such award. Payments due from the Second Injury Fund shall be payable on or before the twentieth business day after receipt of a fully executed agreement. Any employer who fails to pay within the prescribed time limitations of this section shall pay a penalty for each late payment, in the amount of twenty per cent of such payment, in addition to any other interest or penalty imposed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.
(1959, P.A. 580, S. 21; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 26; P.A. 89-70, S. 1, 2; P.A. 93-228, S. 14, 35; P.A. 04-47, S. 1.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 89-70 added the provision allowing the second injury fund ten business days to make payments; P.A. 93-228 added provision imposing 20% penalty, in addition to interest and other existing penalties, on compensation payments which are paid more than ten days after the date of the agreement or award, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 04-47 replaced references to “tenth” day with references to “twentieth” day, effective May 4, 2004.
Cited. 233 C. 14. Phrase “payments due under an award” does not encompass attorney's fees included in award pursuant to Sec. 31-300, and such attorney's fees are not subject to penalty as a late payment thereunder. 260 C. 21.
Penalty provision applicable to workers' compensation cases resolved by stipulation; penalty provision may be applied before effective date. 54 CA 841. Section is not ambiguous and, when read with Sec. 31-301(f) and (g), requires payment to commence within 20 days of order for payment pending appeal of award or imposition of 20 per cent late fee. 114 CA 822.
Sec. 31-304. Destruction of agreement. Section 31-304 is repealed, effective October 1, 2021.
(1955, S. 3048d; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 27; P.A. 21-18, S. 8.)
Sec. 31-305. Medical examinations.Section 31-305 is repealed.
(1949 Rev., S. 7445; 1958 Rev., S. 31-172; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 28; 1967, P.A. 842, S. 11; P.A. 87-160, S. 2; P.A. 91-32, S. 40, 41.)
Sec. 31-306. Death resulting from accident or occupational disease. Dependents. Compensation. (a) Compensation shall be paid to dependents on account of death resulting from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment or from an occupational disease as follows:
(1) Four thousand dollars shall be paid for burial expenses in any case in which the employee died on or after October 1, 1988, and before June 23, 2021, and twelve thousand dollars shall be paid for burial expenses in any case in which the employee died on or after June 23, 2021. On January 1, 2022, and not later than each January first thereafter, the compensation for burial benefits shall be adjusted by the percentage increase between the last complete calendar year and the previous calendar year in the consumer price index for urban wage earners and clerical workers in the northeast, with no seasonal adjustment, as calculated by the United States Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics. If there is no one wholly or partially dependent upon the deceased employee, the burial expenses shall be paid to the person who assumes the responsibility of paying the funeral expenses.
(2) To those wholly dependent upon the deceased employee at the date of the deceased employee's injury, a weekly compensation equal to seventy-five per cent of the average weekly earnings of the deceased calculated pursuant to section 31-310, after such earnings have been reduced by any deduction for federal or state taxes, or both, and for the federal Insurance Contributions Act made from such employee's total wages received during the period of calculation of the employee's average weekly wage pursuant to said section 31-310, as of the date of the injury but not more than the maximum weekly compensation rate set forth in section 31-309 for the year in which the injury occurred or less than twenty dollars weekly. (A) The weekly compensation rate of each dependent entitled to receive compensation under this section as a result of death arising from a compensable injury occurring on or after October 1, 1977, shall be adjusted annually as provided in this subdivision as of the following October first, and each subsequent October first, to provide the dependent with a cost-of-living adjustment in the dependent's weekly compensation rate as determined as of the date of the injury under section 31-309. If the maximum weekly compensation rate, as determined under the provisions of said section 31-309, to be effective as of any October first following the date of the injury, is greater than the maximum weekly compensation rate prevailing at the date of the injury, the weekly compensation rate which the injured employee was entitled to receive at the date of the injury or October 1, 1990, whichever is later, shall be increased by the percentage of the increase in the maximum weekly compensation rate required by the provisions of said section 31-309 from the date of the injury or October 1, 1990, whichever is later, to such October first. The cost-of-living increases provided under this subdivision shall be paid by the employer without any order or award from the administrative law judge. The adjustments shall apply to each payment made in the next succeeding twelve-month period commencing with the October first next succeeding the date of the injury. With respect to any dependent receiving benefits on October 1, 1997, with respect to any injury occurring on or after July 1, 1993, and before October 1, 1997, such benefit shall be recalculated to October 1, 1997, as if such benefits had been subject to recalculation annually under this subparagraph. The difference between the amount of any benefits that would have been paid to such dependent if such benefits had been subject to such recalculation and the actual amount of benefits paid during the period between such injury and such recalculation shall be paid to the dependent not later than December 1, 1997, in a lump-sum payment. The employer or its insurer shall be reimbursed by the Second Injury Fund, as provided in section 31-354, for adjustments, including lump-sum payments, payable under this subparagraph for deaths from compensable injuries occurring on or after July 1, 1993, and before October 1, 1997, upon presentation of any vouchers and information that the Treasurer shall require. No claim for payment of retroactive benefits may be made to the Second Injury Fund more than two years after the date on which the employer or its insurer paid such benefits in accordance with this subparagraph. (B) The weekly compensation rate of each dependent entitled to receive compensation under this section as a result of death arising from a compensable injury occurring on or before September 30, 1977, shall be adjusted as of October 1, 1977, and October 1, 1980, and thereafter, as provided in this subdivision to provide the dependent with partial cost-of-living adjustments in the dependent's weekly compensation rate. As of October 1, 1977, the weekly compensation rate paid prior to October 1, 1977, to the dependent shall be increased by twenty-five per cent. The partial cost-of-living adjustment provided under this subdivision shall be paid by the employer without any order or award from the administrative law judge. In addition, on each October first, the weekly compensation rate of each dependent as of October 1, 1990, shall be increased by the percentage of the increase in the maximum compensation rate over the maximum compensation rate of October 1, 1990, as determined under the provisions of section 31-309 existing on October 1, 1977. The cost of the adjustments shall be paid by the employer or its insurance carrier who shall be reimbursed for such cost from the Second Injury Fund as provided in section 31-354 upon presentation of any vouchers and information that the Treasurer shall require. No claim for payment of retroactive benefits may be made to the Second Injury Fund more than two years after the date on which the employer or its insurance carrier paid such benefits in accordance with this subparagraph.
(3) If the surviving spouse is the sole presumptive dependent, compensation shall be paid until death or remarriage.
(4) If there is a presumptive dependent spouse surviving and also one or more presumptive dependent children, all of which children are either children of the surviving spouse or are living with the surviving spouse, the entire compensation shall be paid to the surviving spouse in the same manner and for the same period as if the surviving spouse were the sole dependent. If, however, any of the presumptive dependent children are neither children of the surviving spouse nor living with the surviving spouse, the compensation shall be divided into as many parts as there are presumptive dependents. The shares of any children having a presumptive dependent parent shall be added to the share of the parent and shall be paid to the parent. The share of any dependent child not having a surviving dependent parent shall be paid to the father or mother of the child with whom the child may be living, or to the legal guardian of the child, or to any other person, for the benefit of the child, as the administrative law judge may direct.
(5) If the compensation being paid to the surviving presumptive dependent spouse terminates for any reason, or if there is no surviving presumptive dependent spouse at the time of the death of the employee, but there is at either time one or more presumptive dependent children, the compensation shall be paid to the children as a class, each child sharing equally with the others. Each child shall receive compensation until the child reaches the age of eighteen or dies before reaching age eighteen, provided the child shall continue to receive compensation up to the attainment of the age of twenty-two if unmarried and a full-time student, except any child who has attained the age of twenty-two while a full-time student but has not completed the requirements for, or received, a degree from a postsecondary educational institution shall be deemed not to have attained age twenty-two until the first day of the first month following the end of the quarter or semester in which the child is enrolled at the time, or if the child is not enrolled in a quarter or semester system, until the first day of the first month following the completion of the course in which the child is enrolled or until the first day of the third month beginning after such time, whichever occurs first. When a child's participation ceases, such child's share shall be divided among the remaining eligible dependent children, provided if any child, when the child reaches the age of eighteen years, is physically or mentally incapacitated from earning, the child's right to compensation shall not terminate but shall continue for the full period of incapacity.
(6) In all cases where there are no presumptive dependents, but where there are one or more persons wholly dependent in fact, the compensation in case of death shall be divided according to the relative degree of their dependence. Compensation payable under this subdivision shall be paid for not more than three hundred and twelve weeks from the date of the death of the employee. The compensation, if paid to those wholly dependent in fact, shall be paid at the full compensation rate. The compensation, if paid to those partially dependent in fact upon the deceased employee as of the date of the injury, shall not, in total, be more than the full compensation rate nor less than twenty dollars weekly, nor, if the average weekly sum contributed by the deceased at the date of the injury to those partially dependent in fact is more than twenty dollars weekly, not more than the sum so contributed.
(7) When the sole presumptive dependents are, at the time of the injury, nonresident aliens and the deceased has in this state some person or persons who are dependent in fact, the administrative law judge may in the administrative law judge's discretion equitably apportion the sums payable as compensation to the dependents.
(b) The dependents of any deceased employee who was injured on or after January 1, 1974, and who subsequently dies shall be paid compensation on account of the death retroactively to the date of the employee's death. The cost of the payment or adjustment shall be paid by the employer or its insurance carrier who shall be reimbursed for such cost from the Second Injury Fund as provided in section 31-354 upon presentation of any vouchers and information that the Treasurer shall require.
(c) (1) The dependents of any deceased employee who was injured between January 1, 1952, and December 31, 1973, and who subsequently dies, shall be paid compensation on account of the death retroactively to the date of the employee's death. The cost of the payment or adjustment shall be paid by the employer or its insurance carrier who shall be reimbursed for such cost from the Second Injury Fund as provided in section 31-354 upon presentation of any vouchers and information that the Treasurer shall require. No claim for payment of retroactive benefits may be made to the Second Injury Fund more than two years after the date on which the employer or its insurance carrier paid such benefits in accordance with this subdivision.
(2) The dependents of any deceased employee who was injured before January 1, 1952, and who died on or before October 1, 1991, shall be paid compensation on account of the death retroactively to the date of the employee's death. The cost of the payment or adjustment shall be paid by the employer or its insurance carrier who shall be reimbursed for such cost from the Second Injury Fund as provided in section 31-354 upon presentation of any vouchers and information that the Treasurer shall require. No claim for payment of retroactive benefits may be made to the Second Injury Fund more than two years after the date on which the employer or its insurance carrier paid such benefits in accordance with this subdivision.
(d) The dependents of any deceased employee who was injured in an accident arising out of and in the course of employment before January 1, 1952, and who died, as a result of those injuries, after October 1, 1991, shall be paid compensation, under the provisions of this section, effective as of the date of death of any such employee. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, the weekly compensation rate for such dependents shall equal the amount of compensation the injured employee was receiving prior to death pursuant to section 31-307. Such weekly compensation rate shall hereafter be adjusted in accordance with the provisions of subsection (a) of this section. The cost of such payment or adjustment shall be paid by the employer or the insurance carrier of such employer who shall be reimbursed for such cost from the Second Injury Fund provided for in section 31-354. No claim for payment of retroactive benefits may be made to the Second Injury Fund more than two years after the date on which the employer or its insurance carrier paid such benefits in accordance with this subsection.
(1949 Rev., S. 7428, 7429; 1949, 1951, 1953, 1955, S. 3042d; 1957, P.A. 463, S. 1; 1958 Rev., S. 31-159, 31-160; 1959, P.A. 580, S. 5, 22; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 29; 1967, P.A. 842, S. 12, 13; P.A. 77-554, S. 1; P.A. 78-369; P.A. 80-124, S. 2; 80-284, S. 2; 80-329; P.A. 84-453; P.A. 88-92; P.A. 89-68, S. 1; P.A. 91-32, S. 21, 41; 91-339, S. 25; P.A. 92-31, S. 4, 7; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11, S. 54, 70; P.A. 93-228, S. 15, 35; P.A. 97-205, S. 3; P.A. 98-104, S. 2, 6; P.A. 01-162, S. 1, 2; P.A. 05-199, S. 2–4; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 21-2, S. 291.)
History: 1959 act replaced previous provisions and was in turn replaced by provisions of 1961 act; 1967 act increased payments for burial expenses from $500 to $1,000 in all cases where previously $1,000 payment was given to father, mother, brother, sister, son or daughter of deceased in Subsec. (a) and raised weekly compensation allowed in Subsec. (b) from 60% to 66.66% of deceased's average weekly earnings; P.A. 77-554 increased burial payments to $1,500 and deleted requirement that death must have occurred within six years of date of injury or first manifestation of occupational disease symptoms in Subsec. (b), added provisions re cost-of-living adjustments in Subsec. (b) and amended Subsec. (c) to allow compensation to widows and widowers on same basis where previously widowers' payments terminated after 312 weeks; P.A. 78-369 reorganized Subsecs., designating former Subsecs. (a) to (h) as Subdivs. (1) to (8) under Subsec. (b) and deleted former Subsec. (i) re reduction of compensation period by the period for which payments were made to deceased if death occurred more than two years from date of injury or manifestation of disease symptoms; P.A. 80-124 specified in Subsec. (b)(2) that time of injury is date of incapacity to work because of disease in cases involving occupational disease; P.A. 80-284 added Subsec. (a)(4) re unmarried children, rephrased Subsec. (b)(5) accordingly and deleted Subdiv. (6); P.A. 80-329 added provisions re cost-of-living adjustments as of October 1, 1980; P.A. 84-453 amended Subsec. (b)(1) to increase burial expense benefits from $1,500 to $3,000; P.A. 88-92 amended Subsec. (b)(1) to increase burial expense benefits from three to $4,000; P.A. 89-68 added Subsec. (c) providing for the payment of compensation to dependents of deceased employees who were injured on or after January 1, 1974, and who died not later than December 31, 1981; P.A. 91-32 deleted existing Subsec. (a) which had detailed persons to be considered wholly dependent on a deceased employee, relettering remaining Subsecs. accordingly and made technical changes; P.A. 91-339 changed the weekly compensation allowed in Subsec. (a)(2) from 66.66% of average weekly earnings to 80% of average weekly earnings reduced by deductions for federal taxes and FICA; P.A. 92-31 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to provide that burial expenses shall be paid in any case where the employee died on or after October 1, 1988, amended Subsec. (a)(2) to provide that cost-of-living increases shall be calculated using a percentage instead of a dollar amount, and amended Subsec. (b) to authorize the payment of compensation to dependents of deceased employees who died not later than November 1, 1991; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11 added Subsec. (c) (Revisor's note: A reference to “second injury and compensation assurance fund” was changed editorially by the Revisors to read “second injury fund” for consistency with section 38 of public act 91-32); P.A. 93-228 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to decrease weekly compensation benefits for dependents of deceased employee from 80% to 75% of deceased's average weekly earnings, to require that state taxes be deducted in calculating such earnings, and to eliminate cost-of-living adjustments for dependents of deceased employees injured on or after July 1, 1993, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 97-205 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to reinstate cost-of-living adjustments to benefits received for injuries occurring on or after July 1, 1993, and before October 1, 1997; P.A. 98-104 increased the annual cost-of-living adjustment on workers' compensation benefits paid to those dependent upon a deceased employee who died of on-the-job injuries prior to October 1, 1990, effective July 1, 1998; P.A. 01-162 made technical changes in Subsecs. (a) and (b), added new Subsec. (c) re compensation to dependents of any deceased employee who was injured between January 1, 1952, and December 31, 1973, and compensation to dependents of any deceased employee who was injured before January 1, 1952, and who died on or before October 1, 1991, and redesignated existing Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d), making a technical change therein, effective July 6, 2001; P.A. 05-199 amended Subsecs. (a), (c) and (d) to require claims for payment of retroactive benefits to be made to Second Injury Fund not more than two years after payment by employer or insurer, effective July 1, 2006; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” and “commissioner's” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” and “administrative law judge's” respectively in Subsec.(a)(2), (4) and (7), effective October 1, 2021; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 21-2 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to increase compensation for burial expenses for deaths after June 23, 2021, to $12,000, to adjust compensation for burial expenses on January 1, 2022, and thereafter, based on the percentage increase of a certain consumer price index and to delete a reference to $4,000, effective June 23, 2021.
Status of dependent in fact involves three factual elements: (1) Reliance on contributions of decedent for necessary living expenses, (2) a reasonable expectation that the contributions will continue, (3) an absence of sufficient means at hand for meeting these expenses; the first two are fixed at the time of injury and consequently the measure of dependence in Sec. 31-315 can change from that existing at the time of the injury only if there is a subsequent change in the financial resources of the claimant. 152 C. 481. Where commissioner found claimant was partial dependent at time of injury but subsequently received sufficient funds from other sources to supply her present necessities, commissioner correctly concluded that, although claimant was dependent in fact at time of injury, her “measure of dependence” had changed before the time of the hearing and consequently defendants were relieved from paying compensation to her unless and until she showed a further change in circumstances; an award to a dependent in fact as well as to a presumptive dependent is an award of compensation and subject to modification under Sec. 31-315. Id., 481, 482. Question of dependency is one of fact not subject to review unless ascertained through an illegal standard or based on no evidence. 156 C. 245. Cited. 187 C. 53; 206 C. 242; 207 C. 665; 208 C. 576. Elimination of waiting period not accorded retroactive application. 209 C. 219. Cited. 213 C. 54. Concurrent payment of benefits for death caused by heart disease under this section and benefits for permanent partial impairment of one's heart under Sec. 31-308(d) is prohibited. 217 C. 50. Cited. 219 C. 28; 223 C. 336; 224 C. 382; 229 C. 587; 232 C. 311. Employee, in settling claim, has the authority to compromise the compensation rights of dependents and a clear and unequivocal expression of intent to do so by the employee will bar a claim under section. 239 C. 19. Health insurance coverage is not considered “compensation”, and employer is not required to provide health insurance coverage to surviving dependent of deceased employee. 285 C. 778.
Cited. 3 CA 162; 21 CA 63; 32 CA 595; 34 CA 307; 37 CA 835; 38 CA 73; Id., 754; 43 CA 737; 44 CA 112. Testimony of even the most persuasive expert witness cannot be credited if it is not based on facts, and therefore decision of board affirming commissioner's award of benefits to widow reversed because there were insufficient subordinate facts to support medical witness's opinion that decedent's death was causally related to the compensable injury or to remove the cause of death from the realm of conjecture. 99 CA 336.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 206 C. 242. Subdiv. (2)(A) does not require Second Injury Fund to reimburse municipal employer for cost-of-living adjustments paid in connection with a claim for benefits under Heart and Hypertension Act in Sec. 7-433c, which benefits are special compensation and are not workers compensation benefits for purposes of reimbursement, and such a result does not deny employers a protected property interest without due process of law. 269 C. 763. Subdiv. (4): Superseding cause doctrine applies under Workers' Compensation Act, and board properly found that superseding events broke chain of proximate causation between decedent's compensable work injuries and his death. 305 C. 360.
Subdiv. (2)(A): Formula devised in 239 C. 676 for calculating cost of living increases to total disability benefits also applies to calculation of cost of living increases to survivors' benefits under Subdiv. from October 1, 1995, through June 30, 1998. 63 CA 370. Subdiv. (4): Decedent's death, which resulted from an accidental overdose of medication, is not compensable under section because there was no evidence to establish that decedent's depression and subsequent prescription for the medication which caused the overdose were related to his compensable injuries. 123 CA 18; judgment affirmed on alternate grounds, see 305 C. 360. Where decedent was a truck driver who was paid for his work, in material part, on the basis of the miles he drove for his employer, commissioner could not reasonably determine the significance of the state's relationship to or interest in that employment relationship as it relates to dependent benefits under Subsec. without making findings as to and considering the miles decedent drove to, through and back from the state in performing his assigned work; decision re dependent benefits under Subsec. may not be based on facts that are demonstrably irrelevant to the issue of whether the state had a sufficiently significant relationship with decedent's employment relationship with defendant. 145 CA 805.
Sec. 31-306a. Payments due children committed to the Commissioner of Social Services or the Commissioner of Children and Families.Notwithstanding any contrary provision in section 31-306, any compensation due on behalf of any presumptive dependent child under the provisions of said section, which child has been committed to the Commissioner of Social Services or the Commissioner of Children and Families as neglected or uncared for, shall be payable to the commissioner as legal guardian of the child less fees approved under subsection (b) of section 31-327.
(1967, P.A. 574, S. 1; P.A. 74-251, S. 12; P.A. 77-614, S. 521, 610; P.A. 91-32, S. 22, 41; P.A. 93-91, S. 1, 2; 93-262, S. 1, 87.)
History: P.A. 74-251 added reference to children committed to children and youth services commissioner; P.A. 77-614 replaced welfare commissioner with commissioner of human resources, effective January 1, 1979; P.A. 91-32 made technical changes; P.A. 93-91 substituted commissioner and department of children and families for commissioner and department of children and youth services, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 93-262 authorized substitution of commissioner and department of social services for commissioner and department of human resources, effective July 1, 1993.
Sec. 31-306b. Written notice of potential eligibility for death benefits. (a) Not later than thirty days after the date an employer or insurer discontinues paying weekly disability benefits to an injured employee under the provisions of this chapter due to the death of the injured employee, the employer or insurer shall send by registered or certified mail to the last address to which the injured employee's workers' compensation benefit checks were mailed, a written notice stating, in simple language, that dependents of the deceased employee may be eligible for death benefits under this chapter, subject to the filing and benefit eligibility requirements of this chapter.
(b) Not later than October 1, 1998, the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission shall develop a standard form that may be used by employers and insurers to provide the notice required under subsection (a) of this section.
(c) The failure of an employer or insurer to comply with the notice requirements of subsection (a) of this section shall not excuse a dependent of a deceased employee from making a claim for compensation within the time limits prescribed by subsection (a) of section 31-294c unless the dependent of the deceased employee demonstrates, in the opinion of the administrative law judge, that he was prejudiced by such failure to comply. Each dependent who, in the opinion of the administrative law judge, demonstrates that he was prejudiced by the failure of an employer or insurer to comply with the notice requirements of subsection (a) of this section shall be granted an extension of time in which to file a notice of claim for compensation with the deceased employee's employer or insurer pursuant to section 31-294c, but such extension shall not exceed the period of time equal to the interim between the end of the thirty-day period set forth in subsection (a) of this section and the date the notice required under said subsection was actually mailed.
(P.A. 98-104, S. 1; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; P.A. 22-89, S. 23.)
History: Pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” in Subsec. (c), effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 22-89 made a technical change in Subsec. (b), effective May 24, 2022.
Sec. 31-307. Compensation for total incapacity.(a) If any injury for which compensation is provided under the provisions of this chapter results in total incapacity to work, the injured employee shall be paid a weekly compensation equal to seventy-five per cent of the injured employee's average weekly earnings as of the date of the injury, calculated pursuant to section 31-310, after such earnings have been reduced by any deduction for federal or state taxes, or both, and for the federal Insurance Contributions Act made from such employee's total wages received during the period of calculation of the employee's average weekly wage pursuant to section 31-310; but the compensation shall not be more than the maximum weekly benefit rate set forth in section 31-309 for the year in which the injury occurred. No employee entitled to compensation under this section shall receive less than twenty per cent of the maximum weekly compensation rate, as provided in section 31-309, provided the minimum payment shall not exceed seventy-five per cent of the employee's average weekly wage, as determined under section 31-310, and the compensation shall not continue longer than the period of total incapacity.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, any employee who suffers any injury or illness caused by the employer's violation of any health or safety regulation adopted pursuant to chapter 571 or adopted by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration and listed in 29 CFR, Chapter XVII, after the violation has been cited in accordance with the provisions of section 31-375 or the provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1601 (1970), 29 USC 658 and not abated within the time fixed by the citation, provided the citation has not been set aside by appeal to the appropriate agency or court having jurisdiction, shall receive a weekly compensation equal to one hundred per cent of the employee's average weekly earnings at the time of the injury or illness.
(c) The following injuries of any person shall be considered as causing total incapacity and compensation shall be paid accordingly: (1) Total and permanent loss of sight of both eyes, or the reduction to one-tenth or less of normal vision; (2) the loss of both feet at or above the ankle; (3) the loss of both hands at or above the wrist; (4) the loss of one foot at or above the ankle and one hand at or above the wrist; (5) any injury resulting in permanent and complete paralysis of the legs or arms or of one leg and one arm; (6) any injury resulting in incurable imbecility or mental illness.
(d) An employee who has suffered the loss or loss of the use of one of the members of the body, or part of one of the members of the body, or the reduction of vision in one eye to one-tenth or less of normal vision, shall not receive compensation for the later injury in excess of the compensation allowed for the injury when considered by itself and not in conjunction with the previous incapacity except as provided in this chapter.
(1949 Rev., S. 7430; 1949, 1951, 1953, S. 3043d; 1957, P.A. 463, S. 2; 1958 Rev., S. 31-161; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 30; 1967, P.A. 842, S. 14; P.A. 78-360, S. 1; P.A. 80-124, S. 3; P.A. 82-455; P.A. 90-272, S. 1, 2; P.A. 91-32, S. 23, 41; 91-339, S. 26; P.A. 93-228, S. 16, 35; P.A. 06-84, S. 1.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1967 act increased compensation rate from 60% to 66.66% of average weekly earnings at time of injury and deleted references to normal vision “with glasses”; P.A. 78-360 authorized compensation at 75% rate where injury or illness caused by employer's violation of health or safety regulation has been cited and he has subsequently failed to abate violation; P.A. 80-124 specified that time of injury is date of incapacity to work as a result of disease in cases involving occupational diseases; P.A. 82-455 changed the minimum weekly benefit from $20 to 20% of the maximum weekly compensation rate, provided the minimum does not exceed 80% of the employee's average weekly wage; P.A. 90-272 increased the weekly compensation from 75% of the employee's weekly earnings to 100% for injury or illness caused by his employer's OSHA violations; P.A. 91-32 divided the existing section into Subsecs. (a) to (d), inclusive, and made technical changes; P.A. 91-339 changed the weekly compensation allowed in Subsec. (a) from 66.6% of average weekly earnings to 80% of average weekly earnings reduced by deductions for federal taxes and FICA; P.A. 93-228 amended Subsec. (a) to decrease weekly compensation allowed for total incapacity from 80% to 75% of injured employee's average weekly earnings, to require that state taxes be deducted in calculating such earnings, and to decrease maximum compensation allowed for minimum payment from 80% to 75% of employee's average weekly wage, and added Subsec. (e) to require that compensation for total incapacity be offset by Social Security retirement benefits, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 06-84 made technical changes in Subsecs. (a), (b) and (d) and deleted former Subsec. (e) re offset of amount of old age insurance benefits employee entitled to receive under Social Security Act against total incapacity workers' compensation payments, effective May 30, 2006.
If a one-eyed man lost his eye, he was entitled to compensation for total incapacity. 95 C. 354. Where plaintiff's labor is unmarketable, may substitute total incapacity. 110 C. 282. Cited. 112 C. 132; Id., 629. Compensation limited to 520 weeks including specific loss. 113 C. 707. Cited. 123 C. 194; Id., 513; 125 C. 564; 126 C. 495. Disability followed by specific indemnity and subsequent disability traceable to original injury, final disability compensable. 127 C. 294. Whether paid specific or total or partial compensation, discretionary with commissioner. 129 C. 591. Not in conjunction with previous incapacity. 130 C. 401. “Total incapacity to work” means not the employee's inability to work at his customary calling, but the destruction of his capacity to earn in that or any other occupation which he can reasonably pursue; if, though he can work, his physical condition is such that no one will employ him, he is just as much totally incapacitated as though he could not work at all. 135 C. 498. Where plaintiff has equal earning capacity in other work, but there is no other work because of business conditions, he is not totally incapacitated. 136 C. 514. Does not apply to partial incapacity. 137 C. 235. If, because of employee's injury, his labor becomes unmarketable, he is totally incapacitated. Id., 454. Since 1946 accident was an equal, concurrent and contributing cause of plaintiff's disability by reason of which compensation was paid in 1950, the award was properly predicated on statutory rate payable in 1950 rather than lower rate of 1946. 139 C. 338. Cited. 196 C. 104; Id., 529; 209 C. 59. Rule against double compensation prohibits concurrent payment of specific indemnity benefits for permanent partial impairment under Sec. 31-308(b) and benefits for total incapacity under this section as result of same incident. 217 C. 42. Cited. Id., 50; 218 C. 9; Id., 531; 219 C. 28. Special benefits under Sec. 5-142(a) are not an obstacle to greater recovery under this section. 220 C. 721. Cited. Id., 739; 221 C. 41; 226 C. 569; 227 C. 261; 231 C. 287. Injured employee's workers' compensation benefit rate to be determined in case of traumatic injury by reference to his earnings preceding the date on which he became incapacitated. Id., 529. Cited. 233 C. 14; 237 C. 71; 239 C. 676. Does not permit discontinuance of total disability benefits to incarcerated recipients. 261 C. 181. Benefits under this section are allowed for a subsequent disability if distinct from and due to a condition that is not a normal and immediate incident of the loss for which a claimant received benefits under Sec. 31-308(b). 294 C. 564. A determination that the estate of a deceased employee does not have standing to pursue workers' compensation benefits does not violate the right to redress guaranteed by article first, section 10 of the Connecticut constitution. 323 C. 26.
Cited. 7 CA 142; 16 CA 660; 25 CA 350; 26 CA 466; 27 CA 483; Id., 699. Benefits are calculated on wages on the date of incapacity to work rather than date of injury. 28 CA 226. Cited. 29 CA 559; 36 CA 298; 45 CA 324. Commissioner did not act improperly in finding plaintiff demonstrated a diminished earning capacity on basis of a 41% permanent partial disability of her master right arm, and, as such, was eligible to receive total incapacity benefits. 105 CA 669. Commissioner improperly considered plaintiff's refusal of surgery and reasonableness of treatment in making a determination of temporary total disability. 130 CA 672. Great weight is given to compensation review board's interpretation of Workers' Compensation Act and its opinion that no specific type of evidence is required for a worker's compensation commissioner to make a finding of total disability. 140 CA 542.
Cited. 9 CS 375; 38 CS 648. Benefits under Sec. 31-308(d) are payable contemporaneously with those under this statute. 39 CS 449.
Former Subsec. (e):
Is constitutional because legislature's goal of cost saving was legitimate and the offset is a rational means to achieve that goal. 263 C. 328. Applies whenever Social Security and total disability benefits are concurrent and does not violate equal protection because it does not discriminate against the totally disabled and has a rational basis in legislature's desire to cut costs. 281 C. 656.
Applies prospectively because it impacts substantive rights. 78 CA 472. Under 1997 revision, defendant is not entitled to a setoff from widow's benefits awarded under Sec. 31-306. 114 CA 822.
Sec. 31-307a. Cost-of-living adjustment in compensation rates. (a) The weekly compensation rate of each employee entitled to receive compensation under section 31-307 as a result of an injury sustained on or after October 1, 1969, and before July 1, 1993, which totally disables the employee continuously or intermittently for any period extending to the following October first or thereafter, shall be adjusted annually as provided in this subsection as of the following October first, and each subsequent October first, to provide the injured employee with a cost-of-living adjustment in his or her weekly compensation rate as determined as of the date of the injury under section 31-309. If the maximum weekly compensation rate as determined under the provisions of section 31-309, to be effective as of any October first following the date of the injury, is greater than the maximum weekly compensation rate prevailing as of the date of the injury, the weekly compensation rate which the injured employee was entitled to receive at the date of the injury or October 1, 1990, whichever is later, shall be increased by the percentage of the increase in the maximum weekly compensation rate required by the provisions of section 31-309 from the date of the injury or October 1, 1990, whichever is later, to such October first. The cost-of-living increases provided under this subsection shall be paid by the employer without any order or award from the administrative law judge. The adjustments shall apply to each payment made in the next succeeding twelve-month period commencing with the October first next succeeding the date of the injury.
(b) The weekly compensation rate of each employee entitled to receive compensation under section 31-307 as a result of an injury sustained prior to October 1, 1969, which has disabled the employee for a period extending to October 1, 1969, or thereafter shall be adjusted as of October 1, 1969, and annually thereafter, as provided in this subsection to provide the injured employee with a partial cost-of-living adjustment in his or her weekly compensation rate. The weekly compensation rate paid prior to October 1, 1969, to the injured employee shall be increased as of October 1, 1969, by the amount that the maximum weekly compensation rate as determined under section 31-309 to be effective for injuries sustained on or after October 1, 1969, is greater than the maximum weekly compensation rate as determined under section 31-309 to be effective for injuries sustained on or after October 1, 1965, or the date of the injury, whichever is later, but not more than fifteen dollars per week. Thereafter, increases, if any, for cost-of-living as provided in subsection (a) of this section shall be added to the amount of weekly compensation payable as of the date of the injury or October 1, 1990, whichever is later. The partial cost-of-living adjustments provided under this subsection shall be paid by the employer without any order or award from the administrative law judge. The adjustments shall apply to each payment made in the next twelve-month period, on or after October 1, 1969. The cost of the adjustments shall be paid by the employer or the employer's insurance carrier who shall be reimbursed therefor from the Second Injury Fund as provided in section 31-354 upon presentation of any vouchers and information that the Treasurer shall require. No claim for payment of retroactive benefits may be made to the Second Injury Fund more than two years after the date on which the employer or its insurance carrier paid such benefits in accordance with this subsection.
(c) On and after October 1, 1997, the weekly compensation rate of each employee entitled to receive compensation under section 31-307 as a result of an injury sustained on or after July 1, 1993, which totally incapacitates the employee permanently, shall be adjusted as provided in this subsection as of October 1, 1997, or the October first following the injury date, whichever is later, and annually on each subsequent October first, to provide the injured employee with a cost-of-living adjustment in his or her weekly compensation rate as determined as of the date of injury under section 31-309. If the maximum weekly compensation rate, as determined under the provisions of said section 31-309, to be effective as of any October first following the date of the injury, is greater than the maximum weekly compensation rate prevailing as of the date of injury, the weekly compensation rate which the injured employee was entitled to receive as of the date of injury shall be increased by the percentage of the increase in the maximum weekly compensation rate required by the provisions of said section 31-309 from the date of the injury to such October first. The cost-of-living adjustments provided under this subdivision shall be paid by the employer without any order or award from the administrative law judge. The adjustments shall apply to each payment made in the next succeeding twelve-month period commencing with October 1, 1997, or the October first next succeeding the date of injury, whichever is later. With respect to any employee receiving benefits on October 1, 1997, with respect to any such injury occurring on or after July 1, 1993, and before October 1, 1997, or with respect to any employee who was adjudicated to be totally incapacitated permanently subsequent to the date of his or her injury or is totally incapacitated permanently due to the fact that the employee has been totally incapacitated by such an injury for a period of five years or more, such benefit shall be recalculated to October 1, 1997, to the date of such adjudication or to the end of such five-year period, as the case may be, as if such benefits had been subject to recalculation annually under the provisions of this subsection. The difference between the amount of any benefits which would have been paid to such employee if such benefits had been subject to such recalculation and the actual amount of benefits paid during the period between such injury and such recalculation shall be paid to the dependent not later than December 1, 1997, or thirty days after such adjudication or the end of such period, as the case may be, in a lump-sum payment. The employer or the employer's insurer shall be reimbursed by the Second Injury Fund, as provided in section 31-354, for adjustments, including lump-sum payments, payable under this subsection for compensable injuries occurring on or after July 1, 1993, and before October 1, 1997, upon presentation of any vouchers and information that the Treasurer shall require. No claim for payment of retroactive benefits may be made to the Second Injury Fund more than two years after the date on which the employer or its insurance carrier paid such benefits in accordance with this subsection.
(1967, P.A. 842, S. 23, 24; 1969, P.A. 696, S. 5; P.A. 91-32, S. 24, 41; 91-339, S. 27; P.A. 93-228, S. 17, 35; P.A. 97-205, S. 4; P.A. 98-104, S. 3, 6; P.A. 05-199, S. 5; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: 1969 act rewrote previous provisions in greater detail and required presentation of vouchers etc. as required by treasurer rather than comptroller; P.A. 91-32 made technical changes; P.A. 91-339 amended Subsec. (a) to provide a cost of living adjustment based on the percentage of the increase in the maximum weekly compensation rate; P.A. 93-228 amended Subsec. (a) to eliminate cost-of-living adjustments for totally incapacitated employees injured on or after July 1, 1993, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 97-205 added new Subsec. (c) establishing cost-of-living adjustments for compensation received by totally incapacitated employees on and after October 1, 1997; P.A. 98-104 increased the annual cost-of-living adjustment on workers' compensation benefits paid to employees totally and permanently disabled by a work-related injury prior to October 1, 1990, effective July 1, 1998; P.A. 05-199 made technical changes and amended Subsecs. (b) and (c) to require claims for payment of retroactive benefits under subsections to be made to Second Injury Fund not more than two years after payment by employer or insurer, effective July 1, 2006; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021.
Cited. 239 C. 676.
Cited. 45 CA 324.
Subsec. (c):
P.A. 97-205, which reinstated cost-of-living-adjustments, also provided that fund, rather than employers and insurers, was responsible for paying such adjustments to qualified employees who sustained compensable injuries on or after July 1, 1993, and before October 1, 1997. 262 C. 416.
Sec. 31-307b. Benefits after relapse from recovery. Recurrent injuries. If any employee who receives compensation under section 31-307 returns to work after recovery from his or her injury and subsequently suffers total or partial incapacity caused by a relapse from the recovery from, or a recurrence of, the injury, the employee shall be paid a weekly compensation equal to seventy-five per cent of his or her average weekly earnings as of the date of the original injury or at the time of his or her relapse or at the time of the recurrence of the injury, whichever is the greater sum, calculated pursuant to section 31-310, after such earnings have been reduced by any deduction for federal or state taxes, or both, and for the federal Insurance Contributions Act made from such employee's total wages received during the period of calculation of the employee's average weekly wage pursuant to said section 31-310, but not more than (1) the maximum compensation rate set pursuant to section 31-309 if the employee suffers total incapacity, or (2) one hundred per cent, raised to the next even dollar, of the average weekly earnings of production and related workers in manufacturing in the state, as determined in accordance with the provisions of section 31-309, if the employee suffers partial incapacity, for the year in which the employee suffered the relapse or recurrent injury and the minimum rate under this chapter for that year, and provided (A) the compensation shall not continue longer than the period of total or partial incapacity following the relapse or recurrent injury and (B) no employee eligible for compensation for specific injuries set forth in section 31-308 shall receive compensation under this section. The employee shall also be entitled to receive the cost-of-living adjustment provided in accordance with the provisions of section 31-307a commencing on October first following the relapse or recurrent injury which disables him or her. If the injury occurred originally prior to October 1, 1969, the difference between the employee's original weekly compensation rate and the rate required by this section and the cost-of-living adjustment, if any, thereafter due shall be paid initially by the employer or the employer's insurance carrier who shall be reimbursed for such payment from the Second Injury Fund as provided by section 31-354 upon presentation of any vouchers and information that the Treasurer shall require. No claim for payment of retroactive benefits may be made to the Second Injury Fund more than two years after the date on which the employer or its insurance carrier paid such benefits in accordance with this section. In no event shall the employee receive more than the prevailing maximum compensation.
(1967, P.A. 842, S. 28; 1969, P.A. 696, S. 6; P.A. 79-376, S. 74; P.A. 91-32, S. 25, 41; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 91-12, S. 51; P.A. 93-228, S. 18, 35; P.A. 05-199, S. 6.)
History: 1969 act deleted reference to Sec. 31-306(b), deleted reference to “maximum” recovery from injury and set forth provisions re payments for cost-of-living adjustments; P.A. 79-376 added references to recurrent injuries; P.A. 91-32 made technical changes; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 91-12 changed the weekly compensation allowed under this section from 66.66% of average weekly earnings to 80% of average weekly earnings reduced by deductions for federal taxes and FICA, and provided for maximum compensation in the case of total and partial incapacity; P.A. 93-228 decreased weekly compensation benefits for relapse or recurrence of previous injury from 80% to 75% of employee's average weekly earnings and required that state taxes be deducted in calculating such earnings, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 05-199 made technical changes and required claims for payment of retroactive benefits under section to be made to Second Injury Fund not more than two years after payment by employer or insurer, effective July 1, 2006.
Claimant need only have recovered sufficiently to have returned to work with medical permission to be entitled to section's benefits on a relapse or recurrence of injury. 231 C. 529. Where claimant underwent surgery for both knees at same time for compensable, unrelated work injuries suffered at different times and covered by different carriers, workers' compensation commissioner had authority under section to order each carrier to make 50 per cent of claimant's total temporary total disability payments. 317 C. 33.
Sec. 31-307c. Compensation under agreements or awards effected prior to October 1, 1953. Any person who received compensation for total incapacity under a workers' compensation agreement or award effected prior to October 1, 1953, shall receive such compensation as was authorized by such agreement or award under section 31-307 or for not longer than the period of total disability, and shall be paid in addition thereto the cost-of-living adjustment provided for under subsection (b) of section 31-307a. The compensation authorized under this section, including the cost-of-living adjustment, shall be paid out of the Second Injury Fund provided for in section 31-354. Such compensation and cost-of-living adjustment shall be paid only for weeks of total disability existing or commencing on or after October 1, 1969.
(1967, P.A. 842, S. 30; 1969, P.A. 696, S. 7; P.A. 79-376, S. 45; P.A. 91-207, S. 4, 9.)
History: 1969 act specified applicability of cost-of-living adjustments; P.A. 79-376 replaced “workmen's compensation” with “workers' compensation”; P.A. 91-207 made a technical change in fund's name.
Sec. 31-308. Compensation for partial incapacity. (a) If any injury for which compensation is provided under the provisions of this chapter results in partial incapacity, the injured employee shall be paid a weekly compensation equal to seventy-five per cent of the difference between the wages currently earned by an employee in a position comparable to the position held by the injured employee before his injury, after such wages have been reduced by any deduction for federal or state taxes, or both, and for the federal Insurance Contributions Act in accordance with section 31-310, and the amount he is able to earn after the injury, after such amount has been reduced by any deduction for federal or state taxes, or both, and for the federal Insurance Contributions Act in accordance with section 31-310, except that when (1) the physician, physician assistant or advanced practice registered nurse attending an injured employee certifies that the employee is unable to perform his usual work but is able to perform other work, (2) the employee is ready and willing to perform other work in the same locality and (3) no other work is available, the employee shall be paid his full weekly compensation subject to the provisions of this section. Compensation paid under this subsection shall not be more than one hundred per cent, raised to the next even dollar, of the average weekly earnings of production and related workers in manufacturing in the state, as determined in accordance with the provisions of section 31-309, and shall continue during the period of partial incapacity, but no longer than five hundred twenty weeks. If the employer procures employment for an injured employee that is suitable to his capacity, the wages offered in such employment shall be taken as the earning capacity of the injured employee during the period of the employment.
(b) With respect to the following injuries, the compensation, in addition to the usual compensation for total incapacity but in lieu of all other payments for compensation, shall be seventy-five per cent of the average weekly earnings of the injured employee, calculated pursuant to section 31-310, after such earnings have been reduced by any deduction for federal or state taxes, or both, and for the federal Insurance Contributions Act made from such employee's total wages received during the period of calculation of the employee's average weekly wage pursuant to said section 31-310, but in no case more than one hundred per cent, raised to the next even dollar, of the average weekly earnings of production and related workers in manufacturing in the state, as determined in accordance with the provisions of section 31-309, or less than fifty dollars weekly. All of the following injuries include the loss of the member or organ and the complete and permanent loss of use of the member or organ referred to:
|
MEMBER |
INJURY |
WEEKS OF |
|
Arm |
||
|
Master arm |
Loss at or above elbow |
208 |
|
Other arm |
Loss at or above elbow |
194 |
|
Hand |
||
|
Master hand |
Loss at or above wrist |
168 |
|
Other hand |
Loss at or above wrist |
155 |
|
One leg |
Loss at or above knee |
155 |
|
One foot |
Loss at or above ankle |
125 |
|
Hearing |
||
|
Both ears |
104 |
|
|
One ear |
35 |
|
|
One eye |
||
|
Complete and permanent loss of sight in, or reduction of sight to one-tenth or less of normal vision |
157 |
|
|
Thumb* |
||
|
On master hand |
63 |
|
|
On other hand |
54 |
|
|
Fingers** |
||
|
First finger |
36 |
|
|
Second finger |
29 |
|
|
Third finger |
21 |
|
|
Fourth finger |
17 |
|
|
Toes*** |
||
|
Great toe |
28 |
|
|
Other toes |
9 |
|
|
Back |
Number of weeks which the proportion of incapacity represents to a maximum of 374 weeks |
|
|
Heart |
520 |
|
|
Brain |
520 |
|
|
Carotid artery |
520 |
|
|
Pancreas |
416 |
|
|
Liver |
347 |
|
|
Stomach |
260 |
|
|
Loss of bladder |
233 |
|
|
Speech |
163 |
|
|
Lung |
117 |
|
|
Cervical spine |
117 |
|
|
Kidney |
117 |
|
|
Rib cage |
Bilateral |
69 |
|
Ovary |
35 |
|
|
Testis |
35 |
|
|
Mammary |
35 |
|
|
Nose |
Sense and respiratory function |
35 |
|
Jaw |
Mastication |
35 |
|
Uterus |
35-104 |
|
|
Vagina |
35-104 |
|
|
Penis |
35-104 |
|
|
Coccyx |
Actual removal |
35 |
|
Sense of smell |
17 |
|
|
Sense of taste |
17 |
|
|
Spleen |
In addition to scar |
13 |
|
Gall bladder |
13 |
|
|
Tooth |
Minimum |
1 |
|
Loss of drainage duct of eye |
||
|
(If corrected by prosthesis) |
17 for each |
|
|
Loss of drainage duct of eye |
||
|
(If uncorrected by prosthesis) |
33 for each |
|
|
Pelvis |
percentage of back |
*The loss or loss of use of one phalanx of a thumb shall be construed as seventy-five per cent of the loss of the thumb.
**The loss or loss of use of one phalanx of a finger shall be construed as fifty per cent of the loss of the finger. The loss of or loss of use of two phalanges of a finger shall be construed as ninety per cent of the loss of the finger.
***The loss or loss of use of one phalanx of a great toe shall be construed as sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of the loss of the great toe. The loss of the greater part of any phalanx shall be construed as the loss of a phalanx and shall be compensated accordingly.
If the injury consists of the loss of a substantial part of a member resulting in a permanent partial loss of the use of a member, or if the injury results in a permanent partial loss of function, the administrative law judge may, in the administrative law judge's discretion, in lieu of other compensation, award to the injured employee the proportion of the sum provided in this subsection for the total loss of, or the loss of the use of, the member or for incapacity or both that represents the proportion of total loss or loss of use found to exist, and any voluntary agreement submitted in which the basis of settlement is such proportionate payment may, if otherwise conformable to the provisions of this chapter, be approved by the administrative law judge in the administrative law judge's discretion. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, the complete loss or loss of use of an organ which results in the death of an employee shall be compensable pursuant only to section 31-306.
(c) In addition to compensation for total or partial incapacity or for a specific loss of a member or use of the function of a member of the body, the administrative law judge, not earlier than one year from the date of the injury and not later than two years from the date of the injury or the surgery date of the injury, may award compensation equal to seventy-five per cent of the average weekly earnings of the injured employee, calculated pursuant to section 31-310, after such earnings have been reduced by any deduction for federal or state taxes, or both, and for the federal Insurance Contributions Act made from such employee's total wages received during the period of calculation of the employee's average weekly wage pursuant to said section 31-310, but not more than one hundred per cent, raised to the next even dollar, of the average weekly earnings of production and related workers in manufacturing in the state, as determined in accordance with the provisions of section 31-309, for up to two hundred eight weeks, for any permanent significant disfigurement of, or permanent significant scar on, (A) the face, head or neck, or (B) on any other area of the body which handicaps the employee in obtaining or continuing to work. The administrative law judge may not award compensation under this subsection when the disfigurement was caused solely by the loss of or the loss of use of a member of the body for which compensation is provided under subsection (b) of this section or for any scar resulting from an inguinal hernia operation or any spinal surgery. In making any award under this subsection, the administrative law judge shall consider (1) the location of the scar or disfigurement, (2) the size of the scar or disfigurement, (3) the visibility of the scar or disfigurement due to hyperpigmentation or depigmentation, whether hypertrophic or keloidal, (4) whether the scar or disfigurement causes a tonal or textural skin change, causes loss of symmetry of the affected area or results in noticeable bumps or depressions in the affected area, and (5) other relevant factors. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, no compensation shall be awarded for any scar or disfigurement which is not located on (A) the face, head or neck, or (B) any other area of the body which handicaps the employee in obtaining or continuing to work. In addition to the requirements contained in section 31-297, the administrative law judge shall provide written notice to the employer prior to any hearing held by the administrative law judge to consider an award for any scar or disfigurement under this subsection.
(d) Any award or agreement for compensation made pursuant to this section shall be paid to the employee, or in the event of the employee's death, whether or not a formal award has been made prior to the death, to his surviving spouse or, if he has no surviving spouse, to his dependents in equal shares or, if he has no surviving spouse or dependents, to his children, in equal shares, regardless of their age.
(1949 Rev., S. 7431; 1949, 1951, 1953, S. 3044d; 1957, P.A. 463, S. 3; 1958 Rev., S. 31-162; 1959, P.A. 580, S. 7; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 31; 1967, P.A. 842, S. 15; P.A. 75-48; P.A. 79-376, S. 75; P.A. 89-36; 89-346; P.A. 91-32, S. 26, 41; 91-339, S. 28; P.A. 93-228, S. 19, 35; P.A. 00-8; P.A. 12-197, S. 37; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; 21-196, S. 59.)
History: 1959 act replaced $45 maximum weekly benefit with reference to rate established by Sec. 31-309 (i.e. 55% of average production wage in state for year in which injury occurred raised to next even dollar, to be determined annually), raised minimum benefit from $15 to $20, added special provisions re loss of master hand and master thumb in Subdivs. (b) and (h) and allowed compensation for serious and permanent disfigurement of upper arms and legs below the knees; 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1967 act raised compensation rate from 60% to 66.66% of difference between average weekly earnings before injury and amount person can earn afterward, added exceptions re payment of full compensation, increased compensation period for loss of master arm from 296 to 312 weeks, for loss of master hand from 42 to 52 weeks and for loss of master thumb from 87 to 95 weeks, deleted reference to normal vision “with glasses”, added Subdiv. (m) re loss of use of the back, specified commissioners' discretionary powers, replaced reference to disfigurement of specific body parts with reference to disfigurement or scarring of any body part, specifically including scarring from hernial or spinal surgery and deleted limit of 780 weeks for compensation; P.A. 75-48 specified scarring from “inguinal hernia”; P.A. 79-376 divided section into Subsecs. and changed alphabetic Subdiv. indicators to numeric ones, used wages currently earned by employee in comparable position rather than incapacitated person's earnings at time of injury in calculating benefits, specified “significant” disfigurement or scarring and replaced “workmen's compensation” with “workers' compensation”; P.A. 89-36 raised minimum benefit from $20 to $50; P.A. 89-346 added Subsec. (e) providing for the payment of benefits in the event of an employee's death; P.A. 91-32 made technical changes; P.A. 91-339 changed the compensation formula in Subsecs. (a), (b) and (e) from 66.66% of average weekly earnings to 80% of average weekly earnings reduced by deductions for federal taxes and FICA, limited compensation to 100% of the average weekly production wage in Subsecs. (a), (b) and (e), provided that awards under Subsec. (e) shall not be made earlier than one year from the date of the injury, and added considerations to be made by the commissioner, notice requirements and provisions re discernible scars or disfigurements in Subsec. (e); P.A. 93-228 changed the compensation formula in existing Subsecs. (a), (b) and (e) from 80% to 75% of average weekly earnings less deductions for state and federal taxes and FICA, reduced maximum duration of temporary and permanent partial disability benefits provided under Subsecs. (a) and (b), modified the schedule of injuries listed in Subsec. (b), deleted Subsecs. (c) and (d) authorizing commissioner to make discretionary awards, relettering former Subsecs. (e) and (f) accordingly, amended relettered Subsec. (c) to prohibit commissioner from awarding scarring benefits later than two years from the injury or surgery date and for scar located on any area of the body other than the face, head or neck, unless it handicaps the employee in obtaining or continuing to work, and amended relettered Subsec. (d) to entitle a deceased employee's dependents to collect compensation due the deceased employee under an informal or formal agreement or award, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 00-8 amended Subsec. (b) to include injuries to ovary, uterus and vagina and to make technical changes; P.A. 12-197 amended Subsec. (a)(1) by adding provision allowing certification by an advanced practice registered nurse; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” and “commissioner's” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” and “administrative law judge's” respectively in Subsecs. (b) and (c), effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 21-196 amended Subsec. (a) by adding reference to physician assistants and making a technical change.
See Sec. 31-259(c) re withdrawals from Employment Security Administration Fund.
See Sec. 31-349 re compensation for second disability and payment of insurance for totally incapacitated persons.
May recover for total incapacity for a time, plus the specific award for subsequent amputation. 93 C. 19; 96 C. 37. May recover for total incapacity for a time plus partial incapacity for a further time resulting from the same accident, but not total and partial for the same period. 93 C. 22. Specific award for loss of a member bars claim for subsequent period exceeding the specific term. Id., 28. If loss of a member results in incapacity of another member, additional compensation may be allowed. 94 C. 628. So also if incapacity distinct from loss of the member and not a normal incident thereof. 99 C. 550. For incapacity naturally following amputation, only the statutory award for loss of the member can be given. 95 C. 300. Specific statutory award does not apply if the injury, because of prior disability, creates total incapacity. Id., 354. Statutory award for specified injury does not expire with employee's death. 100 C. 421. Injury caused partial loss of sight in one eye; prior defect in the other eye not to be considered. 104 C. 577. Payments after death go to dependents, not to administrators. 105 C. 305. Payments accrued during life go to administrator. Id., 400. Computation of partial loss of sight discussed. 106 C. 406. Hernia was compensable under 1927 act. 108 C. 309. Cited. 110 C. 284; 112 C. 132. Where evidence conflicting, amount of disability is question of fact for commissioner. Id., 432; 113 C. 532; Id., 747; 116 C. 707. Pending award for specific loss of second eye, claimant is entitled to total incapacity. 112 C. 627. Cited. 113 C. 707. “Inability to work” means inability to do customary work. 119 C. 556. Cited. 120 C. 285. Under former statute, “snap” not equivalent to feeling of pain when related to hernia. 123 C. 43. Loss of eye resulting from infection year after injury not causally connected with original injury. Id., 405. Cited. Id., 513. Inability to obtain work must exist because of defect which is personal to workman and a direct result of the injury. 125 C. 140. Specific indemnity starts on date maximum of improvement is reached even though total incapacity continues. Id., 563. When several years after total disability and specific indemnity payments for total loss of vision of one eye were completed eye had to be removed, final disability compensable. 127 C. 294. Cited. 128 C. 578. Evidence of pain accompanied by injury. Id., 608. Whether pay specific, or total or partial compensation is discretionary with commissioner. 129 C. 591. Cited. 130 C. 383; Id., 403. Commissioner has discretion to make award for partial incapacity rather than specific indemnity; award must be confined to such proportion of sum provided for incapacity as shall represent proportion of total loss or loss of use found to exist. 137 C. 228. “Average weekly earnings” defined; “amount he is able to earn thereafter” limited to employment in which he was injured or substitute employment. 145 C. 101. Award for disfigurement may be made even though claimant is unable to prove disfigurement likely to cause any loss of earnings or earning capacity; disfigurement, to be serious, must be of such character that it substantially detracts from appearance of person disfigured. 148 C. 87. Injury not excludable merely because it is not clinically or objectively demonstrable. 152 C. 214. Cited. 154 C. 1, 11. Under former section, phrase “legs below the knees”, as used in disfigurement provision of section, held not to include the feet. Id., 162. History discussed. Id., 164. Cited. 171 C. 577. A claim for disability, resulting from partial incapacity, under this statute, is not translatable into an initial claim for liability under Sec. 31-297(b) encompassing a “preclusion of defense” situation. 177 C. 107. Cited. 203 C. 34; 208 C. 576; Id., 709; 209 C. 59; Id., 808; 210 C. 580. Plain language of statute precludes recovery for surgical scars. 211 C. 116. Cited. Id., 166. Award of special benefits not precluded by provisions of Sec. 7-433c. 214 C. 181. Cited. Id., 189; Id., 394; Id., 552; 215 C. 206. Rule against double compensation prohibits concurrent payment of specific indemnity benefits for permanent partial impairment under section and benefits for total incapacity under Sec. 31-307 as a result of same incident. 217 C. 42. Concurrent payment of benefits for death caused by heart disease under Sec. 31-306 and benefits for permanent partial impairment of one's heart under this section is prohibited. Id., 50. Cited. 218 C. 9; Id., 19; Id., 531; 220 C. 721; Id., 739; 221 C. 29; Id., 920; 223 C. 376; 224 C. 8; 226 C. 569; 227 C. 261; 231 C. 287; Id., 529. Remedial nature of statute does not relieve plaintiff of burden of establishing all elements of claim by competent evidence. 294 C. 132. Employee's right to permanent partial disability benefits vests when employee reaches maximum medical improvement and does not depend on an affirmative request for such benefits; entitlement to permanent partial disability benefits for surviving spouse of a deceased employee vested when deceased employee reached maximum medical improvement and did not require that deceased employee make an affirmative request for such benefits. 299 C. 185. A determination that the estate of a deceased employee does not have standing to pursue workers' compensation benefits does not violate the right to redress guaranteed by article first, section 10 of the Connecticut constitution. 323 C. 26.
Cited. 12 CA 138; 15 CA 615; 21 CA 63; 25 CA 350; 26 CA 466; judgment reversed, see 227 C. 261; 27 CA 699; 28 CA 113; Id., 226; 29 CA 432; 34 CA 307; 39 CA 28; 40 CA 409; Id., 562. Test for determining whether particular conduct is a proximate cause of permanent partial loss of function is whether it was a substantial factor in producing the result; commissioner's conclusion that plaintiff's employment was not a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's permanent partial loss of function is conclusive, provided it is supported by competent evidence and is otherwise consistent with the law. 61 CA 131. Temporary partial disability benefits are available until the injured worker has reached maximum medical improvement. 114 CA 210.
The word “hand” does not include disfigurement of the forearm. 10 CS 470. Loss of function of reproductive and urinary members of the body are not further compensable under section. 13 CS 182. Cited. 38 CS 648. Benefits under statute are payable contemporaneously with those under Sec. 31-308(d). 39 CS 449. Payments under section are neither in lieu of wages nor based on loss of earnings; therefore are not includable as income for purpose of determining child support. 42 CS 34.
Subsec. (b):
Following the amendments in Sec. 19 of P.A. 93-228, Subsec. does not provide commissioner with discretion to award compensation for loss or permanent partial disability of an unscheduled body part or organ; Subsec. does not violate equal protection clauses of either fourteenth amendment to U.S. Constitution or Art. I, Sec. 20, of state constitution because it does not involve either a fundamental right or a suspect class, and because rational justification can be found for constructing a statute such that the loss or permanent partial disability of many organs and body parts is compensable, but permanent partial disability of the skin is not. 248 C. 793. Phrase “in addition to the usual compensation for total incapacity but in lieu of all other payments for compensation” was intended to prohibit double payment of permanency awards and to address case law precluding claimant suffering incapacity following a permanent disability from being able to thereafter collect total incapacity benefits. 263 C. 328. A claimant who undergoes a heart transplant is entitled to an indemnity award for permanent partial disability under Subsec. based on the rated function of claimant's new, transplanted heart and not for the total loss of claimant's native heart. 336 C. 654.
Sec. 31-308a. Additional benefits for partial permanent disability. (a) In addition to the compensation benefits provided by section 31-308 for specific loss of a member or use of the function of a member of the body, or any personal injury covered by this chapter, the administrative law judge, after such payments provided by said section 31-308 have been paid for the period set forth in said section, may award additional compensation benefits for such partial permanent disability equal to seventy-five per cent of the difference between the wages currently earned by an employee in a position comparable to the position held by such injured employee prior to his injury, after such wages have been reduced by any deduction for federal or state taxes, or both, and for the federal Insurance Contributions Act in accordance with section 31-310, and the weekly amount which such employee will probably be able to earn thereafter, after such amount has been reduced by any deduction for federal or state taxes, or both, and for the federal Insurance Contributions Act in accordance with section 31-310, to be determined by the administrative law judge based upon the nature and extent of the injury, the training, education and experience of the employee, the availability of work for persons with such physical condition and at the employee's age, but not more than one hundred per cent, raised to the next even dollar, of the average weekly earnings of production and related workers in manufacturing in the state, as determined in accordance with the provisions of section 31-309. If evidence of exact loss of earnings is not available, such loss may be computed from the proportionate loss of physical ability or earning power caused by the injury. The duration of such additional compensation shall be determined upon a similar basis by the administrative law judge, but in no event shall the duration of such additional compensation exceed the lesser of (1) the duration of the employee's permanent partial disability benefits, or (2) five hundred twenty weeks. Additional benefits provided under this section shall be available only to employees who are willing and able to perform work in this state.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, additional benefits provided under this section shall be available only when the nature of the injury and its effect on the earning capacity of an employee warrant additional compensation.
(1967, P.A. 842, S. 25; 1969, P.A. 696, S. 8; P.A. 79-376, S. 76; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 91-12, S. 52; P.A. 93-228, S. 20, 35; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: 1969 act changed amount of additional compensation benefits from the difference between employee's average weekly benefits and his probable weekly earnings after injury to two-thirds of that difference; P.A. 79-376 used wages currently earned by employee in comparable position to that of injured employee prior to injury rather than injured employee's average weekly wages as basis of computation; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 91-12 changed the additional compensation allowed under this section to 80% of the difference between wages currently earned in a comparable position prior to injury, reduced by deductions for federal taxes and FICA, and the weekly amount earned after the injury, reduced by deductions for federal tax and FICA, but not more than 100% of the average production wage; P.A. 93-228 designated existing language as Subsec. (a) and decreased amount of additional benefits available for permanent partial disability from 80% to 75% of difference between wages currently earned in a comparable position prior to injury, less deductions for state and federal taxes and FICA, and weekly amount earned after injury, less such deductions, and to place limitations on availability and duration of such additional benefits, and added Subsec. (b) to condition availability of additional benefits on nature of injury and its effect on employee's earning capacity, effective July 1, 1993; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” in Subsec. (a), effective October 1, 2021.
Cited. 223 C. 376; 231 C. 287; 237 C. 71. It appears that in calculating benefits, legislature was not concerned with a broad all-inclusive definition of “earnings”, but intended the formula to reflect the difference between actual wages claimant had earned from his employer before his injury and wages claimant would be able to earn after his injury. 270 C. 1. Because legislature has explicitly provided for an offset mechanism under either Sec. 5-169(g), which governs Tier I retirees, or Sec. 5-192p(d), which governs Tier II retirees, benefits awarded under this section need not be offset by claimant's receipt of state disability retirement benefits. Id., 32. When a prior disability is a substantial cause of the loss of earning capacity after a second disability, commissioner may consider both disability awards in determining entitlement to and duration of awards pursuant to section. 283 C. 257.
Cited. 40 CA 562; 42 CA 147. Statute does not specifically require claimant to seek employment to qualify for a discretionary award of benefits. 54 CA 289. Court accepts established policy of board and declines to adopt the “whole man” theory. Id., 296. Exclusion of regular retirement pension and Social Security benefits from calculation of award of additional benefits under statute proper and not violative of public policy by allowing double recovery. 82 CA 505.
Subsec. (a):
Use of word “are” evinces legislature's intent that claimant must presently fulfill “willing and able” requirement to receive benefits. 72 CA 611.
Subsec. (b):
Expressly restricts commissioner's authority to compensate even those employees who meet criteria in Subsec. (a). 72 CA 611. A specific medical assessment is not necessary under Subsec. to demonstrate reduced earning capacity and, in present case, there was sufficient evidence to support claim of diminution of earning capacity. 108 CA 370.
Sec. 31-308b. Dependency allowance.Section 31-308b is repealed.
(1967, P.A. 842, S. 22; 1969, P.A. 696, S. 9; P.A. 76-217; P.A. 80-284, S. 3; P.A. 91-32, S. 27, 31; 91-339, S. 52, 55.)
Sec. 31-309. Maximum weekly compensation. Determination of average weekly earnings of state workers and production and related workers in manufacturing. (a) Except as provided in section 31-307, the weekly compensation received by an injured employee under the provisions of this chapter shall in no case be more than one hundred per cent, raised to the next even dollar, of the average weekly earnings of all workers in the state as hereinafter defined for the year in which the injury occurred except that the weekly compensation received by an injured employee whose injury occurred before July 1, 1993, shall be computed according to the provisions of law in effect at the time of his injury. In the case of an occupational disease, the time of injury shall be the date of total or partial incapacity to work as a result of such disease.
(b) (1) The average weekly earnings of all workers in the state shall be determined by the Labor Commissioner on or before the fifteenth day of August of each year, to be effective the following October first, and shall be the average of all workers' weekly earnings for the year ending the previous June thirtieth and shall be so determined in accordance with the standards for the determination of average weekly earnings of all workers established by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(2) Prior to July 1, 1993, the Labor Commissioner shall determine the average weekly earnings of all workers in the state to be effective during the period July 1, 1993, to October 1, 1993.
(c) The average weekly earnings of production and related workers in manufacturing in the state shall be determined by the Labor Commissioner on or before the fifteenth day of August of each year, to be effective the following October first, and shall be the average of the manufacturing production and related workers' weekly earnings for the year ending the previous June thirtieth and shall be so determined in accordance with the standards for the determination of average weekly earnings of production and related workers in manufacturing established by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(1959, P.A. 580, S. 19; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 32; 1967, P.A. 842, S. 16; 1969, P.A. 696, S. 10; 1971, P.A. 371; P.A. 78-354, S. 1, 8; 78-360, S. 2; P.A. 79-483, S. 12; P.A. 80-124, S. 4; P.A. 87-547; P.A. 88-2, S. 1, 2; P.A. 91-339, S. 29; P.A. 93-228, S. 21, 35.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1967 act set maximum at 60% rather than 55% of average production wage in state for year in which injury occurred; 1969 act substituted “weekly earnings of production and related workers” for “production wage”; 1971 act raised percentage maximum to 66.66%; P.A. 78-354 raised percentage to 85% and added exception re employees injured before January 1, 1979; P.A. 78-360 added exception re Sec. 31-307; P.A. 79-483 raised percentage maximum to 100% except for those injured October 1, 1979; P.A. 80-124 specified that in cases of occupational disease, time of injury is date of total or partial inability to work as a result of disease; P.A. 87-547 increased maximum percentages to 150%; P.A. 88-2 replaced “1979” with “1987,” in provision re applicable injury date; P.A. 91-339 divided existing section into Subsecs. (a) and (b) and changed applicable date from October 1, 1987, to October 1, 1991; P.A. 93-228 amended Subsec. (a) to decrease maximum for persons injured on or after July 1, 1993, from 150% to 100% of state average weekly wage for all workers, inserted new Subsec. (b) to require labor commissioner to annually calculate average weekly earnings of all state workers as well as production and related workers, and redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c), effective July 1, 1993, except that Subdiv. (2) of Subsec. (b) effective June 30, 1993.
Rate applicable to volunteer firemen under Sec. 7-314a. 159 C. 53. Cited. 187 C. 363; 217 C. 42; 220 C. 739; 239 C. 676.
Cited. 38 CA 754; 40 CA 409.
Cited. 39 CS 449.
Subsec. (a):
Claimant's weekly compensation limit under Subsec. does not encompass lump-sum payment made pursuant to commutation award. 208 CA 615.
Sec. 31-310. Determination of average weekly wage of injured worker. Concurrent employment. Payments from Second Injury Fund. Publication of wage tables. (a) For the purposes of this chapter, the average weekly wage shall be ascertained by dividing the total wages received by the injured employee from the employer in whose service the employee is injured during the fifty-two calendar weeks immediately preceding the week during which the employee was injured, by the number of calendar weeks during which, or any portion of which, the employee was actually employed by the employer, but, in making the computation, absence for seven consecutive calendar days, although not in the same calendar week, shall be considered as absence for a calendar week. When the employment commenced otherwise than at the beginning of a calendar week, that calendar week and wages earned during that week shall be excluded in making the computation. When the period of employment immediately preceding the injury is computed to be less than a net period of two calendar weeks, the employee's weekly wage shall be considered to be equivalent to the average weekly wage prevailing in the same or similar employment in the same locality at the date of the injury except that, when the employer has agreed to pay a certain hourly wage to the employee, the hourly wage so agreed upon shall be the hourly wage for the injured employee and the employee's average weekly wage shall be computed by multiplying the hourly wage by the regular number of hours that is permitted each week in accordance with the agreement. For the purpose of determining the amount of compensation to be paid in the case of a minor under the age of eighteen who has sustained an injury entitling the employee to compensation for total or partial incapacity for a period of fifty-two or more weeks, or to specific indemnity for any injury under the provisions of section 31-308, the administrative law judge may add fifty per cent to the employee's average weekly wage, except in the case of a minor under the age of sixteen, the administrative law judge may add one hundred per cent to the minor's average weekly wage. When the injured employee is a trainee or apprentice receiving a subsistence allowance from the United States because of war service, the allowance shall be added to the injured employee's actual earnings in determining the average weekly wage. Where the injured employee has worked for more than one employer as of the date of the injury and the average weekly wage received from the employer in whose employ the injured employee was injured, as determined under the provisions of this section, are insufficient to obtain the maximum weekly compensation rate from the employer under section 31-309, prevailing as of the date of the injury, the injured employee's average weekly wages shall be calculated upon the basis of wages earned from all such employers in the period of concurrent employment not in excess of fifty-two weeks prior to the date of the injury, but the employer in whose employ the injury occurred shall be liable for all medical and hospital costs and a portion of the compensation rate equal to seventy-five per cent of the average weekly wage paid by the employer to the injured employee, after such earnings have been reduced by any deduction for federal or state taxes, or both, and for the federal Insurance Contribution Act made from such employee's total wages received from such employer during the period of calculation of such average weekly wage, but not less than an amount equal to the minimum compensation rate prevailing as of the date of the injury. The remaining portion of the applicable compensation rate shall be paid from the Second Injury Fund upon submission to the Treasurer by the employer or the employer's insurer of such vouchers and information as the Treasurer may require. For purposes of this subsection, the Second Injury Fund shall not be deemed an employer or an insurer for any claim brought on behalf of an insolvent insurer and shall be exempt from liability, unless such claim is brought not later than thirty days after a determination of such insurer's bankruptcy. No claim for payment of retroactive benefits may be made to the Second Injury Fund more than two years from the date on which the employer or its insurer paid such benefits in accordance with this subsection. In cases which involve concurrent employment and in which there is a claim against a third party, the injured employee or the employer in whose employ the injury was sustained or the employer's insurer shall advise the custodian of the Second Injury Fund if there is a third party claim, and the employee, employer or employer's insurer shall pursue its subrogation rights as provided for in section 31-293 and shall include in its claim all compensation paid by the Second Injury Fund and shall reimburse the Second Injury Fund for all payments made for compensation in the event of a recovery against the third party.
(b) Each August fifteenth, the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission, in consultation with the advisory board, shall publish tables of the average weekly wage and seventy-five per cent of the average weekly wage after being reduced by any deduction for federal or state taxes, or both, and for the federal Insurance Contributions Act, to be effective the following October first, except that not later than June thirtieth, the chairperson, in consultation with the advisory board, shall publish tables of the average weekly wage and seventy-five per cent of the average weekly wage after being reduced by any deduction for federal or state taxes, or both, and for the federal Insurance Contributions Act, to be effective during the period July 1, 1993, to October 1, 1993. Such tables shall be conclusive for the purpose of determining seventy-five per cent of the average weekly earnings of an injured employee after such earnings have been reduced by any deduction for federal or state taxes, or both, and for the federal Insurance Contributions Act made from such employee's total wages received during the period of calculation of the employee's average weekly wage for purposes of sections 31-306, 31-307 and 31-308.
(1949 Rev., S. 7432; 1949, S. 3045d; 1958 Rev., S. 31-163; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 33; 1967, P.A. 842, S. 17; 1969, P.A. 696, S. 11; 1971, P.A. 350, S. 1; P.A. 79-376, S. 77; P.A. 91-32, S. 28, 41; 91-339, S. 30, 55; P.A. 93-228, S. 22, 35; P.A. 95-277, S. 2, 19; P.A. 05-199, S. 7; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; P.A. 22-89, S. 24.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1967 act added provisions re calculation of and liability for compensation payments when injured employee worked for more than one employer; 1969 act expanded provisions added in 1967 to specify applicability to cases where wages at time of injury would not enable injured employee to receive maximum benefits, to change basis of calculation in such cases, to require that injured person receive at least minimum prevailing rate from employer and dependency allowance if he is totally incapacitated; 1971 act added provisions re third party claims; P.A. 79-376 substituted “worker” for “workman” and rephrased reference to Sec. 31-308; P.A. 91-32 made technical changes; P.A. 91-339 designated existing section as Subsec. (a), deleted provisions re dependency allowance, added provisions re submission of vouchers and information to the treasurer and added Subsec. (b) re average weekly wage tables; P.A. 93-228 amended Subsec. (a) to change the basis of calculation for an employee's average weekly wage from 26 to 52 weeks and amended Subsec. (b) to require the chairman of the workers' compensation commission to publish tables of 75%, rather than 80%, of the average weekly wage less deductions for state and federal taxes and for the federal Insurance Contributions Act, effective July 1, 1993, except that Subsec. (b) effective June 30, 1993; P.A. 95-277 amended Subsec. (a) to change portion of wages paid by the employer in whose employ the injury incurred from a “pro-rata” share to a portion equal to 75% of the “average weekly wage paid by him to the injured employee” after such earnings has been reduced by the applicable federal and state taxes and the federal Insurance Contribution Act and made technical corrections for clarity by substituting “insurer” for “insurance carrier”, effective July 1, 1995; P.A. 05-199 amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes, to provide that Second Injury Fund not be deemed an employer or insurer and be exempt from liability for claim brought by insolvent insurer unless claim brought not later than 30 days after determination of bankruptcy, and to require claims for payment of retroactive benefits under subsection to be made to Second Injury Fund not more than two years after payment by employer or insurer, effective July 1, 2006; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” in Subsec. (a), effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 22-89 made technical changes in Subsec. (b), effective May 24, 2022.
Construed. 95 C. 607. Applies if employee worked 2 weeks in all within the last 26, though not continuously. 98 C. 820. Basis of compensation is average wage 26 weeks before incapacity occurs, though not in employ of employer in whose service disease is contracted. 114 C. 24; 116 C. 193. When allowance for board and room is added to weekly wage. 114 C. 410. Cited. 121 C. 152. Determination of average wage on basis of allowance for truck and hourly rate. 124 C. 433. Average weekly wage. 126 C. 265; 129 C. 591. Prevailing wage in same locality. Id., 234. Working for more than one employer. 133 C. 215. Cited. 135 C. 500. “Prevailing” wage held to be the wage earned by part-time workers engaged for 1 day a week. 136 C. 107. Construed with Sec. 31-308 when employee holds two jobs. 145 C. 101. Industrial corporation employee who was member of volunteer fire department was not person who worked for more than one employer within meaning of section. 159 C. 53. Cited. 203 C. 34; 220 C. 721. Recovery of either salary benefits under Sec. 5-142(a) or workers' compensation benefits including right to receive concurrent employment benefits under this section discussed. Id., 739. Cited. 221 C. 356; 223 C. 911. Injured volunteer firefighters do not come within concurrent employment provisions of section. 224 C. 479. Injured employee's workers' compensation benefit rate to be determined in case of traumatic injury by reference to his earnings preceding the date on which he became incapacitated. 231 C. 529. Provides method for calculating average weekly wage of individual who was unemployed when disease manifested itself. 245 C. 66. “Wages” do not include insurance and pension benefits. 247 C. 126.
Cited. 12 CA 138; 29 CA 559; 44 CA 112; Id., 397. Formula to establish average weekly wage is clear and unambiguous, includes employee's part-time employment and does not include earnings from another part-time job during year prior to injury. 47 CA 628. Weeks for which an employee has received vacation pay, and was not physically at work, are to be included in the divisor of the formula calculating such employee's average weekly wage. 163 CA 362.
Cited. 5 CS 10. When plaintiff on “call” or “daily list”, held that each day is an independent contract of employment. Id., 49. Where part-time worker is injured, wages criterion is that of men similarly employed. 16 CS 30. Cited. Id., 164. Where apprentice employee was totally incapacitated, amount received as war service subsistence allowance was not to be computed as “amount he is able to earn”, thus classifying employee as partially incapacitated under Sec. 31-162. Id., 481.
Subsec. (b):
Applies only to those employees whose income is subject to deduction for contribution to FICA; because it would be inefficient and unduly burdensome to require case-by-case calculations of compensation rates, there is a rational basis for treating employees who contribute to FICA different from employees who do not contribute to FICA, and statute thus does not violate equal protection clauses of federal and state constitutions. 259 C. 783.
Sec. 31-310a. Average weekly wage of supernumerary policemen and volunteer police officers. (a) For purposes of compensation the average weekly wage of a supernumerary policeman shall be construed to be the average weekly earnings of production and related workers in manufacturing in the state as determined by the Labor Commissioner in accordance with the provisions of section 31-309.
(b) For the purposes of this section, compensation shall not be prorated because of other employment by a supernumerary policeman.
(c) For the purpose of determining compensation payable under this chapter for death, disability or injury incurred by volunteer police officers, the average weekly wage of such officers shall be the average production wage in the state as determined by the Labor Commissioner under the provisions of section 31-309.
(1969, P.A. 565, S. 1, 2; P.A. 79-376, S. 46; P.A. 91-32, S. 29, 41.)
History: P.A. 79-376 replaced “workmen's compensation” with “workers' compensation”; P.A. 91-32 made technical changes and added Subsec. (c), re average weekly wage to be considered for purposes of determining compensation.
Sec. 31-310b. Average weekly wage of General Assembly member. For purposes of workers' compensation the average weekly wage of a member of the General Assembly shall be construed to be the average weekly earnings of production and related workers in manufacturing in the state as determined by the Labor Commissioner in accordance with the provisions of section 31-309. For the purposes of this section, there shall be no prorating of benefits because of other employment by a member of the General Assembly.
(1972, P.A. 281, S. 3; P.A. 79-376, S. 47.)
History: P.A. 79-376 replaced “workmen's compensation” with “workers' compensation”.
Sec. 31-310c. Average weekly wage of worker with an occupational disease. For the purposes of this chapter, in the case of an occupational disease the average weekly wage shall be calculated as of the date of total or partial incapacity to work. However, in the case of an occupational disease which manifests itself at a time when the worker has not worked during the twenty-six weeks immediately preceding the diagnosis of such disease, the claimant's average weekly wage shall be considered to be equivalent to the greater of (1) the average weekly wage determined pursuant to section 31-310 and adjusted pursuant to section 31-307a or (2) the average weekly wage earned by the claimant during the fifty-two calendar weeks last worked by the claimant, which wage shall be determined in accordance with said section 31-310 and adjusted pursuant to said section 31-307a.
(P.A. 90-116, S. 8; P.A. 93-228, S. 23, 35.)
History: P.A. 93-228 amended Subdiv. (2) to base payment on wages earned during preceding 52 weeks, rather than 26 weeks, effective July 1, 1993.
Purpose and retroactive application. 245 C. 66. Calculation of benefits for surviving dependent spouse and estate of employee who died as result of occupational disease. Id., 88.
Cited. 44 CA 112.
Sec. 31-311. Replacement of artificial aids. Each employer subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be liable for the payment of damages accidentally sustained by an employee in the course of his employment to artificial legs, feet, arms or hands. Such payments shall consist of the cost of the replacement or repair of such artificial aid. The employer shall also repair or replace eyeglasses, contact lenses, hearing aids and artificial teeth, where damage to such eyeglasses, contact lenses, hearing aids and artificial teeth is accompanied by bodily injury about the face or head.
(1955, S. 3046d; 1958 Rev., S. 31-164; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 34; 1967, P.A. 842, S. 18; 1972, P.A. 171.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1967 act required that employer repair or replace artificial teeth; 1972 act required employer to repair or replace contact lenses and hearing aids.
Sec. 31-312. Compensation for time lost during and expense of medical treatment. Reimbursement of wages lost due to appearance at informal hearing. Payments to prevailing claimants in contested cases. Medical attention outside regular work hours. (a) An employee receiving medical attention under the provisions of this chapter and required to be absent from work for medical treatment, examination, laboratory tests, x-rays or other diagnostic procedures, and not otherwise receiving or eligible to receive weekly compensation, shall be compensated for the time lost from the job for required medical treatment and tests at the rate of such employee's average earnings, but not less than at the minimum wage established by law, provided the amount payable in any one week shall not exceed the employee's weekly compensation rate. Time lost from the job shall include necessary travel time from the plant to the place of treatment, the time for the treatment and any other time that is necessary for the treatment, examination or laboratory test. The employer shall furnish or pay for the transportation of the employee by ambulance or taxi where transportation is medically required from the point of departure for treatment and return. In all other cases, the employer shall furnish the employee transportation or reimbursement for the cost of transportation actually used, at a rate equal to the federal mileage reimbursement rate for use of a privately owned automobile set forth in 41 CFR Part 301-10.303, as from time to time amended, for a private motor vehicle or the cost incurred for public transportation, from the employee's point of departure, whether from the employee's home or place of employment, and return, if the employee is required to travel beyond a one-fare limit on an available common carrier from the point of departure to the place of treatment, examination or laboratory test. Where the medical attention or treatment is provided at a time other than during the employee's regular working hours and the employee is not otherwise receiving or eligible to receive weekly compensation, the employee shall be compensated for the time involved for the medical treatment as though it were time lost from the job at the rate of the employee's average hourly earnings and shall be paid for the cost of necessary transportation as provided in this subsection.
(b) When a claimant is given notice to appear at a conference or an informal hearing before an administrative law judge and does appear, he shall be entitled to reimbursement of wages lost by reason of the appearance if he is not then receiving compensation for the appearance as provided in this subsection. When liability or extent of disability is contested by formal hearing before the administrative law judge, the claimant shall be entitled, if he prevails on final judgment, to payment for services rendered him by a competent physician or surgeon for examination, x-ray, medical tests and testimony in connection with the claim, the administrative law judge to determine the reasonableness of the charges, and he shall be entitled to receive payment of one-fifth of the weekly compensation, as computed in accordance with section 31-310, for each day, or part thereof, that he is in attendance at the formal hearing if he is not then receiving compensation.
(c) No employer shall require any person receiving medical attention under the provisions of this chapter to receive such medical attention outside the person's regular work hours if such work hours overlap or coincide with the office hours of the treating physician.
(1959, P.A. 580, S. 9; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 35; 1969, P.A. 696, S. 12; 1971, P.A. 474; P.A. 79-376, S. 48; P.A. 80-10; P.A. 91-32, S. 30, 41; P.A. 01-33; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1969 act expanded and clarified employer's responsibility to furnish or pay for transportation, replacing previous provision which simply stated that costs for travel “outside the one fare limit from the plant to the place of treatment and return shall be borne by the employer and shall not be included in the maximum limit set forth above”; 1971 act added Subsec. (b) prohibiting employer from requiring treatment to occur outside injured employee's regular work hours; P.A. 79-376 replaced “workmen's compensation” with “workers' compensation”; P.A. 80-10 increased transportation allowance from $0.10 to $0.15 per mile; P.A. 91-32 made technical changes, added new Subsec. (b) re claimant's right to reimbursement for certain expenses and redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c); P.A. 01-33 amended Subsec. (a) by changing the mileage reimbursement rate from $0.15 per mile to a rate equal to the federal mileage reimbursement rate for use of a privately owned automobile and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” in Subsec. (b), effective October 1, 2021.
Sec. 31-313. Transfer to suitable work during period of treatment or rehabilitation or because of physical incapacity. Civil penalty for failure of employer to comply. (a)(1) Where an employee has suffered a compensable injury which disables him from performing his customary or most recent work, his employer at the time of such injury shall transfer him to full-time work suitable to his physical condition where such work is available, during the time that the employee is subjected to medical treatment or rehabilitation or both and until such treatment is discontinued on the advice of the physician conducting the same or of the therapist in charge of the rehabilitation program or until the employee has reached the maximum level of rehabilitation for such worker in the judgment of the administrative law judge under all of the circumstances, whichever period is the longest. (2) The administrative law judge shall conduct a hearing upon the request of an employee who claims his employer has not transferred him to such available suitable work. Whenever the administrative law judge finds that the employee is so disabled, and that the employer has failed to transfer the employee to such available suitable work, he shall order the employer to transfer the employee to such work.
(b) The administrative law judge shall conduct a hearing upon the request of an employee claiming to be unable to perform his customary or most recent work because of physical incapacity resulting from an injury or disease. Whenever the administrative law judge finds that the employee has such a physical incapacity, he shall order that the injured worker be removed from work detrimental to his health or which cannot be performed by a person so disabled and be assigned to other suitable full-time work in the employer's establishment, if available; provided the exercise of this authority shall not conflict with any provision of a collective bargaining agreement between such employer and a labor organization which is the collective bargaining representative of the unit of which the injured worker is a part.
(c) Whenever the administrative law judge finds that an employer has failed to comply with the transfer requirements of subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section, or has failed to comply with any transfer order issued by him pursuant to this section, he may assess a civil penalty of not more than five hundred dollars against the employer. Any appeal of a penalty assessed pursuant to this subsection shall be taken in accordance with the provisions of section 31-301. Any penalties collected under the provisions of this subsection shall be paid over to the Second Injury Fund or its successor.
(1959, P.A. 580, S. 10; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 36; 1967, P.A. 842, S. 26; P.A. 79-376, S. 78; P.A. 83-65; P.A. 86-166; P.A. 91-207, S. 5, 9; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: 1961 act replaced previous provisions entirely; 1967 act increased weekly payments for rehabilitation treatments from $15 to $40 and added Subsec. (b) re reassignment of employees to different work positions; P.A. 79-376 specified that employee be transferred or reassigned to “full-time” suitable work in Subsecs. (a) and (b) and substituted “worker” and “workers' compensation” for “workman” and “workmen's compensation”; P.A. 83-65 amended Subsec. (a) to remove the provisions for compensation of $40 per week for rehabilitation treatments and to remove the requirement that the commissioners establish rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this section and compile a list of available in-state rehabilitation facilities; P.A. 86-166 amended Subsecs. (a) and (b) to specifically provide that the commissioner shall conduct a hearing to determine if a job transfer or assignment is necessary, and to issue an order for the employer to do so and added Subsec. (c), establishing a civil penalty for employers who fail to comply with the transfer requirements; P.A. 91-207 made a technical change to fund's name in Subsec. (c) ; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” throughout, effective October 1, 2021.
Cited. 16 CA 437; 24 CA 362.
Sec. 31-314. Allowance for advance payments.In fixing the amount of any compensation under this chapter, due allowance shall be made for any sum which the employer has paid to any injured employee or to his dependents on account of the injury, except such sums as the employer has expended or directed to be expended for medical, surgical or hospital service.
(1949 Rev., S. 7433; 1958 Rev., S. 31-165; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 37.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions.
Payment to employee not deductible from amount due to dependent for his subsequent death. 93 C. 159. “Payments made on account of” means those payments paid on credit, or in advance of, any sums that subsequently become payable by employer. 270 C. 1.
Sec. 31-315. Modification of award or voluntary agreement. Any award of, or voluntary agreement concerning, compensation made under the provisions of this chapter or any transfer of liability for a claim to the Second Injury Fund under the provisions of section 31-349 shall be subject to modification in accordance with the procedure for original determinations, upon the request of either party or, in the case of a transfer under section 31-349, upon request of the custodian of the Second Injury Fund, whenever it appears to the administrative law judge, after notice and hearing thereon, that the incapacity of an injured employee has increased, decreased or ceased, or that the measure of dependence on account of which the compensation is paid has changed, or that changed conditions of fact have arisen which necessitate a change of such agreement, award or transfer in order properly to carry out the spirit of this chapter. The administrative law judge shall also have the same power to open and modify an award as any court of the state has to open and modify a judgment of such court. The administrative law judge shall retain jurisdiction over claims for compensation, awards and voluntary agreements, for any proper action thereon, during the whole compensation period applicable to the injury in question.
(1949 Rev., S. 7434; 1958 Rev., S. 31-166; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 38; P.A. 95-277, S. 11, 19; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 95-277 amended the section to include any transfer of liability for a claim to the Second Injury Fund and allowed for its modification upon request of the custodian of the fund, effective July 1, 1995; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “compensation commissioner” and “commissioner” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021.
Power of commissioner to modify award. 94 C. 625; 95 C. 298; 97 C. 83; Id., 335. Modification because disability has ceased may be retroactive to the date when it ceased. 108 C. 36. No bar that the controlling facts were known to claimant and might have been presented in the former hearing. 95 C. 356; 97 C. 76, 84. Aliter in case of long continued negligence of moving party. 100 C. 185. Power to open corresponds to that of a court during the term. 98 C. 741. But this is only as to the change of facts named in section. 100 C. 185; 103 C. 704. Employer may claim revision as well as employee. 97 C. 332. Death of employee after award does not entitle employer to retry the question of liability. 103 C. 705; 105 C. 419. Commissioner may open award because he misunderstood the facts. 106 C. 92. Can open only on the motion of person entitled to claim revision. 101 C. 113. Procedure on petition to open award. 94 C. 626; 106 C. 5. Having opened award, commissioner may try it de novo. 97 C. 84. May determine who shall receive payments after employee's death. 100 C. 419. No right of appeal from denial of motion to reopen and rehear unless commissioner exceeds limits of legal discretion. 112 C. 333. As to power to reopen. 109 C. 601; 128 C. 1; Id., 284; Id., 574. Motion to reopen should follow terminology of statute. 113 C. 747; 126 C. 522. Reopening rests largely within discretion of commissioner. 119 C. 170; Id., 522. No power to reopen to correct mistake of law. 116 C. 1. When it is error in refusing to reopen. 112 C. 333; 113 C. 282. If question of law involved, decision subject to appeal. Id., 262. Cited. 110 C. 285; 111 C. 403; 113 C. 172; 114 C. 395; 116 C. 229; 120 C. 284. Voluntary agreement may be modified if fraud shown. 121 C. 149. Cited. 126 C. 494; 127 C. 297. Powers of commissioner under section. 129 C. 591. Cited. 130 C. 665; 132 C. 172. Power of commissioner to open award. 134 C. 269. Commissioner was justified in treating plaintiff's motion as one for a new trial rather than for a modification of award. 136 C. 340. Denial of a motion to reopen award is proper subject of a separate appeal; motion to reopen on ground of mistake denied. Id., 361. Cited. 137 C. 187; Id., 487. Status of dependent in fact involves three factual elements: (1) Reliance on contributions of decedent for necessary living expenses, (2) a reasonable expectation that the contributions will continue, (3) an absence of sufficient means at hand for meeting these expenses; the first two are fixed at the time of injury and consequently the measure of dependence in section can change from that existing at the time of injury only if there is a subsequent change in the financial resources of claimant. 152 C. 481. Where commissioner found claimant was partial dependent at time of injury but subsequently received sufficient funds from other sources to supply her present necessities, commissioner correctly concluded that, although claimant was dependent in fact at the time of injury, her “measure of dependence” had changed before the time of the hearing and consequently defendants were relieved from paying compensation to her unless and until she showed a further change in circumstances; award to a dependent in fact as well as to a presumptive dependent is award of compensation and subject to modification. Id., 481, 482. Trial court was in error in admitting testimony of draftsman of agreement made under Sec. 31-296 which was clear and unambiguous on its face as only commissioner could open and modify award. 157 C. 538. Cited. 159 C. 302; 177 C. 107; 206 C. 242; 210 C. 423; 212 C. 441; 219 C. 28; 221 C. 905; 226 C. 569; 231 C. 469. Authority to modify otherwise final awards does not authorize modifications based on changes of law. 244 C. 1. A motion to open or modify was not required under section because commissioner and parties considered application for total incapacity benefits to be the equivalent of such a motion, commissioner applied the applicable standard, there was no showing of prejudice to defendants, and it would violate public policy to deny benefits because of a failure to frame application for total incapacity benefits as a motion to open or modify. 294 C. 564. Commissioner did not have authority to void agreement pursuant to section; discovery that police department was not organized under Sec. 7-274 was not a changed condition of fact but mistake of law not within scope of this section. 296 C. 352.
Cited. 26 CA 194; 28 CA 536; 37 CA 648; 45 CA 324. Commissioner lacked authority to modify award because statute does not authorize modifications based on a new interpretation of law and therefore lacked authority to recalculate plaintiff's benefits. 55 CA 789. Commissioner did not have authority to grant Second Injury Fund equitable relief under section to open approved stipulation and schedule approval hearing because there was no evidence that fund was prevented from making a defense by fraud, accident, mistake, surprise or improper management of opposite party. 66 CA 332. Under section, commissioner has same power as a court to open and modify an award. 75 CA 591.
Sec. 31-316. Employer to record and report employees' injuries and report insurance coverage or welfare plan payments provided to employees. Increased award due to employer's failure to file. (a) Each employer shall keep a record of the injuries sustained by his employees in the course of their employment that result in incapacity for one day or more. Each employer shall send to the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission, in duplicate, each week, or more often if so directed, a report of all injuries that the rules prescribed by the chairperson determine, including the time of each injury, together with notices of claims for compensation that have been served upon the employer under section 31-294c, within one week of the receipt of the notices of claims. The employer shall inform the chairperson as to the extent to which he provides accident and health insurance and life insurance coverage for his employees, and his payment or contribution requirements for any employee welfare plan, as defined in section 31-284b. No other report of injuries to employees shall be required by any department or office of the state from employers. The duplicates of the reports shall be immediately transmitted to the Labor Commissioner.
(b) Upon determining that the employer or the employer's representative failed to report injuries as required by subsection (a) of this section, the administrative law judge may increase the award for compensation for the employee's injuries proportionate to the prejudice that the employee sustained due to the employer's failure to file.
(1949 Rev., S. 7441; 1958 Rev., S. 31-167; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 39; P.A. 82-398, S. 4; P.A. 85-32; P.A. 91-32, S. 31, 41; 91-339, S. 31; P.A. 96-267, S. 29; P.A. 08-3, S. 2; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; P.A. 22-89, S. 25.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 82-398 required the employer to inform the commissioner as to the insurance coverage and welfare fund payments he provides for his employees and required that injury reports include “time of each injury”; P.A. 85-32 provided that the reports concerning injuries, insurance coverage and employee welfare fund payments shall be sent by each employer to the chairman of the board of compensation commissioners; P.A. 91-32 made technical changes; P.A. 91-339 changed “board of compensation commissioners” to “workers' compensation commission” and changed “employee welfare fund” to “employee welfare plan”; P.A. 96-267 added Subsec. (b) to allow the commissioner to increase an employee's award proportionate to prejudice caused by an employer's failure to report injuries as required; P.A. 08-3 amended Subsec. (b) by adding “or the employer's representative”; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “workers' compensation commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 22-89 made technical changes in Subsec. (a), effective May 24, 2022.
See Sec. 31-40 re required reporting of serious accidents in establishments or work places.
Cited. 109 C. 469; 122 C. 192.
Sec. 31-317. Claims against the state. Section 31-317 is repealed.
(1949 Rev., S. 7443; 1958 Rev., S. 31-169; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 40; P.A. 81-469, S. 3, 8; P.A. 91-32, S. 40, 41.)
Sec. 31-318. Action for minor or mentally incompetent person. When any employee affected by the provisions of this chapter or any person entitled to compensation thereunder is a minor or mentally incompetent, his parent or duly appointed guardian may, on his behalf, perform any act or duty required or exercise any right conferred by the provisions of this chapter with the same effect as if such person were legally capable to act on his own behalf and had so acted. The administrative law judge may, for just cause shown, authorize or direct the payment of compensation directly to a minor or to some person nominated by the minor and approved by the administrative law judge, which person shall act on behalf of such minor.
(1949 Rev., S. 7456; 1958 Rev., S. 31-184; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 44; P.A. 10-32, S. 105; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 10-32 made technical changes, effective May 10, 2010; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021.
Minor illegally employed is under act. 131 C. 157.
Sec. 31-319. Fees to be approved.Section 31-319 is repealed.
(1949 Rev., S. 7457; 1958 Rev., S. 31-185; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 45; 1969, P.A. 556, S. 2; P.A. 88-357, S. 20; P.A. 89-371, S. 23; P.A. 91-32, S. 40, 41.)
Sec. 31-320. Exemption and preference of compensation.All sums due for compensation under the provisions of this chapter shall be exempt from attachment and execution and shall be nonassignable before and after award. The rights of compensation granted by this chapter, reckoned at their present value, shall have the same preference against the assets of an insolvent employer as may be allowed by law to a claim for the unpaid wages of workers earned within three months.
(1949 Rev., S. 7458; 1958 Rev., S. 31-186; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 46; P.A. 79-376, S. 49.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 79-376 substituted “workers” for “workmen”.
See Sec. 33-896 et seq. re judicial dissolution of a stock corporation and appointment of receiver or custodian.
See Sec. 52-512 re wages as preferred claim.
Cited. 224 C. 8.
Defendant's award could be garnished by welfare commissioner in action for reimbursement of funds expended for care and maintenance of defendant's family; purpose of exemption statute is to provide support money to claimant and his dependents. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 69.
Sec. 31-321. Manner of serving notices. Unless otherwise specifically provided, or unless the circumstances of the case or the rules of the commission direct otherwise, any notice required under this chapter to be served upon an employer, employee, administrative law judge or the chairperson shall be by written or printed notice, service personally or by registered or certified mail addressed to the person upon whom it is to be served at the person's last-known residence or place of business. Notices on behalf of a minor shall be given by or to such minor's parent or guardian or, if there is no parent or guardian, then by or to such minor.
(1949 Rev., S. 7459; 1958 Rev., S. 31-187; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 47; P.A. 10-32, S. 106; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; P.A. 22-89, S. 4.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 10-32 made technical changes, effective May 10, 2010; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 22-89 added reference to chairperson, effective May 24, 2022.
Cited. 226 C. 508. Strict compliance with statutory methods of service under section is necessary to constitute meaningful notice under Sec. 31-301(a); commission's failure to comply strictly with statutorily prescribed methods of notice and service under section will not trigger party's obligation to file appeal under Sec. 31-301(a). 263 C. 279.
Cited. 3 CA 162; 29 CA 441; 30 CA 295; 45 CA 199. Does not expressly provide for notice to claimants who are not employees or dependents; notice to last-known address of decedent employee, which was also claimants' address, was adequate. 63 CA 1. Section governs the manner in which notice is to be served when required under act, but does not independently require workers' compensation insurance providers to provide notice in any particular circumstance. 121 CA 144. Sending notice to contest liability to employee by certified mail meets requirements, despite employee's failure to claim it. 138 CA 826. Neither section nor form 43 contain any language that permits the filing of form 43 by facsimile transmission to the commission, rather, both section and form require that form be filed either in person, by registered mail or by certified mail. 190 CA 623.
Sec. 31-322. Injuries received in interstate commerce.Section 31-322 is repealed.
(1949 Rev., S. 7460; 1958 Rev., S. 31-188; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 48; P.A. 91-32, S. 40, 41.)
Sec. 31-323. Attachments to secure payment of compensation. When any person presents in writing to the administrative law judge a claim for compensation, either for injury sustained by such person arising out of and in the course of his or her employment or for injury resulting in the death of some person of whom such person is an alleged dependent, or when it appears to the administrative law judge that the claim may require payment from the Second Injury Fund, such person or the Second Injury Fund, as the case may be, may ask that a writ of attachment issue to secure the payment of the claim or claims for compensation or for reimbursement for payments made or to be made by the Second Injury Fund. Unless it appears from the records of the administrative law judge that there has been a compliance with the provisions of section 31-284, which compliance is then effective, or that the Insurance Commissioner has approved a substitute system of compensation, benefit and insurance, the administrative law judge may issue a writ of attachment in the manner and form of writs of attachment in civil actions and shall be vested with the same jurisdiction as authorities authorized to issue writs of attachment in civil actions. If a writ is issued under this section and thereafter it appears to the satisfaction of the administrative law judge that there has been a compliance with the provisions of section 31-284, which compliance was then effective and applicable to the injury in question, or that the Insurance Commissioner has approved a substitute system of compensation, benefit and insurance, the administrative law judge may vacate the writ of attachment on the payment by the employer of the expense actually incurred under such writ of attachment. The administrative law judges are vested with the authority of the various courts to dissolve attachments made under this section and, on the dissolution of an attachment, may require the substitution of a bond in the same manner as any court upon the dissolution of attachments in civil actions.
(1949 Rev., S. 7463; 1958 Rev., S. 31-190; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 49; P.A. 91-32, S. 32, 41; P.A. 12-77, S. 1; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 91-32 made technical changes and added provisions re approval of substitute compensation system by the insurance commissioner; P.A. 12-77 added provisions re issuance of a writ of attachment when it appears to commissioner that claim may require payment from Second Injury Fund and made technical changes; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” and “commissioners” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” and “administrative law judges” respectively, effective October 1, 2021.
Cited. 112 C. 377; 169 C. 646.
Sec. 31-324. Reservation of cases for the Appellate Court. When, in any case arising under the provisions of this chapter, the Compensation Review Board is of the opinion that the decision involves principles of law which are not free from reasonable doubt and which public interest requires shall be determined by the Appellate Court, in order that a definite rule be established applicable to future cases, said Compensation Review Board may, on its own motion and without any agreement or act of the parties or their counsel, reserve such case for the opinion of the Appellate Court. Upon a reservation so made, no costs shall be taxed in favor of either party, and no entry fee, record fee, judgment fee or other clerk's fee in either court shall be taxed. Upon the filing of such a reservation, the question shall come before the Appellate Court as though an appeal had been taken, and said court shall thereupon reserve the case for the opinion of the Supreme Court in the manner herein indicated; but if, in the opinion of the Appellate Court, the principles of law involved in the decision are in fact free from reasonable doubt and the public interest does not in fact require that they be determined by the Supreme Court, the Appellate Court may, in its discretion, hear and determine the controversy as in other cases.
(1949 Rev., S. 7464; 1958 Rev., S. 31-191; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 50; P.A. 74-338, S. 51, 94; P.A. 76-436, S. 622, 681; P.A. 79-540, S. 7; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29, S. 31, 82; P.A. 91-339, Sec. 32, 55.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 74-338 replaced superior court with court of common pleas; P.A. 76-436 replaced court of common pleas with superior court, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 79-540 replaced superior court with compensation review division and supreme court with appellate session of superior court for purposes of section and deleted provisions re pro forma awards where commissioner believes a doubtful question of law is involved which public interest requires to be be finally and definitely determined; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29 deleted reference to appellate session of the superior court and added reference to appellate court; P.A. 91-339 changed “compensation review division” to “compensation review board”.
Cited. 94 C. 262; 95 C. 609. Effect of a pro forma award and function of an appeal. 116 C. 219. In absence of judgment, there can be no appeal to Supreme Court. 123 C. 102. Reservation can be made without any appeal or judgment when facts are not in dispute. 138 C. 620. Cited. 150 C. 154; 159 C. 53. Reservation from Court of Common Pleas and not Superior Court is the proper procedure to follow; reservation from Superior Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 168 C. 84. Cited. 213 C. 54; 232 C. 758.
Cited. 2 CA 363; 36 CA 150.
Cited. 8 CS 313.
Sec. 31-325. Acknowledgment by employees having certain physical conditions.Section 31-325 is repealed, effective June 29, 1995.
(1949 Rev., S. 7465; 1949, S. 3051d; 1958 Rev., S. 31-192; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 51; 1967, P.A. 842, S. 19; 1971, P.A. 336; P.A. 79-376, S. 79; P.A. 91-32, S. 33, 41; P.A. 95-277, S. 18, 19.)
Sec. 31-326. Proceedings against delinquent insurance companies or employers. Whenever the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission finds that any insurance company or association insuring the liability of an employer under the provisions of this chapter is conducting such business improperly or is dilatory in investigating and adjusting claims or making payments, or fails to comply with the provisions of this chapter or the rules, methods or procedure and forms adopted by the chairperson, the chairperson shall notify the Insurance Commissioner, in writing, setting forth the facts, and thereupon the Insurance Commissioner shall fix a time and place for a hearing thereon, giving reasonable notice to the chairperson and to such company or association of such hearing, and, if he finds the allegations to be true, he shall either suspend for a time or revoke the license of such company or association to transact such business in this state. Whenever an administrative law judge has reason to believe that any employer who has furnished proof of his financial ability or filed with the Insurance Commissioner security for the performance of the obligations of this chapter in accordance with section 31-284 is dilatory in investigating or adjusting claims or in making payments, or fails to comply with the provisions of this chapter or the rules, methods of procedure and forms adopted by the chairperson, he may notify the Insurance Commissioner, in writing, setting forth the facts, and thereupon the Insurance Commissioner shall fix the time and place for a hearing thereon, giving reasonable notice to the administrative law judge and to such employer, and, if he finds the allegations to be true, then, after ten days from the notice of such findings to such employer, the compliance of such employer with the terms of section 31-284 shall be, as to any future injuries, null and void.
(1949 Rev., S. 7466; 1958 Rev., S. 31-193; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 52; P.A. 77-614, S. 163, 610; P.A. 80-482, S. 205, 348; P.A. 91-339, S. 33, 55; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; P.A. 22-89, S. 26.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 77-614 made insurance department a division within the department of business regulation with insurance commissioner as its head, effective January 1, 1979; P.A. 80-482 reinstated insurance division as an independent department with commissioner as its head and deleted reference to abolished department of business regulation; P.A. 91-339 changed “compensation commissioners, or a majority of them” to “chairman of the workers' compensation commission”; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” and “compensation commissioner” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 22-89 made technical changes, effective May 24, 2022.
Cited. 28 CS 5.
Sec. 31-327. Award of fees and expenses. (a) Whenever any fees or expenses are, under the provisions of this chapter, to be paid by the employer or insurer and not by the employee, the administrative law judge may make an award directly in favor of the person entitled to the fees or expenses, which award shall be filed in court, shall be subject to appeal and shall be enforceable by execution as in other cases. The award may be combined with an award for compensation in favor of or against the injured employee or the dependent or dependents of a deceased employee or may be the subject of an award covering only the fees and expenses.
(b) All fees of attorneys, physicians, podiatrists or other persons for services under this chapter shall be subject to the approval of the administrative law judge.
(1949 Rev., S. 7467; 1958 Rev., S. 31-194; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 53; P.A. 91-32, S. 34, 41; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 91-32 made technical changes, designated existing section as Subsec. (a) and added Subsec. (b) re approval of attorneys', physicians' and other fees by commissioner; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021.
Cited. 103 C. 434.
Review board can review commissioner's award of attorney's fees for consistency with fee guidelines. 59 CA 816. Commissioner has authority to approve attorney's fees contained in an award separate from an award for compensation. 64 CA 301. Award of “reasonable attorney's fees” issued under section may, at the discretion of commissioner, include fees accrued by paralegals. 152 CA 116. The commissioner, and by extension the Workers' Compensation Commission, has the authority to adjudicate fee disputes among attorneys who have represented a claimant at different times during the pendency of a case before the commission. 179 CA 846.
Cited. 28 CS 5.
EMPLOYERS' MUTUAL INSURANCE
Sec. 31-328. Mutual associations authorized.With the approval of the Insurance Commissioner, employers who are subject to this chapter and are bound to pay compensation to their employees thereunder may associate themselves, in accordance with the law for the formation of corporations without capital stock, for the purpose of establishing and maintaining mutual associations to insure their liabilities under this chapter; but no such association shall be formed to include employers not in the same or similar trade or business or in trades or businesses with substantially similar degrees of hazard of injury to employees.
(1949 Rev., S. 7468; 1958 Rev., S. 31-195; 1959, P.A. 580, S. 18; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 54; P.A. 77-614, S. 163, 610; P.A. 80-482, S. 206, 348.)
History: 1959 act replaced reference to Part B of chapter with reference to entire chapter; 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 77-614 placed insurance commissioner within department of business regulation and made insurance department a division of that department, effective January 1, 1979; P.A. 80-482 restored insurance division as independent department with commissioner as its head and deleted reference to abolished business regulation department.
Sec. 31-329. Approval by Insurance Commissioner. Before giving his approval, the Insurance Commissioner may require the incorporators of any such association to include in their proposed certificate of incorporation such lawful provisions for the regulation of the affairs of the association and the definition of its powers and the powers of its officers, directors and incorporators as shall satisfy him that it is well designed and wisely adapted to its proposed purposes. When such a certificate, in form and substance acceptable to the Insurance Commissioner, has been approved by and filed with the Secretary of the State, the incorporators shall forthwith cause copies thereof to be filed in the offices of the Insurance Commissioner and each of the administrative law judges.
(1949 Rev., S. 7469; 1958 Rev., S. 31-196; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 55; P.A. 77-614, S. 163, 610; P.A. 80-482, S. 207, 348; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 77-614 placed insurance commissioner within department of business regulation and made insurance department a division within that department, effective January 1, 1979; P.A. 80-482 restored insurance division as independent department with commissioner as its head, deleting references to abolished business regulation department; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “compensation commissioners” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judges”, effective October 1, 2021.
Sec. 31-330. Membership. Membership in such associations shall be limited to employers as defined in this chapter, and each association shall have power, by appropriate bylaws, to provide for the admission, suspension, withdrawal or expulsion of members.
(1949 Rev., S. 7470; 1958 Rev., S. 31-197; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 56.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions.
Sec. 31-331. Control of associations. Insurance Commissioner authorized to accept statement of financial condition by certain employers' mutual associations organized before June 6, 1996.Except as herein otherwise provided, such associations shall be subject to the same regulation and control as is or may be imposed by law upon other corporations or associations taking similar risks in this state, and over them the Insurance Commissioner shall have all the jurisdiction given him by sections 38a-14 and 38a-17 over insurance companies, provided with respect to any such association organized prior to June 6, 1996, with a membership composed exclusively of health care providers and whose premium base is derived entirely from health care organizations, the commissioner may accept a statement of financial condition that shall be audited by an independent certified public accountant using generally accepted accounting principles if such statement also includes a conversion to the accounting standards prescribed by section 38a-70. Such statement of financial condition shall be submitted to the commissioner by such association, annually, on or before the first day of March, signed and sworn to by its president or vice president and secretary or an assistant secretary, of its financial condition on the thirty-first day of December next preceding, prepared in such form and detail as may be prescribed by the commissioner and shall include a certification by an actuary or reserve specialist of all reserve liabilities prepared in accordance with subsection (f) of section 38a-53. In addition to such annual statement of financial condition, any such association shall file, quarterly, unaudited financial statements using generally accepted accounting principles if such statements also include a conversion to the accounting standards prescribed by section 38a-70.
(1949 Rev., S. 7471; 1958 Rev., S. 31-198; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 57; P.A. 77-614, S. 163, 610; P.A. 80-482, S. 208, 348; P.A. 07-27, S. 1; P.A. 13-134, S. 27.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 77-614 placed insurance commissioner within the department of business regulation and made insurance department a division within that department, effective January 1, 1979; P.A. 80-482 restored insurance division as independent department with commissioner as its head and deleted reference to abolished business regulation department; P.A. 07-27 allowed commissioner to accept statement of financial condition from certain employers' mutual associations organized before June 6, 1996, audited by independent certified public accountant using generally accepted accounting principles in such form and detail as prescribed by commissioner, and provided for quarterly filing of unaudited financial statements by such associations; P.A. 13-134 made a technical change.
Sec. 31-332. Policies. Number of members required.No policies shall be issued by any such association until members in such numbers and with such numbers of employees as the Insurance Commissioner may decide will give a fair diffusion of risks have obligated themselves to take policies immediately upon their authorization, nor shall any policies be issued except such as the Insurance Commissioner has approved as conforming in all respects to the requirements of this chapter. In conformance with the provisions of section 31-284, policies may be issued covering claims only in excess of a certain amount. If, at any time, by the retirement of members, reduction of numbers of employees or other cause, the membership of any association appears to the Insurance Commissioner no longer to afford a fair diffusion of risks, he may suspend or forbid the further issue of policies until the former conditions of the association have been restored.
(1949 Rev., S. 7472; 1958 Rev., S. 31-199; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 58; P.A. 77-614, S. 163, 610; P.A. 80-482, S. 209, 348; P.A. 81-472, S. 63, 159.)
History; 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 77-614 placed insurance commissioner within department of business regulation and made insurance department a division within that department, effective January 1, 1979; P.A. 80-482 restored insurance division as independent department with commissioner as its head, deleting reference to abolished department of business regulation; P.A. 81-472 made technical changes.
Sec. 31-333. Officers and voting.The affairs of all associations incorporated under this chapter shall be managed by such officers and directors as may be chosen in manner prescribed by the bylaws of the association; but each member shall be entitled to cast at least one ballot in all elections and votes, any member having had for six months an average of more than one hundred and not more than five hundred employees to whom he is bound to pay compensation under this chapter shall be entitled to cast two ballots, and each additional five hundred employees shall entitle such member to an additional ballot, but no member shall be entitled to cast more than eight ballots.
(1949 Rev., S. 7473; 1958 Rev., S. 31-200; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 59.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions.
Sec. 31-334. Safety rules. Each association shall have power to prescribe and enforce reasonable rules for safety regulations on the premises of its members, and for that purpose its inspectors shall have free access to all such premises during regular working hours.
(1949 Rev., S. 7474; 1958 Rev., S. 31-201; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 60.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions.
Sec. 31-335. Premium rates. Reserve notes. Each association shall have power to determine the comparative premium rates for each occupation or risk insured by it and to prescribe rates of cash premiums sufficient to cover the current cost. Such premium rates shall prevail for the fiscal year of the association, but they may be changed annually by the directors. The current cost herein specified shall be such an amount as is estimated to cover the expenses and the claims or portions of claims payable within the same fiscal year within which they originated. Members of each association shall be required to pay yearly in advance cash premiums for current costs, and in addition thereto an amount in negotiable notes sufficient to maintain a reserve equal to that required by statute of stock or commercial casualty companies for similar classes of risks. These notes shall be payable on the call of the treasurer of the association as they may be required to meet estimated losses or expenses in excess of the current cost or to meet claims covering losses not payable within the same fiscal year within which the claim originated. The directors may, in their discretion, fix rates of interest on either notes or balances.
(1949 Rev., S. 7475; 1958 Rev., S. 31-202; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 61.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions.
Sec. 31-336. Assessments.If an association is not possessed of funds sufficient for the payment of incurred losses and expenses, it shall make an assessment for the amount needed to pay such losses and expenses upon the members liable to assessment therefor, in proportion to their several liabilities.
(1949 Rev., S. 7476; 1958 Rev., S. 31-203; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 62.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions.
Sec. 31-337. Investments. The funds of each association shall be invested by the directors in the same classes of securities and in the same manner in which funds of domestic life insurance companies are by law required or permitted to be invested.
(1949 Rev., S. 7477; 1958 Rev., S. 31-204; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 63.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions.
Sec. 31-338. Bylaws and regulations. Each association shall have power to determine the premiums, contingent liabilities, assessments, penalties and dividends of its members, and to enforce or administer the same without the limitations imposed upon corporations without capital stock by section 33-1057. It shall also have power to make and amend bylaws or regulations for the prompt, economical and safe conduct of its affairs. All bylaws and regulations of each association shall be filed with the Insurance Commissioner and shall be subject to his approval. If not disapproved by him, they shall go into effect thirty days after filing or at such later date as may be indicated in the bylaws or regulations.
(1949 Rev., S. 7478; 1958 Rev., S. 31-205; 1959, P.A. 617, S. 110; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 64; P.A. 77-614, S. 163, 610; P.A. 80-482, S. 210, 348; P.A. 96-256, S. 186, 209.)
History: 1959 act replaced reference to Sec. 33-149 with reference to Sec. 33-446; 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 77-614 placed commissioner of insurance within department of business regulation and made insurance department a division within that department, effective January 1, 1979; P.A. 80-482 restored insurance division as independent department with commissioner as its head, deleting reference to abolished business regulation department; P.A. 96-256 replaced reference to Sec. 33-446 with Sec. 33-1057, effective January 1, 1997.
Sec. 31-339. Appeals to Superior Court. From any decision or order of the Insurance Commissioner affecting any association, such association shall have the right of appeal to the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford.
(1949 Rev., S. 7479; 1958 Rev., S. 31-206; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 65; P.A. 77-614, S. 163, 610; P.A. 78-280, S. 6, 127; P.A. 80-482, S. 211, 348; P.A. 88-230, S. 1, 12; P.A. 90-98, S. 1, 2; P.A. 93-142, S. 4, 7, 8; P.A. 95-220, S. 4–6.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 77-614 placed insurance commissioner within department of business regulation and made insurance department a division within that department, effective January 1, 1979; P.A. 78-280 replaced “Hartford county” with “judicial district of Hartford-New Britain”; P.A. 80-482 restored insurance division as independent department with commissioner as its head and deleted reference to abolished business regulation department; P.A. 88-230 replaced “judicial district of Hartford-New Britain” with “judicial district of Hartford”, effective September 1, 1991; P.A. 90-98 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1991, to September 1, 1993; P.A. 93-142 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1993, to September 1, 1996, effective June 14, 1993; P.A. 95-220 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1996, to September 1, 1998, effective July 1, 1995.
WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE
Sec. 31-340. Insurer directly liable to employee or dependent.Whenever any employer of labor as defined in this chapter insures his liability under this chapter with any company authorized to transact a compensation insurance business in this state, the contract of insurance between such employer of labor and such insurer shall be a contract for the benefit of any employee who sustains an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by such insured by reason of the business operations described in the policy, while conducted at any working place therein described or elsewhere in connection therewith, or, in the event of such injury resulting in death, for the benefit of the dependents of such employee. Every such policy shall contain an agreement by the insurer to the effect that the insurer shall be directly and primarily liable to the employee and, in the event of his death, to his dependents or to any person entitled to burial expenses under section 31-306, to pay to him or to them the compensation, if any, for which the employer is liable; but payment in whole or in part of such compensation by either the employer or the insurer shall to the extent thereof be a bar to the recovery against the other of the amount so paid.
(1949 Rev., S. 7480; 1949, 1951, S. 3052d; 1958 Rev., S. 31-207; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 66.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions.
Cited. 113 C. 130; Id., 515; 223 C. 336.
Cited. 46 CA 596.
Cited. 28 CS 4.
Sec. 31-341. Notice to insurer. When a claim for compensation by any such injured employee or the dependent of an injured employee of an employer who has insured his liability as aforesaid does not result in a voluntary agreement and a hearing before an administrative law judge is necessary to determine such claim, the insurer shall receive the same notice of such hearing as is by law required to be given to the employer and shall thereupon be a party to the proceeding.
(1949 Rev., S. 7481; 1958 Rev., S. 31-208; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 67; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “compensation commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021.
Sec. 31-342. Award; enforcement. In any such hearing, the administrative law judge having jurisdiction may make his award directly against such employer, insurer or both, except that, when there is doubt as to the respective liability of two or more insurers, he shall make his award directly against such insurers; and such awards shall be enforceable against the insurer in all respects as provided by law for enforcing awards against an employer, and the proceedings on hearing, finding, award, appeal and execution shall be in all respects similar to that provided by law as between employer and employee.
(1949 Rev., S. 7482; 1958 Rev., S. 31-209; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 68; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021.
Award should ordinarily be against both employer and insurer. 105 C. 741. Where one company insured until and another after August 1st, and employee was injured May 25th but disability began September 19th, first company is solely liable. Id., 740. Cited. 113 C. 130; Id., 520; 114 C. 27. In occupational disease cases, award should be made against all insurers within whose periods of coverage claimant's work was a substantial factor in the disability. 116 C. 216. Award against principal employer even though direct employer has paid all compensation claims. 124 C. 227.
Cited. 28 CS 4.
Sec. 31-343. Certain defenses not available against employee or dependent. As between any such injured employee or his dependent and the insurer, every such contract of insurance shall be conclusively presumed to cover the entire liability of the insured, and no question as to breach of warranty, coverage or misrepresentation by the insured shall be raised by the insurer in any proceeding before the administrative law judge or on appeal therefrom.
(1949 Rev., S. 7483; 1958 Rev., S. 31-210; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 69; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “compensation commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021.
Effect of section. 105 C. 739. Cited. 111 C. 237; 113 C. 130; Id., 504; 116 C. 221.
Cited. 46 CA 596.
Sec. 31-344. When representations avoid policy. No statement in an application for a policy of compensation insurance shall vitiate such policy as between the insurer and the insured, unless such statement is false and materially affects either the acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed by the insurer.
(1949 Rev., S. 7484; 1958 Rev., S. 31-211; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 70.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions.
Cited. 28 CS 5.
Sec. 31-344a. Workers' Compensation Administration Fund established.There is established a fund to be known as the “Workers' Compensation Administration Fund”. The fund may contain any moneys required by law to be deposited in the fund and shall be held by the Treasurer separate and apart from all other moneys, funds and accounts. The interest derived from the investment of the fund shall be credited to the fund. Amounts in the fund may be expended only pursuant to appropriation by the General Assembly. Any balance remaining in the fund at the end of any fiscal year shall be carried forward in the fund for the fiscal year next succeeding.
(June Sp. Sess. P.A. 91-14, S. 17, 30.)
Sec. 31-345. Insurance Commissioner to approve form of policy. Assessments against employers for administrative costs. Surpluses. (a) No insurer or employer to whom a certificate of solvency pursuant to subsection (b) of section 31-284 has been issued, shall issue any policy of insurance purporting to cover the liability of an employer under the provisions of this chapter until a copy of the form of such policy has been filed with and approved by the Insurance Commissioner. No insurer or employer who is self-insured in whole or in part shall engage in writing insurance under this chapter or providing the compensation and benefits directly to employees unless he files with the Insurance Commissioner a receipt from the State Treasurer or the Comptroller on or before the first day of October, that the employer has paid his pro rata cost of administration required by this section or if the self-insured employer has not, prior to July first of any year, provided compensation and benefits under this chapter, the self-insured employer shall file such receipt on or before October first, annually that he has paid an amount equal to one-quarter of one per cent of the self-insured employer's payroll for the twelve months immediately preceding such July first.
(b) (1) When, after the close of a fiscal year ending prior to July 1, 1990, the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission and the Comptroller have determined the total amount of expenses of the Workers' Compensation Commission in accordance with the provisions of subsection (d) of section 31-280, the Treasurer shall thereupon assess upon and collect from each employer, other than the state and any municipality participating for purposes of its liability under this chapter as a member in an interlocal risk management agency pursuant to chapter 113a, the proportion of such expenses that the total compensation and payment for hospital, medical and nursing care made by such self-insured employer or private insurance carrier acting on behalf of any such employer bore to the total compensation and payments for hospital, medical and nursing care made by all such insurance carriers and self-insurers. The amount so secured shall be used to reimburse the Treasurer for appropriations theretofore made by the state for the payment in the first instance of the expenses of administering this chapter. On and after July 1, 1986, the Treasurer shall, as soon as possible after the close of a fiscal year ending prior to July 1, 1990, estimate the pro rata cost to each employer based upon the costs assessed to such employer in the immediately preceding fiscal year and shall assess upon and collect from each such employer such estimated costs annually which shall be payable as provided in subsection (a) of this section except each annual assessment shall include an amount which represents the difference between the payments collected and the actual costs assessed to such employer for the immediately preceding fiscal year. The Treasurer is authorized to make credits or rebates for overpayments made under this subsection by any employer for any fiscal year.
(2) The chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission shall annually, on or after July first of each fiscal year, determine an amount sufficient in the chairperson's judgment to meet the expenses incurred by the Workers' Compensation Commission and the Department of Aging and Disability Services in providing rehabilitation services for employees suffering compensable injuries in accordance with section 31-283a. Such expenses shall include (A) the costs of the Division of Workers' Rehabilitation and the programs established by its director, for fiscal years prior to the fiscal year beginning July 1, 2011, (B) the costs of the Division of Worker Education and the programs established by its director, and (C) funding for the occupational health clinic program created pursuant to sections 31-396 to 31-402, inclusive. The Treasurer shall thereupon assess upon and collect from each employer, other than the state and any municipality participating for purposes of its liability under this chapter as a member in an interlocal risk management agency pursuant to chapter 113a, the proportion of such expenses, based on the immediately preceding fiscal year, that the total compensation and payment for hospital, medical and nursing care made by such self-insured employer or private insurance carrier acting on behalf of any such employer bore to the total compensation and payments for the immediately preceding fiscal year for hospital, medical and nursing care made by such insurance carriers and self-insurers. For the fiscal years ending June 30, 2000, and June 30, 2001, such assessments shall not exceed five per cent of such total compensation and payments made by such insurance carriers and self-insurers. For the fiscal years ending June 30, 2002, and June 30, 2003, such assessments shall not exceed four and one-half per cent of such total compensation and payments made by such insurance carriers and self-insurers. For any fiscal year ending on or after June 30, 2004, such assessment shall not exceed four per cent of such total compensation and payments made by such insurance carriers and self-insurers. Such assessments and expenses shall not exceed the budget estimates submitted in accordance with subsection (c) of section 31-280. For each fiscal year, such assessment shall be reduced pro rata by the amount of any surplus from the assessments of prior fiscal years. Said surplus shall be determined in accordance with subdivision (3) of this subsection. Such assessments shall be made in one annual assessment upon receipt of the chairperson's expense determination by the Treasurer. All assessments shall be paid not later than sixty days following the date of the assessment by the Treasurer. Any employer who fails to pay such assessment to the Treasurer within the time prescribed by this subdivision shall pay interest to the Treasurer on the assessment at the rate of eight per cent per annum from the date the assessment is due until the date of payment. All assessments received by the Treasurer pursuant to this subdivision to meet the expenses of the Workers' Compensation Commission shall be deposited in the Workers' Compensation Administration Fund established under section 31-344a. All assessments received by the Treasurer pursuant to this subdivision to meet the expenses incurred by the Department of Aging and Disability Services in providing rehabilitation services for employees suffering compensable injuries in accordance with section 31-283a shall be deposited in the Workers' Compensation Administration Fund. The Treasurer is hereby authorized to make credits or rebates for overpayments made under this subsection by any employer for any fiscal year.
(3) As soon as practicable after the close of the state fiscal year, the Comptroller shall examine the Workers' Compensation Administration Fund and shall direct the State Treasurer to set aside within said fund amounts in excess of fifty per cent of the expenditures of the Workers' Compensation Commission for the most recently completed fiscal year, which shall be considered a surplus for purposes of subdivision (2) of subsection (b) of this section.
(1949 Rev., S. 7485; 1958 Rev., S. 31-212; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 71; 1969, P.A. 696, S. 13; 1971, P.A. 334; P.A. 73-32; P.A. 76-246, S. 1, 3; P.A. 77-614, S. 163, 610; P.A. 78-241, S. 1, 2; P.A. 81-469, S. 5, 8; P.A. 85-189, S. 4; P.A. 90-311, S. 1, 3; P.A. 91-191, S. 1, 3; 91-339, S. 34, 55; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 91-14, S. 18, 30; P.A. 92-31, S. 5, 7; P.A. 96-267, S. 25; P.A. 99-214, S. 1, 2; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-9, S. 29, 131; P.A. 11-61, S. 83; June 12 Sp. Sess. P.A. 12-1, S. 87; P.A. 19-157, S. 86; P.A. 22-89, S. 27.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1969 act made previous provisions applicable to employers who have been issued a certificate of solvency, added provisions requiring payment of pro rata share of administration costs and other specified payments before insurer or self-insured employer writes insurance and added Subsec. (b) re assessment of administration expenses; 1971 act deleted requirement that insurer pay $1,000 if it has not, prior to July first in any year, paid out any compensation or benefits before it writes insurance, in Subsec. (a); P.A. 73-32 required that filing of receipt proving payment of pro rata share of administration costs be made on or before October first rather than September first in Subsec. (a); P.A. 76-246 added provisions re quarterly installments of estimated pro rata costs and credits and rebates of overpayments; P.A. 77-614 placed insurance commissioner within the department of business regulation and made insurance department a division within that department, effective January 1, 1979 (provisions later repealed by P.A. 80-482); P.A. 78-241 made payments of estimated costs payable on annual rather than quarterly basis; P.A. 81-469 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that the amount of compensation and payments made by a carrier due to the state's liabilities as an employer shall be exempted when calculating the amount due under the subsection; P.A. 85-189 provided that each employer, other than the state and certain municipalities, is liable for the assessments used to cover administrative costs; P.A. 90-311 added Subsec. (b)(2) re assessment of expenses on or after July 1, 1990; P.A. 91-191 amended Subsec. (b)(2) to replace quarterly assessment with a single annual assessment; P.A. 91-339 amended Subsec. (b) to include the costs of the rehabilitation division and the division of worker education in the expenses of the workers' compensation commission and to limit assessments to 4% of the total compensation and payments; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 91-14 amended Subsec. (b)(2) to provide that on and after July 1, 1991, all assessments received by treasurer pursuant to said subdivision shall be deposited in workers' compensation administration fund; P.A. 92-31 amended Subsec. (b)(2) to require employers who fail to pay assessments within the prescribed time to pay interest at the rate of 8% and to delete provision authorizing pro rata reduction of assessments in accordance with prior years' surplus; P.A. 96-267 amended Subdiv. (b)(2) to require a pro rata assessment reduction equal to any prior fiscal year surplus, and added Subdiv. (3) to calculate such surplus and to direct the State Treasurer to set aside the surplus; P.A. 99-214 amended Subsec. (b)(2) by increasing, for fiscal years 2000 and 2001, the employer assessment cap from 4% to 5% of employers' workers' compensation expenses for the prior year, reducing the cap to 4% for fiscal years commencing on or after 2002, and requiring the chairman to include the cost of funding occupational health clinic programs in determining the amount necessary to meet the Workers' Compensation Commission's annual expenses, effective July 1, 1999; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-9 amended Subsec. (b)(2) to add provision re 4.5% maximum annual employer assessment for the fiscal years ending June 30, 2002, and June 30, 2003, and to provide for a 4% maximum annual employer assessment for fiscal years ending on or after June 30, 2004, effective July 1, 2001; P.A. 11-61 amended Subsec. (b)(2) by adding provision re expenses incurred by Bureau of Rehabilitative Services, designating existing provision re costs of Division of Workers' Rehabilitation and program as Subpara. (A) and amending same to make inclusion of costs of division and program applicable for fiscal years prior to fiscal year beginning July 1, 2011, designating existing provision re costs of Division of Worker Education and programs as Subpara. (B), designating existing provision re funding for occupational health clinic program as Subpara. (C), and adding provisions re assessments to be deposited into the Workers' Compensation Administration Fund, effective July 1, 2011; June 12 Sp. Sess. P.A. 12-1 amended Subsec. (b)(2) by replacing “Bureau of Rehabilitative Services” with “Department of Rehabilitation Services”, effective July 1, 2012; P.A. 19-157 amended Subsec. (b)(2) by replacing “Department of Rehabilitation Services” with “Department of Aging and Disability Services”; P.A. 22-89 made technical changes in Subsec. (b), effective May 24, 2022.
Cited. 37 CA 835.
Sec. 31-345a. Deductibles in workers' compensation coverage. Approval of Insurance Commissioner. Each insurer issuing workers' compensation and employers' liability insurance may issue such coverage with deductibles in accordance with plans filed with and approved by the Insurance Commissioner.
(P.A. 81-469, S. 7, 8.)
Sec. 31-346. Damages for material misstatements.When any insured knowingly makes a material misstatement to any insurer to the damage of such insurer, such insurer may recover just damages resulting from such misstatement.
(1949 Rev., S. 7486; 1958 Rev., S. 31-213; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 72.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions.
Cited. 28 CS 5.
Sec. 31-347. Experience in compensation insurance. Each insurer which writes liability or compensation policies shall include in the annual statement required by law a schedule of its experience thereunder in such form as the Insurance Commissioner may prescribe.
(1949 Rev., S. 7487; 1958 Rev., S. 31-214; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 73; P.A. 77-614, S. 163, 610; P.A. 80-482, S. 212, 348.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 77-614 placed insurance commissioner within department of business regulation and made insurance department a division within that department, effective January 1, 1979; P.A. 80-482 restored insurance division as independent department with commissioner as its head and abolished business regulation department.
Cited. 28 CS 5.
Sec. 31-348. Compensation insurance companies to report their risks. Every insurance company writing compensation insurance or its duly appointed agent shall report in writing or by other means to the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission, in accordance with rules prescribed by the chairperson, the name of the person or corporation insured, including the state, the day on which the policy becomes effective and the date of its expiration, which report shall be made within fifteen days from the date of the policy. The cancellation of any policy so written and reported shall not become effective until fifteen days after notice of such cancellation has been filed with the chairperson. Any insurance company violating any provision of this section shall be fined not less than one hundred nor more than one thousand dollars for each offense.
(1949 Rev., S. 7488; 1958 Rev., S. 31-215; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 74; P.A. 81-469, S. 2, 8; P.A. 90-116, S. 10; P.A. 91-339, S. 35, 55; P.A. 22-89, S. 28.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 81-469 required any insurance company insuring the state's liability under this chapter to report such fact as it would for any other policyholder; P.A. 90-116 allowed for reports from agents of companies and for reports other than in writing; P.A. 91-339 changed “board of commissioners” to “chairman of the workers' compensation commission” and “one week” to “fifteen days”; P.A. 22-89 made technical changes, effective May 24, 2022.
Former statute cited. 113 C. 128; 127 C. 706.
Insurer's initial letter to insured indicating that failure to pay premiums due would result in policy cancellation was not sufficiently unequivocal to constitute notice of cancellation under section. 62 CA 440. Section not applicable to nonrenewals of policies. 67 CA 361. Workers' Compensation Commission's longstanding policy of utilizing National Council on Compensation Insurance to collect notices electronically of compensation policy coverage and cancellations is authorized by section. 206 CA 702.
Cited. 28 CS 5.
Sec. 31-348a. Compensation insurers to reduce premiums. (a) On or before July 1, 1993, each insurer writing workers' compensation insurance in this state, either individually or through a rating organization licensed pursuant to section 38a-672 of which the insurer is a member or subscriber, shall file new voluntary pure premium and assigned risk rates effective for the period July 1, 1993, to June 30, 1994, containing a nineteen per cent benefit level reduction and allowing due consideration for changes in loss costs based upon experience updated through the end of 1992.
(b) Upon receipt of any rate filing made under this section by a rating organization licensed pursuant to section 38a-672, the Insurance Commissioner shall conduct a public hearing regarding the filing and consult with an independent actuary engaged for the purpose of certifying the accuracy of the benefit level reduction set forth in subsection (a) of this section and determining whether the filed rates are excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory as determined by the provisions of section 38a-665. The rates approved for the period July 1, 1993, to June 30, 1994, shall reflect (i) the actual loss costs experience through the end of 1992 and (ii) the savings from benefit level reductions effective July 1, 1993, as achieved by this section and sections 31-40v, 31-275, 31-276, 31-279, 31-280, 31-284a, 31-288, 31-289b, 31-293, 31-294c, 31-295, 31-297a, 31-298, 31-299a, 31-300, 31-303, 31-306, 31-307 to 31-307b, inclusive, 31-308, 31-308a, 31-309, 31-310, 31-310c, 31-349, 31-349a and 31-354.
(c) Within thirty days of the Insurance Commissioner's final decision regarding a filing by a rating organization made pursuant to this section, each insurer writing workers' compensation insurance in this state shall file revised rates for the voluntary market in accordance with the provisions of section 38a-676. Such revised rates shall be applicable to all new and renewal workers' compensation insurance policies effective on or after July 1, 1993. For any policy in effect as of June 30, 1993, during the period from July 1, 1993, through the end of the policy period, the premium shall be reduced by a percentage which equals the benefit level reduction certified pursuant to subsection (b) of this section. With respect to new and renewal policies effective on or after July 1, 1993, and before the final approval of the rates filed pursuant to this subsection, each workers' compensation insurance carrier shall, not later than forty-five days after the rates approved pursuant to this section become final, adjust the premium of such new or renewal policy for the period after July 1, 1993, to reflect the difference between the premium on the policy as issued and the premium which reflects the rates as finally approved, which rates shall reflect the specific savings achieved by this section and sections 31-40v, 31-275, 31-276, 31-279, 31-280, 31-284a, 31-288, 31-289b, 31-293, 31-294c, 31-295, 31-297a, 31-298, 31-299a, 31-300, 31-303, 31-306, 31-307 to 31-307b, inclusive, 31-308, 31-308a, 31-309, 31-310, 31-310c, 31-349, 31-349a and 31-354.
(P.A. 93-228, S. 32, 35; P.A. 22-67, S. 16.)
History: P.A. 93-228 effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 22-67 deleted references to Sec. 31-40u in Subdivs. (b) and (c), effective May 23, 2022.
SECOND INJURY FUND
*Cited. 212 C. 427; 218 C. 9; 231 C. 287.
Cited. 37 CA 835.
Cited. 38 CS 644; 39 CS 250.
Sec. 31-349. Compensation for second disability. The fact that an employee has suffered a previous disability, shall not preclude him from compensation for a second injury, nor preclude compensation for death resulting from the second injury. If an employee having a previous disability incurs a second disability from a second injury resulting in a permanent disability caused by both the previous disability and the second injury which is materially and substantially greater than the disability that would have resulted from the second injury alone, he shall receive compensation for (1) the entire amount of disability, including total disability, less any compensation payable or paid with respect to the previous disability, and (2) necessary medical care, as provided in this chapter, notwithstanding the fact that part of the disability was due to a previous disability. For purposes of this section, “compensation payable or paid with respect to the previous disability” includes compensation payable or paid pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, as well as any other compensation payable or paid in connection with the previous disability, regardless of the source of such compensation.
(1949 Rev., S. 7489; 1949, 1951, 1953, S. 3053d; September, 1957, P.A. 13, S. 6; 1958 Rev., S. 31-216; 1959, P.A. 580, S. 11; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 75; 1967, P.A. 842, S. 20; 1969, P.A. 696, S. 14; 1971, P.A. 447, S. 1; P.A. 79-376, S. 80; P.A. 81-464, S. 2; P.A. 82-398, S. 6; 82-472, S. 109, 183; P.A. 86-31; P.A. 88-40, S. 1, 2; 88-47, S. 1; P.A. 89-66, S. 1, 2; P.A. 90-116, S. 7; 90-327, S. 2, 3; P.A. 91-32, S. 35, 41; 91-339, S. 36, 55; P.A. 93-228, S. 24, 35; 93-429, S. 2, 7; P.A. 95-277, S. 3, 19; P.A. 96-242, S. 1, 10; P.A. 21-18, S. 5.)
History: 1959 act simplified provisions by deleting references to specific loss of or damage to body organs, allowed compensation for injuries which result in permanent partial incapacity greater than would have resulted if person did not have preexisting incapacity, specified amount of additional compensation as “the same amount as the weekly compensation paid by his employer”, changed minimum payment for total incapacity from $15 to $20 and maximum payment from $45 to maximum rate in Sec. 31-309 and replaced 780-week payment limit with unspecified “period of incapacity”; 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions and was entirely replaced by provisions of 1967 act; 1969 act deleted requirement that insurer or employer furnish custodian with a copy of the agreement or award and deleted provision which stated that fund was to be used to pay for injuries covered by Sec. 31-310; 1971 act clarified employer's responsibilities to notify custodian of agreement and award; P.A. 79-376 substituted executions of acknowledgment of physical defect for executions of waiver and reduced compensation by amount of “any compensation benefits payable or paid with respect to the previous disability”; P.A. 81-464 permitted the use of the second injury fund for payment of insurance coverage for totally incapacitated recipients of workers' compensation after 104 weeks of benefits and provided for notification of fund custodian; P.A. 82-398 replaced the reference to Sec. 31-51h with a reference to Sec. 31-284b, as Sec. 31-51h was repealed by the act and deleted obsolete provision requiring employer to notify custodian of second injury fund within 60 days after October 1, 1981, that coverage is required for persons who have received payments for more than 104 weeks as of that date; P.A. 82-472 made a technical correction; P.A. 86-31 divided section into Subsecs. and clarified the notice requirements for payment by the second injury fund of insurance coverage costs for totally incapacitated workers' compensation recipients; P.A. 88-40 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that the cost of insurance for totally incapacitated individuals shall be paid to the employer as reimbursement and the employer shall furnish all medical information in support of the claim as to liability of the second injury fund as requested; P.A. 88-47 added Subsec. (c) re payment of the cost of accident and health insurance coverage by the second injury fund for certain employees receiving workers' compensation payments who are affected by a plant move or shutdown; P.A. 89-66 specified that the provisions of Subsec. (c) apply to employers who shut down or relocate on or after January 1, 1985, specified that the fund's liability is effective as of the date it receives notice and provided that the fund shall be liable for the cost of equivalent insurance; P.A. 90-116 amended Subsec. (c) to provide that notice shall be by certified mail; P.A. 90-327 added Subsec. (d) concerning insurance coverage for employees injured on or after January 1, 1980, but before January 1, 1982; P.A. 91-32 made technical changes and divided existing Subsec. (a) into Subsecs. (a) to (d), inclusive, relettering former Subsecs. (b) to (d), inclusive, accordingly; P.A. 91-339 amended Subsec. (f)(2) to provide that the fund's liability shall begin 15 days after notice to the custodian and by adding provisions re determination of ineligibility for costs of coverage; P.A. 93-228 amended Subsec. (a) to define “compensation payable or paid with respect to the previous disability” for purposes of the subsection, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 93-429 amended Subsecs. (b) and (c) to modify the notice and filing requirements imposed on employers or their insurance carriers in order to transfer liability for an injury or death to the second injury fund, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 95-277 amended Subsec. (b) to replace previous provisions re transfer of claims to the Second Injury Fund, to substitute references to “insurer” for “insurance carrier”, to detail notification procedure for the rejection of a claim and to specify that improper submittal of claims within specific time period could result in a prejudice of claim, amended Subsec. (c) to replace previous provisions re transfer of liability for death benefits with new provisions, deleted Subsecs. (d) to (g), inclusive, added a new Subsec. (d) to close the Second Injury Fund for injuries occurring on or after July 1, 1995, and new Subsec. (e) requiring an employer or insurer to notify the custodian of the fund prior to October 1, 1995, of its intention to pursue a transfer of claim to the Second Injury Fund, effective July 1, 1995; P.A. 96-242 added Subsec. (f) concerning the eligibility of claims for transfer to the Second Injury Fund, effective June 6, 1996; P.A. 21-18 deleted Subsec. (a) designator, deleted former Subsecs. (b) to (f) and made a conforming change.
Cited. 150 C. 156. “Second Injury Fund”, legislative history and purpose discussed; phrase “permanent physical impairment” construed to include decedent's heart disease, although that disease had neither manifested itself so as to be a hindrance to obtaining employment nor come to the attention of the employer. 166 C. 352. Second Injury Fund assumes responsibility for compensation and medical treatment only when preexisting impairment contributes materially and substantially to permanent disability. 171 C. 577. Cited. 174 C. 181; 218 C. 9; 222 C. 78; 223 C. 336. Phrase “one-hundred-four-week period” refers to time period of claimant's disability. 224 C. 382. Cited. 226 C. 569; 227 C. 333. Interpretation of “compensation” discussed. 231 C. 287. Cited. Id., 469; 232 C. 311; 233 C. 14; Id., 243; 235 C. 778; Id., 790; 237 C. 259; Id., 490; 241 C. 282. Limitations provision in Subsec. (b) and re-notification provision of Subsec. (e) do not violate contract or due process clause of U.S. Constitution because premise that second injury fund had contractual relationship with employees, employers and insurers is unsustainable. 248 C. 466. Section requires employer at time of claimant's second injury to accept liability for all compensation benefits due claimant for a period of 104 weeks, and thereafter, requires fund to accept liability for all benefits due claimant for the combined injuries. Id., 635. Legislature intended amendment to section, contained in P.A. 95-277, to remove fund's obligation to reimburse employers on or after July 1, 1995. 250 C. 753.
Cited. 6 CA 45. Notification provision relating to a fatality is mandatory. 15 CA 625, 627. Cited. 27 CA 699; 37 CA 131; 41 CA 231; 42 CA 147; 43 CA 732; Id., 737; 45 CA 324; Id., 448; 46 CA 346. Where employee has suffered two separate injuries that result in total disability, fund is liable only for the portion of disability attributable to the second injury. 48 CA 474. “Disability”, as used in section, connotes medical impairment. 76 CA 563. Employee's permanent disability met standard in section, and therefore may not be apportioned under statutory gap remedy set forth in 288 C. 303. 146 CA 154.
Cited. 37 CS 742.
Subsec. (a):
“Compensation benefits” refers only to compensation under act. 223 C. 336. For purposes of calculating 104-week period in which notice must be given, “disability” refers to claimant's degree of medical impairment, rather than inability to work or loss of earning capacity. 243 C. 513. Subsec. provides compensation for any injury that combines with a preexisting nonoccupational or noncompensable disability to materially increase claimant's overall impairment. 315 C. 543.
Disability refers to physical impairment, not capacity for employment. 59 CA 565.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 38 CA 175. Employer's insurer was excused from complying with statutory notice requirements for transfer of liability to Second Injury Fund where evidence showed that employer was defunct and that insurer was unable to obtain wage information necessary for strict compliance with statute. 52 CA 819. Employer and insurance company did not give timely notice of their intent to transfer liability to the fund because period of plaintiff's disability began on the day he was injured rather than on the day he sought medical care for the injuries or the day he underwent surgeries for the injuries. 67 CA 385. Appeal dismissed as moot; notice filed was timely but not proper. 69 CA 385. A person can be disabled for purposes of section even though such person can carry on all aspects of the employment. 73 CA 523.
Subsec. (d):
With passage of section, legislature rebutted any presumption in favor of prospective only application of Sec. 31-349c. 241 C. 282. Apportionment is not an available form of relief for second injury employer or its insurer under Subsec. 263 C. 279.
Subsec. (e):
Re-notification clause in Subsec. does not violate contract or due process clause of U.S. Constitution because no showing under circumstances of case that legislature, in establishing Second Injury Fund, entered into a contract with employees, employers and insurers. 248 C. 457.
Renotice letter was timely where town sent it by certified mail on September 28, 1995 and fund received it on October 2, 1995. 67 CA 276.
Sec. 31-349a. Powers of investigators in the office of the State Treasurer.Any investigator in the investigations unit of the office of the State Treasurer, when investigating Second Injury Fund claims which may violate the requirements of this chapter and when investigating compliance by employers with the provisions of section 31-284, shall have the powers, as described in section 54-1f, of a peace officer as defined in subdivision (9) of section 53a-3.
(P.A. 85-602, S. 2, 4; P.A. 91-207, S. 6, 9; 91-339, S. 37, 55; P.A. 93-228, S. 25, 35; P.A. 95-277, S. 12, 19; P.A. 96-216, S. 3, 5.)
History: P.A. 91-207 made a technical change in fund's name; P.A. 91-339 added provisions re investigation of compliance with Sec. 31-284; P.A. 93-228 transferred jurisdiction over second injury fund investigators from the state treasurer's office to the workers' compensation commission and expanded the powers and duties of the investigators to include investigation of all claims, not just second injury fund claims, which violate the provisions of this chapter, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 95-277 transferred jurisdiction over Second Injury Fund investigations from the Workers' Compensation Commission to the office of the State Treasurer, effective June 29, 1995; P.A. 96-216 deleted “at the direction of the commissioner” when referring to the powers of peace officers, effective June 4, 1996.
Sec. 31-349b. Certificate for permanent vocational disability. Employer reimbursed by Second Injury Fund for insurance premiums for certified employees. (a) Any employee who has suffered a compensable injury under the provisions of this chapter, and who is receiving benefits for such injury from the Second Injury Fund pursuant to the provisions of section 31-349, may file a written request with the administrative law judge in the district where the original claim was filed for a hearing to determine whether the employee's injury constitutes a permanent vocational disability. The hearing shall be held within sixty days of the date the request was filed. Upon the request of the administrative law judge and prior to the conclusion of such hearing, the Commissioner of Aging and Disability Services shall, after receiving such information on the case which the administrative law judge deems necessary, submit written recommendations concerning the case to the administrative law judge for his consideration. The administrative law judge shall issue his decision, in writing, within ten days after the conclusion of the hearing. If the administrative law judge determines that the employee's injury is a permanent vocational disability, the employee shall be issued a certificate of disability by the administrative law judge. Such certificate shall be effective for a stated period of time of from one to five years, as determined by the administrative law judge. The decision of the administrative law judge may be appealed in accordance with the provisions of section 31-301.
(b) (1) Whenever any individual who has been issued a certificate of disability, pursuant to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, is thereafter employed, the employer, upon written application and presentation of sufficient proof to the State Treasurer, shall be reimbursed from the Second Injury Fund for any workers' compensation insurance premiums paid by the employer which are attributable to such individual's employment during the effective period of such certificate. (2) Whenever any such certified individual is hired by an employer to whom a certificate of self-insurance has been issued pursuant to section 31-284, the employer, upon written application and presentation of sufficient proof to the State Treasurer, shall be reimbursed from the Second Injury Fund at the rate of two per cent of the gross wages paid to the individual for work performed during the effective period of his certificate. No employer may make more than one such application related to a certified employee within a twelve-month period.
(c) Upon the expiration of any certificate of disability or of an extension of such certificate, the person to whom such certificate was issued may file a written request with the administrative law judge for an extension of the effective period of such certificate. The determination as to whether such an extension should be granted shall be made by the administrative law judge in accordance with the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, provided such extension shall be effective for a stated period of time of from one to five years.
(P.A. 86-33; P.A. 91-207, S. 7, 9; P.A. 95-277, S. 10, 19; P.A. 11-44, S. 50; June 12 Sp. Sess. P.A. 12-1, S. 88; P.A. 19-157, S. 87; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 91-207 made technical changes re name of fund; P.A. 95-277 in Subsec. (a) eliminated the reference to “section 31-325”, effective July 1, 1995; P.A. 11-44 amended Subsec. (a) to replace “Division of Workers' Rehabilitation within the Workers' Compensation Commission” with “Bureau of Rehabilitative Services”, effective July 1, 2011; June 12 Sp. Sess. P.A. 12-1 amended Subsec. (a) by replacing “director of the Bureau of Rehabilitative Services” with “Commissioner of Rehabilitation Services”, effective July 1, 2012; P.A. 19-157 amended Subsec. (a) by replacing “Commissioner of Rehabilitation Services” with “Commissioner of Aging and Disability Services”; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” in Subsecs. (a) and (c), effective October 1, 2021.
Sec. 31-349c. Controverted issues of previous disability. Physician panel established. (a) The custodian of the Second Injury Fund and an insurer or self-insured employer seeking to transfer a claim to the fund shall submit all controverted issues regarding the existence of a previous disability under section 31-349 to the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission. The chairperson shall appoint a panel of three physicians, as defined in subdivision (17) of section 31-275, and submit such dispute to the panel, along with whatever evidence and materials he deems necessary for consideration in the matter. The panel may examine the claimant, who shall submit to any examination such panel may require. Within sixty days of receiving the submission, the panel shall file its opinion, in writing, with the chairperson, who shall forward it, along with any records generated by the panel's work on the case, to the administrative law judge having jurisdiction over the claim in which the dispute arose. The panel's opinion shall be determined by a majority vote of the three members. Such opinion shall be binding on all parties to the claim and may not be appealed to the Compensation Review Board pursuant to section 31-301.
(b) The chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission shall adopt regulations in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54 to establish a fee schedule for payment of medical panel members. Any fees paid pursuant to the provisions of this section shall be paid by the self-insured employer or insurer seeking fund reimbursement.
(P.A. 95-277, S. 4, 19; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; P.A. 22-89, S. 29.)
History: P.A. 95-277 effective July 1, 1995; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” in Subsec. (a), effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 22-89 made technical changes, effective May 24, 2022.
Court concluded legislation intended section to apply retroactively to be consistent with Sec. 31-349(d). 241 C. 282.
Sec. 31-349d. Treasurer to solicit proposals for the managing of Second Injury Fund claims.Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 4a-19 and 4a-20 to the contrary, the Treasurer may solicit proposals from any firm engaged in the business of workers' compensation medical case management for purposes of managing Second Injury Fund claims or providing any other necessary service not provided by state employees.
(P.A. 95-277, S. 5, 19.)
History: P.A. 95-277 effective July 1, 1995.
Sec. 31-349e. Advisory board for the Second Injury Fund. There shall be an advisory board for the Second Injury Fund to advise the custodian of the Second Injury Fund on matters concerning administration, operation, claim handling and finances of the fund. On or before July 1, 1995, the Treasurer shall appoint six of the eight members to the board. Three members shall represent employers and insurers who pay assessments to the fund pursuant to section 31-354. Three such members shall represent employees receiving benefits paid or reimbursed by the fund. The two remaining members shall be the chairpersons of the labor and public employees committee of the General Assembly or their designees. The six members appointed by the Treasurer shall be appointed for a term of four years from January first in the year of their appointment. Any vacancy shall be filled for the remainder of the term in the same manner as the original appointment. All members shall serve without compensation. The board shall elect a chairperson from among its members. The Treasurer shall provide such staff as is necessary for the performance of the functions and duties of the board. The board shall meet at least twice a year. All actions of the board shall require an affirmative vote of a majority of those members present and voting, provided at least four members shall be present and voting. The board may adopt any rules of procedure that it deems necessary to carry out its duties.
(P.A. 95-277, S. 6, 19; P.A. 98-104, S. 5, 6; P.A. 01-31.)
History: P.A. 95-277 effective July 29, 1995; P.A. 98-104 authorized members' designees to vote, effective July 1, 1998; P.A. 01-31 changed voting requirement for board action from six members or their designees to a majority of those members present and voting, provided at least four members are present and voting, and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality.
Sec. 31-349f. Condition of the Second Injury Fund. Report to the Governor and General Assembly.On or before July 1, 1996, and annually thereafter, the Treasurer shall submit to the Governor and the General Assembly a report on the financial condition of the Second Injury Fund. Such report shall include (1) an estimate of the fund's unfunded liability as of the preceding July first; (2) the effect of settlements and stipulations on the unfunded liability; (3) the number and amount of assessments levied under section 31-354 for the previous fiscal year; (4) the number and amount of such assessments projected for the coming year; and (5) any recommendations for legislative change to improve the operation or financing of the fund.
(P.A. 95-277, S. 8, 19.)
History: P.A. 95-277 effective July 1, 1995.
Sec. 31-349g. Method of assessing all employers for liabilities of Second Injury Fund. Reporting. Audits. Insurance companies deemed collection agents. (a) For purposes of this section:
(1) “Insured employer” means an employer who insures its risks incurred under this chapter with an insurance company authorized to issue workers' compensation policies in this state by the Insurance Department, and includes any member of a workers' compensation pool administered by an interlocal risk management agency, and on and after January 1, 2005, an employer mutual association organized prior to June 6, 1996, with a membership composed exclusively of health care providers and whose premium base is derived entirely from health care organizations.
(2) “Self-insured employer” means an employer who is approved to self-insure its liabilities under this chapter by the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission. For the period commencing October 1, 2004, and ending December 31, 2004, “self-insured employer” includes an employer mutual association organized prior to June 6, 1996, with a membership composed exclusively of health care providers and whose premium base is derived entirely from health care organizations.
(3) “Paid losses” means the total indemnity, medical and any other expenses, prior to any credits or deductions being taken, paid on or after January 1, 2006, by or on behalf of an employer to or on behalf of an injured employee. Paid losses includes all legal expenses paid for the benefit of an injured worker in accordance with this chapter and any loss payments within deductible limits on workers' compensation policies.
(4) “Second Injury Fund surcharge base” means direct written premium on policies prior to application of any deductible policy premium credits.
(5) “Direct written premium” includes all endorsements, retrospective adjustments, audits and minimum premium and shall be determined without regard to when or whether the premium on the policy is paid.
(6) “Second Injury Fund surcharge” for insurance companies, interlocal risk management agencies and self-insurance groups means the rate set by the custodian multiplied by the Second Injury Fund surcharge base.
(7) “Self-insurance group” means a not-for-profit association consisting of fifteen or more employers who are engaged in the same or similar type of business, who are members of the same bona fide trade or professional association which has been in existence for not less than five years, and who enter into agreements to pool their liabilities for workers' compensation benefits and employers' liability.
(b) The State Treasurer, in consultation with the Insurance Commissioner, may adopt regulations, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54, regarding the method of assessing all employers for the liabilities of the Second Injury Fund. The liabilities shall be allocated between self-insured employers and insured employers based on a percentage of paid losses for the preceding calendar year for each group. No credits shall be taken against paid losses, except voided checks in connection with expenses paid under this chapter previously reported as a paid loss, recoveries from third party tortfeasors, reimbursement granted pursuant to section 31-299b and Second Injury Fund reimbursements. The method of assessment for self-insured employers shall be based on paid losses. The method of assessment for insured employers, for policies with effective dates before July 1, 2006, shall be based on the standard premium, and for policies with effective dates on or after July 1, 2006, shall be based on the Second Injury Fund surcharge base. In adopting regulations under this section, the State Treasurer shall consider their effect upon (1) the cost of doing business in this state, (2) the overall cost of the workers' compensation system, (3) the effect of the regulations on insurers, insureds and self-insured employers, and (4) the financial condition and liabilities of the fund.
(c) An employer mutual association organized prior to June 6, 1996, with a membership composed exclusively of health care providers and whose premium base is derived entirely from health care organizations may make payments without penalty or interest over a five-year period for any outstanding assessment due from the association for the period commencing January 1, 1996, and ending December 31, 2004.
(d) (1) For insured employers and self-insurance groups, the Second Injury Fund surcharge base shall initially be reported to the fund in the quarter of the effective date of the policy, regardless of when the policy is billed by the insurance carrier or self-insurance group or paid by the policyholder or member of a self-insurance group. All endorsements, retrospective adjustments and audits shall be reported in the quarter processed by the insurance carrier or group self-insured employer.
(2) The custodian of the fund shall conduct an audit or periodic audits of any self-insured employer, group self-insured employer, insured employer or insurance company acting as collection agent of the Second Injury Fund relative to any information or payment required by the custodian. The employer and insurer shall provide all necessary documents and information in relation to an audit by the custodian in a manner prescribed by the Treasurer. The period of review of an audit shall be not more than three years, except that when the date of the previous audit is less than three years prior to such audit, the period of review shall be to the date of such prior audit. If the audit determines repeated errors or underreporting by an employer or an insurer acting as collection agent of the Second Injury Fund, the fund reserves the right to audit an additional two-year review period. Upon the determination of the Treasurer or the Treasurer's agents, as a result of an audit, that an employer or an insurer acting as collection agent of the Second Injury Fund has not properly reported to the Second Injury Fund and, as a result, has underpaid the assessment or surcharge, the employer or the insurer acting as collection agent of the Second Injury Fund, upon notice from the Treasurer or the Treasurer's agent, shall pay the full amount of the underpaid assessment or surcharge, along with interest and any penalty due not later than thirty days after such notice.
(e) For purposes of collection of the Second Injury Fund surcharge from insureds and payment of such surcharge to the Second Injury Fund, insurance companies shall be deemed to be collection agents of the Second Injury Fund. The insured employer is liable for payment of the surcharge, and the insurance company shall collect such payment and remit it to the Second Injury Fund in accordance with section 31-354. Insurance companies shall be subject to the audit provisions of this section and shall be subject to the penalty and interest provisions of this section for failure to remit the surcharge to the Second Injury Fund.
(P.A. 95-277, S. 14, 19; P.A. 96-242, S. 5, 10; P.A. 04-229, S. 1; P.A. 05-199, S. 8; P.A. 22-89, S. 30.)
History: P.A. 95-277 effective July 1, 1995; P.A. 96-242 made technical change correcting the references to the State Treasurer and included certain employer mutual associations in the definition of “self-insured employers” after January 1, 1996, effective June 6, 1996; P.A. 04-229 designated existing provisions as Subsecs. (a) and (c), making technical and conforming changes therein, added Subsec. (b) re certain employer mutual associations organized prior to June 6, 1996, and added provision re such associations in Subsec. (c); P.A. 05-199 amended Subsec. (a) to redefine “insured employer” and “self-insured employer” and to define “paid losses”, “Second Injury Fund surcharge base”, “direct written premium”, “Second Injury Fund surcharge” and “self-insurance group”, redesignated existing provisions of Subsec. (a) as new Subsec. (b) and amended same by making adoption of regulations permissive, specifying credits to be taken against paid losses, and basing fund assessments for self-insured employers on percentage of paid losses and assessment for insured employers for policies with effective dates before July 1, 2006, on standard premium and for policies with effective dates on or after July 1, 2006, on Second Injury Fund surcharge base, redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as new Subsec. (c), deleted former Subsec. (c) re definitions, added Subsec. (d) re reporting of Second Injury Fund surcharge base, auditing of employers and insurance companies by fund custodian, and payment of interest and penalties for underpaid assessment and added Subsec. (e) re insurance companies to be deemed collection agents of fund, effective July 1, 2006; P.A. 22-89 made a technical change in Subsec. (a)(2), effective May 24, 2022.
Sec. 31-349h. Transfer of claims. Claims not transferred.All transfers of claims to the Second Injury Fund with a date of injury prior to July 1, 1995, shall be effected no later than July 1, 1999. All claims not transferred to the Second Injury Fund, on or before July 1, 1999, shall remain the responsibility of the employer or its insurer.
(P.A. 96-242, S. 2, 10.)
History: P.A. 96-242 effective June 6, 1996.
Deadline of July 1, 1999, re transfer of claims applies only to claims where eligibility for transfer is not in question on said date. 257 C. 481.
Sec. 31-349i. Cost-saving methodologies. The custodian of the Second Injury Fund may implement cost-saving methodologies within the existing prescription drug program but shall not mandate the use of a mail order pharmacy by the claimant.
(P.A. 96-242, S. 3, 10.)
History: P.A. 96-242 effective June 6, 1996.
Sec. 31-349j. Appeal of decision by State Treasurer concerning the method of assessing the employer for the liabilities of the Second Injury Fund. Any employer or any private insurance carrier or interlocal risk management agency acting on behalf of an employer that is aggrieved by a decision of the State Treasurer or the State Treasurer's agents concerning the method of assessing the employer for the liabilities of the Second Injury Fund pursuant to section 31-349g may appeal the decision to the Superior Court in accordance with the provisions of section 4-183.
(P.A. 01-40, S. 2.)
Secs. 31-350 and 31-351. Notice to commissioner of second injury. Hearings; awards.Sections 31-350 and 31-351 are repealed.
(1949 Rev., S. 7490, 7491; 1958 Rev., S. 31-217, 31-218; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 76, 77; 1967, P.A. 692, S. 3; P.A. 79-376, S. 50; P.A. 91-32, S. 40, 41.)
Sec. 31-352. Enforcement of liability of third person. The provisions of section 31-293 shall apply to any payments from the Second Injury Fund and the Treasurer is authorized to bring an action, or join in an action as provided by said section, when he has paid, or by award has become obligated to pay, compensation out of the fund.
(1949 Rev., S. 7492; 1949, 1951, S. 3054d; 1958 Rev., S. 31-219; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 78; P.A. 91-32, S. 36, 41.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 91-32 made technical changes.
Cited. 150 C. 156. “Second Injury Fund”, legislative history and purpose discussed. 166 C. 352. Cited. 171 C. 577; 174 C. 181. Fund is entitled to recover payment made pursuant to voluntary settlement agreement as “compensation” paid within meaning of Sec. 31-293. 259 C. 325
Cited. 24 CA 93.
Sec. 31-353. Voluntary agreements and stipulated settlements; approval. (a) If the Treasurer and an injured employee, or his legal representative, reach an agreement in regard to compensation payable under the provisions of this chapter, such agreement shall be submitted in writing to the administrative law judge for his approval and, upon approval, shall remain in effect until otherwise ordered by the administrative law judge.
(b) The Treasurer may make payment by way of stipulated settlement in any matter concerning the fund under the provisions of this chapter, subject to the approval of the administrative law judge, whenever such stipulated settlement is: (1) In the best interests of the injured employee, (2) in the best interests of the injured employee's dependents, or (3) for claims by an employer or insurer pursuant to section 31-306, 31-307a or 31-310.
(1949 Rev., S. 7493; 1949, 1951, S. 3055d; 1958 Rev., S. 31-220; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 79; P.A. 05-199, S. 9; P.A. 12-77, S. 2; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 05-199 made technical changes, effective July 1, 2006; P.A. 12-77 designated existing provisions as Subsecs. (a) and (b) and amended Subsec. (b) by substituting “stipulated” for “final” re settlement, substituting “under the provisions of this chapter” for “including matters under section 31-355”, designating existing provision re injured employee's best interests as Subdiv. (1), adding Subdivs. (2) and (3) re circumstances supporting approval of a stipulated settlement and making a technical change; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” throughout, effective October 1, 2021.
Cited. 150 C. 156. “Second Injury Fund”, legislative history and purpose discussed. 166 C. 352. Cited. 171 C. 577; 174 C. 181.
Cited. 16 CS 225.
Sec. 31-354. Second Injury Fund contributions. Duties and powers of State Treasurer. (a) There shall be a fund to be known as the Second Injury Fund. Each employer, other than the state, shall, within thirty days after notice given by the State Treasurer, pay to the State Treasurer for the use of the state a sum in payment of his liability under this chapter which shall be calculated in accordance with the Second Injury Fund surcharge base, as defined in section 31-349g, sections 31-349g, 31-349h and 31-349i, this section, section 31-354b and sections 8 and 9 of public act 96-242*. Such sum shall be an amount sufficient to (1) pay the debt service on state revenue bond obligations authorized to be issued under and for the purposes set forth in section 31-354b including reserve and covenant coverage requirements, (2) provide for costs and expenses of operating the Second Injury Fund, and (3) pay Second Injury Fund stipulations on claims settled by the custodian or other benefits payable out of the Second Injury Fund and not funded through state revenue bond obligations and shall be determined in accordance with the regulations adopted pursuant to the provisions of section 31-349g. The custodian shall establish a factor for the annual surcharge that caps such surcharge for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1996, 1997 and 1998. In determining such factor the custodian shall consider the funding mechanism authorized by sections 31-349g, 31-349h and 31-349i, this section, section 31-354b and sections 8 and 9 of public act 96-242*, recognize that an acceptable level of employer assessment is important to the vitality of the economy of the state and nevertheless shall assure provision of services to injured workers that enhances their ability to return to work and improve their quality of life. In any event, such factor shall not exceed, with respect to insured employers, a rate of fifteen per cent on the Second Injury Fund surcharge base with respect to workers' compensation and employers' liability policies and, with respect to self-insured employers, a comparable percentage limitation representing their pro rata share of any assessment. Any employer or any insurance company acting as collection agent for the custodian of the Second Injury Fund who fails to pay in accordance with such regulations shall pay a penalty to the State Treasurer of fifteen per cent on the unpaid assessment or surcharge or fifty dollars, whichever is greater. Interest at the rate of six per cent per annum shall be charged on any amounts owed on assessment audits or surcharge audits. For self-insured employers interest shall accrue thirty days after notice from the Second Injury Fund of the unpaid audit assessment. For insurance companies, the interest shall accrue from the date of the notice of audit errors or deficiencies as determined by the date postmarked by the United States Postal Service. The State Treasurer shall notify each employer of the penalty or interest provision with the notice of assessment. Any partial payments made to the fund shall be first applied to any unpaid penalty, then to any unpaid interest and the remainder, if any, to the unpaid assessment or surcharge. Interest or penalties shall be applied if assessment or surcharge reports or payments are postmarked by the United States Postal Service after the designated due date. The sums received shall be accounted for separately and apart from all other state moneys and the faith and credit of the state of Connecticut is pledged for their safekeeping. The State Treasurer shall be the custodian of the fund and all disbursements from the fund shall be made by the Treasurer or the Treasurer's deputies. The moneys of the fund shall be invested by the Treasurer in accordance with applicable law and section 8 of public act 96-242*. Interest, income and dividends from the investments shall be credited to the fund. Each employer, each private insurance carrier acting on behalf of any employer and each interlocal risk management agency acting on behalf of any employer shall annually, on or before April first, report to the State Treasurer, in the form prescribed by the State Treasurer, the amount of money expended by or on behalf of the employer in payments for the preceding calendar year. Each private insurance carrier, each self-insurance group and each interlocal risk management agency shall submit annually, on or before April first, to the State Treasurer, in the form prescribed by the State Treasurer, a report of the total Second Injury Fund surcharge base collected in the preceding calendar year and a report of the projected total Second Injury Fund surcharge base for the current calendar year. The fund shall be used to provide the benefits set forth in section 31-306 for adjustments in the compensation rate and payment of certain death benefits, in section 31-307b for adjustments where there are relapses after a return to work, in section 31-307c for totally disabled persons injured prior to October 1, 1953, in section 31-349 for disabled or handicapped employees and in section 31-355 for the payment of benefits due injured employees whose employers or insurance carriers have failed to pay the compensation, and medical expenses required by this chapter, or any other compensation payable from the fund as may be required by any provision contained in this chapter or any other statute and to reimburse employers or insurance carriers for payments made under subsection (b) of section 31-307a. The assessment required by this section is a condition of doing business in this state and failure to pay the assessment, when due, shall result in the denial of the privilege of doing business in this state or to self-insure under section 31-284. Any administrative or other costs or expenses incurred by the State Treasurer in connection with carrying out the provisions of this part, including the hiring of necessary employees, shall be paid from the fund. The State Treasurer may adopt regulations, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54, prescribing the practices, policies and procedures to be followed in the administration of the Second Injury Fund.
(b) The State Treasurer shall establish within the Second Injury Fund three accounts to be known as the operating account, the settlement account and the finance account which accounts shall be held separate and apart from each other. The operating account shall cover the costs and expenses to the state of operating the Second Injury Fund. The settlement account shall cover actual disbursement of the settled claims whether by one-time full payments or by payments over a period of time. The finance account shall contain such funds and be operated in the manner provided in section 31-354b.
(1949 Rev., S. 7494; 1949, 1951, S. 3056d; 1958 Rev., S. 31-221; 1959, P.A. 580, S. 12; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 80; 1967, P.A. 842, S. 21; 1969, P.A. 696, S. 15; 1971, P.A. 351, S. 1; 1972, P.A. 136, S. 1; P.A. 77-119, S. 1; 77-554, S. 2; P.A. 79-376, S. 51; P.A. 81-469, S. 6, 8; P.A. 82-472, S. 110, 183; P.A. 85-189, S. 5; P.A. 86-21; 86-25; P.A. 87-277, S, 1, 4; 87-589, S. 58, 87; P.A. 88-29, S. 1, 2; P.A. 89-68, S. 2; P.A. 90-230, S. 54, 101; 90-311, S. 2, 3; P.A. 91-32, S. 37, 38, 41; 91-339, S. 38, 55; P.A. 93-228, S. 26, 35; 93-429, S. 3, 7; P.A. 95-277, S. 15, 16, 19; P.A. 96-242, S. 6, 10; P.A. 05-199, S. 10; P.A. 10-11, S. 1; P.A. 21-18, S. 6.)
*Note: Sections 8 and 9 of public act 96-242 are special in nature and therefore have not been codified but remain in full force and effect according to their terms.
History: 1959 act created second injury and compensation assurance fund and transferred assets of second injury fund to it on October 1, 1959; 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1967 act required that fund be maintained at $100,000 level rather than $50,000 level; 1969 act required self-insurers to pay 1.5% rather than 1% of their liability payments for preceding year, increased level at which to be maintained to $250,000, specified uses to which fund is to be put and required payment of assessment as a condition of doing business in state; 1971 act made provisions applicable to mutual insurance companies; 1972 act required payment of assessment within 30 days after notice by treasurer rather than “annually on or before July first”, increased payments to not more than 2% of preceding year's liability payments and replaced requirements re $250,000 level to be maintained in fund with provision allowing treasurer to make assessments to cover expenditure and maintain fund at $500,000 level; P.A. 77-119 increased assessment rate to 3.5%; P.A. 77-554 specified that funds be used for adjustments in compensation rate; P.A. 79-376 replaced “workmen's compensation” with “workers' compensation”; P.A. 81-469 provided that the amount of money expended by a carrier in payment of the state's liabilities under this chapter shall be exempted when calculating the payment due under section; P.A. 82-472 made a technical correction; P.A. 85-189 provided that each employer, other than the state and certain municipalities, is liable for assessments levied by the state treasurer to fund the second injury and compensation assurance fund; P.A. 86-21 provided that assessments shall be levied by the state treasurer against employers on whose behalf the second injury fund has made payments pursuant to Sec. 31-355; P.A. 86-25 increased the maximum assessment from 3.5% to 5% and increased the fund's minimum reserve from $500,000 to $1,000,000; P.A. 87-277 added provision re payment from fund of costs or expenses incurred by treasurer in carrying out provisions of part E of chapter 568; P.A. 87-589 changed effective date of P.A. 87-277 from July 1, 1988, to July 1, 1987; P.A. 88-29 added an interest penalty to be imposed on any employer who fails to make payment of an assessment when due to the second injury fund under the Workers' Compensation Act; P.A. 89-68 provided that the fund shall be used to provide the benefits set forth in Sec. 31-306(c); P.A. 90-230 corrected an omission; P.A. 90-311 removed the exemption from payment for municipalities participating in interlocal risk management agencies, effective July 1, 1991; P.A. 91-32 made technical changes; P.A. 91-339 added provisions re payments to the fund by the treasurer on behalf of the state and deleted reference to dependency allowance; P.A. 93-228 raised the amount of money to be contributed to the second injury fund by the state treasurer on behalf of the state from 5% of expenditures to the total amount of expenditures, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 93-429 authorized the state treasurer to adopt regulations re administrative practices, policies and procedures for the second injury fund, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 95-277 added a requirement that each private insurance carrier and each interlocal risk management agency annually submit to the Treasurer a report of the total standard earned premium collected in the preceding calendar year, effective June 29, 1995, and replaced provisions detailing funding of Second Injury Fund by employer contributions with provision authorizing Treasurer to develop such policies re determination of employers' contributions through regulations, effective January 1, 1996; P.A. 96-242 made existing language Subsec. (a) and made technical change concerning the reference to the State Treasurer, added provisions on the special assessment premium surcharge, specified April first as annual report deadline and required report to include projected total standard earned premium and added Subsec. (b) requiring State Treasurer to establish three accounts within the Second Injury Fund, effective June 6, 1996; P.A. 05-199 amended Subsec. (a) by substituting “calculated in accordance with the Second Injury Fund surcharge base” for “the special assessment premium surcharge” and “Second Injury Fund surcharge base” for “standard premiums”, subjecting insurance companies acting as collection agents for fund to penalty for failure to pay assessment, changing penalty to 15% or minimum of $50 on unpaid assessment or surcharge, and interest at 6% per annum on amounts owed on assessment or surcharge audits, to accrue 30 days after notice of unpaid audit assessment from fund for self-insured employers and from date of notice of audit errors or deficiencies for insurance companies, requiring Treasurer to notify employers of interest provision with notice of assessment, deleting requirement that State Treasurer, upon levy of assessment, pay to fund sum not to exceed total amount of money expended on behalf of state employees during period following last assessment, providing for application of partial payments, requiring each self-insurance group to submit annual report to Treasurer of projected total Second Injury Fund surcharge base for current calendar year and making technical changes, effective July 1, 2006; P.A. 10-11 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting “or a minimum of fifty dollars” and adding “or fifty dollars, whichever is greater” re penalty for failure to pay in accordance with regulations, effective May 5, 2010; P.A. 21-18 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting “and shall be assessed in accordance with subsection (f) of section 31-349,”, deleting reference to Sec. 31-349(f) in provision re the custodian's consideration of funding mechanisms in determining a factor for the annual surcharge and making technical changes.
See Sec. 31-289 re deposit of certain fines and penalties in Second Injury Fund.
Cited. 150 C. 156; 159 C. 53. “Second Injury Fund”, legislative history and purpose discussed. 166 C. 352. Cited. 171 C. 577; 174 C. 181; 210 C. 626; 212 C. 427; 226 C. 569.
Cited. 37 CA 835; 46 CA 346.
Sec. 31-354a. Assistant administrators of the Second Injury Fund.(a) The Treasurer may, in his discretion, appoint not more than four assistant administrators as necessary to assist him in carrying out his duties as custodian of the Second Injury Fund under section 31-354. Such assistant administrators shall be in the unclassified service and shall serve at the pleasure of the Treasurer. Such assistant administrators shall be sworn to the faithful discharge of their duties and shall perform such functions relating to the administration of the Second Injury Fund under sections 31-275 to 31-355a, inclusive, as the Treasurer may direct.
(b) Any administrative and personnel costs incurred pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be paid from the Second Injury Fund.
(May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-1, S. 1, 7.)
Cited. 37 CA 835.
Sec. 31-354b. Finance account within Second Injury Fund. Subaccounts. Duties of State Treasurer. (a) There is established within the Second Injury Fund an account to be known as the finance account. The account shall be administered by the State Treasurer as a trust fund in, and accounted for as an account within, the Second Injury Fund. The State Treasurer may enter into contracts that may be useful to the organization, establishment, operation and administration of the account. The finance account shall be funded, first, with state revenue bond proceeds and interest income or income earned on investment of moneys for disbursement purposes and, second, from the special assessment premium surcharges for payment of debt service and reserve requirements. All costs of organizing, establishing and operating the account, including the costs of personnel and contractual services and establishing billing and collection procedures, shall be a charge upon and paid by the State Treasurer from the account unless the State Treasurer otherwise determines to pay such costs from the operating account.
(b) There is established within the finance account (1) a single cost of issuance and finance administration subaccount, (2) a bond proceeds subaccount, and (3) a debt service and reserve subaccount, which subaccounts shall be held separate and apart from each other. Additional subaccounts may be established by the State Treasurer as he deems necessary.
(c) There shall be deposited in the bond proceeds subaccount proceeds of revenue bonds issued in accordance with section 8 of public act 96-242* for application, in accordance with the bond authorization documentation for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To pay in full the settlement of certain claims, including any interest due thereon; (2) to provide cash advances for payment of other claims pending receipt of anticipated current year assessments therefor; and (3) to provide for cost of issuance, capitalized interest, if necessary, reinsurance premiums, if any, and other cash flow requirements.
(d) There shall be deposited in the debt service and reserve subaccount, in accordance with the proceeding authorizing the bonds, the proceeds of the issuance of revenue bonds which are expected to be applied as capitalized interest to the extent required prior to receipt of special assessment premium surcharges and to provide for a reserve which shall not exceed the maximum debt service in any year.
(e) There shall be deposited in the cost of issuance and finance administration subaccount: (1) The proceeds of revenue bonds expected to be deposited into the said subaccount; and (2) any additional money received from employers in payment of special assessment premium surcharges established in accordance with section 31-354 to offset the costs and expenses of administering and operating the finance account.
(f) Investment earnings credited to the assets of the finance account and to any subaccount within the account shall become part of the assets of the Second Injury Fund and applied in accordance with the bond authorization documents. Any balance remaining in the account at the end of any fiscal year shall be carried forward in the account and subaccount for the next fiscal year.
(g) Upon the issuance of revenue bonds and to the extent there are sufficient proceeds or other amounts in the finance account available therefor, the State Treasurer may withdraw from the finance account, in accordance with the bond authorization documents amounts determined to be necessary for the purposes of section 9 of public act 96-242*. The State Treasurer shall, from time to time and at least annually, determine the amount of interest, amortization, reserve and associated costs required for the finance account under this section and such amounts shall be assessed as a special assessment premium surcharge as provided in section 31-354.
(h) Unless the context requires a different meaning, the term “bonds” or “revenue bonds” under this section and section 8 of public act 96-242* includes notes issued in anticipation of the issuance of revenue bonds or notes issued pursuant to a commercial paper program.
(P.A. 96-242, S. 7, 10.)
*Note: Sections 8 and 9 of public act 96-242 are special in nature and therefore have not been codified but remain in full force and effect according to their terms.
History: P.A. 96-242 effective June 6, 1996.
Sec. 31-355. Hearings; awards. Payments from Second Injury Fund on employer's failure to comply with award. Civil action for reimbursement. Insolvent insurer. Settlements and agreements. Failure of uninsured employer to pay. (a) The administrative law judge shall give notice to the Treasurer of all hearing of matters that may involve payment from the Second Injury Fund, and may make an award directing the Treasurer to make payment from the fund.
(b) When an award of compensation has been made under the provisions of this chapter against an employer who failed, neglected, refused or is unable to pay any type of benefit coming due as a consequence of such award or any adjustment in compensation required by this chapter, and whose insurer failed, neglected, refused or is unable to pay the compensation, such compensation shall be paid from the Second Injury Fund. The administrative law judge, on a finding of failure or inability to pay compensation, shall give notice to the Treasurer of the award, directing the Treasurer to make payment from the fund. Whenever liability to pay compensation is contested by the Treasurer, the Treasurer shall file with the administrative law judge, on or before the twenty-eighth day after the Treasurer has received an order of payment from the administrative law judge, a notice in accordance with a form prescribed by the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission stating that the right to compensation is contested, the name of the claimant, the name of the employer, the date of the alleged injury or death and the specific grounds on which the right to compensation is contested. A copy of the notice shall be sent to the employee. The administrative law judge shall hold a hearing on such contested liability at the request of the Treasurer or the employee in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. If the Treasurer fails to file the notice contesting liability within the time prescribed in this section, the Treasurer shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the compensability of such alleged injury or death from the Second Injury Fund and shall have no right thereafter to contest the employee's right to receive compensation on any grounds or contest the extent of the employee's disability.
(c) The employer and the insurer, if any, shall be liable to the state for any payments made out of the fund in accordance with this section or which the Treasurer has by award become obligated to make from the fund, together with cost of attorneys' fees as fixed by the court. If reimbursement is not made, or a plan for payment to the fund has not been agreed to by the Treasurer and employer, not later than ninety days after any payment from the fund, the Attorney General shall bring a civil action, in the superior court for the judicial district where the award was made, to recover all amounts paid by the fund pursuant to the award, plus double damages together with reasonable attorney's fees and costs as taxed by the court. Any amount paid to the Treasurer by the employer or insurer after the filing of an action, but prior to its completion, shall be subject to an interest charge of eighteen per cent per annum, calculated from the date of original payment from the fund.
(d) Any recovery made under this section, including any recovery for costs or attorney's fees, shall be paid into the fund. Any administrative or other costs or expenses incurred by the Attorney General in connection with carrying out the purposes of this section, including the hiring of necessary employees, shall be paid from the fund. The Treasurer shall adopt regulations, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54, which describe what constitutes a proper and sufficient “plan for payment to the fund” for the purposes of this section.
(e) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) to (d), inclusive, of this section, whenever the employer's insurer has been determined to be insolvent, as defined in section 38a-838, payments required under this section shall be the obligation of the Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association pursuant to the provisions of sections 38a-836 to 38a-853, inclusive.
(f) Notwithstanding subsection (b) of this section, the administrative law judge may approve a stipulated settlement for benefits between an injured worker and the Treasurer under this chapter at any time prior to or after the issuance of a finding and award against the employer if the administrative law judge determines that it is in the best interest of the injured workers to do so. Notice of the proposed settlement shall be sent to the employer by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the employer's last-known address on file with the Secretary of the State or local postal authority. The administrative law judge shall hold a hearing on such proposed settlement at the request of the employer in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. If the employer does not file with the Workers' Compensation Commission a written objection to the proposed settlement not later than twenty-eight days after the date of the notice to the employer of the proposed settlement, the employer shall be deemed to have consented to the proposed settlement and may not thereafter contest the terms of the settlement in any forum. Where payment has been ordered under this subsection, the terms of such order shall have the same status and be governed by the same provisions as an award issued pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.
(g) Nothing in this section shall preclude the Treasurer from entering into an agreement with the employer for the reimbursement of expenses, costs or benefits paid by the fund. The Treasurer, the uninsured employer, the injured worker, or the injured worker's beneficiaries, or a third party who is liable under section 31-293 may enter into a settlement agreement to finally or partially settle the rights and liabilities of any or all parties under this chapter, subject to the approval of the administrative law judge.
(h) When a finding and award of compensation has been made against an uninsured employer who fails to pay it, that compensation shall be paid from the Second Injury Fund, and if there are further claims for any related, reasonable and necessary treatment, payment shall by provided to the claimant without a subsequent finding and award.
(1959, P.A. 580, S. 13; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 81; 1969, P.A. 696, S. 16; P.A. 85-349, S. 2; P.A. 86-35, S. 1; P.A. 87-277, S. 2, 4; 87-589, S. 58, 87; P.A. 91-32, S. 39, 41; 91-207, S. 1, 9; P.A. 92-31, S. 6, 7; P.A. 05-199, S. 11; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; P.A. 22-89, S. 31.)
History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1969 act specified benefits to be considered as “compensation”; P.A. 85-349 required the attorney general to bring a civil action for reimbursement of the payments made by the fund, and assessed an interest charge of 18% on delinquent payments; P.A. 86-35 provided that any recovery of moneys pursuant to this section be paid into the second injury fund, that outside counsel may be used for reimbursement procedures and paid for from the fund, that treasurer may agree to a reimbursement payment plan in lieu of civil action, and that payments due from an insolvent workers' compensation insurer be the obligation of the Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association; P.A. 87-277 deleted provision re payment from fund of compensation for outside counsel and substituted provision re payment from fund of costs or expenses incurred by attorney general in carrying out purposes of section; P.A. 87-589 changed effective date of P.A. 87-277 from July 1, 1988 to July 1, 1987; P.A. 91-32 made technical changes, added new Subsec. (a), divided existing Subsec. (a) into Subsecs. (b) to (d), inclusive, and redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (e); P.A. 91-207 amended Subsec. (b) by adding provisions re notice whenever liability to pay compensation is contested by the treasurer; P.A. 92-31 made technical changes in Subsec. (b); P.A. 05-199 made technical changes in Subsecs. (a) to (c), amended Subsec. (b) to impose liability on Second Injury Fund for employer and insurer who neglected or refused to pay award of compensation and replace references to specific unpaid benefits with “any type of benefit coming due as a consequence of such award”, added Subsec. (f) re approval by commissioner of stipulated settlement between injured worker and Treasurer, added Subsec. (g) re settlement agreements and added Subsec. (h) re payment from fund of award of compensation against uninsured employer and payment of further claims without subsequent finding and award, effective July 1, 2006; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” in Subsecs. (a), (b), (f) and (g), effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 22-89 made a technical change in Subsec. (b), effective May 24, 2022.
Where injury complained of occurred prior to effective date of number 580 of the 1959 public acts, and award in favor of injured employee was made subsequent to that date, provisions of act apply to award so as to require State Treasurer to pay it. 150 C. 153. “Second Injury Fund”, legislative history and purpose discussed. 166 C. 352. Cited. 171 C. 577; 174 C. 181; 187 C. 53; 210 C. 626; 212 C. 427. Legislature intended that fund would be liable if employer were bankrupt, in which case no judgment could enter against it; commissioner's ability to enter award against employer's estate for the purpose of establishing fund's liability when a claim against the estate is barred by the nonclaim statute is necessary for the operation of section; commissioner need not determine whether a claim against employer's estate is barred by the nonclaim statute before entering award against the estate or ordering fund to make payments. 256 C. 456.
Cited. 24 CA 93; 37 CA 835; 46 CA 346; Id., 596. Creation of Second Injury Fund under section does not modify Sec. 31-291 and does not abrogate the liability of a governmental entity as a principal employer when the injured employee of the uninsured contractor or subcontractor qualifies for benefits under Sec. 31-291. 183 CA 612.
Cited. 28 CS 5.
Subsec. (b):
Purpose of section is to provide compensation for injured employee when employer fails to pay; section does not make distinctions concerning reasons for employer's failure to pay; no duty is imposed on commissioner to determine reasons for employer's failure to pay before imposing liability on the fund; there is no requirement that commissioner provide the fund with opportunity to contest liability in every case where an order to make payment is entered against the fund, regardless of whether the fund participated in prior proceedings. 256 C. 456. Subsec. is inapplicable for purposes of determining when appeal period begins to run under Sec. 31-301(a) re Second Injury Fund claim because the fund had already been participating in proceedings before Workers' Compensation Commission. 299 C. 376.
Subsec. (c):
Employer and its insurer are liable to reimburse the fund for any payment made to an employee. 256 C. 456.
Subsec. (e):
Jurisdiction of Workers' Compensation Commission to adjudicate claims originating under act against Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association discussed. 243 C. 438.
Sec. 31-355a. Collection of moneys owed to the Second Injury Fund. Tax warrants. Lien. Foreclosure. (a) Whenever the Second Injury Fund is required, pursuant to section 31-355, to pay benefits or compensation mandated by the provisions of this chapter for any employer or insurer who fails or is unable to make such payments, the amount so paid by the fund shall be collectible by any means provided by law for the collection of any tax due the state of Connecticut or any subdivision thereof, including any means provided by section 12-35. Tax warrants referred to in said section 12-35 may be signed by the State Treasurer.
(b) Any such amount due shall be a lien from the due date until discharged by payment against all the property of the employer or insurer within the state, whether real or personal, except such as is exempt from execution, including debts to the employer or insurer, and a certificate of such lien without specifically describing such real or personal property, signed by the State Treasurer, may be filed in the office of the clerk of any town in which such real property is situated, or, in the case of personal property, in the office of the Secretary of the State, which lien shall be effective from the date on which it is recorded. When any such amount with respect to which a lien has been recorded under the provisions of this section has been satisfied, the State Treasurer, upon request of any interested party, shall issue a certificate discharging such lien. Any action for the foreclosure of such lien shall be brought by the Attorney General in the name of the state in the superior court for the judicial district in which the property subject to such lien is situated or, if such property is located in two or more judicial districts, in the superior court for any one such judicial district and the court may limit the time for redemption or order the sale of such property or pass such other or further decree as it judges equitable. When the property to be liened is concealed in the hands of an agent or trustee so that it cannot be found or attached, or is a debt due to the employer, the certificate of lien may be filed by leaving a copy thereof with such agent, trustee or debtor, or by mailing to him a copy thereof by registered or certified mail, and from the time of the receipt of such lien all the effects of the employer or insurer in the hands of such agent or trustee and any debt due from such debtor to the employer or insurer shall be secured in the hands of such agent, trustee or debtor to pay the amount secured by such lien. The payment by such agent, trustee or debtor to the State Treasurer shall discharge him of his liability to the employer or insurer to the extent thereof. The State Treasurer may require such agent, trustee or debtor to disclose under oath within ten days whether he has in his hands the goods or effects of the employer or insurer or is indebted to him. If such agent, trustee or debtor fails to disclose or, having disclosed, fails to turn over such effects or pay to the State Treasurer the amount of his indebtedness to the employer or insurer, the lien shall have the effect of a judgment and the State Treasurer may proceed against him by scire facias taken out from the clerk of the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford in the manner provided in chapter 905 for scire facias against a garnishee.
(P.A. 86-173; P.A. 88-47, S. 2; 88-230, S. 1, 12; 88-364, S. 49, 123; P.A. 90-98, S. 1, 2; P.A. 91-207, S. 8, 9; P.A. 93-142, S. 4, 7, 8; P.A. 95-220, S. 4–6; P.A. 21-18, S. 7.)
History: P.A. 88-47 added the reference to Subsec. (c) of Sec. 31-349; P.A. 88-230 replaced “judicial district of Hartford-New Britain” with “judicial district of Hartford”, effective September 1, 1991; P.A. 88-364 made a technical change in Subsec. (b); P.A. 90-98 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1991, to September 1, 1993; P.A. 91-207 made a technical change to fund's name in Subsec. (a); P.A. 93-142 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1993, to September 1, 1996, effective June 14, 1993; P.A. 95-220 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1996, to September 1, 1998, effective July 1, 1995; P.A. 21-18 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting reference to Sec. 31-349(c) and making a technical change.
Cited. 37 CA 835.
Sec. 31-355b. Actions against entities failing to comply with Second Injury Fund reporting requirements.Upon request by the State Treasurer, the Attorney General is authorized to bring an action in the Superior Court against any employer or any private insurance carrier or interlocal risk management agency acting on behalf of an employer that fails to comply with the Second Injury Fund reporting requirements set forth in section 31-354 for injunctive relief requiring compliance with such reporting requirements.
(P.A. 01-40, S. 1.)