

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

In the Matter of a Complaint by

FINAL DECISION

Christopher Crayton,

Complainant

against

Docket #FIC 2025-0096

Ronnell Higgins, Commissioner, State of
Connecticut, Department of Emergency
Services and Public Protection; and State of
Connecticut, Department of Emergency
Services and Public Protection,

Respondents

January 28, 2026

The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on June 12, 2025 and September 9, 2025, at which times the complainant and the respondents appeared and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint.

After consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:

1. The respondents are public agencies within the meaning of §1-200(1), G.S.
2. It is found that, by email dated June 26, 2024, the complainant requested copies of all audio transmissions and body worn camera videos (“body cam videos”) associated with Case Number 2300209359, which relates to an incident that occurred on May 23, 2023 (“May 23rd incident”), that resulted in the complainant’s arrest.
3. It is found that, by email, on or around June 26, 2024, the respondents acknowledged the complainant’s records request. It is also found that, by email dated December 6, 2024, the respondents informed the complainant that they were denying his records request because they had informed the State’s Attorney’s Office of such request, pursuant to §1-215(d), G.S., and the State’s Attorney’s Office objected to the release of the records described in paragraph 2, above, because the matter was still pending in Superior Court. It is further found that, by the same email, the respondents suggested that the complainant contact the Supervisory State’s Attorney (“SSA”) assigned to his case to obtain copies of the requested records.
4. It is found that, by email dated January 10, 2025, the complainant informed the respondents that he had reached out to the SSA but had not heard back. It is also found that, by the same email, the complainant, again requested the records described in paragraph 2, above.

5. By email, dated January 14, 2025, and received and filed February 11, 2025, the complainant appealed to this Commission, alleging that the respondents violated the Freedom of Information (“FOI”) Act by failing to promptly provide the records described in paragraph 2, above. The complainant also requested the imposition of a civil penalty against the respondents.

6. Section 1-200(5), G.S., provides:

“[p]ublic records or files” means any recorded data or information relating to the conduct of the public’s business prepared, owned, used, received or retained by a public agency, or to which a public agency is entitled to receive a copy by law or contract under 1-218, whether such data or information be handwritten, typed, tape-recorded, videotaped, printed, photostated, photographed or recorded by any other method.

7. Section 1-210(a), G.S., provides, in relevant part:

[e]xcept as otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute, all records maintained or kept on file by any public agency, whether or not such records are required by any law or by any rule or regulation, shall be public records and every person shall have the right to ... (3) receive a copy of such records in accordance with section 1-212.

8. Section 1-212(a), G.S., provides, in relevant part: “[a]ny person applying in writing shall receive, promptly upon request, a plain, facsimile, electronic or certified copy of any public record.”

9. It is concluded that the requested records, to the extent they exist and are maintained by the respondents, are public records within the meaning of §§1-200(5) and 1-210(a), G.S.

Provision of Records

10. It is found that, on April 28, 2025, the respondents provided the complainant with copies of five responsive body cam videos from three state troopers who participated in the arrest of the complainant during the May 23rd incident. It is also found that three of the responsive body cam videos contained redactions.

11. At the June 12, 2025 hearing on this matter (“June 12th hearing”), the complainant testified, and it is found, that five state troopers were present during the May 23rd incident, and that he should have received responsive body cam videos from all five state troopers. The complainant also testified, and it is found, that he did not receive copies of any audio transmissions responsive to his request described in paragraph 2, above.

12. With respect to the audio transmissions, the respondents testified, and it is found, that they have a retention policy of one year for such audio transmissions and that any responsive audio transmissions were purged, in accordance with such retention policy, on or around May 23, 2024. It is also found that the complainant's records request was made on June 26, 2024, just over one month subsequent to the conclusion of the respondents' one-year retention policy.

13. It is therefore found that at the time of the complainant's request, described in paragraph 2, above, the respondents did not maintain any responsive audio transmissions. Consequently, it is concluded that the respondents did not violate the disclosure provisions of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., with respect to such audio transmissions.

14. With respect to the responsive body cam videos, the respondents testified, and it is found, that they have a retention policy of ninety days for such videos, unless the body cam videos are "flagged" or "classified" by the respondents, which extends the retention policy to four years.

15. It is found that the respondents conducted a diligent and thorough search for responsive body cam videos and could not locate responsive body cam videos for two of the five state troopers described in paragraph 11, above. It is therefore found that the respondents either failed to properly classify the body cam videos for the two missing state troopers and such body cam videos were purged in accordance with the respondents' ninety-day retention schedule, or the two state troopers with missing body cam videos failed to turn on their respective body cameras and such body cam videos never existed.¹

16. It is therefore found, based upon the findings in paragraphs 14 and 15, above, that at the time of the complainant's records request, described in paragraph 2, above, the respondents did not maintain responsive body cam videos for two of the state troopers who participated in the arrest.

17. At the June 12th hearing, the complainant argued that the respondents violated the FOI Act by purging the responsive body cam videos described in paragraph 15, above.

18. It is well settled, however, that the Commission does not have jurisdiction over matters relating to the retention and destruction of public records. Rather, authority over such matters rests with the State's Public Records Administrator, pursuant to §§1-18 and 11-8 through 11-8b, G.S., and with the Office of the State's Attorney, pursuant to §1-240, G.S. See Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 103 Conn. App. 571, 577 (2007) (the Commission is a creature of statute with limited jurisdiction; it can only administer and enforce the provisions set forth in the FOI Act). See also Docket #FIC 2025-0038, Joe Glenn v. Superintendent of Schools, Groton Public Schools, et al., (November 19, 2025); Docket #FIC 2024-0225, Deanna Bouchard v. Superintendent of Schools, Colchester Public Schools, et al., (March 26, 2025); C.J. Mozzochi, Ph.D. v. Marshall Porter, Chief Police Department, Town of

¹ The respondents testified, and it is found, that at least one of the two state troopers with missing body cam video was surprised to learn that her body cam video had not been properly classified and retained. It is therefore found that at least one of the missing body cam videos was purged in accordance with the respondents' ninety-day retention policy.

Glastonbury, et al., (June 26, 2024); Docket #FIC 2022-0598, Jon Shoenhorn v. Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, et al., (September 26, 2023); Docket #FIC 2019-0719, Robert Cushman v. Director, Central Communications, City of Middletown, et al., (November 18, 2020); Docket #FIC 2019-0607, David Montoya v. Superintendent of Schools, Westport Public Schools, et al., (June 23, 2021); Docket #FIC 1997-397, James Connolly v. Mayor, City of Hartford, et al., (April 18, 1998); Docket #FIC 1979-220, Bijan Bahramian v. City and Town of Meriden, et al., (February 26, 1980).

19. Consequently, it is concluded, based upon the facts and circumstances of this case, that the respondents provided the complainant with all responsive body cam videos that existed and were maintained at the time of his records request and, therefore, did not violate the disclosure provisions of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., with respect to such body cam videos.²

In Camera Inspection

20. Subsequent to the close of the June 12th hearing, by order of the hearing officer, dated June 27, 2025, the matter was reopened for the limited purpose of taking additional evidence and argument regarding: (i) whether the respondents complied with the promptness requirements of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., in disclosing responsive body cam videos; and (ii) whether the redactions made to such responsive body cam videos were proper.

21. On September 9, 2025, by order of the hearing officer, the respondents submitted to the Commission unredacted copies of three responsive body cam videos for in camera inspection, along with an in camera index.³ Such body cam videos shall be identified hereinafter as IC-2025-0096-v1, IC-2025-0096-v2, and IC-2025-0096-v3. The respondents also submitted redacted copies of the body cam videos.⁴

22. On the in camera index, the respondents contended that portions of the in camera records are exempt from disclosure under 28 U.S.C. §534, 42 U.S.C. §14616, §§1-210(b)(3)(G),

² The Commission encourages the respondents to review their internal policies and practices for how body cam videos are classified for retention, in order to help ensure body cam videos are not prematurely purged in the future.

³ The Commission notes that both the redacted and unredacted versions of IC-2025-0096-v2 have no audio from timestamp 11:28 through 16:59. It is found that such sound was not redacted or withheld from the body cam video, but rather, the audio stopped recording for reasons that are apparent based upon a careful inspection of the in camera records.

⁴ The Commission notes that the visual redactions made to the body cam videos consist of blurring the video screen, which allows the viewer to see basic shapes and colors but precludes the identification of specific identities of individuals or details.

29-6d(c)(4)(g)(1)(C)⁵, 29-6d(c)(4)(g)(2)(B)(i)⁶, 29-164f, 46b-38⁷, and 54-86e, G.S. Although the respondents did not claim portions of the in camera records are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(10), G.S., it is found that such statute provides, in relevant part, that disclosure is not required of records exempted by federal or other state law.

23. With regard to the portions of the in camera records claimed to be exempt from disclosure under 28 U.S.C. §534, 42 U.S.C. §14616, and §29-164f, G.S., it is found that such portions of the in camera records are described on the in camera index as: “COLLECT screen (on computer)”.

24. The Commission takes administrative notice of the Criminal Justice Information System’s website, on which an explanation of the COLLECT system is posted, as follows:

The Connecticut On-Line Law Enforcement Communications Teleprocessing (COLLECT) System is a Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection (DESPP) application utilized throughout Connecticut to access valuable online State and Federal law enforcement resources.

The DESPP COLLECT system is the statewide criminal justice system that is dedicated to the law enforcement and criminal justice agencies in the State of Connecticut. Access to COLLECT is granted only to law enforcement and criminal justice agencies. The Collect system services over 180 local, state and federal agencies.

There are over 15,000 certified COLLECT system users within the law enforcement/criminal justice community. The COLLECT system provides access to in-state COLLECT files and access to two national systems: National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and International Justice and Public Safety Information Sharing Network (NLETS)....⁸

25. Section 29-164f, G.S., provides, in relevant part, as follows: “The National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact is hereby entered into and enacted into law with any and all of the states and the federal government legally joining herein....”

⁵ The Commission notes that, although the respondents cite to §29-6d(c)(4)(g)(1)(C), G.S., on the in camera index, it is clear from the description of such records on the in camera index, the records themselves, and the other evidence in this matter, that the respondents intended to cite to §29-6d(g)(1)(C), G.S.

⁶ The Commission notes that, although the respondents cite to §29-6d(c)(4)(g)(2)(B)(i), G.S., on the in camera index, it is clear from the description of such records on the in camera index, the records themselves, and the other evidence in this matter, that the respondents intended to cite to §29-6d(g)(2)(B)(i), G.S.

⁷ The Commission notes that, although the respondents cite to §46b-38, G.S., on the in camera index, it is clear from the description of such records on the in camera index, the records themselves, and the other evidence in this matter, that the respondents intended to cite to §46b-38a, G.S.

⁸ See <https://portal.ct.gov/cjis/content/applications/connecticut-on-line-law-enforcement-communications-teleprocessing---collect> (last visited Dec. 26, 2025).

26. In Comm'r of Public Safety v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, et al., 144 Conn. App. 821, 827 (2013), the Appellate Court clarified that, “the compact provides that the NCIC database is to be used for limited purposes authorized by law, such as background checks, and that NCIC records may only be used for official purposes.” The Court concluded that §29-164f, G.S., provides a statutory exemption to the disclosure provisions of §1-210(a), G.S. Comm'r of Public Safety, 144 Conn. App. at 831.

27. Based upon a careful in camera inspection, it is found that the portions of the in camera records described in paragraph 23, above, contain NCIC information within the meaning of §29-164f, G.S.

28. It is therefore concluded that the portions of the in camera records described in paragraph 23, above, are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §29-164f, G.S., and that the respondents did not violate the disclosure provisions of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., by withholding such portions of the in camera records from the complainant.⁹

29. With regard to the portions of the in camera records claimed to be exempt from disclosure under §§1-210(b)(3)(G), 29-6d(g)(2)(B)(i), 46b-38a, and 54-86e, G.S., it is found that such portions of the in camera records are described on the in camera index as: “Image of family violence victim” and “Residence of family violence victim”.

30. Section 1-210(b)(3), G.S., provides, in relevant part, that nothing in the FOI Act shall require disclosure of the following:

[r]ecords of law enforcement agencies not otherwise available to the public which records were compiled in connection with the detection or investigation of a crime, if the disclosure of such records would not be in the public interest because it would result in disclosure of ... (G) the name and address of a victim of sexual assault under section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53-71, 53a-72a, 53a-72b or 53a-73a, voyeurism under section 53a-189a, injury or risk of injury, or impairing of morals under section 53-21 or family violence, as defined in section 46b-38a, or of an attempt thereof...

31. Section 54-86e, G.S., provides:

[t]he name and address of the victim of a sexual assault under section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70c, 53a-71, 53a-72a, 53a-72b or 53a-73a, voyeurism under section 53a-189a, or injury or risk of injury, or impairing of morals under section 53-21, or of an attempt thereof, or family violence, as defined in section

⁹ The Commission notes that because the records described in paragraph 22, above, are exempt from disclosure under §29-164f, G.S., the Commission need not further address the respondents' claims with respect to 28 U.S.C. §534 or 42 U.S.C. §14616m.

46b-38a and such other identifying information pertaining to such victim as determined by the court, shall be confidential and shall be disclosed only upon order of the Superior Court, except that (1) such information shall be available to the accused in the same manner and time as such information is available to persons accused of other criminal offenses, and (2) if a protective order is issued in a prosecution under any of said sections, the name and address of the victim, in addition to the information contained in and concerning the issuance of such order, shall be entered in the registry of protective orders pursuant to section 51-5c. (Emphasis added.)

32. In turn, §46b-38a, G.S., provides, in relevant part:

(1) “[f]amily violence” means an incident resulting in physical harm, bodily injury or assault, or an act of threatened violence that constitutes fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault, including, but not limited to, stalking or a pattern of threatening, between family or household members. Verbal abuse or argument does not constitute family violence unless there is present danger and the likelihood that physical violence will occur....

33. Based upon a careful in camera inspection, it is found that the portions of the in camera records described in paragraph 29, above, contain the name, address and other identifying information pertaining to a victim of family violence.

34. It is therefore concluded that the portions of the in camera records described in paragraph 29, above, are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §§1-210(b)(3)(G) and 54-86e, G.S., and that the respondents did not violate the disclosure provisions of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., by withholding such portions of the in camera records from the complainant.¹⁰

35. With regard to the respondents’ claim that portions of the in camera records are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §29-6d(g)(1)(C), G.S., it is found that such portions of the in camera records are described as “Trooper’s personal cell phone” on the in camera index.

36. Section 29-6d(g)(1), G.S., provides, in relevant part:

[e]xcept as otherwise provided in any agreement between a law enforcement unit and the federal government, no police officer shall use body-worn recording equipment ... to intentionally record ... (C) when an officer is on break or is otherwise engaged in a personal activity....”

¹⁰ The Commission notes that because the records described in paragraph 29, above, are exempt from disclosure under §§1-210(b)(3)(G) and 54-86e, G.S., the Commission need not further address the respondents’ claims with respect to §29-6d(g)(2)(B)(i).

37. It is found that §29-6d(g)(1)(C), G.S., does not provide an exemption to disclosure of a state trooper's personal cell phone activity. Rather, it is found that such statute prohibits a state trooper from intentionally recording when such state trooper is on break or is otherwise engaged in a personal activity.

38. Moreover, based upon a careful in camera inspection, it is found that the state trooper who recorded IC-2025-0096-v1 was on duty and actively used his cell phone to conduct public business during the redacted portions of such body cam video. It is also found, based upon a careful in camera inspection, that the state trooper who recorded IC-2025-0096-v2 was leaving the scene of the May 23rd incident and had just entered his vehicle, but it is unknown for what purpose he opened his cell phone. It is therefore found that the respondents failed to prove that such state troopers were on break or otherwise engaged in a personal activity when they used their respective cell phones in IC-2025-0096-v1 and IC-2025-0096-v2.

39. Consequently, it is found, based upon the findings in paragraphs 37 and 38, above, that the respondents failed to prove that the portions of the in camera records described in paragraph 35, above, are exempt from disclosure.

40. It is therefore concluded that the respondents violated the disclosure provisions of sections §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., by withholding the portions of the in camera records described in paragraph 35, above.

41. The Commission notes, however, that certain redacted portions of IC-2025-0096-v1 depict a woman and minor children that are unrelated to the May 23rd incident. The Commission, in its discretion, declines to order the disclosure of such images. Specifically, the Commission declines to order disclosure of the redactions made to IC-2025-0096-v1, occurring at the following timestamps: 40:01 through 40:03; 47:23 through 47:24; and 49:58 through 50:02.

Promptness

42. With regard to the complainant's allegation that the respondents failed to provide records promptly, this Commission takes guidance from Advisory Opinion #51, In the Matter of a Request for Declaratory Ruling, Third Taxing District of the City of Norwalk, Applicant (Notice of Final Decision dated January 11, 1982).

43. In Advisory Opinion #51, the Commission advised that the word "promptly," as used in §1-210(a), G.S., means quickly and without undue delay, taking into consideration all of the factors presented by a particular request. As the court recognized in Commissioner of Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection v. Freedom of Information Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. HHB-CV-18-6047741 (July 20, 2020) *6 ("DESPP v. FOI Comm'n"), a public agency should consider its obligations under the FOI Act as a "primary duty" of that agency, "on par with the [agency's] other significant duties, or said another way, that the agency's FOIA duty is not a second class duty."

44. The advisory opinion goes on to describe some of the factors that should be considered in weighing a request for records against other priorities: the volume of records requested; the time and personnel required to comply with a request; the time by which the person requesting records needs them; the time constraints under which the agency must complete its other work; the importance of the records to the requester, if ascertainable; and the importance to the public of completing the other agency business without the loss of the personnel time involved in complying with the request.

45. The respondents' witness, Shelly Vincenzo, testified, and it is found, that she was the individual primarily responsible for coordinating the respondents' compliance with the complainant's records request. Ms. Vincenzo also testified, and it is found, that she was assigned to the complainant's records request on June 26, 2024, and within a few days of being assigned to such records request, Ms. Vincenzo reached out to the appropriate state troopers and received the responsive body cam videos from Troop C.¹¹ Ms. Vincenzo also testified, and it is found, that, she checked the status of the complainant's underlying criminal case related to the May 23rd incident and determined that such case was "pending." Ms. Vincenzo further testified, and it is found that, by email, on or around November 23, 2024, she notified the State's Attorney's Office of the complainant's records request and the SSA responded that the State's Attorney's Office objected to the release of responsive body cam videos.

46. At the hearings on this matter, Ms. Vincenzo claimed that the reason for the delay in providing responsive body cam videos to the complainant was twofold: (i) her volume of work; and (ii) the fact that the SSA objected to the release of the responsive body cam videos.

47. Ms. Vincenzo testified that her volume of work was predominantly responsible for the delay between the time of the complainant's request on June 26, 2024, and Ms. Vincenzo reaching out to the State's Attorney's Office, on or around November 23, 2024. At the September 9, 2025 hearing, Ms. Vincenzo testified that she had approximately 200 FOI requests pending and that she works on FOI requests every day. Ms. Vincenzo also testified, generally, that, during the approximate five-month delay between June and November of 2024, she had a high volume of work, consisting of tasks related to subpoenas, litigation, and various meetings. It is found that Ms. Vincenzo did not specifically testify as to how much time she spent complying with the complainant's records request, the time constraints under which she needed to complete her other work, or the importance to the public of completing her other work.

48. With respect to the delay in complying with the complainant's records request, between November 23, 2024 and April 28, 2025, the respondents claimed that the complainant's underlying criminal case was pending for the majority of that time, and the SSA notified the respondents that she objected to the release of the requested body cam videos.¹²

49. Section 1-215, G.S., provides, in relevant part, as follows:

¹¹ Troop C is the specific Connecticut State Troopers barracks that maintained records responsive to the complainant's records request.

¹² See ¶ 3, above.

(a) For the purposes of this section, 'record of the arrest' means

(1) the name, race and address of the person arrested, the date, time and place of the arrest and the offense for which the person was arrested, and

(2) in addition, in a case in which (A) the arrest has been by warrant, the arrest warrant application, including any affidavit in support of such warrant, or (B) the arrest has been made without a warrant, the official arrest, incident or similar report, provided if a judicial authority has ordered any such affidavit or report sealed from public inspection or disclosure, in whole or in part, the portion of the affidavit or report that has not been sealed, if applicable, as well as a report setting forth a summary of the circumstances that led to the arrest of the person in a manner that does not violate such order. 'Record of the arrest' does not include any record of arrest of a juvenile, a record erased pursuant to chapter 961a or any investigative file of a law enforcement agency compiled in connection with the investigation of a crime resulting in an arrest.

(b) Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes, and except as otherwise provided in this section, any record of the arrest of any person shall be a public record from the time of such arrest and shall be disclosed in accordance with the provisions of section 1-212 and subsection (a) of section 1-210. No law enforcement agency shall redact any record of the arrest of any person, except for (1) the identity of witnesses, (2) the name, address or other identifying information of any victim of sexual assault under section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a, 53a-72b or 53a-73a, voyeurism under section 53a-189a, injury or risk of injury, or impairing of morals under section 53-21 or family violence, as defined in section 46b-38a, or of an attempt thereof, (3) specific information about the commission of a crime, the disclosure of which the law enforcement agency reasonably believes may prejudice a pending prosecution or a prospective law enforcement action, or (4) any information that a judicial authority has ordered to be sealed from public inspection or disclosure. Any personal possessions or effects found on a person at the time of such person's arrest shall not be disclosed unless such possessions or effects are relevant to the crime for which such person was arrested.

(c) In addition, any other public record of a law enforcement agency that documents or depicts the arrest or custody of a person during the period in which the prosecution of such person is

pending shall be disclosed in accordance with the provisions of subsection (a) of section 1-210 and section 1-212, unless such record is subject to any applicable exemption from disclosure contained in any provision of the general statutes.

(d) Any law enforcement agency receiving a request for a record described in subsection (c) of this section shall promptly provide written notice of such request to the office of the state's attorney for the appropriate judicial district where the arrest occurred. The state's attorney for such district shall be afforded the opportunity to intervene in any proceeding before the Freedom of Information Commission concerning such request.

(e) The provisions of this section shall only be applicable to any record described in this section during the period in which a prosecution is pending against the person who is the subject of such record. . . .

50. Section 1-215, G.S., exclusively governs law enforcement agencies' disclosure obligations under the FOI Act while a criminal prosecution is pending. In Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, et al., 312 Conn. 513 (2014) ("Public Safety"), the Supreme Court interpreted §1-215, G.S., and ruled that during the pendency of a criminal prosecution, a law enforcement agency must disclose no more than basic police blotter information and one other piece of information, designated by the law enforcement agency: either a press release, the arrest or incident report, or other similar report of the arrest of a person. In response to Public Safety, the General Assembly enacted Public Act 15-164, *An Act Concerning the Disclosure of Arrest Records During a Pending Prosecution under the Freedom of Information Act*, which amended §1-215, G.S., by increasing law enforcement agencies' disclosure obligations under §1-215, G.S.

51. Accordingly, the respondents were required to disclose to the complainant any public record that documents or depicts the arrest or custody of the complainant, within the meaning of §1-215(c), G.S., unless such public record was exempt from disclosure.

52. Based upon a careful in camera inspection, it is found that the responsive body cam videos depict the arrest or custody of the complainant, and, therefore, the respondents were required to disclose such body cam videos to the complainant, throughout the pendency of his prosecution, unless the body cam videos were exempt from disclosure for another reason.

53. It is found that the respondents presented no evidence to establish that the body cam videos should be withheld in their entirety or that disclosure would be prejudicial to a prospective law enforcement action, pursuant to §1-210(b)(3)(D), G.S. Moreover, it is found that the State's Attorney's Office did not intervene in this matter, pursuant to §§1-215(c) and (d), G.S.

54. It is found that the volume of records is relatively small: five responsive body cam videos, only three of which were redacted and, together, the three redacted body cam videos consist of less than ninety minutes of total video footage. Given the nature of the requested records, and the facts and circumstances of this case, it is found that such records were of high importance to the complainant.

55. It is concluded, based upon all of the foregoing, that the respondents violated the promptness requirements in §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S.

56. After consideration of the entire record, the Commission in its discretion declines to consider the imposition of a civil penalty.


The following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the above-captioned complaint:

1. Within fourteen (14) days of the date of the Notice of Final Decision in this matter, the respondents shall provide the complainant with copies of IC-2025-0096-v1 and IC-2025-0096-v2, free of charge, with those portions of the in camera records described in paragraph 35 of the findings, above, unredacted.

2. In complying with paragraph 1 of the order, above, the respondents may redact those portions of the in camera records described in paragraph 41 of the findings, above.

3. Henceforth, the respondents shall strictly comply with the promptness and disclosure provisions in §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S.

Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of January 28, 2026.




Jennifer M. Mayo
Acting Clerk of the Commission

PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S., THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.

THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:

CHRISTOPHER CRAYTON, 29 Jonathan Lane, Storrs-Mansfield, CT 06268

RONNELL HIGGINS, COMMISSIONER, STATE OF CONNECTICUT, DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY SERVICES AND PUBLIC PROTECTION; AND STATE OF CONNECTICUT, DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY SERVICES AND PUBLIC PROTECTION, c/o Attorney Gwaina D. Wauldon and Attorney Jennifer F. Miller, Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, 1111 Country Club Road, Middletown, CT 06457



Jennifer M. Mayo
Acting Clerk of the Commission