CHRO Declaratory Ruling on the Petition of the Town of Avon

STATE OF CONNECTICUT COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES
CHRO NO. 9415041

VS. :

TOWN OF AVON

NOVEMBER 14, 1996

DECLARATORY RULING ON THE PETITION OF THE TOWN OF AVON

I. INTRODUCTION.

On April 30, 1996, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO) received a Petition for Declaratory Ruling from the Town of Avon (Avon). Under the authority of CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 4-176 and Section 46a-54-122 of the REGULATIONS OF CT STATE AGENCIES (Regulations), Avon seeks a ruling from the CHRO as to whether the CHRO, in the factual background set forth in Part II of this Declaratory Ruling, is a "complainant" within the meaning of Section 46a-54-68 of the Regulations, and so required to comply with the obligations imposed upon a complainant by the Regulations and Connecticut General Statutes.

Avon has also submitted a Reply Brief dated November 12, 1996, which addresses an earlier draft of this Declaratory Ruling. Despite the late hour of its submission, the CHRO has considered the contents of this document in issuing the present Declaratory Ruling.

Avon has consented to an extension of the 180 day period in which to issue this Ruling. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 4-176(i). This Ruling is issued within the extention agreed to. See attached letter from Atty. Robert Hunt dated October 21, 1996.

In accordance with CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 4-176(e)(1), the CHRO issues this Declaratory Ruling on the Petition of the Town of Avon.

II. FACTS PRESENTED.

The facts giving rise to this Declaratory Ruling are quoted verbatim from Part IV of Avon's Petition for a Declaratory Ruling dated April 23, 1996. Words appearing in bold are so found in the original. These facts are assumed to be true for the purpose of this Ruling only. The facts are:

1. On or about April 14, 1994, at a meeting of the Commission, Philip A. Murphy, Jr., recommended that the Commission initiate the Complainant against the Respondent.
2. Counsel Murphy's recommendation was considered by the Commission in Executive Session at which the following persons were present: Louis Martin, Executive Director, Jewel E. Brown, Deputy Director, Philip A. Murphy, Jr., Commission Counsel, Robert Zamlowski, Staff Attorney, William Binkley, Manager Systems (sic) Unit, Gloria C. Williams, Executive Secretary 3 and Commission members Christopher L. Rose, Chairperson, Asar (sic) Batalla, Deputy Chair, Dr. Ramon A. Batson, Leslie J. Brett, Ph.D., Jane Glover and Wyrot Ward.
3. Upon returning to the regular session, the Commission members voted unanimously to initiate the Complaint against the Respondent.
4. Thereafter, the Commission filed the Complaint dated April 14, 1994. Paragraph 1 of the Complaint states that, "The Complainant is the State of Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities..." ("Complainant"). Copy of the Complainant is appended hereto as Exhibit A.
5. On or about May 20, 1994, the Respondent filed an answer to the Complainant denying all the Complainant's allegations of discriminatory conduct by the Respondent.
6. Upon information and belief, to date, neither the Commission, nor a duly designated staff member of the Commission has:
7. 1. conducted an investigation pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. ' 46a-83, notwithstanding the appointment of an investigator more than eighteen (18) months ago;
   2. made or caused to be made within the time pre-scribed by Conn. Gen. Stat. ' 46a-83 a determination of whether or not there is reason to believe that the Respondent engaged in the discriminatory practices alleged by the Complainant in the Complaint;
   3. appointed a hearing officer pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. ' 46a-84 to whom the Respondent may submit motions, as provided for by Section 46a-54-101 of the Regulations.
8. As a consequence of said failure of the Commission to appoint a hearing officer, the Respondent had to resort to the submission of a "Request of Respondent, Town of Avon, For Production Of Documents And Information" ("Request"), to Louis Martin, Executive Director, on March 14, 1996. A copy of this Request is appended hereto at Exhibit B in which the Respondent sought the compliance of the Complainant whith the provisions of Section 46a-54-68 of the Regulations with espect to the documents identified therein.
9. By letter dated March 21, 1996, former Staff Attorney, now identified as Supervisor, Special Enforcement Unit, Robert J. Zamlowski, on behalf of the Executive Director, Louis Martin, replied to the Request. A copy of said response is appended hereto at Exhibit C. The Commission denied the Request for the following reasons:
10. 1. Respondent is not entitled to seek a ruling on the subject Request for production because CHRO Case #9415041 "is still in the investigatory stage and has not been certified to a hearing" with the consequence that there is no hearing officer with authority to rule as contemplated by Section 46a-54-101 of the Regulations; and
    2. the Commission either should not be considered as a complainant for the purposes of Section 46a-54-68 of the Regulations or, if so considered, is not obliged to comply with the obligations imposed upon a complainant by Section 46a-54-68 of the Regulations.

Avon's Reply Brief dated November 12, 1996 contains a number of recitations of fact, surmise and/or belief which do not appear in its Petition for a Declaratory Ruling dated April 23, 1996. Examples occur on pp. 5, 6, 7, 8, 11 and elsewhere. Had Avon wished to include such assertions as part of the factual background provided as part of its Petition for a Declaratory Ruling, Avon could have done so. Avon is responsible for presenting an adequate factual recitation. See Section 46a-54-122(b)(3). Under CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 4-176(e)(1), it is Avon which specified the circumstances to which the CHRO now issues this Declaratory Ruling.

Further, the arguments of counsel are not facts. Cf. Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 197 Conn. 141, 154 (1985). Nor is the purpose of a Reply Brief is not to introduce novel arguments. Cf. CHRO v. Truelove and Maclean, Inc., 238 Conn. 337, 344 n.11 (1996).

The factual circumstances specified by Avon in its Petition for a Declaratory Ruling must control. Thus, the CHRO accepts the facts found in the Petition, unadorned by the Reply Brief.

III. PARTIES.

The party to this declaratory proceeding is:

Town of Avon
60 West Main Street
Avon, CT 06001

IV. P.A. 96-241 PRESERVES THE CHRO'S JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT IT INITIATED AGAINST THE TOWN OF AVON, CHRO NO. 9415041. CONSEQUENTLY, THIS COMPLAINT IS STILL PENDING BEFORE THE CHRO.

A. Introduction.

As a preliminatory matter, the CHRO must determine whether it continues to retain jurisdiction over the discriminatory practice complaint underlying Avon's Petition for a Declaratory Ruling, the complaint filed by the CHRO against Avon, CHRO No. 9415041. According to the facts presented by Avon, the CHRO filed the Complaint on April 14, 1994. See Petition at 3 and Exhibit A. As of April 23, 1996, the date Avon's Petition for a Declaratory Ruling is dated, "[u]pon information and belief, to date, neither the Commission, nor a duly designated staff member of the Commission has:

1. i) conducted an investigation pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. ' 46a-83, notwithstanding the appointment of an investigator more than eighteen (18) months ago;
2. ii) made or caused to be made within the time prescribed by Conn. Gen. Stat. ' 46a-83 a determination of whether or not there is reason to believe that the Respondent engaged inthe discriminatory practices alleged by the Complainant in the Complaint;
3. iii) appointed a hearing officer pursuasnt to Conn. Gen. Stat. ' 46a-84 to whom the Respondent may submit motions, as provided for by Section 46a-54-101 of the Regulations.

See Petition at 3-4.

Assuming the truth of these assertions, more than two years has elapsed since the CHRO filed its Complaint against Avon, but the agency has not "made or caused to be made within the time prescribed by Conn. Gen. Stat. ' 46a-83 a determination of whether or not there is reason to believe that the Respondent engaged in the discriminatory practices alleged by the Complainant in the Complaint". See Petition at 3.

Elsewhere in the Petition, Avon cites the Supreme Court's recent decision in Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. CHRO, 236 Conn. 681 (1996). See Petition at 9. The holding of Angelsea is that the CHRO's failure to make a determination of reasonable cause within the statutory period found in CONN. GEN. STAT. (Rev. 1993) ' 46a-83 causes the CHRO to lose jurisdiction over a complaint, thereby requiring that the complaint be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Angelsea, 236 Conn. at 700-01. Since the longest time the CHRO has to investigate a complaint under CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-83 is 12 months, according to the facts provided, the CHRO would have lost jurisdiction over its Complaint against Avon nearly a year before Avon filed its Petition for a Declaratory Ruling, if Angelsea is to be applied.

While not directly challenging the jurisdiction of the CHRO to proceed on the Complaint underlying its Petition, the clear thrust of Avon's remarks on Angelsea, scattered throughout the Petition for a Declaratory Ruling; see Petition at 9 (decision "stat[es] 'justice delayed is justice denied' and hold[s] Commission must issue reasonable cause finding within nine month re-quirement set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. ' 46a-83")(emphasis in original); Petition at 9 ("The failure to make such a [reasonable cause] finding...nearly two years after the filing of the Complaint is contrary to the clear public policy embodied in the statute."); Petition at 10 ("Such...[failure to make a finding within statutory time limit] strikes at the heart of the principles of due process and is unquestionably contrary to public policy. The Commission's lack of diligent investigation...[is] clearly contrary to Connecticut Statutes".)(citing Angelsea, 236 Conn. at 700); as well as the presentation of facts which add nothing to the subject of whether the CHRO is a "complainant" for Section 46a-54-68 purposes, but which suggest noncompliance with CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-83; see Petition at 3-4; is to hint both repeatedly and strongly that the CHRO's jurisdiction to proceed on its Complaint against Avon has lapsed. For this reason, the CHRO construes the Petition for a Declaratory Ruling to contain a request, however veiled, that the CHRO determine whether its jurisdiction over Avon survives Angelsea.

Avon argues in its Reply Brief that it "did not request and has never requested that the CHRO determine whether the CHRO con- tinue[s] to retain jurisdiction over its complaint against the Town." See Reply Brief at 2. This may be. But administrative tribunals of limited jurisdiction like the CHRO must affirmatively establish jurisdiction and not presume its existence. Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420, 434 (1988). And so the CHRO addresses the preliminary matter of jurisdiction in light of Angelsea, a subject which Avon itself has raised, however obliquely or un-intentionally.

As appears below, Angelsea does not require the CHRO to dismiss its Complaint against Avon. This is not because of any escape hatch in the Angelsea decision, but is due to events which transpired after Angelsea was decided: the enactment of P.A. 96-241.

B. P.A. 96-241 Assures That the CHRO Retains Jurisdiction Over its Complaint Against Avon, Despite the CHRO's Failure to Comply With CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-83 or CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-84.

1. Introduction.

P.A. 96-241 is the General Assembly's response to Angelsea. By its very terms, P.A. 96-241 is intended to protect from dismissal any case in which the CHRO failed to meet statutory time limits for the investigation or hearing of a discriminatory practice complaint, including CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-83 and CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-84. Section 1 of P.A. 96-241 expressly states that

According to Avon's factual recitation, the CHRO's Com- plaint against Avon is saved by P.A. 96-241. The CHRO's Complaint was filed before January 1, 1996. See Petition at 3 and Exhibit A. The statutory provisions whose time limits Avon raises, CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-83 and CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-84, are contained in Chapter 814c of the Connecticut General Statutes. And the CHRO Complaint against Avon has not yet been finally adjudicated or resolved by the CHRO. See Petition at 3-4. Section 7 of P.A. 96-241 states that the Act "shall take effect from its passage." It was signed into law on June 6, 1996. Thus, P.A. 96-241 assures continued jurisdiction by the CHRO over its Complaint against Avon. This expression of legislative will overrides the Supreme Court's decision to the con- trary in Angelsea.

2. P.A. 96-241 is an act which clarifies the original intent of the legislature in enacting the time limits found in CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-83 and CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-84.

It has been often held that an amendment which in effect construes and clarifies an earlier statute must be accepted as a declaration of meaning of the original act. State v. Magnano, 204 Conn. 259, 278 (1987); Tax Commissioner v. Estate of Bissell, 173 Conn. 232, 246 (1977); Kluttz v. Howard, 228 Conn. 401, 409 (1994); Reid v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 235 Conn. 850, 860-64 (1996). Our Supreme Court "long has recognized that a subsequent amendment to an existing statute may clarify the legislature's original intent. Pollio v. Planning Commission, 232 Conn. 44, 56 (1995); Daly v. DelPonte, 225 Conn. 499, 511 (1993)." Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Bannon, 233 Conn. 243, 249 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted; parallel citations omitted). As has been written,

State v. Blasko, 202 Conn. 541, 558 (1987)(citations omitted). Such is the case with P.A. 96-241.

P.A. 96-241 clearly embodies the General Assembly's profound disagreement with the Angelsea decision. There be no doubt from examining its legislative history that the intent of P.A. 96-241 was to overrule Angelsea. As Rep. Tulisano remarked,

See Attachment.

Rep. Tulisano was one of the legislators who sponsored the "strange" time limits which were the subject of the Angelsea litigation, as well as the chief sponsor of P.A. 96-241. His comments, then, deserve special attention and are particularly useful in determining the intent of the General Assembly in enacting P.A. 96-241; Angelsea, 236 Conn. 695 n.10; Bridgeport Hospital v. CHRO, 232 Conn. 91, 102 (1995); as well as the time limits in the previously enacted legislation.

If Rep. Tulisano's statements are not enough, the nearness in time between the Angelsea decision and the legislative action to overrule that decision is just as telling. "If the amendment was enacted soon after controversies arose as to the interpretation of the original act, it is logical to regard the amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original act". State v. Blasko, 202 Conn. 541, 558 (1987), quoting 1A J. Sutherland, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (4th Ed. Sands 1984) ' 22.31. Here, the General Assembly's swift response to overrule Anglesea is "a classic reaction to a judicial interpretation that was deemed inappropriate" by the legislature. State v. Magnano, 204 Conn. 259, 283 (1987). Indeed, only a matter of weeks intervened between the Angelsea decision and the enactment of P.A. 96-241 by the General Assembly, a far shorter period than the three months characterized as being indicative of a clarifying act in Shelton v. Commissioner, 193 Conn. 506, 514-15 (1984)("In light of the... legislature's undisputed intent to override the decision of the trial court in this case", the Court was "persuaded that...the act was intended to clarify and not to alter the preexisting law.").

Finally, as a matter of statutory construction, the General Assembly is presumed to know--and approve--of court interpretations of its statutes. Indeed, the General Assembly's nonaction is understood as affirming those interpretations. Ralston Purina Co. v. Bd. of Tax Review, 203 Conn. 425, 439 (1987); Iacomacci v. Trumbull, 203 Conn. 220, 221-22 (1988). As in Shelton, the legislature did not move to reverse any of the many pre-Angelsea decisions holding various CHRO time limits to be directory. Bridgeport Hospital v. CHRO, No. CV-92-0299985, J.D. of Fairfield at Bridgeport (February 18, 1994)(Maloney, J.), rev'd on other grounds, 232 Conn. 91 (1995)[CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-82a]; CHRO v. Truelove and Maclean, No. CV-93-0115306, J.D. of Waterbury (July 20, 1994)(Sullivan, J.)(same), aff=d in part, rev=d in part, judgment directed on other grounds, 238 Conn. 337 (1996); Anne Howard=s Apricots Restaurant, Inc. v. CHRO, No. CV-93-0704762, J.D. of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford (December 19, 1994)(Maloney, J.), rev'd on other grounds, 237 Conn. 209 (1996)[CONN. GEN. STAT. (Rev. 1993) ' 46a-83(b); CONN. GEN. STAT. (Rev. 1993) ' 46a-84(b)]; McBreairty v. CHRO, No. CV-95-0067609, J.D. of Litchfield (September 15, 1995)(Pickett, J.)[CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-83(e)]. It was only Angelsea which stirred the General Assembly to action. The General Assembly's reaction, allowing pre-Angelsea cases to stand and striking out Angelsea, must be viewed as conscious and deliberate. The legislature "is always presumed to have intended that effect which its action or non-action [with respect to judicial construction of statutes] produces." Beccia v. Waterbury, 185 Conn. 445, 459 (1981).

For these reasons, P.A. 96-241 must be viewed as a clarifying act.

3. Alternatively, P.A. 96-241 is a validating act.

The legislature may retroactively make legal and regular that which was previously illegal and irregular through a statutory device known as a validating act. Enfield Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Bissell, 184 Conn. 569, 572 (1981). This rule is an old one. Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, 226-27 (1982). As noted in Manchester Environmental Coalition v. Stockton, 184 Conn. 51, 71 (1981),

The validating language placed in P.A. 96-241 is not a new invention by the General Assembly; rather, it is part of an ac- cepted legislative practice of validating, after the fact, the actions of governmental bodies which have for some reason become arguably illegal. Far from being some sort of "legislative novas[, these provisions] have a history, a purpose and a relationship and all of those facets must be examined in order to arrive at a proper construction" of the particular statute. State v. Martin, 35 Conn.Sup. 555, 557 (App.Sess.Sup.Ct. 1978) (Parskey, J.). Our statute books presently contain many similar validating provisions, showing that the General Assembly prefers not to elevate trivialities into determinatives, when people's rights are at stake. See, for example, CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 7-147k(a); CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 7-246(c); CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 7-369b; CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 8-191a; CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 10-45; CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 10-183l; CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 12-118a; CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 13a-175h; CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 13a-175v; CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 13b-76; CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 16a-44d; CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 26-253; CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 29-5f; CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 30-52; CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 34-38a; CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 45a-493; CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 45a-555; CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46b-22a; CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 47-7a; CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 49-35d; CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 49-37a; CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 49-39; CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 51-345b; CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 52-350b(b).

As the legislative history of P.A. 96-241 indicates, P.A. 96-241 draws from the well of this tradition. In particular, Rep. Tulisano, commenting on various features of P.A. 96-241, remarked that these provisions were pulled from legislation designed to overrule earlier decisions of the Supreme Court with which the General Assembly disagreed:

See Attachment.

According to the bill's sponsor, then, P.A. 96-241 was patterned after the validating act which was enacted to counter the effect of the Supreme Court's two decisions in Simko v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 205 Conn. 413 (1987), on rehearing, 206 Conn. 374 (1988), which held that the failure to cite and serve the town clerk in a zoning appeal was a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal of the appeal. In passing P.A. 88-79, the "legislature clearly articulated its intent, for a stipulated grace period, to validate pending zoning appeals... after our decisions in Simko I and Simko II." Capalbo v. Planning & Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 208 Conn. 480, 489 (1989). The intent of the legislature was to "save zoning appeals subject to dismissal on Simko grounds". Aitken v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 18 Conn.App. 195, 200 (1989). As noted in a later case, by enacting P.A. 88-79, "the General Assembly effectively overruled Simko". Demar v. Open Space & Conservation Committee, 211 Conn. 416, 422 (1989). The referenced legislation "effectively annul[led] the holding of Simko." Id. at 423. Similarly, the passage of P.A. 96-241 removes the jurisdictional obstacle which Angelsea would otherwise have erected by assuring the CHRO's jurisdiction to proceed against Avon on the CHRO's Complaint.

Several other statutory initiatives overruling court precedent are likewise the root out of which P.A. 96-241 branches. In enacting P.A. 86-408, titled "An Act Clarifying the Powers and Authority of the Freedom of Information Commission", the General Assembly clearly aimed at overruling Zoning Bd. of Appeals v. FOIC, 198 Conn. 498 (1986), in which the Supreme Court held that the time limitations for the FOIC to hear and decide appeals are mandatory, and that a failure of the FOIC to comply with those time limitations nullified any subsequent action by the agency, a holding remarkably similar to that of Angelsea. Section 2(a) of P.A. 86-408 took a shape very much like Section 1 of P.A. 96-241, after which it is clearly patterned. It reads as follows:

The legislative history of this provision fully demonstrates that the General Assembly was aware of the Supreme Court's then recent decision in Zoning Bd. of Appeals v. FOIC, and took steps to validate appeals otherwise affected by that decision, because the legislature was not satisfied with the result in that case. According to Rep. Schmidle, who summarized the bill in the House,

See Connecticut General Assembly House Proceedings, Vol. 29, Part 13 at 5096-98 (1986).

Rep. Karbowski felt "the fact that we are making the freedom of information's decisions correct after our courts have said that they weren't, and they didn't act in the proper time, I feel is wrong. We are changing the rules in the middle of the game and the freedom of information [commission] should abide by those rules." See at 5109. These comments did not deter the General Assembly from enacting P.A. 86-408, however.

Another instance in which the General Assembly resorted to legislation to overturn a Supreme Court case occurs in the area of mechanics liens. Nothing more plain could emerge from the legislative history of P.A. 75-418:

See Connecticut General Assembly House Proceedings, Vol. 18, Part 10 at 4922 (1975).

The reference here is to Roundhouse Construction Corp. v. Telesco Masons Supplies Co., 168 Conn. 371, vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), on remand, 170 Conn. 155, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 889 (1976). The General Assembly again resorted to validating language to preserve liens which had been rendered invalid due to the unconstitutionality of the mechanic's lien statute:

Id. at 4924.

Based upon its legislative history and text, P.A. 96-241 is a properly enacted validating act which preserves the CHRO=s jurisdiction over its complaint against Avon.

C. Conclusion.

The enactment of P.A. 96-241 is proof that Angelsea is not a case where "the legislature has responded to [a court] decision ...in a manner that strongly supports the conclusion that [the case] was correctly decided." Lash v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 236 Conn. 318, 327 (1996). Indeed, the quick repudiation of Angelsea by the legislature points to precisely the opposite conclusion: that Angelsea, with its strict, punitive reading of the CHRO's case processing time limits and its punishment of wholly innocent parties because of the CHRO's inability to meet those limits--enjoyed little support among legislators. Now that the legislature has spoken, it is incumbent that all listen.

The legal landscape has been radically transformed by the passage of P.A. 96-241. For this reason, Avon's implicit in-vitation that the CHRO declare it lacks jurisdiction over its Complaint against Avon cannot be accepted, because it assumes the existence of a set of assumptions which is no longer valid, after the passage of P.A. 96-241.

V. IN THOSE CASES WHERE THE CHRO INITIATES A COMPLAINT AGAINST A RESPONDENT, THE CHRO IS A "COMPLAINANT" UNDER SECTION 46a-54-68 OF THE REGULATIONS.

Having determined that the CHRO has jurisdiction to hear its complaint against Avon, the CHRO must now address the second question raised: whether the CHRO is a "complainant" within the meaning of Section 46a-54-68 of its Regulations. Section 46a-54-68 provides:

The word "complainant" is not defined in Section 46a-54-68. Nor is there a specific definition for the word found in the general definition section of the regulations, Section 46a-54-26. Section 46a-54-26(a) states that "[t]erms defined in Chapter 814c of the Connecticut General Statutes shall have the same meaning in these regulations", but there is no specific definition of "complainant" found therein. In the absence of a special definition, the ordinary rules of statutory interpretion must be given effect. AirKaman, Inc. v. Groppo, 221 Conn. 751, 756-57 (1992); Carr v. Bridgewater, 224 Conn. 44, 56 (1992).

In construing statutes, words are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Oller v. Oller-Chiang, 230 Conn. 828, 848 (1994); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 299 (1991). CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 1-1 so provides:

When a word is undefined, it is appropriate to consult dictionaries to arrive at the proper meaning. Gallacher v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 221 Conn. 166, 172 (1992); Baerst v. Bd. of Ed., 34 Conn.App. 567, 576, cert. denied, 230 Conn. 915 (1994). The interpretation of regulatory language follows the same path. Zipperstein v. Tax Commissioner, 178 Conn. 493, 497 (1979). The word "complainant" has been defined in Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language 92d coll. ed.) at 290 to mean "a person who files a charge or makes the complaint in court; [the] plaintiff". In this case, that is the CHRO. There is nothing in Section 46a-54-68 which indicates an intent to exclude the CHRO from the regulation's scope As a general rule, unless a statute or regulation specifically grants an exception, a law effectively covers the entire field. State v. Bunkley, 202 Conn. 629, 640 (1987). Exceptions to this rule are strictly construed. Conservation Commission v. Price, 193 Conn. 414, 423-24 (1984).

To say that the CHRO is required to comply with Section 46a-54-68 when it is the complainant in a discriminatory practice complaint opens the door to a further question: who is the CHRO for purposes of complying with Section 46a-54-68?

CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-82(b) states that "[t]he commission, whenever it has reason to believe that any person has been en-gaged or is engaged in a discriminatory practice, may issue a complaint...." The word "commission" carries the meaning supplied by CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-51(2): the "Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities created by section 46a-52." CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-52(a) states that the "commission shall consist of nine persons", and further specifies who those individuals are. Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that, for the purpose of Section 46a-54-68, the word "complainant" may refer to the CHRO, which in turn must mean the nine members of the CHRO appointed through the political process.

In construing statutes, it is presumed that a rational result was intended. Windham First Taxing District v. Windham, 208 Conn. 543, 553 (1988); Zapata v. Burns, 207 Conn. 496, 507 (1988); In re Corey E., 40 Conn.App. 366, 372 (1996). Moreover, statutes are to be read as contemplating rational, not bizarre, results. LeConche v. Elligers, 215 Conn. 701, 713 (1990). Finally, statutes are also to be read consistently, and as a single body of law. Paige v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 235 Conn. 448, 455 (1995); Galvin v. FOIC, 201 Conn. 448, 456 (1986). Since it is the "commission" which initated the complaint against Avon pursuant to CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-82(b), and the "commission" means, according to CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-51(2), the CHRO created by CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-52, it follows that the word "complainant" as it is used in Section 46a-54-68 must mean the nine individuals who comprise the CHRO, the very same persons who initiated the complaint against Avon.

Section 46a-54-68 requires that in cases where the CHRO is the complainant, the CHRO's commissioners will disclose the in-formation specified in Section 46a-54-68 "upon receipt of a copy of the respondent's answer". In other words, the duty to disclose information to the CHRO Investigator arises no earlier than the date a respondent's Answer is received by the complainant. Simultaneously, the complainant transmits a copy of that information to the respondent, as provided in Section 46a-54-68(b). The facts recited by Avon do not indicate whether the CHRO's commissioners were ever provided with a copy of Avon's Answer. Unless the CHRO's commissioners received a copy of Avon's Answer, there is no obligation to disclose the information summarized in Section 46a-54-68.

Avon argues in its Reply Brief that the duty of a complaint to provide information to a respondent does not depend on the commencement of an investigation. See Reply Brief at 9-11. This argument does not satisfactorily explain the presence of the prepositional phrase "upon receipt of a copy of the respondent's answer" in Section 46a-54-68. The prepositional phrase just quoted locates the complainant's duty of disclosure at a point in time after receipt of the answer. An answer is submitted only as part of an investigation; the statutory mechanics of the investigatory process make that clear. The measuring stick for the nine month period in which the CHRO must complete its investigation under CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-83(d) is "the date of filing of the complaint", not the date of receipt of the answer.

Further, the triggering event for disclosure of Section 46a-54-68 information is "when the complainant meets with the investigator to review the respondent's answer". According to Avon, no investigation has yet taken place. See Petition at 3. An Investigator meets with a party as part of the investigation. Consequently, if no investigation has taken place, there is no need for the CHRO to produce any material until such a time as "the complainant meets with the investigator to review the respondent's answer". Further, in the absence of any factual recitation by Avon that a CHRO Investigator met with the nine commissioners to discuss Avon's Answer, it will not be assumed that such a meeting has taken place. Indeed, since government officials are presumed to act in accorance with law, the CHRO will presume that Section 46a-54-68 has not been violated. "Public officers, acting in their official capacity, are presumed, until the contrary appears, to have acted legally and properly." Brookfield v. Candlewood Shores Estates, Inc., 201 Conn. 1, 6 (1986)(citations omitted); Clisham v. Bd. of Police Commissioners, 223 Conn. 354, 362 (1992). "There is a strong presumption of regularity in the proceedings of a public body...." Trinkley v. Ella Grasso Regional Center, 220 Conn. 739, 743-44 (1992)(citations omitted).

As part of its submission, Avon has appended an Exhibit B, which Avon describes as a request for information in which it "sought the compliance of the Complainant with the provisions of Section 46a-54-68 of the Regulations with respect to the documents identified therein." See Petition at 4. According to Avon, Exhibit B was addressed to "Louis Martin, [CHRO] Executive Director, on March 14, 1996." Id. In so doing, Avon confuses the disclosure requirement found in Section 46a-54-68, which applies specifically to the "complainant", and the general right of access enjoyed by a respondent to the fruits of a CHRO investigation, which are found elsewhere. CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-83(g) provides:

CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-83(d) states:

Thus, our statutes provide the parties a separate route of access for information gathered during the investigative process.

In the investigation of its complaint against Avon, the CHRO wears two different hats: as complainant, as Investigator. These roles are completely different, give rise to varying rights and responsibilities, and cannot be merged, as Avon wrongly argues. A CHRO investigator is not synonymous with a CHRO commissioner, as our statutes make plain. While the CHRO=s commissioners may initiate a complaint; see CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-82; they are powerless to investigate a complaint. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-83(d). Indeed, the authority of a commissioner to investigate a complaint, rarely if ever exercised as a practical matter, vanished entirely as a matter of law with the passage of P.A. 91-302, ' 3.

For these reasons, it is important to keep the dual roles of the CHRO in perspective. It is the Investigator who, acting at times independently of a complainant like the CHRO, has a duty to develop a broad factual inquiry into the allegations of a complaint. Dufraine v. CHRO, 236 Conn. 250, 261 (1996); Adriani v. CHRO, 220 Conn. 307, 316-17 (1991). Information gathered by the Investigator as part of this process is discloseable as provided in CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-83. According to Avon, however, no investigation has yet been conducted. See Petition at 3. Necessarily, until there is an investigation, the disclosure requirements found in CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 46a-83 do not come into play. On the other hand, there is an entirely separate provision regarding disclosure of information provided by a complainant. See Section 46a-54-68. These later disclosure requirements apply only to a complainant, as the CHRO=s commissioners are in this case.

In its Reply Brief, Avon argues that the CHRO's Commissioners have delegated duties to staff, who act as their agents, in-cluding the ability to receive answers, and makes other presumptions relative to staff duties and actions. See Reply Brief at 4-6. Avon also argues that the CHRO's Commissioners have not always acted consistently with the role of a complainant, and "don the 'Complainant' cap only when it is expedient and advantageous for them to do so." See Reply Brief at 8. Again, assumes facts which are from the mouth of counsel and do not form part of the circumstances specified in the Petition for a Declaratory Ruling dated April 23, 1996.

This Declaratory Ruling addresses only the narrow question of the appliability of Section 46a-54-68 when the CHRO is the complainant. The broad language nothwithstanding, this declaratory ruling should not be interpreted to apply to regulatory requirements beyond Section 46a-54-68. Since it is only hard facts which provide the necessary dimension to create true and proper perspective, the scope of other provisions of the CHRO=s regulations must await development on a case by case basis through a reasoned consideration of the facts of live cases. Declaratory rulings should not be issued in a vacuum.

Finally, it should be noted that nothing in this ruling requires disclosure of deliberative information or information otherwise exempt by operation of state or federal law. The requirements of Section 46a-54-68 apply only to information relevant to the complaint, and may not be used to examine the thought processes or subjective impressions of the complainant. Cf. Adriani v. CHRO, 228 Conn. 545, 551 (1994).

VI. CONCLUSION.

Based upon the factual submission set out in Part II of this Declaratory Ruling, the CHRO has jurisdiction to proceed on its complaint against Avon. Further, based upon the same factual submission, the CHRO is required to comply with Section 46a-54-68 of its Regulations, as discussed more fully above.

In accordance with CONN. GEN. STAT. ' 4-176(i), Avon has consented to an extension of the 180 day period in which to issue this ruling. This ruling is issued within the extension agreed to by Avon. See attached letter.

ADOPTED BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF THE COMMISSIONERS PRESENT AND VOTING AT A COMMISSION MEETING HELD ON NOVEMBER 14, 1996 IN HARTFORD, CT.

Ramon Martinez, Chairperson
Or duly authorized Commissioner