

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

In the Matter of a Complaint by

FINAL DECISION

Ralph Neunteufel,

Complainant

against

Docket #FIC 2025-0464

Raymond Ganim, Chair, Planning and
Zoning Commission, Town of Easton;
Planning and Zoning Commission, Town of
Easton; and Town of Easton,

Respondents

May 27, 2026

The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on November 25, 2025 (“November 25th hearing”), February 10, 2026 (“February 10th hearing”), and April 28, 2026 (“April 28th hearing”), at which times the complainant and the respondents appeared, stipulated to certain facts, and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint. The case caption has been amended to accurately reflect the respondents in this matter.

After the February 10th hearing, by order of the hearing officer, the respondents submitted an after-filed exhibit, which has been admitted into evidence and marked as follows:

Respondents’ Exhibit 3 (after-filed): Written statement of Finance Director and Treasurer, Christine Calvert, dated February 21, 2026 (with attachments).¹

After consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:

1. The respondents are public agencies within the meaning of §1-200(1), G.S.
2. It is found that, by form dated May 16, 2025, the complainant requested copies of the following records from the respondents: “[a]ny and all communications between the Planning & Zoning Commission or its staff and the office of the First Selectman.”
3. It is found that, by email dated May 19, 2025, the Clerk of the respondent Planning and Zoning Commission (“P&Z Commission”) acknowledged the complainant’s records request and informed him that the proper contact person, Zoning Enforcement Officer Jonathan Rosenthal (“former ZEO”), was out of the office and would provide a more detailed response upon his return.

¹ See paragraph 22, below.

4. It is found that, by email dated May 20, 2025, the former ZEO sent an email that was intended for the complainant, stating that the request described in paragraph 2, above, was “extensive and broad and [would] take time to respond to”, but that staff was “working to respond further.” It is also found that the ZEO’s May 20th email asked how many years of responsive records the complainant was requesting. It is further found, however, that the former ZEO’s May 20th email was erroneously sent to himself, and the complainant never received such email.

5. By complaint, dated June 3, 2025 and filed June 11, 2025, the complainant appealed to this Commission, alleging that the respondents violated the Freedom of Information (“FOI”) Act by failing to provide him with all responsive communications “regarding an illegal warrantless trespass onto [the complainant’s] property.” By email, dated and filed October 6, 2025, the complainant also requested the imposition of a civil penalty against the respondents.

6. Section 1-200(5), G.S., provides:

“[p]ublic records or files” means any recorded data or information relating to the conduct of the public’s business prepared, owned, used, received or retained by a public agency, or to which a public agency is entitled to receive a copy by law or contract under 1-218, whether such data or information be handwritten, typed, tape-recorded, videotaped, printed, photostated, photographed or recorded by any other method.

7. Section 1-210(a), G.S., provides, in relevant part:

[e]xcept as otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute, all records maintained or kept on file by any public agency, whether or not such records are required by any law or by any rule or regulation, shall be public records and every person shall have the right to ... (3) receive a copy of such records in accordance with section 1-212.

8. Section 1-212(a), G.S., provides, in relevant part: “[a]ny person applying in writing shall receive, promptly upon request, a plain, facsimile, electronic or certified copy of any public record.”

9. It is concluded that the requested records, to the extent they exist and are maintained by the respondents, are public records within the meaning of §§1-200(5) and 1-210(a), G.S.

10. It is found that, at the November 25th hearing, the respondents’ only witness, the Finance Director for the Town of Easton (“Finance Director”), testified that the respondents did not realize the former ZEO’s mistake, described in paragraph 4, above, and had been waiting for a response from the complainant. It is also found that the Finance Director testified that, earlier

that same month, the former ZEO had ended his employment with the respondent Town of Easton.

11. It is found that, at the November 25th hearing, the respondents conceded that they never responded to the records request described in paragraph 2, above. The Finance Director testified, and it is found, that the respondents lost track of this particular records request due, at least in part, to the large volume of other records requests made by this complainant around the same time. The Finance Director also testified, and it is found, that in May of 2025, the complainant made approximately thirty-nine records requests to the respondent Town of Easton.² The Finance Director further testified, and it is therefore found, that prior to the November 25th hearing, no records were provided to the complainant in response to his request described in paragraph 2, above.

12. It is found that, at the November 25th hearing, the respondents, for the first time, provided the complainant with copies of records in response to his request described in paragraph 2, above (“November 25th disclosure”). The Finance Director testified that the records contained in the November 25th disclosure were responsive to various requests the complainant had made to multiple public agencies within the respondent Town of Easton and that such records consisted of the entire universe of responsive records. The Finance Director also testified, and it is found, that the search for the records contained in the November 25th disclosure was entirely performed by the former ZEO prior to his departure from the respondent Town of Easton.

13. At the conclusion of the November 25th hearing, the hearing officer orally issued two orders, as follows: (a) the complainant was ordered to review the November 25th disclosure and report to the Commission within two weeks as to whether he was satisfied with the respondents’ production; and (b) the respondents were ordered to provide an affidavit of the former ZEO, on or around December 15, 2025,³ attesting to the nature of the search conducted by the former ZEO for responsive records and whether all responsive records had been provided in the November 25th disclosure (“November 25th order”).

14. It is found that, by letter dated December 10, 2025, the complainant informed the Commission that he was not satisfied with the November 25th disclosure and requested the imposition of a civil penalty against the former ZEO. It is also found that the respondents did not comply with the November 25th order. A continued hearing was therefore scheduled for February 10, 2026.

² The Commission also takes administrative notice of Docket #FIC 2025-0338, Ralph Neunteufel v. Zoning Officer, Land Use Department, Town of Easton, et al. (April 22, 2026), in which the former ZEO testified that the complainant in this matter submitted approximately 110 records requests around the same time as the request at issue in Docket #FIC 2025-0338, which was made on April 29, 2025 (seven days prior to the records request at issue in this matter).

³ The Commission notes that the hearing officer provided the respondents some flexibility with the date by which they were required to submit the affidavit described in paragraph 13, above, because, although the respondents testified they would be able to obtain such affidavit, they testified that the former ZEO was traveling for the holidays.

15. It is found that, at the February 10th hearing, under direct questioning by the hearing officer, the respondents for the first time addressed their failure to comply with the hearing officer's order to submit an affidavit from the former ZEO regarding the November 25th disclosure. It is found that the Finance Director testified that she was unable to obtain the affidavit because the former ZEO was no longer an employee of the town, that she reached out to the former ZEO and would reach out to the former ZEO again.

16. It is found that, as of the conclusion of the contested case hearings on this matter, the respondents failed to comply with the November 25th order.

17. It is found that, at the February 10th hearing, the Finance Director testified that she believed the respondents had provided the complainant with all responsive records, based upon her previous conversations with the former ZEO. It is also found that the Finance Director testified that she believed the respondents' information technology service ("IT") had conducted a search and provided all responsive records, but the Finance Director did not testify as to when that alleged search was conducted or any other details or specifics regarding such alleged search. It is further found that the Finance Director testified that, subsequent to the November 25th hearing, she met with the former first selectman, who was first selectman at the time of the complainant's request described in paragraph 2, above, and watched as he searched his email for responsive records. It is found that the Finance Director testified that no responsive records were located by the former first selectman, but the Finance Director could not recall how the former first selectman searched for such records or testify that the search was conducted thoroughly. It is further found that the former first selectman did not provide any responsive emails to the complainant prior to the November 25th disclosure.

18. Contrary to the Finance Director's testimony, however, it is found that the complainant established, through the submission of evidence, that the former first selectman maintained responsive emails at the time of the complainant's records request described in paragraph 2, above, and that such emails should have been provided by the respondents in the November 25th disclosure. It is also found that, under direct questioning of the hearing officer, the Finance Director testified that, as of the February 10th hearing, she had not contacted any members of the P&Z Commission regarding the records described in paragraph 5, above, and therefore admitted that she did not know whether the complainant's records request was properly fulfilled by the respondents in this case. It is further found that the Finance Director had access to the former first selectman's emails but would need IT's assistance to search such emails effectively.

19. At the conclusion of the February 10th hearing, the hearing officer orally issued the following orders to the respondents: (a) work with IT to do a search of the emails between all members of the P&Z Commission and their staff, including the former ZEO, and the former first selectman that relate to the complainant; and (b) on or before February 20, 2026, submit an affidavit attesting to when such search was conducted, how it was conducted, and what were the results of such search ("February 10th order").

20. It is found that the Finance Director testified that she understood the orders described in paragraph 19, above, and that she would do whatever it took to comply with the February 10th

order. It is also found that the Finance Director testified that IT worked in the respondents' office every other week. It is further found that, at no time, did the respondents request additional time to comply with the February 10th order.

21. It is found that the respondents failed to submit an affidavit, as ordered by the Commission and as described in paragraph 19, above. It is found that, instead, by email dated February 21, 2026, the Finance Director submitted to the Commission and the complainant a purported "sworn statement" that was not notarized ("February 21st written statement") with copies of records attached, including copies of certain responsive emails of the former first selectman and one email from the respondent Chair of the P&Z Commission that was not responsive ("February 21st disclosure").⁴

22. It is found that, in her February 21st written statement, the Finance Director asserted the following:

- (a) "I personally went through Dr. Bindelglass', Former First Selectman of Easton, e-mails dating from 1/1/25 through 11/11/25 and have attached all emails that I have found, with the exception of an email that is attorney client privileged";
- (b) "[w]e have reached out to the [P&Z Commission] and they have checked their emails and all e-mail correspondence is attached"; and
- (c) "IT was unable to do a search as the Town of Easton contracts out our IT service and they were only at the Town Hall for a few hours on November 19 and were working on other issues. The Town of Easton only has IT come to the office twice a month."

23. It is found that, as of the conclusion of the contested case hearings on this matter, the respondents failed to comply with the February 10th order.

24. In light of the complainant's request for a civil penalty, the testimony and evidence presented at the November 25th and February 10th hearings, and the respondents' failure to comply with multiple order of the Commission, by order of the hearing officer dated February 25, 2026, the matter was reopened for a civil penalty hearing against the respondents, and the respondent Chair of the P&Z Commission, Raymond Ganim ("Chair Ganim"), was ordered to appear at such civil penalty hearing ("February 25th order"). It is found that the reopened hearing was scheduled for April 1, 2026.

25. It is found that, by email dated March 9, 2026, the respondents requested a postponement of the reopened hearing because Chair Ganim was scheduled to be out of the country on April 1, 2026.

⁴ The February 21st written statement together with the February 21st disclosure, are what has been marked as Respondents' Exhibit 3 (after-filed).

26. By order dated March 10, 2026, the hearing officer granted the respondents' postponement request, and the reopened civil penalty hearing was rescheduled for April 28, 2026.

27. It is found, however, that Chair Ganim failed to appear at the April 28th hearing and, therefore, the respondents failed to comply with the February 25th order. It is also found that the Finance Director appeared at the April 28th hearing approximately thirty minutes late.

28. It is found that, at the April 28th hearing, the Finance Director testified that Chair Ganim was not present at such hearing because "[she] couldn't get in touch with him." It is also found that the Finance Director testified that the Chair of the P&Z Commission is a volunteer position, that Chair Ganim is an attorney, which makes him busy, and that Chair Ganim was not Chair of the P&Z Commission at the time of the complainant's request described in paragraph 2, above.⁵ It is further found that the Finance Director testified that in searching and providing responsive records as part of the February 21st disclosure, she reached out to Chair Ganim but did not contact all members of the P&Z Commission to determine whether they maintained records responsive to the complainant's request described in paragraph 2, above, as narrowed by paragraph 5, above.⁶ It is found that the Finance Director did not testify regarding what efforts, if any, were undertaken by the respondents to enlist the assistance of IT in searching for responsive records or complying with the February 10th order. It is further found that the Finance Director testified that she did not think to reach out to any former members of the P&Z Commission who served on such P&Z Commission at the time of the complainant's records request.

29. Based upon all of the foregoing, it is found that the respondents failed to prove that they conducted a diligent and thorough search for the records described in paragraph 5, above, and therefore, that they provided the complainant with a copy of all records responsive to his request described in paragraph 2, above, as narrowed in paragraph 5, above.

30. Accordingly, it is concluded that the respondents violated the disclosure provisions of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S.

In Camera Inspection

31. Based upon the Finance Director's assertion described in paragraph 22(a), above, that the respondents withheld from disclosure "an email that is attorney client privileged", by order of the hearing officer, on May 6, 2026, the respondents submitted to the Commission an unredacted copy of such record for in camera inspection ("in camera record"), along with an

⁵ The Commission notes, however, that the Chair was a member of the P&Z Commission at the time of the complainant's request described in paragraph 2, above.

⁶ The Commission notes that this testimony appears inconsistent with the Finance Director's assertions made in paragraph 22(b), above.

Index to Records Submitted for In Camera Inspection (“in camera index”). Such in camera record shall be identified, hereinafter, as IC-2025-0464-1 through IC-2025-0464-3.⁷

32. On the in camera index, the respondents contend that the entire record, described in paragraph 31, above, is exempt from disclosure pursuant to the attorney-client privilege.⁸

33. With regard to the respondents’ claim that the in camera record is exempt from disclosure pursuant to the attorney-client privilege, §1-210(b)(10), G.S., permits a public agency to withhold from disclosure records of “communications privileged by the attorney-client relationship.”

34. The applicability of the exemption contained in §1-210(b)(10), G.S., is governed by established Connecticut law defining the privilege. That law is well set forth in Maxwell v. FOI Comm’n, 260 Conn. 143 (2002). In that case, the Supreme Court stated that §52-146r, G.S., which established a statutory privilege for communications between public agencies and their attorneys, merely codifies “the common-law attorney-client privilege as this court previously had defined it.” Id. at 149.

35. Section 52-146r(a)(2), G.S., defines “confidential communications” as:

all oral and written communications transmitted in confidence between a public official or employee of a public agency acting in the performance of his or her duties or within the scope of his or her employment and a government attorney relating to legal advice sought by the public agency or a public official or employee of such public agency from that attorney, and all records prepared by the government attorney in furtherance of the rendition of such legal advice. . . .

36. The Supreme Court has also stated that “both the common-law and statutory privileges protect those communications between a public official or employee and an attorney that are confidential, made in the course of the professional relationship that exists between the attorney and his or her public agency client, and relate to legal advice sought by the agency from the attorney.” Maxwell at 149.

37. The Commission recognizes that “[w]here legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, the communications relating to that purpose, made in confidence by the client, are at his instance permanently protected from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, except the protection be waived.” Rienzo v. Santangelo, 160

⁷ The respondents did not number the lines and words on the in camera records. Therefore, the hearing officer numbered such lines in pencil, in order to properly identify the specific portion(s) of a particular record, as identified on the in camera index. See paragraph 40, below.

⁸ The Commission notes that, although the respondents identified Line Ref. # 1-3 on the in camera index as being exempt from disclosure, it is clear from the full submission that the respondents intended to claim pages 1-3 as entirely exempt from disclosure.

Conn. 391, 395 (1971); see also. Moreover, in Connecticut, “the attorney-client privilege protects both the confidential giving of professional advice by an attorney acting in the capacity of a legal advisor to those who can act on it, as well as the giving of information to the lawyer to enable counsel to give sound and informed advice. . . . The privilege fosters full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote[s] the broader public interests in the observation of law and [the] administration of justice.” PSE Consulting, Inc. v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc., 267 Conn. 279, 329-30 (2004). However, the privilege only applies when necessary to achieve its purpose; it is not a blanket privilege. Harrington v. FOI Comm’n, 323 Conn. 1, 12 (2016). Further, a party can establish that a document is privileged by showing that the document itself is the record or memorialization of a communication between the client and the attorney; by showing that the document was created with the intent to communicate the contents to an attorney, and the client actually communicated the contents to the attorney; or by showing that the document was somehow transformed for the purpose of seeking legal advice and communicated or intended to be communicated to an attorney. See State v. Kosuda-Bigazzi, 335 Conn. 327 (2020). However, with regard to claims of privilege involving records, “[t]he privilege must be established for ‘each document separately considered’ and must be narrowly applied and strictly construed.” Id. at 342-43.

38. It is found that the respondents did not provide testimony or other evidence in support of their claim that the in camera record is exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(10), G.S. However, the Supreme Court has held that if it is clear from the face of the record, extrinsic evidence is not always required to prove the existence of the attorney-client privilege. Lash v. FOI Comm’n, 300 Conn. 511, 516 (2011).

39. Based upon a careful inspection of the in camera record described in paragraph 31, above, it is found that, contrary the respondents’ assertions, the in camera record is not a single email, but rather, multiple emails in a single email chain.

40. Based upon a careful inspection of the in camera record described in paragraph 31, above, it is found that the following portions of such record constitute written communications, transmitted in confidence, between a public official or employee of a public agency, acting within the scope of their employment, and their attorney(s), and that such communications are related to legal advice sought: IC-2025-0464-1 (lines 9 through 11, and 22); and IC-2025-0464-2 (lines 9 through 28). It is also found that no evidence was provided by the complainant to rebut the presumption that such communications were made in confidence or that the privilege had been waived. See Blumenthal v. Kimber Mfg., Inc., 265 Conn. 1, 15 (2003).

41. It is therefore concluded that the respondents did not violate the FOI Act by withholding the portions of the in camera record identified in paragraph 40, above.

42. However, the Commission has routinely found, and the courts have agreed, that certain information, such as the identity of a client or when meetings occurred and with whom, is not protected by the attorney-client privilege. In the context of an attorney’s billing records, for example, the Commission notes that it is generally accepted that attorney billing statements and time records are protected by the attorney-client privilege *only to* the extent that they reveal litigation strategy and/or the nature of the services performed. See, e.g., Bruno v. Bruno,

FA0540049006S, 2009 WL 2451005, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 10, 2009). “[T]he identity of the client, the amount of the fee, the identification of payment by case file name, and the general purpose of the work performed are usually not protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.... However, . . . bills . . . and time records which also reveal the motive of the client in seeking representation, litigation strategy, or the specific nature of the services provided, such as researching particular areas of law, fall within the privilege.” *Id.* at *2. In *Bruno*, the court said that “[m]ost of the billing records of Cohen & Wolf, P.C., in question merely refer to conferences with client or e-mails to and from client or others as well as appearances at hearings. None of that information falls within the attorney-client privilege.” *Id.* at *3.

43. Based upon a careful inspection of the remainder of the in camera record identified in paragraph 31, above, it is found that such portions consist of information not generally protected by the attorney-client privilege and that disclosure would not reveal litigation strategy or the specific nature of the services performed by an attorney.

44. It is therefore found that the portions of the in camera record described in paragraph 43, above, are not exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(10), G.S.

45. Accordingly, it is concluded that the respondents violated the disclosure provisions of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., by withholding the portions of the in camera records described in paragraph 43, above.

Civil Penalty

46. Section 1-206(b)(2), G.S., provides, in relevant part:

upon a finding that denial of any right created by the Freedom of Information Act was without reasonable grounds and after the custodian or other official directly responsible for the denial has been given an opportunity to be heard at the hearing conducted in accordance with sections 4-176e to 4-184, inclusive, the commission may, in its discretion, impose against the custodian or other official a civil penalty of not less than twenty dollars nor more than five thousand dollars.

47. With regard to the complainant’s request for the imposition of a civil penalty, the Finance Director testified that the respondents are a small town with limited resources, that the complainant’s many records requests have caused multiple employees of the respondent Town of Easton to quit, which had made responding to such records requests even more difficult, and that they have generally tried to fulfill the complainant’s records requests.

48. While the Commission is sympathetic to the difficulties faced by the Finance Director and the respondents in this matter, it is found that such difficulties do not make their actions in response to this specific records request, the complaint in this matter, or the ensuing contested case hearing process, reasonable.

49. It is found that the respondents' continued reliance on, and assumptions regarding, the former ZEO's initial response to the complainant's records request throughout the entirety of the contested case hearings, was not reasonable.

50. It is found that the respondents' failure to contact former and current members of the P&Z Commission, and to obtain access to their records, in response to the complainant's records request, other than reaching out to Chair Ganim subsequent to the February 10th hearing, was not reasonable.

51. It is found that the respondents' failure to use IT to search for responsive emails at any point during the proceedings, either by the date required by the November 25th order or throughout the entirety of the contested case hearings, was not reasonable.

52. Finally, it is found that the respondents' failure to comply with three separate orders of the Commission was not reasonable:

- (a) with respect to the November 25th order, it is found that the respondents failed to provide an affidavit of the former ZEO subsequent to the Finance Director's assurances, under oath, that they would do so;
- (b) with respect to the February 10th order, it is found that the respondents failed to provide an affidavit, as ordered, and instead submitted a signed statement. In such signed statement, as described in paragraph 22(a), above, it is found that the Finance Director asserted that she looked through the former first selectman's emails and located emails responsive to the narrowed request, as described in paragraph 5, above, even though she had previously testified that no such emails existed and that all records had been disclosed. In such signed statement, as described in paragraph 22(b), above, it is found that the Finance Director claimed she contacted the P&Z Commission and attached all responsive records, but the Finance Director subsequently testified that she did not contact all members of the P&Z Commission or any former member of the P&Z Commission, and it is found that she attached a single nonresponsive email from Chair Ganim. In such signed statement, as described in paragraph 22(c), above, it is found that the Finance Director simply claimed that IT was too busy to conduct a search and did not offer testimony or other evidence regarding the importance of IT's other work or what, if any, efforts were made by the respondents to have IT conduct the ordered search prior, or subsequent, to the date required by the February 10th order; and

- (c) with respect to the February 25th order, it is found that the respondents requested a postponement of the initial, continued civil penalty hearing because Chair Ganim would be out of the country and that the hearing officer granted such postponement request on those grounds; however, Chair Ganim still failed to appear, as ordered, at the April 28th hearing, with only the Finance Director's testimony that he was a volunteer and otherwise busy.

53. It is found that the respondent Town of Easton has previously been found in violation of the FOI Act, most recently in Docket #FIC 2025-0334, Ralph Neunteufel v. Zoning Officer, Land Use Department, Town of Easton, et al. (April 22, 2026); Docket #FIC 2025-0335, Ralph Neunteufel v. Zoning Officer, Land Use Department, Town of Easton, et al. (April 22, 2026); Docket #FIC 2025-0336, Ralph Neunteufel v. Zoning Officer, Land Use Department, Town of Easton, et al. (April 22, 2026); Docket #FIC 2025-0337, Ralph Neunteufel v. Zoning Officer, Land Use Department, Town of Easton, et al. (April 22, 2026); Docket #FIC 2025-0338, Ralph Neunteufel v. Zoning Officer, Land Use Department, Town of Easton, et al. (April 22, 2026); Docket #FIC 2025-0339, Ralph Neunteufel v. Zoning Officer, Land Use Department, Town of Easton, et al. (April 22, 2026). It is also found that the respondent Zoning Officer in all of the above-captioned matters is the same former ZEO whose prior work was relied upon by the respondents in this matter.

54. It is concluded, based upon the totality of the specific facts and circumstances of this case, that the complainant's right to prompt access to responsive public records was denied by the respondents "without reasonable grounds" within the meaning of §1-206(b)(2), G.S., and that the imposition of a civil penalty is warranted.

The following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the above-captioned complaint:

1. Within fourteen (14) days of the date of the Notice of Final Decision in this matter, the respondents shall provide the complainant with a copy of the in camera record, described in paragraph 31 of the findings, above, free of charge.

2. In complying with paragraph 1 of the order, above, the respondents may redact only those portions of the in camera record identified in paragraph 40 of the findings, above.

3. Within thirty (30) days of the date of the Notice of Final Decision in this matter, the respondents shall have IT conduct a diligent and thorough search for emails of all members of the P&Z Commission and all current and former staff of the P&Z Commission, including the former ZEO, that are to, from or include the former first selectman, that responsive to the narrowed request described in paragraph 5 of the findings, above, up through the date of the complainant's request described in paragraph 2 of the findings, above.

4. Within fourteen (14) days of the date of the Notice of Final Decision in this matter, the respondents shall contact all members of the P&Z Commission, who served on such P&Z

Commission at the time of the complainant's request described in paragraph 2 of the findings, above, and request that they conduct a diligent and thorough search of their personal email accounts for records responsive to the narrowed request described in paragraph 5 of the findings, above.

5. Within seven (7) days after completing the search described in paragraph 3 of the order, above, the respondents shall provide any responsive records located as a result of such search, or as a result of the search described in paragraph 4 of the order, above, to the complainant unredacted and free of charge. If, after conducting a diligent and thorough search, the respondents do not locate any additional records, they shall submit to the Commission, with a copy to the complainant, an affidavit sworn to or attested by a person with the requisite knowledge indicating that no additional records were located and detailing the search(es) for such records.

6. The respondent Chair of the P&Z Commission, Raymond Ganim, shall remit to the Commission, within thirty (30) days of the date of the Notice of Final Decision in this matter, a civil penalty in the amount of one-hundred dollars (\$100.00).

7. Henceforth, the respondents shall strictly comply with the disclosure provisions of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S.

Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of May 27, 2026.



Jennifer M. Mayo
Acting Clerk of the Commission

PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S., THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.

THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:

RALPH NEUNTEUFEL, 15 Hayes Street, Easton, CT 06612

RAYMOND GANIM, CHAIR, PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION, TOWN OF EASTON; PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION, TOWN OF EASTON; AND TOWN OF EASTON, 225 Center Road, Easton, CT 06612


Jennifer M. Mayo
Acting Clerk of the Commission