Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities

0130212, Smith v. Lee, et al., Final Decision, Hearing in Damages

0130212, Smith v. Lee, et al., Final Decision, Hearing in Damages

CHRO No. 0130212

Commission on Human Rights and

Opportunities ex rel.

Alex Smith, Complainant : 

v.

Tony Lee, d/b/a

Better Built Transmissions, Respondent : July 27, 2001

FINAL DECISION – HEARING IN DAMAGES

AFTER THE ENTRY OF AN ORDER OF DEFAULT

On November 13, 2000, Alex Smith ("complainant") filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ("commission"). In his complaint, the complainant alleged that Tony Lee, doing business as Better Built Transmissions, ("respondent") illegally discriminated against him in violation of General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(1) ("CFEPA"). He alleged that he was harassed, discriminated against in the terms and conditions of his employment, and constructively discharged because of his race and color. For the reasons stated herein, the respondent is found to have illegally discriminated against the complainant.

The complainant is awarded $48,496.00 together with further relief as set forth herein.

I. PARTIES

The complainant resides at 145 Vance Street, New Britain, Connecticut. He was represented by Attorney Robert J. McKay, Davila & Dilzer, 1232 Corbin Avenue, New Britain, Connecticut. The commission is located at 21 Grand Street, Hartford, Connecticut and was represented by Attorney David L. Kent. The respondent’s place of business is located at 154 S. Riverside Drive, Pequabuck, Connecticut.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The complaint was filed on November 13, 2000. On May 14, 2001, the chief of field operations, acting as designee for the executive director of the commission, entered an "Entry of Default Order" against the respondent pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-83. Pursuant to General Statutes §§ 46a-57 and 46a-83, the undersigned was appointed as the presiding referee to determine the relief necessary to eliminate the discriminatory practice complained of and make the complainant whole. Notice was given that a hearing was scheduled for June 28, 2001. On June 28, 2001, the hearing was held. The complainant and the commission appeared to prosecute the action. The respondent did not appear. The transcript was filed on July 17, 2001. The complainant’s Affidavit of Debt was filed on July 20, 2001, at which time the record closed.

III. FINDINGS OF FACT

References to testimony are to the witness and the transcript page ("Tr.") where the testimony is found. The commission was the sole party to introduce exhibits. Its exhibits are denoted as "CHRO Ex." followed by the exhibit number.

Based upon the complaint, exhibits, and testimony, the following facts relevant to this decision are found:

  1. All procedural, notice, and jurisdictional prerequisites have been satisfied and this matter is properly before this presiding officer to hear the complaint and render a decision. (CHRO Exs. 1– 6.)
  2. By certified mail dated November 20, 2000, the commission served a copy of the complaint on the respondent, advised him to file an answer to the complaint, and informed him that failure to file an answer could result in a default. The respondent received the complaint on November 29, 2000 as indicated by his signature on the return receipt or "green card". (CHRO Ex. 2.)
  3. By correspondence dated February 26, 2001, the commission again advised the respondent to file an answer and that his failure to file an answer could result in a default. (CHRO Ex. 3.)
  4. By memorandum dated April 9, 2001, the acting regional manager of the commission’s Waterbury office requested of the executive director that she enter a default order against the respondent for his failure to file an answer to the complaint. A copy of this memorandum was sent to the respondent by certified mail, return receipt requested. The respondent received the copy of the memorandum on April 10, 2001 as indicated by his signature on the return receipt. (CHRO Ex. 4.)
  5. By correspondence dated May 16, 2001 ("Notice of Hearing in Damages Pursuant to an Order of Default Entered by the Executive Director"), the respondent was informed of the entry of an order of default. He was further informed that a hearing in damages would be held on June 28, 2001. The notice included a copy of the complaint and order of default. The respondent received the correspondence on May 29, 2001 as indicated by his signature on the return receipt. (CHRO Ex. 6.)
  6. The complainant is a member of one or more protected classes, in that he is a 38-year old black, African American. (Complainant, Tr. 20; CHRO Ex. 1.)
  7. The respondent employs at least four people and, as the complainant’s boss, supervised the complainant. (Complainant, Tr. 14, 18; CHRO Ex. 1.)
  8. From approximately 1992 to August 2000, the complainant was employed as an auto mechanic at Smith Brothers Transmission, located in Plainville, Connecticut. He initially earned $8.50 per hour. As of August 2000, he was earning $20.00 per hour. (Complainant, Tr. 10, 12.)
  9. For approximately one year, the respondent called the complainant numerous times at the complainant’s home and work to ask the complainant to come work for him. The respondent eventually offered the complainant a salary of $24.00 per hour. Because the respondent was offering him better compensation, the complainant accepted the offer. (Complainant, Tr. 10-12, 15-16.)
  10. Smith Brothers replaced the complainant by hiring two mechanics. (Complainant, Tr. 14.)
  11. The respondent’s premises includes a sign which states "Parking for rebels only" with a confederate flag included. The respondent’s vehicle has "Redneck" prominently displayed on the front windshield. (Complainant, Tr. 10; CHRO Ex. 1.)
  12. Prior to commencing employment with the respondent, the complainant asked the respondent not to use the word "nigger" in his presence. The respondent agreed. (Complainant, Tr. 10, 13.)
  13. The complainant began working for the respondent on August 14, 2001. (Complainant, Tr. 14; CHRO Ex. 1.) His hours were 8:00AM – 5:00PM (Complainant, Tr. 15), for a 40-hour workweek. (Complainant, Tr. 22.)
  14. At the time of his employment, the complainant was the only person of color employed by the respondent. (CHRO Ex. 1.)
  15. Notwithstanding his agreement with the complainant, the respondent called the complainant his "new nigger". (CHRO Ex. 1.)
  16. Notwithstanding his agreement with the complainant to pay him $24.00 per hour, the respondent only paid him $19.00 per hour. (Complainant, Tr. 19-20.)
  17. Although the complainant again asked the respondent not to use the word "nigger", the respondent repeatedly continued to use the word. (Complainant, Tr. 18.)
  18. The respondent called the complainant a "clean nigger" after the complainant went home one day to change his clothes. (Complainant, Tr. 16; CHRO Ex. 1.)
  19. The respondent pushed the complainant and said to him "You think you can beat this big redneck?" (CHRO Ex. 1.)
  20. The respondent told racial jokes. (Complainant, Tr. 17.)
  21. The respondent called the complainant "nigger" on at several occasions in front of customers. (Complainant, Tr. 15-17; CHRO Ex. 1.)
  22. The respondent’s racial epithets and jokes were an almost daily occurrence. (Complainant, Tr. 18.)
  23. The respondent’s repeated racial epithets and jokes made the complainant feel small (Complainant, Tr. 13), unhappy, (Complainant, Tr. 16), angry (Complainant, Tr. 17), and hate for the world. (Complainant, Tr. 23.)
  24. The complainant was given more jobs to do than was given to the respondent’s white employees. (CHRO Ex. 1.)
  25. As the respondent continued his racial epithets despite the complainant’s requests that he stop, the complainant’s only alternatives were to continue working for the respondent or to quit. (Complainant, Tr. 18.)
  26. As a result of the respondent’s repeated racial comments, the complainant quit his job on August 25, 2001. (Complainant, Tr. 18; CHRO Ex. 1.)
  27. The complainant collected unemployment compensation for a period of time between August 28, 2000 and October 16, 2000 that totaled $1,884. (Complainant, Tr. 27; Affidavit of Debt.)
  28. The complainant, after reasonable diligence, began work as an auto mechanic with Transmission Works on October 13, 2000. He earns $16.50 per hour or $660 per week or $2,838 per month (at 4.3 weeks per month). (Complainant, Tr. 21-22, 26, 31-32.)
  29. It will take the complainant approximately four years to earn $24.00 per hour. (Complainant, Tr. 32.)
  30. The respondent promised the complainant $24.00 per hour for a forty-hour week. The complainant’s current job pays him $16.50 per hour for a forty-hour week, a shortage to the complainant of $7.50 per hour, or $300 per week or $1290 per month (at 4.3 weeks per month).
  31. As a result of the complainant’s mitigation, his income from the date of termination, August 25, 2000, to the date of this decision, July 27, 2001, totaled $28,944, consisting of $1,884 in unemployment compensation benefits and $27,060 in salary from Transmission Works. Had the complainant remained employed by the respondent, his income from this same period would have totaled $48,080, based upon $24.00 per hour per 40-hour week for 48 weeks. This difference between what his income from the respondent would have been and his actual income represents a loss to the complainant of $17,136 in back pay for this period.
  32. Given the animus exhibited by the respondent toward the complainant based on his race and color, reinstatement is not a viable alternative.

IV. ANALYSIS

While the hearing is to determine the relief necessary to eliminate the discriminatory practice and make the complainant whole, this decision also discusses the complainant’s success, through his prima facie case, in establishing an unrebutted inference of actionable discriminatory conduct committed by the respondent that warrants the relief awarded.

A. APPLICABLE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

General Statutes § 46a-60 (a) provides in relevant part that "It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) for an employer, by himself or his agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against him in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual’s race, color …; (5) For any person, whether an employer or an employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any act declared to be a discriminatory employment practice or to attempt to do so; …."

In a hearing held pursuant to the entry of an order of default by the executive director or designee, the hearing is limited to determining the relief necessary to eliminate the discriminatory practice and make the complainant whole. General Statutes § 46a-83(i). Allegations in the complaint that are not answered by the respondent are deemed admitted without the need for further proof. Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46a-54-94(b).

B. APPLICABLE CASE LAW

  1. Disparate treatment

The complainant alleges that he was treated differently because of his race and/or color. To prove a race discrimination claim, the complainant must first establish a prima facie case; that is, "1) he belongs to a protected class; 2) he was qualified for the position in question; 3) despite his qualifications, he suffered an adverse employment decision; and 4) the decision was made under circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination." Delgado v. Achieve Global f/k/a Learning International, Inc., 2000 WL 1861853 *5 (Conn. Super., November 15, 2000) citing Levy v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 236 Conn. 96, 107 (1996).

"Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include the employer’s criticism of the plaintiff’s performance in ethnically degrading terms or its invidious comments about others in the employee’s protected group or the more favorable treatment of employees not in the employee’s protected group or the sequences of events leading to the plaintiff’s discharge [or] the timing of the discharge …." (Internal quotation marks and punctuation omitted; citations omitted.) Delgado, supra, 2000 WL 1861853 *6.

If the complainant establishes his prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination is created. The burden of production then shifts to the respondent to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Once the respondent articulates such a reason, the complainant must then show by a preponderance of the evidence that the articulated reason is a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Levy, supra, 236 Conn. 107-108.

  • Hostile work environment
    •

    To prove a hostile work environment claim, the complainant must establish that (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) that he was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment was based upon his protected class; "(4) the harassment affected a term, condition or privilege of employment (i.e., that the harassment was sufficiently pervasive or severe to create an abusive work environment); and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action." Britell v. State of Connecticut, Department of Correction, 1997 WL 583840 *13 (Conn. Super., September 9, 1997) aff’d, 247 Conn. 148 (1998).

    "To satisfy the fourth element or requirement, the … harassment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment. Mere utterances of … epithets which perhaps give rise to offensive feelings on the part of an employee are not sufficient. … [T]he standard of pervasiveness or severity has both objective and subjective implications. The conduct at issue must create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment, one that a reasonable person, in the plaintiff’s situation, would find to be hostile or abusive. Similarly, if a victim does not subjectively view the environment to be abusive, the conduct cannot be found to have altered the conditions of the victim’s employment." Britell, supra, 1997 WL 583840 *14.

    However, "not all allegations of harassment are actionable. … The abuse must be severe and pervasive; the incidents must be persistent, not isolated." (Internal citations omitted; quotation marks omitted.) Massey v. Connecticut Mental Health Center, 1998 WL 470590 *4 (Conn Super., July 31, 1998). "To establish a claim of hostile work environment, the workplace (must be) permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted.) Brittell v. Department of Correction, 247 Conn. 148, 166-167 (1998).

    "The fifth element is where proof of the agency relationship … is needed. The plaintiff must show that a specific basis exists for imputing the conduct that created the hostile work environment to the employer. … [I]t is apparent that the fifth element has two parts, the employer’s actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment and the employer’s inaction or lack of adequate action after learning of it. A somewhat more refined statement of essentially the same criterion is that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant either provided no reasonable avenue for complaint or that the defendant knew of the harassment but did little or nothing about it." (Internal citations omitted.) Britell, supra, 1997 WL 583840 *15.

  • Constructive discharge
    •

    "Normally, an employee who resigns is not regarded as having been discharged, and thus would have no rights of action for abusive discharge. … Through the use of constructive discharge, the law recognizes that an employee’s ‘voluntary’ resignation may be, in reality, a dismissal by an employer. Constructive discharge of an employee occurs when an employer, rather than directly discharging an individual, intentionally creates an intolerable work atmosphere that forces an employee to quit involuntarily. Working conditions are intolerable if they are so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would have felt compelled to resign. Accordingly, a claim of constructive discharge must be supported by more than the employee’s subjective opinion that the job conditions have become so intolerable that he or she was forced to resign." (Internal quotation marks omitted; internal citations omitted.) Brittell, supra, 247 Conn 178.

    An essential element of the claim, the existence of an intolerable work atmosphere that would compel a reasonable person to resign, can be shown if the complainant can establish that he was given the choice either to continue working in the same environment or to leave the respondent’s employment. Brittell, supra, 247 Conn. 179.

  • Damages
    •

    The presiding officer is authorized to award retroactive and prospective monetary relief (back pay and front pay). Silhouette Optical Limited v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 10 Conn. L. Rptr. 19, 599 (February 28, 1994); State of Connecticut v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 211 Conn. 464, 478 (1989). The award of front pay must be limited to a reasonable time period and supported by the evidence. Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 234 Conn. 1, 33-34 (1995). "[T]he award of front pay is particularly appropriate in cases such as this, where the claimant took steps to mitigate [his] damages by seeking work elsewhere but had to settle for a lower paying job." Silhouette Optical, supra, 10 Conn. L. Rptr. No. 19, 603.

    The presiding officer is also authorized to award prejudgment and postjudgment interest on the award of front and back pay. The award of interest and its method of calculation are within the discretion of the presiding officer, who may choose the interest calculation best suited to making the complainant whole and may compound the interest. Silhouette Optical Limited, supra, 10 Conn. L. Rptr. No. 19, 604.

    CFEPA also imposes individual liability on supervisors who hold positions of power, control, and authority and who use that power, control, and authority to engage in conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ex rel. Barbara G. DeRosa v. Dr. Fredric Rosen, CHRO No. 9830057 (Ruling on Motion to Dismiss)(July 22, 1999); Valenti v. Carten Controls, Inc., 1997 WL 766854 *3 (D. Conn. 1997); Murphy v. Burgess & Norwalk Economic Opportunities Now, Inc., 1997 WL 529610 *5 (D. Conn. 1997); Lueneburg v. Mystic Dental Group, 2 Conn. Ops. 937, 939 (Conn. Super., August 26/September 2, 1996); Dombrowksi v. Envirotest System, 25 Conn. L. Rptr. 272 No. 8, 273 (October 25, 1999).

    The presiding officer is also authorized to order the respondent to pay to the commission the amount of unemployment compensation or welfare assistance paid to the complainant. The commission shall then transfer such amount to the appropriate state or local agency. General Statutes § 46a-86(b).

    C. APPLICATION

    1. Disparate Treatment

    In this case, the complainant has established his prima facie case that he was treated differently than white employees. He is a member of a protected class in that he is a black, African American. (FF 6.) His approximately eight years of experience doing similar work for his previous employer indicates that he was qualified for the position he held with the respondent. (FF 8.) He suffered an adverse employment decision in that he was given more work to do than were white employees, received a lower salary than the respondent had promised him, and was constructively discharged. (FF 15-24.) The respondent’s use of racial epithets and more favorable treatment of his white employees establish the inference that the adverse employment actions occurred as a result of illegal racial discrimination.

    The respondent offered no legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reason for its actions. He failed both to answer the complaint and to attend the hearing in damages. Therefore, the complainant has established by a preponderance of the evidence that he was treated differently because of his race and/or color.

  • Hostile work environment
    •

    In this case, the complainant met the criteria necessary to establish a hostile work environment. He belonged to a protected class in that he is a black, African American. (FF 6.) Although he told the respondent that the respondent’s comments were unwelcome, the complainant was the subject of racial epithets and jokes directed at the complainant’s race and color. (FF 12, 15-22.)

    The respondent repeatedly used racial epithets and told racial jokes. He repeatedly said them to the complainant himself and, in the presence of and referring to the complainant, to the complainant’s coworkers and to respondent’s customers. (FF 15-22.) The respondent was physically threatening. (FF 19.) The comments and behavior had an adverse impact on and interfered with the complainant’s work performance such that he quit his job. (FF 26.) The complainant found the environment offensive, as would any reasonable person. (FF 23.)

    The employer knew of the harassment and provided no reasonable avenue of complaint. Indeed, the employer himself committed the behavior and continued committing the behavior despite having been asked by the complainant to stop. (FF 12, 15-22.)

    The respondent offered no legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reason for its actions. He failed both to answer the complaint and to attend the hearing. Therefore, the complainant has established by a preponderance of the evidence that he was subjected to a hostile environment created by racial harassment.

  • Constructive discharge
    •

    The complainant has also established that he was constructively discharged as a result of the respondent’s intentional creation of an intolerable work atmosphere. In less than one week, he was subjected to repeated and public derogatory racial epithets and jokes and was physically pushed. (FF 15-22.) As the perpetrator of this behavior was the owner of the business and complainant’s supervisor, the complainant could not have escaped by transferring to another unit. His only alternatives were to continue working with the respondent or to leave his employment. (FF 25.)

    The respondent offered no legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reason for its actions. He failed both to answer the complaint and to attend the hearing. Therefore, the complainant has established by a preponderance of the evidence that he was constructively discharged.

  • Damages
    •

    An order of default having been entered and liability having been found, the undersigned must now determine the relief necessary to make the complainant whole. There are five aspects to the award of monetary damages in this case: (a) back pay for the discrepancy between the $24.00 per hour promised to the complainant and the $19.00 per hour actually paid by the respondent during the complainant’s employment; (b) back pay subsequent to the complainant’s termination; (c) front pay; (d) prejudgment and postjudgment interest, and (e) repayment of unemployment compensation.

    1. The complainant is awarded $400.00 in back pay representing the difference between the $24.00 per hour he was promised and the $19.00 per hour he was actually paid during the time period (August 14 – 25, 2000) that he worked for the respondent. (Complainant, Tr. 19-20.) Given the racial epithets made by the respondent and the difference in work assignments the respondent made between the complainant and the white employees, the only inference that can be drawn is that the pay disparity is the result of illegal racial discrimination.
    2. The complainant is awarded additional back pay for the period between August 25, 2000 (the date of his constructive discharge) and July 27, 2001 (the date of the final decision) in the amount of $17,136. This award is based upon the $24.00 per hour the complainant should have received from the respondent (for a total during this period of $46,080) less the amount the complainant, through reasonable mitigation, actually earned ($28,944) from unemployment compensation and Transmission Works.
    3. The complainant is awarded front pay for a two-year period, from July 28, 2001 to July 27, 2003, in the amount of $30,960, representing $1,290 per month for 24 months. This award is reasonable in the amount of time and supporting by the evidence for reasons including: as a result on his reliance on the respondent’s offer of $24.00 per hour, the complainant left his employment at Smith Brothers (at $20.00 per hour), thereby losing seniority and the pay increases that accompany seniority; the complainant cannot return to his previous employer, Smith Brothers, because that company has already hired two mechanics to replace him; the complainant, after reasonable attempts at mitigation in the current economy, was able to secure employment at only $16.50 per hour; and the complainant’s estimate that it will take four years to reach a salary of $24.00 per hour. Factors in the two-year award also include the complainant’s continuing future efforts to mitigate, prospects of obtaining comparable employment, relative youth, and likelihood of many employable years ahead of him.
    4. Prejudgment and postjudgment interest is awarded on the award of front and back pay at the rate of 10%, compounded annually, from August 25, 2000 (the date of the constructive discharge) until payment is received by the complainant.
    5. The respondent shall pay to the commission the amount of unemployment compensation paid to the complainant totaling $1,884.

    V. CONCLUSION OF LAW

    The respondent was given legally sufficient notice of the Notice of Hearing in Damages Pursuant to an Order of Default (CHRO Exs. 1-6.)

    The entry of default established the respondent’s liability for violation of General Statutes §§ 46a-60(a)(1) and 46a-60(a)(5).

    The respondent illegally discriminated against the complainant on the basis of his race and color in violation of General Statutes §§ 46a-60(a)(1) and 46a-60(a)(5). The complainant established by a preponderance of the evidence that he was treated differently than white employees, subjected to a hostile environment, and constructively discharged.

    The complainant is awarded back pay and front pay from August 25, 2000 to July 27, 2003.

    The award of front pay through July 27, 2003 is reasonable in time and supported by the evidence.

    The complainant is further awarded prejudgment and postjudgment interest from August 25, 2000 to the date of payment.

    The respondent shall reimburse the State of Connecticut for unemployment compensation paid to the complainant.

    VI. ORDER OF RELIEF

    The respondent, Tony Lee, individually and as doing business as Better Built Transmissions, shall pay the complainant the sum of $17,536 as back pay for the period of August 14, 2000 to July 27, 2001.

    The respondent, Tony Lee, individually and as doing business as Better Built Transmissions, shall also pay the complainant the sum of $30,960 in front pay for the period of two years, July 28, 2001 to July 27, 2003.

    The respondent, Tony Lee, individually and as doing business as Better Built Transmissions, shall also pay the complainant interest. Interest is awarded on the $48,496 back and front pay from August 25, 2000 to the date of payment of such moneys to the complainant at the rate of 10% compounded per annum

    Pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-86(b), the respondent, Tony Lee, individually and as doing business as Better Built Transmissions, shall pay to the commission $1,884, representing the unemployment compensation amount paid to the complainant. The commission shall then transfer such amount to the appropriate state agency.

    The respondent, Tony Lee, individually and as doing business as Better Built Transmissions, shall cease and desist from the practices complained of concerning the complainant and all employees who may or will in the future become similarly situated.

    Pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(4), the respondent, Tony Lee, individually and as doing business as Better Built Transmissions, shall not engage in nor allow any of its employees to engage in any conduct against the complainant or any party to or participant in these proceedings.

    The respondent, Tony Lee, individually and as doing business as Better Built Transmissions, shall provide the complainant with a standard letter of employment stating dates of employment, position(s) held, and rate(s) of pay regarding the complainant’s employment with the respondent.

    Should prospective employers seeking references concerning the complainant ever contact him, the respondent, Tony Lee, individually and as doing business as Better Built Transmissions shall provide only the dates of said employment, the last position held, and rate(s) of pay. In the event additional information is requested in connection with any inquiry regarding the complainant, the respondent shall require written authorization from the complainant before such information is provided, unless required by law to provide such information.

    Pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-54(13), the respondent, Tony Lee, individually and as doing business as Better Built Transmissions, shall post in prominent and accessible locations, visible to all employees and applicants for employment, such notices regarding statutory antidiscrimination provisions as the commission shall provide. The notices shall be posted within three working days of their receipt.

    The respondent, Tony Lee, individually and as doing business as Better Built Transmissions, shall cease and desist from all acts of discrimination prohibited under federal and state law and shall provide a nondiscriminatory work environment pursuant to federal and state law.

    __________________________

    Hon. Jon P. FitzGerald

    Presiding Human Rights Referee

    C:

    Mr. Alex Smith

    Atty. Robert J. McKay

    Mr. Tony Lee d/b/a Better Built Transmissions

    Atty. David L. Kent