Federal Drivers Privacy Protection Act and Disclosure of Motor Vehicle Grand Lists by Local Assessors

The State Supreme Court has upheld a Superior Court ruling which held that motor vehicle grand lists compiled by local tax assessors using information received from the state Department of Motor Vehicles is not exempt from disclosure under the FOI Act pursuant to the Federal Drivers Privacy Protection Act (“FDPPA”) and Public Act 97-266, amending §14-10, G.S.  Pamela Davis v. Freedom of Information Commission, et al., 259 Conn. 45 (2002)

The case arose when an insurance investigator requested to inspect certain motor vehicle grand list books from the Bridgeport Tax Assessor.  The assessor denied access claiming that both the FDPPA and Public Act 97-266, amending §14-10, G.S., prohibited such disclosure.  The investigator then appealed to the FOI Commission. The FOIC concluded that neither the FDPPA nor Public Act 97-266, amending §14-10, G.S., prohibited disclosure by the assessor and that the assessor violated §1-210(a), G.S., of the FOI Act by failing to provide access.  In affirming the FOIC decision, the court noted that §14-163, G.S., requires the commissioner of motor vehicles to provide to the tax assessors in each town a list containing the names and addresses of the owners of motor vehicles in their respective towns, and that assessors, in carrying out their function, use the lists furnished to them to create motor vehicle grand lists for their towns.  The court then concluded that:  both the FDPPA (which prohibits state department of motor vehicles employees, officers or contractors from disclosing information about any individual obtained by the department of motor vehicles in connection with a motor vehicle record) and §14-10, as amended by P.A. 97-266 (which regulates the disclosure of personal information contained in the records of the department of motor vehicles) apply only to the department of motor vehicles and motor vehicle records; and that neither apply to the office of the tax assessor or motor vehicle grand list books. Therefore, the court concluded that the assessor improperly claimed that the grand list books were exempt from disclosure and that the FOIC correctly determined that the assessor had violated the FOI Act by failing to disclose such records.  The assessor appealed the superior court decision to the Appellate Court and the Supreme Court transferred the case to itself.  In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court adopted the Superior Court's decision in its entirety as a proper statement of the issues and applicable law.

Proceedings as Meetings Under the Freedom of Information Act
When public agency board members discuss agency business in private, which business does not fall within the executive session provisions, such discussions are “proceedings” of the agency and therefore “meetings” under the FOI Act, and are required to be conducted during the public meeting.  Meriden Board of Education v. Freedom of Information Commission et al., CV 99 0496503S, June 6, 2000, Cohn, J.

During a regular meeting, the Meriden Board of Education (“board”) recessed to research the issue of whether Robert’s Rules of Order permitted rescission of a prior vote of the board.  During the recess, three board members (along with a fourth member briefly), the superintendent of schools and the assistant superintendent met privately and discussed not only whether the board could rescind the prior vote, but also what a “contract” meant and whether the underlying issue being addressed by the board should be tabled.  The Freedom of Information (“FOI”) Commission concluded that the discussion was not a recess but rather a continuation of the board’s meeting in private, and that pursuant to the “meeting” definition set forth at §1-200(2), G.S., the discussion was a “proceeding” and therefore a “meeting” of the board.  The FOI Commission concluded further that the board violated the open meeting provisions of the FOI Act by discussing in private, matters that did not fall within the executive session provisions, and which therefore should have been discussed during the public meeting.  The court in affirming the FOI Commission’s decision concluded that the private discussion constituted a “proceeding” and therefore a “meeting” under the FOI Act because it was more than a “check” of Robert’s Rules, and was an integral part of the board’s discussion of a contentious issue.

Freedom of Information Act and Rules of Discovery

The Supreme Court recently ruled that a public agency must disclose records under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) even if those records are, or might be, subject to the rules of discovery in either federal or state court proceedings.  Chief of Police, Hartford Police Department v. Freedom of Information Commission et al., 252 Conn. 377 (2000).

The case arose when an attorney made a request under the FOIA, on behalf of his client, for copies of certain internal affairs investigation reports. The request was denied by the Hartford Police Chief. The attorney filed a complaint with the FOIC. Subsequently, the attorney also filed an action in U.S. district court against the City of Hartford and the officer who was the subject of the internal investigations, claiming various civil rights violations. The attorney then requested the same information he had requested under the FOIA through discovery proceedings in the federal action. When he appeared before the FOIC, the Chief claimed that the provision in the FOIA stating that "nothing in [the FOIA] shall be deemed in any manner to limit the rights of litigants under the laws of discovery of this state", exempted the subject records from disclosure. The FOIC concluded that disclosure of the internal investigation records would not limit the rights of litigants and ordered their disclosure. On appeal, the superior court and the appellate courts concluded that the term "to limit the rights of litigants under the laws of discovery of this state" should be interpreted as prohibiting the use of the FOIA to restrict the rights of parties seeking information through discovery; and that an exemption to disclosure under the FOIA, does not by itself preclude a litigant from obtaining the same documents through discovery.