

RICHARD BENSON

USE OF FORCE INVESTIGATION





June 1, 2026

Commissioner Sharonda Carlos
Connecticut Department of Correction
24 Wolcott Hill Road
Wethersfield, CT 06109

Re: Richard Benson Use of Force Investigation May 1, 2025

Dear Commissioner Carlos:

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Office of the Correction Ombuds under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 18-81qq, as amended by Public Act 25-161, I write to formally transmit the enclosed investigative findings report concerning the May 1, 2025 planned use-of-force incident involving Mr. Richard Benson at Carl Robinson Correctional Institution.

This report reflects the Office's findings following review of Department records, available video footage, relevant Administrative Directives, medical and disciplinary documentation, and information obtained during the Office's investigation. As detailed in the report, the Office identified significant concerns regarding the manner in which the planned operation was executed, including the initiation of force in a populated open dormitory, the attempted physical retrieval of suspected contraband from Mr. Benson's mouth, the deployment of chemical agent in close proximity to uninvolved incarcerated persons, the adequacy of the post-incident evaluation prior to placement in Restrictive Housing, and the disciplinary consequences that followed.

The Office recognizes that the Department may have possessed information warranting investigative action concerning suspected contraband. However, the existence of a security concern does not eliminate the Department's obligation to plan and execute interventions in a manner consistent with applicable Administrative Directives, including requirements related to reasonable and proportional force, verbal intervention, controlled search procedures, medical safeguards, and the protection of uninvolved incarcerated persons.

The enclosed report includes recommendations regarding review of compliance with Administrative Directives 6.5 and 6.7, planned use-of-force operations involving suspected contraband, supervisory planning and documentation, attempted physical retrieval of suspected contraband, use of chemical agent in populated housing units, disciplinary sanctions imposed

upon Mr. Benson, staff training, and review of mandibular and hypoglossal nerve compression techniques.

Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 18-81qq(e)(4), the Office requests that the Department provide a written response no later than June 30, 2026, identifying any action taken in response to the findings and recommendations contained in the report, or the Department's reasons for not complying with any recommendation.

The Office asks that the Department specifically address the Office's request that the Department reconsider the disciplinary sanctions imposed upon Mr. Benson for assault on a Department of Correction employee and interfering with safety and security, including whether those sanctions will be modified or cancelled in light of the findings contained in the report.

The findings outlined in this report raise important concerns regarding safety, policy compliance, medical response, and the use of force in planned operations. As always, the Office remains available to engage constructively with the Department regarding implementation of the recommendations and any corrective action taken.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "DeVaughn L. Ward".

DeVaughn L. Ward, Esq.

Correction Ombuds

State of Connecticut

Introduction

Pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes Section 18-81qq, as amended by Public Act 25-161, the Office of the Correction Ombuds has statutory authority to receive communications from persons who are incarcerated regarding decisions, actions, omissions, policies, procedures, rules and regulations of the Department of Correction. Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §18-81qq the Correction Ombuds is authorized to:

1. Investigate complaints by, or behalf of, persons in the custody of the Department of Correction;
2. Inspect and monitor the conditions and operation of any facility or program operated by or under contract with the Department of Correction;
3. Review policies, procedures, and practices that may adversely affect persons in custody;
4. Make recommendations to the Commissioner of Correction regarding improvements to correctional operations, policies, and procedure.

It is important to note that the Correction Ombuds need not investigate a complaint, if the Correction Ombuds determines such investigation is not warranted¹. However, in course of an investigation, the Correction Ombuds shall rely on variety of sources to corroborate matters raised by persons who are incarcerated. Where such matters turn on validation of incidents, the Correction Ombuds shall endeavor to rely on communications from persons who are incarcerated who have reasonably pursued a resolution of the complaint through any existing internal grievance procedures of the Department of Correction².

The Correction Ombuds shall include in any decision findings of any department administrative directive, state or constitutional right that has been violated by the department or an employee of the department and recommendations and reasoning if, in the Correction Ombuds' opinion, the department or any employee should (I) further investigate the complaint; (II) modify or cancel an action of the department or employee; (III) alter a department rule, practice or ruling; (IV) explain in detail the action in question; or (V) rectify an omission of the department or employee³.

At the Correction Ombuds' request, the department shall, during a period of time agreed upon with the Correction Ombuds, inform the Correction Ombuds of any action taken on recommendations contained in a decision pursuant to subdivision (3) of this subsection or any reason for not complying with any such recommendation⁴.

¹ Conn. Gen. Stat. §18-81qq (e)(1)

² Conn. Gen. Stat. § 18-81qq (e)(2)

³ Conn. Gen. Stat. §18-81qq(e)(3)(A)

⁴ Conn. Gen. Stat. §18-81qq(e)(4)

*All incarcerated individuals referenced have executed written authorizations with the Office of the Correction Ombuds consenting to the publication of their names in this report.

Background

On May 1, 2025, a planned use-of-force incident involving Mr. Richard Benson occurred at Carl Robinson Correctional Institution. According to Department of Correction documentation, the incident arose during an operation to remove Mr. Benson from general population and place him in restrictive housing pending investigation into allegations that he was involved in the introduction of contraband into the facility.

On May 6, 2025, the Office of the Correction Ombuds received a complaint alleging excessive force in connection with the incident. On May 13, 2025, the Office initiated a formal investigation Office of the Correction Ombuds consenting to the publication of their names in this report.

DOC Investigation

According to Incident Report CRCI 2025-05-002, on April 29, 2025, Officer Roman reported receiving information from a confidential informant alleging that Mr. Benson was introducing narcotics into the facility through contact visits with the assistance of a visitor described as a white female. DOC records further reflect that Mr. Benson had previously received a Class A disciplinary report for Conspiracy to Convey Contraband on July 24, 2018.

Following receipt of the intelligence, Lieutenant Ouellette instructed Officer Roman to review Mr. Benson's Securus communications. Officer Roman reported that his review revealed information he believed supported the allegation that Mr. Benson was facilitating the introduction of contraband into the facility, including through contact visits and potentially with the assistance of another unidentified source.

In a recorded call dated April 26, 2025, Officer Roman interpreted the conversation as referencing a third party who was allegedly involved in obtaining narcotics. Officer Roman noted that the third party was believed to be a former incarcerated person previously housed at Carl Robinson Correctional Institution. The incident report further referenced information allegedly received by the intelligence unit concerning possible staff involvement in conveying contraband. The Office makes no independent finding regarding the truth of those underlying intelligence claims, but notes that they formed part of DOC's stated rationale for initiating the operation.

On May 1, 2025, at approximately 8:09 a.m., at the direction of Lieutenant Ouellette, Officer Roman, accompanied by multiple correctional employees and Lieutenant Ouellette, entered Housing Unit 3B to remove Mr. Benson from general population and transfer him to restrictive housing pending investigation

According to staff reports, when correctional employees approached Mr. Benson, who was lying on his assigned bunk, they observed him place an object into his mouth. Video footage reviewed by the Office reflects that correctional staff entered the housing unit and rapidly approached Mr. Benson's bunk. Within approximately twelve seconds of the recording beginning, staff had reached Mr. Benson's bedside. By approximately twenty-eight seconds, two correctional employees were physically on top of Mr. Benson, while staff repeatedly shouted commands including "stop resisting" and "spit it out." (Exhibit A)



At approximately thirty-two seconds into the recording, Officer Yanez is observed placing his fingers inside Mr. Benson's mouth before yelling, "Stop biting my finger." By approximately fifty-two seconds into the recording, several correctional employees were surrounding Mr. Benson, and a chemical agent had been deployed. (Exhibit B)

At approximately one minute and two seconds, officers can be heard shouting, "open your mouth" and "you're going to get sprayed again," while Mr. Benson remained pinned to the bunk. During this period, Mr. Benson can be heard coughing and gagging. (Exhibit C)

At approximately one minute and twenty-four seconds into the recording, Mr. Benson was handcuffed with his wrists secured behind his back, lifted to his feet by two officers, and escorted from the housing unit while surrounded by additional staff.

The incident occurred in an open dormitory housing unit occupied by a substantial number of incarcerated persons, several of whom were in close proximity when force was initiated. The chemical agent was deployed inside the open dormitory. At several points in the video, other incarcerated persons housed in the unit can be seen wiping their eyes and covering their mouths after the chemical agent was deployed. (Exhibit D)

No contraband was recovered from Mr. Benson at the time of the incident. No contraband was recovered during subsequent post-incident searches or related investigative processes. Mr. Benson also tested negative for contraband during all post-incident testing reviewed by the Office.

On May 1, 2025, Mr. Benson was charged with the DOC disciplinary offense of assault on a Department of Correction employee. He was ultimately found guilty and sanctioned with fifteen days of punitive segregation, sixty days loss of correspondence privileges, and the forfeiture of fifteen days of Risk Reduction Earned Credit.

On May 1, 2025, Mr. Benson was also charged with the DOC disciplinary offense of interfering with safety and security. He was ultimately found guilty and sanctioned with five days of punitive segregation, thirty days loss of commissary privileges, and twenty-eight days loss of tablet privileges.

On May 1, 2025, Mr. Benson was charged criminally under Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-167c, Assault of Public Safety Personnel. On October 15, 2025, that charge was dismissed.

On May 2, 2025, Mr. Benson was charged with the DOC disciplinary offense of conspiracy to convey contraband. That disciplinary charge was later dismissed due to process failure.



Ombuds Investigation

On May 13, 2025, the Office contacted Warden Caron to request the incident report concerning the May 1, 2025 planned use-of-force incident involving Mr. Benson. On that same date, Warden Caron reported that the incident report had not yet crossed her desk for review or been completed.

On that same day, the Office obtained the completed incident report from DOC Central Office.

On May 14, 2025, a call was scheduled with Mr. Benson but was not completed due to a scheduling issue involving the Office.

On May 15, 2025, the Office was informed that Mr. Benson had been transferred to MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution.

On May 20, 2025, the Office met with Mr. Benson at MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution. Mr. Benson reported that he was sitting on his bunk eating a coffee cake when correctional employees approached him from behind and force was initiated. He reported that he was not given a meaningful opportunity to comply before staff physically restrained him. Mr. Benson further reported that, after the incident, Lieutenant Ouellette questioned him about whether another correctional employee was involved in bringing contraband into the facility. While housed in restrictive housing, Mr. Benson reported that officers made threatening and degrading comments toward him.

The Office notes Mr. Benson's allegations as part of the investigative record. The findings below are based primarily on the available video footage, DOC records, applicable Administrative Directives, and the totality of the information reviewed by the Office.

Findings

Use of Force

Administrative Directive 6.5 governs the use of force within Department facilities. Administrative Directive 6.5 provides that the amount of force used shall be reasonable and appropriate to the circumstances based on the situation, the information in the possession of correctional personnel at the time, and the information reasonably available under the circumstances. The Directive further provides that force shall be utilized to promote the safety of the public, staff, and inmates, shall be based on sound correctional objectives, and shall be reasonably related to the degree and duration necessary to achieve its authorized objective.

Administrative Directive 6.5 further provides that, prior to a planned use of physical force, a correctional supervisor shall summon a video camera to document verbal intervention as well as the planned use of physical force. When there is no immediate threat to staff, the inmate, others, or the order, safety, and security of the facility, and the inmate is secure, voluntary cooperation, control, and compliance shall be attempted by verbal intervention. before initiating the use of physical force.



The Directive further requires that a correctional supervisor issue a last verbal warning, advise the inmate that force will be used, and provide the inmate with a reasonable amount of time to comply with lawful direction before initiating the use of physical force.

The May 1, 2025 incident was not a spontaneous emergency response. It was a planned operation initiated after DOC received and reviewed intelligence concerning suspected contraband. Because the operation was planned, the Department had time to consider the safest and least disruptive means of achieving its objective.

The stated objective of the operation was to remove Mr. Benson from general population and transfer him to restrictive housing pending investigation. Based on the record reviewed by the Office, DOC also suspected that Mr. Benson may possess or attempt to conceal contraband. Those concerns implicated both Administrative Directive 6.5, governing use of force, and Administrative Directive 6.7, governing searches within correctional facilities.

The Office finds that the Department's decision to initiate physical force in a populated open dormitory was inconsistent with the planning, proportionality, and safety principles reflected in Administrative Directive 6.5. The video does not reflect meaningful verbal intervention or a reasonable opportunity for Mr. Benson to comply before physical force was initiated. Within seconds of staff reaching Mr. Benson's bunk, multiple correctional employees were physically restraining him. Shortly thereafter, a chemical agent was deployed in close proximity to uninvolved incarcerated persons.

The Office recognizes that correctional staff may have had legitimate security concerns based on the intelligence available to them. The Office does not find that DOC was prohibited from intervening or from taking reasonable steps to secure Mr. Benson. However, the existence of a security concern does not eliminate the Department's obligation to plan and execute the operation in a manner consistent with its own directives.

The record reflects that staff entered a populated housing unit, immediately approached Mr. Benson's bunk, initiated physical contact within seconds, attempted to retrieve suspected contraband from his mouth, and deployed chemical agent in an open dormitory environment. That sequence created significant and foreseeable risks to Mr. Benson, staff, and uninvolved incarcerated persons.

Administrative Directive 6.7 governs searches conducted in correctional facilities. The policy has since been revised, with the current version effective January 16, 2026. The current version expressly provides that, at all times and when circumstances permit, the least invasive search method shall be utilized. It also identifies body scanning, if available, as an authorized search method when an inmate is suspected of ingesting or inserting contraband into a body cavity and provides procedures for positive body-scan readings, including voluntary surrender, supervisor review, Health Services consultation, and dry-cell placement where appropriate.

The current version of Administrative Directive 6.7 defines a manual body cavity search as the manual examination of an inmate's mouth, nose, ears and/or genital or rectal areas. The Directive further provides that the Connecticut Department of Correction shall not authorize manual body cavity searches. Where an inmate is suspected of concealing contraband in a body cavity and less intrusive measures of recovery have been unsuccessful, the shift commander or designee shall consult with Health Services to determine whether medical treatment at an outside hospital is necessary.

The Office finds it is likely that Officer Yanez's conduct constituted a formal manual body cavity search under Administrative Directive 6.7 because, at minimum, the conduct involved an attempted physical retrieval of suspected contraband from Mr. Benson's mouth during an active use-of-force encounter. That conduct implicated the same safety, medical, and procedural concerns addressed by Administrative Directive 6.7, including the Directive's current prohibition on manual body cavity searches and its requirement that less intrusive measures and Health Services consultation be used where suspected internal concealment of contraband is at issue.

The video reflects Officer Yanez placing his fingers into Mr. Benson's mouth while other staff physically restrained Mr. Benson on his bunk. This created a foreseeable risk of injury to both Mr. Benson and Officer Yanez. It also escalated an already unstable physical encounter.

The Department had less intrusive and more controlled alternatives available, including controlled search procedures, dry-cell placement where appropriate, Health Services consultation, and outside medical evaluation if medically necessary, all requirements outlined in Administrative Directive 6.7. Instead, the attempted recovery occurred immediately, physically, and in a setting that heightened the likelihood of harm.

The Office further finds that the deployment of chemical agent in the open dormitory created foreseeable collateral exposure to uninvolved incarcerated persons. The video reflects other incarcerated persons reacting to the chemical agent by covering their mouths and wiping their eyes. Planned use-of-force operations must account for the presence of uninvolved individuals and should be structured to reduce unnecessary exposure to force or chemical agents.

The Department's failure to move the operation to a more controlled setting is significant. If the primary objective was to remove Mr. Benson from general population, staff could have considered summoning Mr. Benson to another area or intercepting him during movement outside the housing unit. If the primary concern was suspected contraband, staff could have considered controlled search procedures consistent with Administrative Directive 6.7. The Department's decision to execute the operation at Mr. Benson's bunk, in an occupied dormitory, increased the risk of unnecessary harm and reduced the Department's ability to control the environment.

Evaluation Prior to Placement in Restrictive Housing

The Office further finds that the evaluation completed after the deployment of chemical agent and before Mr. Benson's placement in Restrictive Housing Unit ("RHU") did not adequately reflect Mr. Benson's observable condition as captured on video.

The CTDOC Health Services Unit Policies and Procedures Manual, E 9.01, Evaluation for Contraindication to Placement of Inmates in RHU, requires that before or upon placement in RHU, all inmates be evaluated by a CTDOC registered nurse, APRN, or physician, and that the results of that evaluation be documented on the Health Evaluation for RHU form. In this matter, the Health Evaluation for RHU form was completed by Thaddeus N. Burgmyer, RN. However, the documentation contained in the form was inconsistent with Mr. Benson's observable behavior and verbal statements during the recorded evaluation.

Video reviewed by the Office reflects that Mr. Benson entered the treatment room shortly after the use-of-force incident while visibly distressed. He can be heard groaning and repeatedly stating that his eyes were burning and that he could not see. While officers assisted Mr. Benson in flushing his eyes with water at the sink, Mr. Benson stated, *"I can't see, my eyes burn, please man."* He continued to state, *"my eyes burn," "please they burn,"* and *"turn the water back on."*

Mr. Benson's eyes were flushed for less than two minutes before he was turned away from the sink and informed that the nurse would ask him questions. When Mr. Benson continued to report that his eyes were burning, the nurse stated that the water would be turned back on when Mr. Benson arrived in RHU. Mr. Benson responded that he could not go to RHU because *"it's burning."* The nurse also observed that Mr. Benson had mucus coming from his nose and wiped Mr. Benson's face with paper towels. Mr. Benson then stated, *"I can't answer your questions,"* while bending over, groaning, and with fluid dripping from his face.

Despite Mr. Benson's visible distress and repeated statements that he could not see, that his eyes were burning, and that he could not answer questions, the nurse proceeded to ask the required mental-health screening questions associated with the RHU evaluation. Mr. Benson remained in the treatment room with the nurse for approximately three minutes and eleven seconds before he was escorted toward RHU.

The Health Evaluation for RHU form documented "no" in response to whether Mr. Benson appeared anxious, scared, or depressed. The form also documented "no" in response to whether Mr. Benson was having trouble following directions or responding appropriately. Those entries are not consistent with the video reviewed by the Office. Mr. Benson's repeated statements that he could not see, that his eyes were burning, and that he could not answer questions, together with his visible physical distress, required more careful assessment and documentation before RHU placement.



Video further reflects that while Mr. Benson was being escorted to RHU, he continued to state that “*it burns,*” while keeping his head down, breathing heavily, and groaning. During the strip search process before placement in RHU, Mr. Benson stated, “*give me some water,*” and “*I can’t breathe.*” Despite those statements and his observable condition, Mr. Benson was placed in RHU shortly thereafter.

The Office finds that the evaluation and related documentation did not adequately account for Mr. Benson’s condition following exposure to chemical agent. The issue is not merely whether the Health Evaluation for RHU form was completed, but whether the evaluation meaningfully assessed and accurately documented Mr. Benson’s condition before placement in restrictive housing. Based on the video reviewed by the Office, the documentation did not accurately reflect Mr. Benson’s observable distress, difficulty responding, and continued complaints of burning eyes and difficulty breathing.

This finding reinforces the broader concern that the planned operation was not executed in a manner that sufficiently accounted for the foreseeable medical and safety consequences of force and chemical agent deployment. Where chemical agent is used and an incarcerated person is then placed in RHU, the Department must ensure that the medical evaluation is meaningful, accurately documented, and responsive to the person’s observable condition.

Disciplinary Consequences

The disciplinary consequences imposed upon Mr. Benson also warrant review. The Office does not function as a disciplinary appellate body and does not substitute its judgment for the disciplinary process. However, where disciplinary findings arise directly from an incident involving significant policy concerns, the Department should review whether those sanctions remain appropriate.

Mr. Benson was found guilty of assault on a Department of Correction employee and interfering with safety and security. The assault finding appears to be connected to Officer Yanez’s report that Mr. Benson bit or injured his finger during the attempted retrieval of suspected contraband from Mr. Benson’s mouth. The Office finds that this context is relevant. Where an officer places his fingers into an incarcerated person’s mouth during a physical struggle, the risk of injury is foreseeable. That requires careful review of whether the disciplinary charge and sanction fairly account for the circumstances under which the injury occurred.

The Office further notes that no contraband was recovered, the conspiracy-to-convey-contraband disciplinary charge was dismissed due to process failure, and the related criminal charge under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-167c was dismissed. These facts do not establish that DOC lacked any basis for initiating an investigation, but they do underscore the need for careful review of the force used, the attempted contraband recovery, and the disciplinary outcomes that followed.

Taken together, these facts support a finding that the May 1, 2025 planned use-of-force operation was not executed in a manner consistent with Administrative Directive 6.5. The Department failed to adequately plan for a controlled intervention, failed to provide a meaningful opportunity for compliance before force escalated, attempted physical retrieval of suspected contraband in a manner that created foreseeable safety risks, and deployed chemical agent in an open dormitory where uninvolved incarcerated persons were exposed.

The Office further finds that the attempted physical retrieval of suspected contraband from Mr. Benson's mouth was inconsistent with the safety, medical, and procedural safeguards now expressly reflected in Administrative Directive 6.7. Where suspected internal concealment of contraband is the basis for intervention, the Department must use controlled procedures that minimize risk, preserve evidence, and protect the safety of staff and incarcerated persons.

Recommendations

Review of Administrative Directive 6.5 and 6.7 Compliance

The Office recommends that the Department review the May 1, 2025 planned use-of-force incident for compliance with Administrative Directives 6.5 and 6.7 and take appropriate corrective action where violations are identified. The review should address not only the conduct of individual employees, but also the supervisory planning and operational decisions that allowed the intervention to occur in a populated open dormitory rather than in a controlled setting.

Planned Use-of-Force Operations Involving Suspected Contraband

The Office further recommends that the Department alter its practices regarding planned use-of-force operations involving suspected contraband. Where DOC has advance intelligence suggesting that an incarcerated person may possess contraband, the Department should be required to consider whether the individual can be secured, searched, scanned, or monitored in a controlled environment before force is initiated in a housing unit. Planned use-of-force operations should not default to immediate physical intervention at an incarcerated person's bunk when safer and less disruptive alternatives are reasonably available.

Supervisory Planning and Documentation

The Office recommends that the Department develop or revise a planned use-of-force checklist requiring supervisory staff to document consideration of the operational setting, the presence of uninvolved incarcerated persons, the availability of less intrusive alternatives, the likelihood that chemical agent may be deployed, and whether the objective can be accomplished through controlled movement or search procedures. Such documentation should be completed before a planned operation when circumstances permit.

Review of Mandibular and Hypoglossal Nerve Compression Techniques

The Office recommends that the Department review the continued use, training, and approval of the mandibular nerve area and hypoglossal nerve area compression techniques. Based on the training materials reviewed by the Office, these techniques are intended to be used in conjunction with other control techniques to distract an incarcerated person and assist staff in establishing control over the person's extremities during resistant or assaultive behavior.

The Office is concerned that the manner in which these techniques are described and trained may create a heightened risk of inconsistent or inappropriate application during dynamic use-of-force incidents. Because the techniques require staff to secure the head while applying pressure near the jaw, ear, and mouth area, they require precise application under circumstances that are often fast-moving, crowded, and physically unstable. When used simultaneously with other force techniques, the risk of misapplication increases.

This incident illustrates that concern. Video reviewed by the Office reflects Officer Yanez placing his fingers into Mr. Benson's mouth during the force encounter. That conduct is not authorized by the mandibular nerve area or hypoglossal nerve area technique as described in the training materials reviewed by the Office. Nor is it consistent with the safety and procedural safeguards governing searches and suspected contraband recovery. The fact that an approved control technique appears to have resulted in an officer's fingers entering Mr. Benson's mouth raises serious concerns about whether the technique can be consistently and safely applied in practice, particularly during a multi-staff use-of-force event.

The Office therefore recommends that the Department conduct a formal review of the mandibular nerve area and hypoglossal nerve area techniques and consider removing them from use-of-force training. If the Department elects to continue training these techniques, it should revise its training materials to clearly define the limited circumstances in which they may be used, expressly prohibit any application that results in fingers entering an incarcerated person's mouth, and require staff to discontinue the technique when it cannot be safely and precisely applied.

Attempted Physical Retrieval of Suspected Contraband

The Office further recommends that the Department review and clarify its policies and training regarding attempted recovery of suspected contraband from an incarcerated person's mouth or body. Correctional employees should be instructed that physical attempts to retrieve suspected contraband from the mouth during an active force encounter create significant safety risks and shall not be used in a manner inconsistent with Administrative Directive 6.7, including the Directive's prohibition on manual body cavity searches and its requirement that less intrusive measures and Health Services consultation be considered where suspected internal concealment is at issue.



Department Response and Requested Reconsideration

Finally, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 18-81qq(e)(4), the Office requests that the Department provide a written response no later than June 30, 2026, identifying any action taken in response to the findings and recommendations contained in this report, or the Department's reasons for not complying with any recommendation.

The Office asks that the Department specifically address the Office's request that the Department reconsider the disciplinary sanctions imposed upon Mr. Benson for assault on a Department of Correction employee and interfering with safety and security, including whether those sanctions will be modified or cancelled in light of the findings contained in this report.

Exhibit A



Exhibit B



Exhibit C



Exhibit D





Connecticut Office of Correction Ombudsman

55 Farmington Avenue, Suite 427

Hartford, CT 06105

Correction.Ombuds@ct.gov