These findings of fact are derived from the Complaint, the pleadings, the testimony of witnesses at the Public Hearing and the exhibits admitted into evidence. Only those facts deemed necessary to an understanding of the issues raised at the Public Hearing and discussed in this decision are set forth herein.

1. All procedural and jurisdictional prerequisites to a public hearing have been met.
2. The Complainant has a high school diploma and has worked in various jobs since she was 16 years old; including sales person and donut finisher at Dunkin Donuts, candy manufacturer at Munson’s Candy, cashier and courtesy desk associate at Caldor’s, assistant manager at Video Galaxy, pharmacy technician at Stop & Shop Pharmacy, store manager at Basket People, and floral designer at Ames. (Tr. 80-85, 88-89; Exh. C-2)
3. The Complainant applied for a job at the North Windham Wal-Mart and was hired as a Pharmacy Sales Associate on November 9, 1993. (Tr. 90-91, 93) She worked in that position for 10 months. (Tr. 101). In her first performance evaluation, which was given after 90 days of employment, she received the second highest rating, entitled "exceeds requirements." (Tr. 103; Exh. C-6)
4. Due to her good performance, the Complainant was promoted to Personnel Manager on or about September 14, 1994. (Tr. 107; Exh. C-7) She moved from the pharmacy division within the store to Division One, which was under the control of the store manager and assistant managers. (Tr. 109-110) Although the title implies management, this was an hourly position. (Tr. 120)
5. Within approximately one week of her promotion, Respondent Noll became the store manager in September of 1994. (Tr. 110, 1123)
6. One of the main duties of Personnel Manager included meeting with associates and listening to their concerns. (Tr. 113-14) Other duties included making the associates aware of the equal employment opportunity procedures, posting the appropriate notices, and coordinating reasonable accommodations for disabled associates. (Tr. 115-16)
7. The Complainant took tutorials through computer-based learning, or "CBLs" on equal employment opportunity policies and sexual harassment. (Tr. 110, 133) She also learned just about all of her job duties through the CBL’s, except for payroll, which she learned from a support manager. (Tr. 119)
8. On October 31, 1994 the Complainant received an evaluation in which she was given the highest rating of "Above Standard." (Exh. C-8)
9. On April 25, 1995 the Complainant received a commendation and a raise from Respondent Noll which provided that she was doing an "outstanding" job in personnel. (Tr. 159; Exh. C-9)
10. On September 30, 1995, Brian Jarvis gave her an annual performance evaluation in which she was rated "above standard" and was given a raise. (Tr. 162; Exh. C-10)
11. In winter of 1995, the Complainant witnessed Respondent Noll rubbing the shoulders of the UPC associate, Lucy St. John, in the UPC office. (Tr. 174). She witnessed this conduct often, continuing into 1996. (Tr. 175, 180) The Complainant believed this conduct to be more than that between friends. (Tr. 177) The Complainant considered this conduct to constitute sexual harassment. (Tr. 749)
12. Also in 1995, the Complainant witnessed Respondent Noll rub the shoulders of another associate, Heather Saucier, but this conduct occurred only once and was perceived by the Complainant as more "friendly" than that with Lucy St. John. (Tr. 178-79) The Complainant did not perceive this behavior to be sexual harassment. (Tr. 753) She also witnessed Respondent Noll rub the shoulders of Colleen Gilmore a couple of times in the same friendly manner. (Tr. 179)
13. The Complainant believed that Respondent Noll and Lucy St. John were having a relationship outside of work because she would see them get into each other’s cars at the end of the work day on an ongoing basis. (Tr. 180, 187, 259, 746-47, 832)
14. The Complainant believed that a consensual relationship between Respondent Noll and Lucy St. John was sexual harassment. (Tr. 748)
15. Two associates came to the Complainant in her capacity as Personnel Manager with concerns about the relationship between Respondent Noll and Lucy St. John. (Tr. 188-89) Ellie Belanger spoke to her about it, (Tr. 191) and Karen Canova spoke to her about it (Tr. 193).
16. Karen Canova expressed a concern to the Complainant that Lucy St. John was receiving special treatment from Respondent Noll. (Tr. 193) Ms. Canova told the Complainant she had witnessed Lucy St. John walk off her job (Tr. 193).
17. The Complainant also overheard what she perceived to be an argument between Respondent Noll and Lucy St. John in the UPC office in which Lucy St. John stormed out. (Tr. 196-200).
18. Walking out on one’s job was against Wal-Mart policy as set forth in the Associate handbook, and would subject the associate to discipline. (Tr. 202-03, 206; Exh. C-15)
19. The Complainant did not believe Lucy St. John was ever disciplined for the instances she walked off the job and therefore also believed that Lucy St. John was receiving preferential treatment. (Tr. 207-08). She also believed that Lucy St. John did not regularly report to work during her scheduled hours, (Tr. 210) and did not take her required lunch breaks. (Tr. 211)
20. Lucy St. John was, in fact, disciplined for walking off of the job. (Tr. 1154, 1252, 1460) Furthermore, Lucy St. John had a flexible work schedule, as did others who worked in the back offices, including the Complainant, which merely required her to work 8 hours within a day. (Tr. 1295, 1407, 1447)
21. Shortly before the Complainant left the employment of Respondent Wal-Mart, the jewelry department manager, Gale Abbott, came to the Complainant in her capacity as Personnel Manager to complain that she was informed by two girls within her department that Respondent Noll was continually asking them out for dates. (Tr. 255, 290) The Complainant told her to speak with the district manager. (Tr. 290)
22. An associate, Michelle Landry, came to the Complainant to complain that Respondent Noll was flirting with her in spite of her telling him to stop. (Tr. 264-65) She was in Division One. (Tr. 265) The Complainant informed her she needed to go through the chain of command, which included: first her supervisor, then the district manager, then further up the corporate ladder. (Tr. 265)
23. The Complainant told any associates that came to her to complain about Respondent Noll to speak with Respondent Noll. (Tr. 267)
24. The Complainant believed Respondent Noll was also having a romantic relationship with Kim Bergeron, Colleen Gilmore, and Jessie Kimbal. (Tr. 274, 954, 957)
25. The Complainant never complained to Respondent Noll about his sexual harassment of associates or about what she believed to be assistant manager Andrew Cray’s sexual harassment nor did she speak to him about his allegedly telling her not to hire various protected classes, or his use of alleged derogatory terms. (Tr. 1150, 1176, 1199-1201)
26. The Complainant routinely spoke with district manager Celester Davis whenever he was visiting the store and also mentioned one day that store morale was low and that he should let associates know that he was in the store so that they would be able to talk to him. (Tr. 300-01)
27. In another conversation, the Complainant told Celester Davis that he should be available to associates on a day that Respondent Noll was not in the office because they feared retaliation from Respondent Noll. (Tr. 303-04)
28. The Complainant never complained to Celester Davis about Respondent Noll’s conduct, including sexual harassment, or about his allegedly telling her not to hire various protected classes or his alleged use of derogatory terms.
29. At the end of August, 1996, (Tr. 38) the Complainant spoke to district manager Dennis Teel at a meeting of personnel managers in Putnam, Connecticut (Tr. 306) She went over associate scheduling. (Tr. 315-16, 804) She also discussed some payroll issues. (Tr. 338)
30. When the Complainant returned to the store, Respondent Noll appeared very agitated and told her he would speak to her later. (Tr. 339) He later made a comment to her about being loyal to the company. (Tr. 340-41)
31. The Complainant sensed Respondent Noll’s behavior toward her changed after her meeting with Dennis Teel. She believed he was short with her, he did not take her questions or ideas seriously. She felt he would talk to her only when necessary. (Tr. 342-44) Other times she believed he would have Andrew Cray talk to her, instead. (Tr. 345)
32. Due to her meeting with Dennis Teel, the Complainant believed she was receiving work requiring her to stay more than her allotted 8 hours per day. (Tr. 347-48)
33. On Monday, September 30, 1996, the Complainant received a phone call at work that her father was in critical condition. The Complainant reported to Respondent Noll that she needed to leave for that reason. He died that day. (Tr. 432-33, 434)
34. Later that evening the Complainant called Respondent Noll and told him that she would not be in the rest of the week on bereavement time. (Tr. 433, 1135) Bereavement time covers three days. (Tr. 434, 1135; Exh. C-21) Respondent Noll asked her to call him the following day with the arrangements. (Tr. 436, 458)
35. Tuesday, October 1, 1996, the Complainant called Respondent Noll and told him she would not be in the rest of the week. (Tr. 436; Exh. C-18A) Respondent Noll did not voice any disapproval to her. (Tr. 436) At that point, she had vacation time saved that would expire on November 9, 1996 (her anniversary date). She had also been instructed previously that she could not take any vacation time after October 15^th due to the busy hiring season. (Tr. 436, 447, 984)
36. At the time of the Complainant’s father’s death, the store was gearing up its hiring. (Tr. 624, 1215) Approximately 30 people needed to be hired and trained for the Christmas season. (Tr. 984, 1138) Respondent Wal-Mart was behind in its hiring at the time of the Complainant’s father’s death. (Tr. 625)
37. October 1, 2, and 3, 1996 the Complainant used her bereavement leave and October 4, 1996 the Complainant used a personal day. (Tr. 446, 1136)
38. On Saturday, October 5, 1996, the Complainant called the store and spoke to Lori Beck. (Tr. 446-47) She informed Lori that she would be taking a vacation week the following week to get her father’s things in order. (Tr. 447, 450) Lori Beck told her to call Andrew Cray first thing on Monday morning. (Tr. 447)
39. On Monday, October 7, 1996, assistant manager Clifton Perkins informed Andrew Cray of the Complainant’s situation and that she would be calling him for vacation leave. (Tr. 983, 1019)
40. Andrew Cray immediately called Respondent Noll, who was on a one-week vacation, and was told to call Dennis Teel to determine what they should do. (Tr. 983, 1137-39) He and Respondent Noll had decided to offer the Complainant a leave of absence to accommodate her. (Tr. 983, 1138, 1215) They also discussed temporarily putting someone else in her position. (Tr. 1140-41)
41. Next, Andrew Cray telephoned Dennis Teel. (Tr. 780, 985) Andrew Cray told him that the Complainant was not able to return from her bereavement leave and asked what he should do. Dennis Teel told him to assess the situation and put her on a leave of absence until she was able to return. (Tr. 780, 985) This was the Respondent Wal-Mart’s policy. (Tr. 780, 985, 1242-44; Exh. C-21) They further discussed staffing the Personnel Manager position temporarily in order to continue the hiring process in the holiday season because they were already understaffed. (Tr. 781)
42. After speaking with Respondent Noll and Dennis Teel, on Monday, October 7, 1996, Andrew Cray received a call from the Complainant. Because Respondent Noll was on vacation that week, Andrew Cray was in charge of the store. (Tr. 450, 1245) The Complainant informed Andrew Cray that she would be taking that week as vacation. Andrew Cray responded that they needed her in the store and tried to get her in sooner. (Tr. 451, 986) She told him that she needed the vacation as an emergency to get her father’s things in order and to "get her feet back on the ground." (Tr. 451, 986)
43. Andrew responded that because he had to run the store and she could not be there when she was needed that maybe she would consider temporarily stepping into another position with less stress. (Tr. 451, 936, 987) Andrew Cray also referred to the fact that her mother had recently died in January of 1995 and expressed a concern that she would be unable to perform her functions in personnel during this busy time with the stress of the additional loss of her father. (Tr. 451-52) He stated that he had spoken with Respondent Noll who shared this concern. (Tr. 452) The Complainant did not respond or voice an opinion. (Tr. 987-88) The Complainant decided to take her vacation and discuss the matter with Respondent Noll the following week. (Tr. 451)
44. The conversation ended that the Complainant was on vacation and she would talk to Respondent Noll when he returned the following Monday. (Tr. 452-53, 988)
45. During the Complainant’s telephone conversation with Andrew Cray on October 7, 1996, Andrew Cray did not at any time terminate her. (Tr. 987-88, 1003, 1019) Andrew Cray did not have authority to terminate the Complainant. (Tr. 1003, 1144)
46. Upon termination of an employee, Respondent Wal-Mart’s policy is to conduct an exit interview and have the employee sign a form. (Tr. 597, 1142) An exit interview form was ultimately filled out for the Complainant but she was not present and could not sign. (Tr. 1142, 1224)
47. Gaston Simoneau, a sales manager, was initially placed into the Personnel Manager position temporarily. (Tr. 1141, 1143, 1193-94, 1375; Exh. R-18) He took over the position permanently when the Complainant refused an offer from Jim Wilburn for her job back. (Tr. 1143-44) Respondent Noll determined this to be a lateral transfer in which Gaston Simoneau received no adjustment in pay. (Tr. 1193, 1293, 1389; Exhs. R-21, R-43)
48. Prior to this conversation, the Complainant had no problems with her job performance. (Tr. 104, 166, 453, 1131)
49. Prior to October of 1996, Dennis Teel had spoken to the Complainant about 8-12 times. (Tr. 781) Her main concern was Respondent Noll’s people skills and that he did not spend the time she needed him to spend with her. She would bring up this concern almost every conversation that they had. (Tr. 782)
50. On October 8, 1996, two associates, Karen Canova and Anita Edwards called the Complainant to see how she was doing and they informed her that at the morning meetings it was announced that the Complainant had stepped down as Personnel Manager and that Gaston Simoneau would be in Personnel. (Tr. 453-54; Exh. C-18A) She was told that Gaston Simoneau replaced her on Monday, October 7, 1996. (Tr. 454) They further told her that they had heard she had suffered a nervous breakdown. (Tr. 454-55)
51. Other people that had called her included Clifton Perkins, Jeff Labranche, Renee Hence, Kelly Sanborn, Sue Dickinson, Deb DeVito, and Beth (Bukowski) Jones. (Tr. 455)
52. After hearing the rumors including that Gaston Simoneau had been placed in her position, on October 9, 1996 the Complainant went to the store with her name badge, keys to the Personnel Office, discount card, and a letter with her accrued personal and vacation time. (Tr. 463, 472, 474; Exh. C-17) She also gave a letter stating she was unjustly asked to "step down of [her] position as Personnel Manager." (Tr. 471; Exh. C-28) She had intended to hand them to Andrew Cray when she saw Lori Beck in the parking lot. Gaston Simoneau and Sydney Waldron were standing to the side of Lori Beck. Lori Beck confirmed that Simoneau was in personnel. At that point the Complainant handed over her name badge, discount card, and the letter. (Tr. 463, 1525; Exh. C-17)
53. Lori Beck told the Complainant to talk to Andrew Cray but the Complainant refused. (Tr. 463-64, 1525) The Complainant told Lori Beck she was handing in everything necessary and wished Gaston Simoneau luck and said she thought he would do a good job. (Tr. 464, 1527) The Complainant got into her car and left. (Tr. 464)
54. Lori Beck gave the Complainant’s things to Andrew Cray and told him that the Complainant had quit. (Tr. 989)
55. On Monday, October 14, 1996, the day Respondent Noll returned from vacation, the Complainant called Respondent Noll at the store more than once and left messages. (Tr. 475-76) Respondent Noll never received these messages. (Tr. 1303) He telephoned her but was told that she was not at home. (Tr. 1322)
56. The following day, the Complainant called the home office of Respondent Wal-Mart. She was ultimately transferred to Lisa Coudin in Regional Personnel. (Tr. 476-77, 1028) The Complainant told her of her attempts to reach Respondent Noll and that he had not returned her calls. (Tr. 477)
57. The Complainant told Lisa Coudin that she had been terminated. (Tr. 478)
58. About 2 hours after this conversation, Lisa Coudin called the Complainant and asked if she would be willing to speak with a new District Manager, Jim Wilburn. She said she would. (Tr. 484-85)
59. Later that night Jim Wilburn called the Complainant to arrange a meeting. (Tr. 486)
60. A couple of days later the Complainant had a meeting with Jim Wilburn in the snack bar of the North Windham store. (Tr. 486, 1544) The Complainant told him that she was terminated for taking the extra time to grieve her father’s death. (Tr. 487, 1544-45, 1549, 1553) The Complainant told Jim Wilburn that Respondent Noll was fraternizing with associates. (Tr. 1545)
61. Jim Wilburn offered the Complainant her job back. (Tr. 487, 494, 844, 1546) She discussed her fear of returning to the store and being retaliated against. (Tr. 488, 1547) He assured her that she would not be retaliated against in his district. (Tr. 494-95) Jim Wilburn also offered her another job in another store within his district, such as Oxford or Putnam. (Tr. 1548) The Complainant told him she would think about it. (Tr. 495)
62. Jim Wilburn met with Respondent Noll and Andrew Cray to discuss the Complainant’s allegations and to tell them that he offered the Complainant her job back. (Tr. 1030-31, 1145-46, 1551-52)
63. The Complainant believed that Respondent Noll had been watching her meeting with Jim Wilburn and afterward she felt that he had given her a look of contempt that confirmed her fear of retaliation if she returned. (Tr. 497)
64. Jim Wilburn called the Complainant on Monday and the Complainant told him she could not return to the North Windham store due to her fear of retaliation nor would she work at the other stores. (Tr. 497, 1551)
65. Jim Wilburn told Respondent Noll that Lisa Coudin would be coming to the Wal-Mart store to investigate the allegations of the Complainant and that he should take the day off. (Tr. 1327)
66. The Complainant applied for unemployment compensation. Respondent Wal-Mart contested her application claiming that the complainant had voluntarily quit and was not discharged. (Tr. 498; Exh. C-18A) The Complainant ultimately received unemployment compensation benefits. (Tr. 508)
67. The Complainant was paid bi-weekly during her employment with Respondent Wal-Mart and a regular work week was Monday through Friday. (Tr. 510, 531)
68. The Complainant commenced employment with Respondent Wal-Mart earning $6.00 per hour, and at the time of her termination of employment with Respondent Wal-Mart, was earning $8.30 per hour. (Tr. 870, 874; Exh. C-12)
69. Gaston Simoneau was paid more than the Complainant when they both started to work at Wal-Mart because he began as a department manager and she began as a sales clerk. (Tr. 1197) Respondent Noll was not the store manager at that time and did not have any role in setting their initial rates of pay. (Tr. 1197)
70. Gaston Simoneau was earning more than the Complainant prior to her becoming Personnel Manager. (Tr. 893) He was an employee of the North Windham store prior to Respondent Noll becoming store manager. (Tr. 895)
71. Prior to beginning his employment with Wal-Mart, Gaston Simoneau had prior experience in the hiring, firing, disciplining, and management of personnel. (Tr. 1354-59; Exh. R-29) He had attended a management training program and received commendations from one of his former employers. (Tr. 1360-61; Exh. R-30)
72. In his position as Personnel Manager, Gaston Simoneau has been excluded from management meetings. (Tr. 1391)
73. At the end of 1996, there were approximately 130-140 female employees in the North Windham store, and 40-50 male employees. (Tr. 1129; Exh. R-42)
74. Department managers are paid more than associates. (Tr. 1129)

The Complainant alleges the Respondents violated the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes §§ 46a-51 et seq. ("CFEPA") and its corresponding provisions within Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). More specifically, the Complainant alleges gender discrimination, a violation of General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(1), which makes it unlawful:

Retaliation is alleged pursuant to subsection (a)(4) of § 46a-60 which makes it unlawful:

The Respondents are further alleged to have violated (a)(5) of § 46a-60, which prohibits:

The federal counterparts to the above state statutes have similar language. Section 2000e-2 of Title VII states:

Retaliation is prohibited by § 2000e-3:

The legal standards established for the federal statutes may be applied to Connecticut law. "Although we are not bound by federal interpretation of Title VII provisions, we have often looked to federal employment discrimination law for guidance in enforcing our own anti-discrimination statute." Brittel v. Department of Correction, 247 Conn. 148, 164, 717 A.2d 1254 (1998); State v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 211 Conn. 464, 469-70, 559 A.2d 1120 (1989). "Federal law defines the beginning and not the end of our approach to the subject." State v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, supra, at 470. It is widely accepted that the same legal standards apply to claims under CFEPA as to claims under Title VII. Levy v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 35 Conn.App. 474, 646 A.2d 893 (1994), aff’d, 236 Conn. 96, 671 A.2d 349 (1996); Sedotto v. Borg-Warner Protective Services Corporation, 94 F.Supp.2d 251, 268 (D.Conn.2000)

In cases such as this, where there is no direct evidence of employment discrimination, "the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine model of analysis must be employed." Ann Howard’s Apricots Restaurant, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 237 Conn. 209, 225, 676 A.2d 844 (1996); Langner v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Company, 2000 WL 158325 (Conn.Super.2000) *4. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981).

"McDonnell Douglas and subsequent decisions have established an allocation of the burden of production and an order for the presentation of proof in . . . discriminatory-treatment cases." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 2000 WL 743663, *5, 120 S.Ct 2097, 2106 (U.S.2000). The Complainant must first set forth a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. If the Complainant succeeds, the burden shifts to the Respondent to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. Id. "The burden is one of production, not persuasion; it can involve no credibility assessment." Id. If the Respondent carries this burden, it then shifts back to the Complainant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence "that the legitimate reasons. . . were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." Id., at *6. This burden-shifting analysis applies both to the Complainant’s allegations of retaliation and gender discrimination. Langner v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Company, supra, at *4; Curran v. All Waste Systems, Inc., 2000 WL 639999, *3, 213 F.3d 625 (2^nd Cir.2000); Sedotto v. Borg-Warner, supra, at 268.

The Complainant claims that the Respondents’ alleged termination of her employment constituted discriminatory retaliation. As set forth above, the initial analysis must focus on whether the Complainant has established a prima facie case. This means she must establish the following three elements under state and federal law:

1. She participated in a protected activity known to the Respondents;
2. An employment action disadvantaging the Complainant;
3. A causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Curran v. All Waste Systems, Inc., supra, at *3.

The burden at the prima facie stage of a retaliation claim is de minimis. Id.; Richardson v. New York State Dept of Correctional Services, 180 F.3d 426, 444 n. 4 (2d Cir.1999).

The Complainant testified that she complained specifically about these unlawful practices several times. First, she alleges she complained repeatedly to Respondent Noll, himself. (Tr. 257) I do not find any credible evidence to support this, however. Not only does Respondent Noll deny that she ever complained to him about these specific unlawful employment practices (Tr. 1150), she cannot remember any specific dates or times that she made these complaints to him. She does not even know how many times she complained to him about it. (Tr. 734) If she had made these specific complaints to him, he would have been required to commence an investigation—at least as to Andrew Cray’s conduct—which was never done. Yet, when sexual harassment was reported to him against Clifton Perkins, he immediately commenced an investigation and obtained written statements pursuant to store policy. (Tr. 1198) Also, she was not just any employee within the store, but the Personnel Manager, someone whose job it was to be intimately aware of the state and federal laws on unlawful discrimination including sexual harassment, as well as the store’s policies on sexual harassment and discrimination. Although the law does not require a written complaint, I would expect that someone in her position would certainly know better and would have placed something in writing. Particularly since she could be held individually liable for implementing any discriminatory hiring practices. Furthermore, the allegations she makes about being told specifically not to hire particular protected classes, shock the conscience. If these allegations were true, I would expect someone in her position to demand an immediate meeting, if not with Respondent Noll, then certainly with his superiors, including district management. Yet again, there are no written documents to support any of her complaints, in spite of the extreme nature of these allegations. Although she claims his conduct was ongoing, she does not even claim to speak to someone in district management about it until August of 1996, almost two years after hearing and knowing about these alleged unlawful practices.

The Respondent Wal-Mart has a clear sexual harassment policy set forth within its Associate Handbook (Exh. C-15, p.14) which directs employees to "immediately report the offensive conduct to your immediate supervisor or member of the Coaching team. . .[or] contact your Regional Personnel/Zone Personnel representative." The Open Door Policy posted all of the levels of management’s pictures and phone numbers in the employee lounge and the training room (Tr. 1210), and the Complainant clearly had access to these numbers. In spite of this access, she does not contact Regional Personnel until after she was allegedly terminated and district management until after a period of almost two years in the position of Personnel Manager. Furthermore, the Personnel Guide (Exh. C-13, p.11) requires an immediate investigation of harassment charges by the manager/supervisor. If the Complainant realized that Respondent Noll was not conducting an investigation, she should have immediately demanded one from the next level of management or from Regional Personnel. Based on these circumstances, I find it hard to believe the Complainant ever made such complaints to Respondent Noll.

The Complainant also alleges she complained to district manager Celester Davis. Again, I do not find this to be credible as she does not remember any date or time, and she does not testify that her complaints were specific to sexual harassment or to Respondent Noll and/or Andrew Cray’s directions to her about not hiring protected classes. (Tr. 736) There is no written record of any such complaint, even from Celester Davis who would be required to commence an immediate investigation. (Tr. 736) In fact, the Complainant admits she does not know whether she spoke to Mr. Davis about Respondent Noll and his unlawful conduct. (Tr. 738) The only specific complaint she remembers had to do with Respondent Noll’s personality and his "hyperness." (Tr. 738-39) This is not the protected activity contemplated by General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(4) and Title VII. I also find it relevant that there is no mention in the Complaint that the Complainant made any complaints to Celester Davis. The Complaint, filed with the Commission on March 17, 1997, would certainly be closer in time to the events set forth therein so one would assume her memory would be more accurate. Therefore, I have concluded that the Complainant did not complain about sexual harassment or discriminatory hiring practices of Respondent Noll or anyone else to Celester Davis.

The Complainant’s first specific memory of a complaint to district management was at a meeting of personnel managers which included district manager Dennis Teel in August of 1996. However, again, there is no evidence supporting her claims that she complained to him about sexual harassment and discriminatory hiring practices. (Tr. 317, 336) She has a specific memory of complaining about fraternization, the use of disparaging terms and scheduling, but she does not remember specifically saying "sexual harassment." Although she claims she said Respondent Noll was dating associates, she did not name any associates. (Tr. 318) Not only does Dennis Teel deny she made such complaints to him, but he also did not conduct any investigation as required by Wal-Mart policy, which he was required to do if she had made such complaints. (Tr. 785)

There is proof, however, that the Complainant did complain to district manager Jim Wilburn, but those complaints occurred after the Complainant turned in her things to Lori Beck in the parking lot of the Wal-Mart store. Still, she did not inform him of any alleged unlawful employment practices, such as the retaliation against her for her prior complaints to management or sexual harassment or Respondent Noll’s discriminatory hiring instructions. Instead, she complains solely of fraternization within the store to him. (Tr. 1544, 1545, 1553) Although at this point there can be no adverse employment action against the Complainant as she is no longer working for the store, one would think that the Complainant would have at least characterized her discharge to Jim Wilburn as retaliation. Instead, the only retaliation mentioned is what she feared would occur if she accepted his offer of reinstatement. I find this to be further evidence that she had made no prior complaints. Just as Wal-Mart policy requires, Jim Wilburn immediately commenced an investigation related solely to the fraternization, based on her complaint, which ultimately he concluded was baseless. (Tr. 1550)

The Complainant simply was not a credible witness. Although she testified to having made these complaints, other than her testimony, there was no corroborating evidence. Having observed and listened to her testimony over the course of several days, I came to characterize her testimony and her demeanor as evasive, vague at best, contradictory, and often illogical. Her inability to give a straight answer to even the simplest of questions and her constant requests to repeat the questions asked of her proved to be exasperating at times but ultimately diminished her credibility.

Contradictions in her testimony were rampant. To list just a few examples, she admitted telling the unemployment compensation commission that she was demoted, but claimed at the time of her testimony that that statement was untrue and she was actually terminated. (Tr. 640; Exh. C-18A) She testified that even though paragraph 13 of her Complaint does not state that she informed Respondent Noll she would take the following week as vacation, her testimony that she did tell him is correct and not her complaint. (Tr. 644) She first testified that two associates and Andrew Cray were listening when Celester Davis came into the store to talk but then she changed her story that they were present when Dennis Teel came into the store. (Tr. 703-05) In her evidence on damages, she requests backpay based on a 40-hour work-week yet during her entire employment with the Respondents, it was a rare occurrence that she actually worked a 40-hour workweek. (Tr. 680, 682; Exhs. C-12, C-32) Other concerns arose in that she could not affirmatively state at one point that there were more female employees in the store than male employees, (Tr. 671) and more female department managers than male department managers, (Tr. 672) even though she was the Personnel Manager, someone it would be assumed would automatically be aware of such facts.

In sum, there was just no evidence of Complainant’s complaints to any member of management other than her testimony, which, as described above, was vague, at best and not believable. Based on the above, I find that the Complainant did not complain about unlawful discriminatory employment practices to Respondent Noll, district manager Celester Davis, district manager Dennis Teel, nor to district manager Jim Wilburn.

The next problem with the first prong of the Complainant’s prima facie case, lies in her "good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying employment practice was unlawful." The unlawful employment practices that she allegedly complained about were: (i) sexual harassment; (ii) discriminatory hiring instructions from Respondent Noll and Andrew Cray; and (iii) disparaging terms used about protected classes.

While I do find that the Complainant believed that there was sexual harassment in the store, I do not find that this was a reasonable belief in that it is based solely on rumor and her illogical interpretation of others’ behavior within the store. The sexual harassment most referred to by the Complainant in her testimony, was the alleged dating relationship between Respondent Noll and Lucy St. John. Setting aside the facts that Respondent Noll was married and his wife actually worked for another Wal-Mart store, and that Lucy St. John had a boyfriend with whom she lived (Tr. 831, 1463), the Complainant’s basis for this belief was irrational. The Complainant based this belief on the following: (1) she thought she saw Respondent Noll rub Lucy St. John’s shoulders in a sensual way; (2) she saw the two get into each other’s cars; (3) she believed Lucy St. John received preferential treatment, i.e. she was not disciplined when she walked off her job several times and she had no set hours (Tr. 232, 248, 693); (4) she saw Respondent Noll have lunch with Lucy St. John (Tr. 732); and (5) other associates told her of the relationship and that pictures existed of the two of them (Tr. 254). However, she never heard from Respondent Noll or from Lucy St. John whether this was true or not. Although she claims to have "spoken" to Respondent Noll, her office was so close to Lucy St. John’s office (Tr. 1449), and she had a friendly relationship with her, I cannot believe that as Personnel Manager, she did not approach Lucy and ask if she was in an uncomfortable or unwanted situation. She never did. (Tr. 1478) She should have, because she would have immediately learned the falsity of her assumptions. And, of course, Lucy, herself, never approached the Complainant in her capacity of Personnel Manager to complain of the alleged relationship. The Complainant admits she has no facts to support this assumption that the two were involved in a relationship. (Tr. 746)

Both Lucy and Respondent Noll denied any relationship ever existed. (Tr. 1273, 1470) What further lessens the plausibility of a relationship between Respondent Noll and St. John, is the fact that the Complainant also believed Respondent Noll was dating other associates at the same time. He credibly denies this. (Tr. 991, 992, 994) She points to Colleen Gilmore, Kim Bergeron, Jessie Kimball, Claudine DuRocher and Barbie Calderwood as all involved with Respondent Noll. (Tr. 753-56) He credibly denies this. (Tr. 1148, 1271, 1273-75) She also believed Andrew Cray was dating some of the same associates, including Kim Bergeron (Tr. 685). Yet, none of these many girls, when the alleged relationships inevitably soured, ever complained to anyone of sexual harassment.

Furthermore, if the Complainant had bothered to investigate her assumptions about St. John and Respondent Noll, she would have learned the truth. First, she saw Respondent Noll rub the shoulders of other associates in a way she did not take to be sensual; in any event, St. John has no memory of him rubbing her shoulders at all. (Tr. 1474, 1477) The two regularly got into each other’s cars to do audits, or STARs, of other stores. (Tr. 1152, 1472) The two had lunch out with each other along with other associates. (Tr. 1471) Lucy St. John was, in fact, disciplined for the one time she walked off of her job. (Tr. 1153) She had a flexible schedule like that of everyone in the back offices, including the Complainant. (Tr. 1155, 1295, 1447, 1449) The fact that other associates told her of a relationship between the two is just more evidence that, while there were rumors about the relationship, rumors are not facts. The Complainant, as an adult, should have known better. In fact, I think she did know better and that is why she failed to formally complain about the sexual harassment to any member of management or to ask Lucy St. John, herself, if the rumors were true.

As far as the associates that she claims came to her office to complain about harassment from Respondent Noll, she testified that she told all of them to speak to Respondent Noll about it. In her capacity as Personnel Manager, again, she should have known better. First of all, the Personnel Guide specifically mentions Regional Personnel or district management as other options. It is beyond reason to send someone claiming harassment to their alleged harasser to "talk about it." If these events occurred, it was up to the Personnel Manager, pursuant to the Personnel Guide, to formally report it, either in writing or through an immediate meeting. Such a meeting she would clearly remember if it had happened. The Complainant, therefore, did not have a good faith, reasonable belief that sexual harassment was occurring in the store by Respondent Noll and Andrew Cray.

As far as the disparaging terms used by Respondent Noll about protected classes, (Tr. 278, 281, 284-85) set forth in Paragraphs 32-33 of the Complaint, and the discriminatory hiring instructions he allegedly gave to the Complainant, (Tr. 280, 283, 286) I also find that the Complainant did not have a good faith, reasonable belief of such unlawful conduct. First of all, the disparaging terms alleged to be used, as well as the blatant discriminatory hiring instructions are so horrible and so outrageous that I find it hard to believe that the Complainant would be the only one to have heard them. None of the people these comments were allegedly made about heard them or complained to the Complainant about them. Secondly, in her capacity of Personnel Manager, she should have called for an immediate meeting with district management or Regional Personnel to discuss these utterances and instructions, particularly since Respondent Noll was her supervisor and she would be disobeying his instructions. If she did not disobey his instructions, then she, too, could be liable for discriminatory hiring pursuant to Connecticut law. This she did not do. I particularly find it hard to believe that she did not file a formal complaint when she allegedly heard a joke about epileptics having sex. Given, as she testified, that her daughter had epilepsy and it truly upset her, I find it surprising that she did not formally complain, as that comment had a direct effect on her. Again, that leads me to believe that these comments and instructions did not occur and were not believed in good faith.

The Complainant called Clifton Perkins, a former assistant manager, as a witness and he corroborates that he heard Respondent Noll use disparaging terms about protected classes. (Tr. 355) He also claims he saw Lucy St. John walk off her job three times. (Tr. 359) He claimed St. John received preferential treatment because she was not disciplined for walking off the job, yet when he left early he was disciplined. (Tr. 360) The problem with this comparison is that he, as assistant manager, was a managerial employee who left no assistant manager in charge when he left his job. The two positions and resulting consequences are in no way similar. Unfortunately, he clearly showed that he had an axe to grind and therefore a bias against Respondent Noll. He also admitted to being friends with the Complainant. (Tr. 384) Although he voluntarily left employment with Wal-Mart, (Tr. 1171) while he was there he received poor performance evaluations, (Tr. 390, 1169) and even blames Respondent Noll for the loss of his subsequent job. (Tr. 423) I did not take him to be a very credible witness.

Deb DeVito was also a witness with a bias against the Respondents. She apparently quit her job with Respondent Wal-Mart and then applied for unemployment compensation benefits which the Respondents contested. (Tr. 1073) Although I am unclear as to exactly what her value was to the Complainant’s case, she corroborates Lucy St. John walking off the job, (Tr. 1056-57) which is not in dispute, and she also believed the rumors that Respondent Noll was dating St. John. (Tr. 1064) I did not give any weight to her testimony.

The final difficulty with the Complainant meeting the first prong of her prima facie case, is that, even if I believe that she did complain and that it was about "reasonable, good faith beliefs about unlawful employment practices," she has presented no proof that this protected activity was, in fact, known to the Respondents. As for her alleged repeated complaints to Respondent Noll, he denies receiving any such complaints and she has nothing in writing. (Tr. 1150, 1176, 1198) The Complainant claims that he became "standoffish" after she complained; however, she always had problems with his personality, as did other associates. (Tr. 738-39, 782, 1394, 1454) Respondent Noll also denies knowing she ever complained to district managers Celester Davis and Dennis Teel. (Tr. 1176, 1203) Dennis Teel denies she ever spoke to him about sexual harassment. (Tr. 785) The Complainant testified Noll knew of these complaints because he was upset with her after her meeting with Teel, saying he would talk to her later, yet she never testified if they ever had such a talk, what he meant about being loyal to the company, or that Noll ever admitted to her knowing she spoke to Dennis Teel. Because the Complainant has also failed to show knowledge by the Respondents of these complaints I find that she has failed to establish the first element of her prima facie case.

Even if the Complainant had proven the first element of her prima facie case, she cannot establish the second element, that an adverse employment action occurred. The Commission and the Complainant assert that the Complainant was terminated in retaliation for her meeting with district manager Dennis Teel. The Respondents state that the Complainant was never terminated but that she quit her job when she turned in her badge and other store items in the parking lot of the store. I find that the Complainant was not terminated and that she effectively quit her employment with Respondent Wal-Mart.

An adverse action is a "materially adverse change" in the terms and conditions of employment. Curran v. All Waste Systems, Inc., 2000 WL 639999, *3, 213 f.3d 625 (2d Cir.2000); Richardson v. New York State Department of Correctional Service, 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2d Cir.1999).

 "Because there are no bright-line rules, courts must pore over each case to determine whether the challenged employment action reaches the level of ‘adverse.’" Richardson, supra, at 446. "An adverse action is not every action that the employee dislikes or disagrees with. Rather a reasonable person must view the decision as adverse." Leson v. ARI of Connecticut, Inc., 51 F.Supp.2d 135, 142 (D.Conn.1999).

Here, the Complainant claims the adverse action was that she was terminated. She bases this on several factors which stem from her telephone call to assistant manager Andrew Cray on October 7, 1996 in which she informs him she will be taking an additional week vacation in bereavement of her father’s death. The Complainant claims Andrew Cray terminated her during this telephone call because he informs her she will no longer be working in personnel. In spite of believing this, she decides to take the matter up with her supervisor, Respondent Noll, when he returns from vacation. However, this is where rumors come into play again. The Complainant hears from several associates that telephoned her at home that it was announced she had "stepped down" as Personnel Manager and that Gaston Simoneau had replaced her. Based on this, she drives to the store, happens to run into Lori Beck, Gaston Simoneau and Sydney Waldron in the parking lot, and turns in her name badge, keys, discount card, a letter with her accrued personal and vacation time and a written statement that she was unjustly asked to "step down of [her] position as Personnel Manager." She wished Gaston Simoneau luck in his new position.

The Respondents argue that Andrew Cray did not terminate the Complainant on October 7, 1996, that he did not have the authority to terminate the Complainant, and that the Complainant’s actions in turning in her property and wishing Gaston Simoneau luck reveal that she quit. I agree.

"Whether an employee has been discharged depends on the reasonable inference an employee could draw from what her employer said." Chertkova v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 92 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir.1996). The analysis must center on the "reasonable perceptions of the employee, not on whether formal words of firing were in fact spoken." Id. I conclude it was not a reasonable perception of the Complainant to believe that she had been terminated.

The complainant, in her capacity as Personnel Manager, knew the job duties and responsibilities of all positions within the store. She also knew that her supervisor was the store manager, Respondent Noll, and not assistant manager Andrew Cray. Therefore, she knew that Andrew Cray did not have authority to terminate her. (Tr. 1003, 1144) This is evident when she testified that she believed Andrew Cray had told her she was "no longer in personnel." Rather than accept this statement, she decided to take the matter up with her supervisor upon his return. (Tr. 451) This clearly is not someone who believed she was terminated. At this point the dispute was over whether she would be paid for this additional week off. She next testified that many of her friends that were associates in the store, including her daughter, told her that it had been announced that Gaston Simoneau had replaced her as Personnel Manager. This time, rather than deciding to keep her initial plans of waiting for Respondent Noll to return, the Complainant wrote a letter saying, not that it was unfair that she was terminated or fired, but instead that she was unjustly asked to "step down of [her] position as Personnel Manager." (Exh. C-28) She turns in all of her property, including her keys to another assistant manager, Lori Beck, who she also knew did not have the authority to terminate her. Lori Beck then logically informs Andrew Cray that the Complainant had quit. It was not at all reasonable for the Complainant to conclude that she had been terminated based solely on rumors from people without any knowledge or authority as to her true employment status.

These are clear acts of a person who has quit. If she truly felt that she was terminated unfairly, it would be up to her to have either gone into the store to discuss what was going on with Andrew Cray, who could then have told her the replacement would be temporary, or to report to work on Monday, October 14, 1996 and discuss the matter with her supervisor, Respondent Noll. She did neither of these things. In fact, the only person with authority to terminate her was Respondent Noll, who was not even in the store at the time of these events to effect such an action.

The Complainant claims she attempted to call Respondent Noll upon his return but her calls were unreturned. However, even if she felt that Respondent Noll was intentionally failing to return her calls, there was nothing preventing her from driving to the store and speaking to him. Instead, she chose to call in a complaint with the corporate offices.

Further evidence of her choosing to end her employment rather than being terminated can be found in the fact that there was no progressive discipline prior to her exit, in that she received no prior warnings, coachings, or poor performance evaluations. In fact, the Respondents still admit that they had no problems with her performance. No exit interview was conducted with her. I find particularly telling the wording in her letter to the store, in which she specifically cites just that she was "unjustly asked to step down of my position"—not that she was terminated. And finally, in her application for unemployment compensation, she tells the intake worker that she was demoted in her call to Andrew Cray. (Exh. C-18A) This shows that it was not until she heard the rumors from store associates that she would quit. If she had simply confronted any one of the parties involved, such as Andrew Cray and Respondent Noll, rather than rely on the interpretation of her circumstances from those who had nothing to do with it, the whole matter could have been cleared up, she would have been paid for her additional week of leave, and she could still be working there today.

The Respondent’s position at the public hearing has been consistent. Upon the Complainant’s application for unemployment, the Respondent contested the application on the very basis that she quit. (Exh. C-18A) This could not be perceived as an act of retaliation, in that they also contested the unemployment application of another associate who quit, Complainant’s witness, Deb DeVito. The Commission points to the Referee’s decision that awarded the Complainant benefits as evidence that the Complainant was terminated. I disagree. The standard applicable in such hearings is whether she was discharged for "willful misconduct." (Exh. C-18B) If willful misconduct is found, an applicant is denied benefits. Here, it was not found and she was awarded benefits. Furthermore, unlike this pubic hearing in which Andrew Cray testified as did Dennis Teel, the Associate Appeals Referee heard only from witnesses with no first-hand knowledge. (Exh. C-18B) That hearing is hardly dispositive of the issues in this case, specifically whether an adverse action was taken by the Respondents, in light of the testimony and evidence presented during the public hearing.

The Complainant’s witnesses testified that they were told the Complainant was terminated. Clifton Perkins testified Andrew Cray told him that Respondent Noll instructed him that the Complainant would be terminated if she did not return from leave. (Tr. 365) Conversely, Andrew Cray, a witness not motivated by a current working relationship with the Respondent Wal-Mart, (Tr. 982) testified that Respondent Noll said no such thing and he, in turn, said no such thing to Clifton Perkins. (Tr. 997) Respondent Noll also testified that he never gave such an instruction. Given that Andrew Cray and Respondent Noll had first-hand knowledge as to their own conversation and my concerns over the biases and credibility of Clifton Perkins, I do not give any weight to this testimony of Clifton Perkins.

Additionally Deb DeVito testified that Gaston Simoneau told her the Complainant was fired. (Tr. 1053) Again, given my concerns expressed earlier about her biases against Respondent Wal-Mart and in favor of her friend, the Complainant, I did not give any weight to this testimony, particularly when Gaston Simoneau denied this conversation and testified that he saw the Complainant hand over her property to Lori Beck and he, too, assumed she was quitting. (Tr. 1382-83).

The Complainant called another witness, Darlene Rich. Ms. Rich testified that when she asked Respondent Noll where the Complainant was, Respondent Noll informed her that she had been "let go due to nonscheduled time off." (Tr. 1605, 1609) Respondent Noll denies this conversation took place. (Tr.1655) Again, I doubt Ms. Rich’s testimony. First, she contradicted herself and it appeared she did not remember Respondent Noll’s exact words, which are critical to the issue. (Tr. 1609) Second, I find it hard to believe that had Respondent Noll actually terminated the Complainant, that he, as the store manager, would discuss not only that she had been terminated, but also the reason for the termination with any other associate that happened to ask. Again, I did not give any weight to Ms. Rich’s testimony.

The Complainant also points to other instances as evidence of retaliation where, after she allegedly made her complaints to Respondent Noll, district manager Celester Davis and district manager Dennis Teel, Respondent Noll became "standoffish" to her and treated her differently, avoiding her and relying on Andrew Cray to talk to her instead. (Tr. 287, 292, 293) She claims he no longer included her in management meetings. (Tr. 288) She also suddenly received more work after speaking with Dennis Teel. (Tr. 347) The Commission points to these instances as adverse actions. I have already discussed above that I do not find that these complaints occurred. However, even if they had, they do not constitute "materially adverse changes in the terms and conditions of her employment."

To begin, Respondent Noll’s "standoffishness" can hardly be attributed to retaliation when almost every witness of both the Complainant and Respondent all testified to Respondent Noll’s difficult personality. In fact, Dennis Teel had testified that the only thing he ever spoke to the Complainant about was Respondent Noll’s personality problems. The Complainant testified that she specifically remembered speaking to Celester Davis about Respondent Noll’s personality. (Tr. 738-39) There is not enough evidence of a dramatic change in personality that can be attributed directly to any complaints made by the Complainant.

Furthermore, there is no evidence about how this alleged personality change, or refusal to talk to her affected the terms and conditions of her employment. Although the Complainant testified that it made it difficult for her to do her job, she does not clarify. She states she was excluded from management meetings, yet there was no reason for her to be there given that she was not a member of management and it did not interfere with the performance of her job. (Tr. 1221) There is no evidence that she was left unable to perform any of her required duties and responsibilities, no evidence of poor performance reviews or any sudden occurrence of coachings or discipline. In fact, she claims she complained to Respondent Noll throughout 1995 yet she received excellent performance reviews. (Exhs. C-9, C-10) Her claimed additional work came after her August 1996 meeting with Dennis Teel, yet this was the beginning of the busy time of the year. Furthermore, in a review of her employee time in the period including August 1996 to her discharge, which are calculated bi-weekly, she never once worked a full 80 hours in any two-week period. (Exh. C-12) Therefore, even if I found that the Complainant had complained, this alleged personality change in Respondent Noll does not constitute an adverse action disadvantaging the Complainant, nor does her claimed exclusion from management meetings and alleged additional workload.

The law is clear that a transfer in positions can constitute an adverse change if it is accompanied by a decrease in salary or benefits or even status. Garber v. New York City Police Department, 159 F.3d 1346, 1998 WL 514222, *3 (2d Cir.1998). However, there was no evidence presented as to what position the Respondent Wal-Mart had determined they would temporarily place the Complainant into. The evidence presented showed only that it would be temporary, with no guidance as to how long this period would be, and would result in no reduction in salary. Of course, if the Complainant was forced from her position of Personnel Manager, only one of which exists in the store, to that of department manager, of which there are several, that could be perceived as a loss of status and potentially constitute an adverse employment action. However, there is no evidence of what that other position would have been because the Complainant never spoke to her supervisor to find out.

Based on the above, the Complainant has not established the second element of her prima facie case.

Because it is here determined that the Complainant has not established either of the first two prongs of her prima facie case, it is not necessary to discuss the third element, which requires a causal connection between the first two. Therefore, the Complainant’s allegations against the Respondents for unlawful retaliation pursuant to General Statutes §§ 46a-60(a)(4) and Title VII must fail, as must the state claim of aiding and abetting pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(5). I do not find that the Respondent Wal-Mart nor Respondent Noll aided, abetted or attempted to retaliate against the Complainant because there were no complaints made of unlawful employment practices that were known to them and no Respondent terminated or attempted to terminate the Complainant.

The Complainant claims that she was replaced by a male Personnel Manager, Gaston Simoneau, who received a higher pay than she, although he was less experienced, and he received training for the position, although she never did. She alleges this to be gender discrimination. The Respondent counters that Gaston Simoneau received a higher salary because he had been earning a higher salary prior to replacing the Complainant, and that he, in fact, did have prior personnel experience.

The main problem with Complainant’s claims of gender discrimination is that it is unclear exactly what her claims are. Either she claims unequal pay pursuant to Title VII because of her allegations that Gaston Simoneau was paid higher than she for the same job, or she claims discrimination in her termination because of her gender. Surprisingly, the Commission entirely failed to brief this issue and the Complaint provides little to no guidance. Therefore, I am forced to address both prima facie burdens.

Claims of unequal pay for equal work under Title VII are analyzed under the same standards as in the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) claims. Tomka v. Seiler Corporation, 66 F.3d 1295, 1312 (2d Cir.1995). The difference is that Title VII claimants must have evidence of discriminatory animus in order to make out a prima face case of intentional sex-based salary discrimination. Id., at 1313. Therefore, the prima facie case to be established here requires the following four elements:

Even if the Complainant is able to establish the first three elements, she fails to produce any evidence of the fourth element, and this claim also must be dismissed.

The position held by the Complainant, Personnel Manager, was the only one in the store. The Complainant has not made any allegations nor has she shown any evidence that the Respondent Wal-Mart paid its male employees a higher rate than its female employees for any other positions. Therefore, the comparison in wages lies in what she was paid while she was employed, and what her replacement, Gaston Simoneau was paid after her separation from employment. The Complainant has introduced evidence to satisfy the first prong of this prima facie case, in that her final rate of pay, after several raises, upon her separation was $8.30 per hour (Exh. C-12), while Gaston Simoneau’s initial rate of pay was $9.30 in October of 1996 and increased to $9.77 in November of 1996. (Tr. 1389; Exh. R-21)

The second and third prongs of the prima facie case are also met. There was only one Personnel Manager position and Gaston Simoneau replaced the Complainant for that position. As no evidence has been presented that the requirements of the position had changed at the time it was assumed by Gaston Simoneau, it is established that the position entailed the same skill, effort and responsibility. Furthermore, both the Complainant and Gaston Simoneau faced similar working conditions, in that they worked the same shift, though a flexible schedule, and in the same office of the same store.

It is the fourth prong which presents the most difficulty. The Complainant has not presented any evidence that suggests she was paid less than her male replacement because of her gender. Although she claims that he had no personnel experience, the Respondent showed that he, in fact, had more personnel experience than the Complainant did at the time she had been hired. He had three managerial jobs, prior to his employment with Wal-Mart, in which he was responsible for hiring personnel. (Exh. R-29) He also had completed a management training program with a prior employer and received commendations for his management skills. (Exh. R-30) This does not raise an inference of discrimination. Nor does the allegation that he, unlike she, was not asked to forfeit his pay raise, as she was upon assuming the responsibilities of Personnel Manager. (Tr. 894, 924; Exh. C-7) To this, the Respondents pointed out that when Gaston Simoneau was finally appointed the permanent replacement, it was a lateral transfer from his prior position of sales manager, and therefore that requirement did not apply. The fact that he was sent for training, when she alleges she did not receive any despite repeated requests, (Tr. 119) also does not suggest gender discrimination. It was perfectly understandable that the Respondent would have to send its new replacement for immediate training, especially since he was taking over the Complainant’s job at the busiest possible time, and he needed to jump right into hiring and scheduling without any prior guidance. Therefore, the Complainant has failed to establish that Respondent Wal-Mart had any discriminatory intent under this model of prima facie case. None of her reasons suggest that the difference in pay was due to gender.

The other model of prima facie case would apply to the Complainant’s vague claims that she was terminated due to her gender. This model requires the following elements to be established:

The Complainant clearly meets the first and second elements of her prima facie case. As a woman, she belongs to a protected class, and the Respondents do not dispute that she was performing her duties satisfactorily. However, as set forth in my analysis of her retaliation claims, the Complainant was not terminated. It is here, that her prima facie case for gender discrimination fails, for the reasons set forth earlier.

She could not have met the fourth prong, either. "Evidence that a similarly situated employee not in the protected class was treated differently from the plaintiff allows for an inference of discrimination." Shumway, supra, at 63; Ortiz v. Prudential Insurance Co., 94 F.Supp.2d 225, 234 (D.Conn.2000). " To be ‘similarly situated,’ the individuals with whom [the Complainant] attempts to compare herself must be similarly situated in all material respects." Shumway, supra, at 64. Gaston Simoneau was not similarly situated to the Complainant. First, he began his employment at Wal-Mart at a higher rate of pay than the Complainant. (Exhs. C-12, R-21) Therefore, with the raises earned through the years, (Exhs. R-12, R-15, R-16, R-17, R-18) he ultimately held a position that was in the same class as Personnel Manager, that of sales manager, unlike the Complainant, who was promoted into the position of Personnel Manager. (Exh. C-7, R-42) Because his transfer into the Personnel Manager position was lateral, he was not required to agree to a lower rate of pay in the event he changed positions, as the Complainant was required. At the time of his transfer into the position, he had been earning, as a sales manager, a higher rate of pay, which was not changed upon the transfer. I find that all of these conditions do not support any inference of discrimination because Gaston Simoneau was not similarly situated to the Complainant. Therefore, the Complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case under this model of gender discrimination, as well.

Based on the above, the Complainant’s claims of gender discrimination pursuant to Title VII and General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(1) are dismissed. Her claims against the Respondents pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(5) are also dismissed based on her failure to establish a prima facie case.

Therefore, because the Complainant cannot establish a prima facie case for retaliation or gender discrimination under state or federal law, judgment must enter for the Respondents and the Complaint is dismissed.