Payton v. DMHAS - 0220394, Ruling Re: R's Motion in Limine

CHRO No. 0220394

Fed No. 16aa201183

Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ex rel. : Meredith Payton

v.

State of Connecticut, Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services

June 8, 2004

Ruling re: Respondent's Motion in Limine

I.

By a motion in limine filed on May 24, 2004 ("motion"), the State of Connecticut, Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services ("respondent" or "DMHAS") moves to exclude from the public hearing certain evidence proposed by Meredith Payton ("complainant") and the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ("commission" or "CHRO"). The respondent did not submit any affidavits or other documentation in support of its motion. The commission filed its objection to the motion on June 7, 2004. The complainant did not file a response.

For the reasons set forth herein, the motion is denied.

II.

The complainant filed his Affidavit of Illegal Discriminatory Practice ("complaint") with the commission on May 8, 2002. The complainant claims that the respondent violated General Statutues § 46a-60(a)(1) and Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by discriminating against the complainant in the terms and conditions of his employment on the basis of his religion. According to the complainant, the respondent will not allow him to use his religious title, "reverend", in the context of his employment relationship and is treating him differently than another DMHAS employee whom the respondent had allowed to use a religious title.

III.

A.

The respondent's first argument is that "permitting the Complainant to use his title during work would result in DMHAS violating the Establishment Clause in that government is required to disassociate itself from endorsing any religion." (Motion, 1). According to the respondent, if the commission does not allow the respondent to prohibit the complainant's use of 'reverend', the commission will be requiring the respondent to violate the Supremacy and Establishment clauses of the federal constitution. I agree with the proposition that the commission cannot compel the respondent to violate the federal constitution. However, although it cites to several federal and state cases, the respondent offers absolutely no discussion on how or why the complainant's use of his religious title would violate the federal constitution. Absent any analysis by the respondent of its conclusory legal position, I decline to find, at this stage of the proceeding, that the complainant's requested relief is unconstitutional.

B.

In seeking to exclude "(1) conduct by DMHAS as it relates to other employees and (2) conduct occurring prior to the 180 day limitation period from consideration" (Motion, 1), the respondent apparently misinterprets the 180-day limitation and the disparate treatment analysis. The evidence that the respondent seeks to exclude also "includes any and all evidence of the state's treatment of other employees prior to November 9, 2001, which is 180 days prior to the filing of the CHRO complaint on May 8, 2002. The filing of a discrimination claim with CHRO based on a discrete act must be filed within 180 days after the alleged act of discrimination pursuant to Conn. Gen. State. § 46a-82(e) …. The [respondent's] denial of the use of the title 'Reverend' is a discrete act that requires a timely filing of a CHRO action." (Motion, 3).

In fact, the complaint was timely filed. The respondent's denial of the use of "reverend" occurred on November 20, 2001 and the complainant filed his complaint on May 8, 2002, within the 180-day statutory requirement. Also, the statute does not require that the respondent's conduct toward its other employees occur within 180 days prior to the filing of the complaint. As the commission notes in its objection, the respondent's conduct toward other employees can, in some cases, be relevant and admissible even if the conduct occurred more than 180 days prior to the filing of the complaint.

The respondent also asserts that the complainant's comparison of himself to a co-worker, Arthur Norton ("Norton") is prejudicial and would not be probative for reasons including the length of time between the decisions involving the complainant and Norton, the different positions held by the complainant and Norton, and the different supervisory personnel involved. The respondent's underlying argument seems to be that the complainant and Norton are not similarly situated. The problem with this argument is that respondent wants me to assume facts for which I have no evidence. No evidence, affidavits or other documentation have been presented regarding the complainant's and Norton's job duties, the positions they held, their supervisory personnel or any other factors relevant to determining whether the complainant and Norton are similarly situated.

IV.

For the reasons set forth, the respondent's motion in limine is denied.

_________________________
Hon. Jon P. FitzGerald
Presiding Human Rights Referee

C:
Rev. Meredith Payton
Beth Z. Margulies, Esq.
Cheryl A. Sharp, Esq.