FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

In the Matter of a Complaint by FINAL DECISION

English Harbour Capital Partners, LLC,

Complainant

against Docket #FIC 2024-0589

Chairman, Zoning Commission,
Town of East Lyme; Zoning
Commission, Town of East Lyme;
and Town of East Lyme,

Respondents September 10, 2025

The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on March 19, 2025 at which time the complainant and the respondents appeared, stipulated to certain facts, and presented testimony, exhibits, and argument on the complaint.

After consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:

1. The respondents are public agencies within the meaning of §1-200(1), G.S.

2. It is found that, by letter dated June 9, 2024, the complainant requested a copy of the following records from the respondents:

a. Any documents and or communications and or correspondence…sent to or received from any of the following parties or individuals that refers to or relates to [the] matters or persons identified in Paragraph [2.b, below]:

(i) Daniel Cunningham;
(ii) Edward O'Connell, Esq.;
(iii) Mark Zamarka, Esq.;
(iv) Waller Smith & Palmer, PC;
(v) Tracy Collins, Esq.;
(vi) Gary Coeschel;
(vii) William Mulholland;
(viii) English Harbour Capital Partners LLC;
(ix) Kristen Clarke, Esq.;
(x) Harry Heller, Esq.
(xi) Heller, Heller & McCoy;

(xii) Jazon Pazzaglia;
(xiii) Pazz and Construction LLC;
(xiv) Bride Lake, LLC;
(xv) Paul Geraghty, Esq.;
(xvi) Kristen Clarke, P.E.;
(xvii) Stephen Harney;
(xviii) Port Side Holdings, Inc.;
(xix) Hathaway Farm LLC;
(xx) Gary Pivo;
(xxi) Nicholas Menapace;
(xxii) Town of East Lyme Zoning Construction;
(xxiii) Norman Peck;
(xxiv) Anne Thurlow;
(xxv) Deb Jett-Harris;
(xxvi) Sarah Suco;
(xxvii) Denise Markovitz;
(xxviii) Cathy Yuhas;
(xxix) Michael Foley;
(xxx) Deb Jett-Harris;
(xxxi) Nancy Kalal;
(xxxii) Michael Carey, Esq.;
(xxxiii) Lisa McGowan;
(xxxiv) Donald Danila; and
(xxxv) Deb Moshier-Dunn.

b. During the Period November 1, 2023 through and including [July 9, 2024], the documents and or communications and or correspondence…includ[ing] anything that refers to and or relates to any or all of the following persons, legal entities or subjects that are in your possession or control:

(i) Anthony Novak, Esq.;
(ii) East Lyme Land Trust, Inc.;
(iii) Hathaway Farm, LLC;
(iv) Port Side Holdings, Inc.;
(v) Stephen Harney;
(vi) Duval Partners, LLC;
(vii) English Harbour Capital Partners LLC;
(viii) Kristen Clarke, P.E.;
(ix) Robert Blatt;
(x) Edward O'Connell, Esq.;
(xi) Mark Zamarka, Esq.;
(xii) Waller Smith & Palmer PC;
(xiii) Tracy Collins, Es.;
(xiv) Duval Partners LLC;
(xv) Michael Carey, Esq.;
(xvi) Town of East Lyme Zoning Commission;

(xvii) Roger Reynolds, Esq.;
(xviii) Donald Danila;
(xix) Deb Moshier-Dunn;
(xx) Save the River-Save the Hills, Inc.;
(xxi) Steven Trinkaus, PE;
(xxii) William Mulholland;
(xxiii) Anne Thurlow;
(xxiv) Deb Jett-Harris;
(xxv) Nacy Kalal;
(xxvi) Glenn Russo;
(xxvii) Landmark Development Group LLC;
(xxviii) Jarvis of Cheshire LLC;
(xxix) Legal Proceedings Captioned Duval Partners and Kristen Clarke P.E. v. Town of East Lyme Zoning Commission pending in the Connecticut Superior Court Case No: HHD-CV-23-6177383S;
(xxx) Application of Bride Lake, LLC for site plan approval for the modification of the December 3, 2020 approval of eighty (80) unit affordable housing multi-family residential development pursuant to [CGS] 8-30g increasing the total unit count to 100 multi-family units at 94 N. Bridge Brook Rd.;
(xxxi) Communications between Harry Heller, Esq. and or Heller, Heller & McCoy to Mark Zamarka and or Walter Smith & Palmer and or the Town of East Lyme Zoning Commission regarding the application of Bride Lake, LLC for the site plan approval for the modification of the December 3, 2020 approval of 80 unit affordable housing multi-family residential development pursuant to [CGS] 8-30g that addresses a violation by the Town of East Lyme Zoning Commission's legal obligation under [CGS] 8-7d(b)-65 day decision deadline on site plan application;
(xxxii) Real Property located at 91 Boston Post Road, East Lyme, Connecticut;
(xxxiii) Application of Kristen Clarke, PE for Conceptual Site Plan approval per [CGS] 8-30g for a 25-Unit age restricted single and multi-family affordable residential housing development to be located on the northerly side of Boston Post Rd on a parcel identified as 91 Boston Post Road;

(xxxiv) Application of Kristen Clarke, P.E. for an amended, modified Conceptual Site Plan Approval per [CGS] 8-30g of the original application for a 25-unit age restricted single and multi-family affordable residential housing development to be located on the northerly side of Boston Post Road on a parcel identified as 91 Boston Post Road;

(xxxv) Property located on Holmes Road owned by Duval Partners, LLC known as assessors Map 55.0 Lot 30; and

(xxxvi) Application of Kristen Clarke, P.E. for Conceptual Site Plan review for an affordable housing multi-family residential development pursuant to [CGS] 8-30g at property located at Holmes Road, East Lyme, CT, assessors Map 55.0 Lot 30.

3. It is found that, by email dated July 18, 2024, the respondents confirmed that, days earlier, the complainant had amended the request set forth in paragraph 2, above, as follows:

From November 1, 2023 through July 2, 2024:

(a) [A]ny documents, including emails, etc., which relate to the application for my client at 91 Boston Post Road and Holmes Road and Grassy Hill (the Duval Partners application parcel); and

(b) [A]ny correspondence…that relates to affordable housing applications by Glen Russo and his companies and/or Jason Pazzaglia and/or Pazz Construction, specifically but not limited to correspondence from Heller, Heller McCoy (sic) to any town staff member or the town's legal counsel wherein it is alleged that the Zoning Commission failed to act timely on an application by Mr. Pazzaglia or his companies and [such failure] resulted in an automatic approval.

(the "Amended Request").

4. It is found that, by email dated August 1, 2024, the complainant requested a status update on the processing of the Amended Request.

5. It is found that, by email dated August 1, 2024, the respondents informed the complainant that they had over 300 pages of potentially responsive records to review and hoped to have such review completed the following week. It is further found that the respondents requested that the complainant confirm that the Amended Request referred to in paragraph 3, above, properly set forth the terms of the request for copies at issue.

6. In response, it is found that, by email dated August 12, 2024, the complainant, through counsel, informed the respondents:

> [T]he dates [in the Amended Request]…are the correct range. As we discussed, the documents that I am looking for in this request pertain to the Landmark matters (sic) and [the] Pazzaglia affordable housing application…. [W]e are aware of correspondence from the Heller law firm to the town or its agents regarding the automatic approval of an application, [concerning] his clients….

7. It is found that, by email dated August 30, 2024, the respondents provided the complainant with an electronic link containing 302 pages of responsive records, some of which were redacted.

8. By email dated and filed September 26, 2024, the complainant appealed to this Commission, alleging that the respondents violated the Freedom of Information ("FOI") Act by failing to provide it with a copy of all the requested records.

9. Section 1-200(5), G.S., provides:

> "[p]ublic records or files" means any recorded data or information relating to the conduct of the public's business prepared, owned, used, received or retained by a public agency, or to which a public agency is entitled to receive a copy by law or contract under section 1-218, whether such data or information be handwritten, typed, tape-recorded, videotaped, printed, photostated, photographed or recorded by any other method.

10. Section 1-210(a), G.S., provides in relevant part that:

> [e]xcept as otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute, all records maintained or kept on file by any public agency, whether or not such records are required by any law or by any rule or regulation, shall be public records and every person shall have the right to . . . (3) receive a copy of such records in accordance with section 1-212.

11. Section 1-212(a), G.S., provides in relevant part that "[a]ny person applying in writing shall receive, promptly upon request, a plain, facsimile, electronic or certified copy of

any public record."

12. It is concluded that the requested records, to the extent that they exist and are maintained by the respondents, are public records within the meaning of §§1-200(5) and 1-210(a), G.S.

13. It is found that, by email dated March 18, 2025, the respondents provided the complainant with a second electronic link containing 335 pages of responsive records, some of which were redacted.

14. At the hearing, the complainant challenged the redactions contained in the responsive records and contended that the respondents had failed to provide it with copies of the requested records in a prompt manner.

15. In reply, the respondents claimed that they worked diligently in providing the complainant with the requested records and that some of the responsive records were partially exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(2), G.S., (invasion of personal privacy), and §1-210(b)(10), G.S., (communications privileged by the attorney-client relationship).

16. On April 14, 2025, the respondents submitted unredacted copies of the records that they claimed were partially exempt from disclosure to the Commission for in camera inspection. Such records shall be identified as IC-2024-0589-1 through IC-2024-0589-36. On the index that accompanied the in camera records, the respondents raised an additional exemption pursuant to §1-210(b)(4), G.S., (strategy and negotiations with respect to pending litigation).

17. With regard to the claims of exemption, the respondents first contended that portions of the in camera records are exempt pursuant to §1-210(b)(2), G.S., which section provides that nothing in the FOI Act shall be construed to require disclosure of "personnel or medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute an invasion of personal privacy."

18. In Perkins v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 228 Conn. 158, 175 (1993), the Connecticut Supreme Court set forth the following test for the exemption contained in §1-210(b)(2), G.S.: the claimant must first establish that the files in question are personnel, medical or similar files. Second, the claimant must show that disclosure of the records would constitute an invasion of personal privacy. In determining whether disclosure would constitute an invasion of personal privacy, the claimant must establish both of two elements: first, that the information sought does not pertain to legitimate matters of public concern, and second, that such information is highly offensive to a reasonable person.

19. Section 1-214, G.S., provides, in relevant part, that:

> (b)(1) Whenever a public agency receives a request to inspect or copy records contained in any of its employees' personnel or medical files and similar files and the agency reasonably believes that the disclosure of such records would legally constitute an invasion of privacy, the agency

shall immediately notify in writing (A) each employee concerned....

(b)(2) Whenever a public agency receives a request to inspect or copy records contained in any of its employees' personnel or medical files and similar files, and the agency reasonably believes that the disclosure of such records would not legally constitute an invasion of privacy, the agency shall first disclose the requested records to the person making the request to inspect or copy such records and subsequently, within a reasonable time after such disclosure, make a reasonable attempt to send a written or an electronic copy of the request to inspect or copy such records, if applicable, or a brief description of such request, to each employee concerned and the collective bargaining representative, if any, of each employee concerned.

(b)(3) Nothing in this section shall require an agency to withhold from disclosure the contents of personnel or medical files and similar files when it does not reasonably believe that such disclosure would legally constitute an invasion of personal privacy.

(c) A public agency which has provided notice under subdivision (1) of subsection (b) of this section shall disclose the records requested unless it receives a written objection from the employee concerned or the employee's collective bargaining representative, if any, within seven business days from the receipt by the employee or such collective bargaining representative of the notice or, if there is no evidence of receipt of written notice, not later than nine business days from the date the notice is actually mailed, sent, posted or otherwise given. Each objection filed under this subsection shall be on a form prescribed by the public agency, which shall consist of a statement to be signed by the employee or the employee's collective bargaining representative, under the penalties of false statement, that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it and that the objection is not interposed for delay. Upon the filing of an objection as provided in this subsection, the agency shall not disclose the requested records unless ordered to do so by the Freedom of Information Commission pursuant to section 1-206. Failure to comply with a request to inspect or copy records under this section shall constitute a denial for the purposes of section 1-206. Notwithstanding any provision of this subsection or subsection (b) of section 1-206 to the contrary, if an employee's collective bargaining

> representative files a written objection under this subsection, the employee may subsequently approve the disclosure of the records requested by submitting a written notice to the public agency.

20. Upon careful in camera inspection, it is found that the portions of the in camera records claimed to be exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(2), G.S., are various individuals' private and government email addresses.

21. It is found that the respondents failed to prove that they "immediately" notified any of the individuals in writing that there was a request for records that contain their personal email addresses, as required by §1-214(b)(1), G.S. In this regard, the respondents provided no evidence as to when, how or whether they provided notice to any of the individuals concerned that their email addresses are the subject of the request in this case.

22. It is further found that the respondents failed to prove that any of the individuals in question timely filed a written objection to the disclosure of their email addresses, pursuant to §1-214(c), G.S. In fact, the respondents did not enter any of the individuals' objection letters into evidence, nor did they proffer any testimony regarding whether, when or in what form they received such objection.

23. Moreover, it is found that the various email addresses do not constitute "personnel" or "similar" files within the meaning of §1-210(b)(2), G.S.

24. It is further found that the respondents did not proffer any evidence by which it could be found that the individuals whose personal email addresses appear in the in camera records "took extraordinary measures to keep [their] email address[es] out of the public domain." See Town of West Hartford, et al. v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, et al., 218 Conn. 256, 258 (1991). In fact, it is found that the individuals whose private email addresses appear in the public records at issue in this case are either public officials who chose, at times, to conduct public business using their private email accounts or are private individuals—such as reporters—who chose to receive information from the respondent agency by way of their private email accounts. In both instances, it is found that such individuals chose to insert their private email addresses into the public records of the respondent agency. Moreover, with regard to the records containing certain public employees' government email addresses, it is found that such records pertain to legitimate matters of public concern. Finally, it is found that the respondents did not proffer any evidence as to why the disclosure of the personal or government email addresses in question would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.

25. It is therefore found that the respondents failed to prove that disclosure of the email addresses contained in the in camera records would constitute an invasion of personal privacy within the meaning of §1-210(b)(2), G.S.

26. It is concluded that the respondents violated the disclosure provisions of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., when they redacted those portions of the records at issue pursuant to the provisions §1-210(b)(2), G.S., before disclosing such records to the complainant.

27. Next, the respondents contended that portions of the in camera records are exempt pursuant to §1-210(b)(4), G.S., which section provides that nothing in the FOI Act shall be construed to require disclosure of:

> Records pertaining to strategy and negotiations which respect to pending claims or pending litigation to which the public agency is a party until such litigation or claim has been finally adjudicated or otherwise settled.

28. Section 1-200(8), G.S., provides that "pending claim" means

> a written notice to an agency which sets forth a demand for legal relief or which asserts a legal right stating the intention to institute an action in an appropriate form if such relief or right is not granted.

29. Section 1-200(9), G.S., provides that "pending ligation means:

> (A) a written notice to an agency which sets forth a demand for legal relief or which asserts a legal right stating the intention to institute an action before a court if such relief or right is not granted by the agency; (B) the service of a complaint again an agency returnable to a court which seeks to enforce or implement legal relief or a legal right; or (c) the agency's consideration of action to enforce or implement legal relief or a legal right.

30. In Glastonbury Educ. Ass'n v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 234 Conn. 704, 721–22 (1995) ("Glastonbury"), the Connecticut Supreme Court defined "strategy and negotiations" as follows:

> Strategy is defined as the art of devising or employing plans or stratagems. This suggests that strategy goes beyond devising to include the implementation of the plan or stratagem devised.... Negotiation is defined as the action or process of negotiating, and negotiate is variously defined as: to communicate or confer with another so as to arrive at the settlement of some matter: meet with another so as to arrive through discussion at some kind of agreement or compromise about something; to arrange for or bring about through conference and discussion: work out or arrive at or settle upon by meetings or agreements or compromises; and to influence successfully in a desired way by discussions and agreements or compromises.

Citing Websters Third New International Dictionary (emphasis in original) (citations omitted.)

31. It is found that there is no evidence in the administrative record to establish that any of the respondents are parties to a pending claim or pending litigation.

32. Moreover, even if the respondents are parties to a pending claim and/or a pending litigation and simply failed to present evidence to establish such fact(s), upon careful in camera inspection, it is found that none of the portions of the in camera records redacted pursuant to the provisions of §1-210(b)(4), G.S., pertain to "strategy or negotiations," as such terms have been defined in the Glastonbury decision.

33. It is therefore found that none of the in camera records are exempt from disclosure pursuant to the provisions of §1-210(b)(4), G.S.

34. It is therefore concluded that the respondents violated the disclosure provisions of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., when they redacted the portions of the records at issue pursuant to the provisions of §1-210(b)(4), G.S., before disclosing such records to the complainant.

35. Finally, the respondents contended that portions of the in camera records are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(10), G.S., which section permits an agency to withhold from disclosure records of "communications privileged by the attorney-client relationship."

36. Section 52-146r(b), G.S., provides that "[i]n any civil or criminal case or proceeding or in any legislative or administrative proceeding, all confidential communications shall be privileged and a government attorney shall not disclose any such communications unless an authorized representative of the public agency consents to waive the privilege and allow disclosure."

37. Section 52-146r(a)(2), G.S., defines "confidential communications" to mean:

> all oral and written communications transmitted in confidence between a public official or employee of a public agency acting in the performance of his or her duties or within the scope of his or her employment and a government attorney relating to legal advice sought by the public agency or a public official or employee of such public agency from that attorney, and all records prepared by the government attorney in furtherance of the rendition of such legal advice.

38. In Maxwell v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 260 Conn. 143, 149 (2002), the Connecticut Supreme Court held that §52-146r, G.S., "merely condif[ies] the common law attorney-client privilege as this court previously defined it." The Court further stated that "both the common-law and statutory privileges protect those communications between a public official or employee and an attorney that are confidential, made in the course of the professional relationship that exists between the attorney and his or her public agency client and relate to legal advice sought by the agency from the attorney." Id.

39. The Supreme Court has adopted a four part test to determine whether communications are subject to the attorney-client privilege: "(1) the attorney must be acting in a professional capacity for the agency; (2) the communications must be made to the attorney

a professional capacity for the agency; (2) the communications must be made to the attorney by current employees or officials of the agency; (3) the communications must relate to the legal advice sought by the agency from the attorney; and (4) the communications must be made in confidence." Shew v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 245 Conn. 149, 159 (1998). "The burden of establishing the applicability of the privilege rests with the party invoking it." Harrington v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 323 Conn. 1, 12, (2016) ("Harrington"). If it is clear from the face of the records, extrinsic evidence is not required to prove the existence of the attorney-client privilege." Lash v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 300 Conn. 511, 516-17 (2011).

40. Moreover, in Connecticut, the attorney-client privilege protects both the confidential giving of professional advice by an attorney acting in the capacity of a legal advisor to those who can act on it, as well as the giving of information to the lawyer to enable counsel to give sound and informed advice....The privilege fosters full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote[s] the broader public interests in the observation of law and [the] administration of justice." PSE Consulting, Inc. v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc., 267 Conn. 279, 329–30 (2004).

41. Upon careful in camera inspection, it is found that the following portions of the in camera records constitute communications "between a public official or employee of a public agency acting in the performance of his or her duties or within the scope of his or her employment and a government attorney," which "relate to legal advice" sought by the public agency client from the attorney, and which were "transmitted in confidence," within the meaning of §52-146r(a)(2), G.S.:

> IC-2024-0589-11 (lines 19 through 28); IC-2024-0589-14 (lines 20 through 26); IC-2024-0589-31 (lines 14 through 16); IC-2024-0589-32 (line 10, and lines 18 through 20); IC-2024-0589-34 (lines 18 through 36); IC-2024-0589-35 (line 1); and IC-2024-0589-36 (lines 17 and 18).

42. It is concluded that the portions of records identified in paragraph 41, above, constitute communications privileged by the attorney-client relationship, within the meaning of §1-210(b)(10), G.S. It is found that the attorney-client privilege has not been waived with respect to such records. Accordingly, it is further concluded that the respondents did not violate the disclosure provisions of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., when they redacted such portions from the records they provided to the complainant.

43. However, it is found that the remaining portions of records claimed exempt from disclosure pursuant to the provisions of §1-210(b)(10), G.S., do not constitute "confidential communications," within the meaning of §52-146r(a)(2), G.S.

44. It is therefore concluded that, other than the portions of records specifically identified in paragraph 41, above, the respondents violated the disclosure provisions of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., when they redacted the records at issue pursuant to the provisions of §1-210(b)(10), G.S., before disclosing such records to the complainant.

45. Finally, with regard to whether the respondents have acted promptly in responding to the instant request, this Commission has previously opined that the word "promptly" in §1-

210, G.S., means "quickly and without undue delay, taking into account all of the factors presented by a particular request . . . [including] the volume of records requested; the amount of personnel time necessary to comply with the request; the time by which the requester needs the information contained in the records; the time constraints under which the agency must complete its other work; the importance of the records to the requester, if ascertainable; and the importance to the public of completing the other agency business without loss of the personnel time involved in complying with the request." See FOI Commission Advisory Opinion #51 (Jan. 11, 1982). The Commission also recommended in Advisory Opinion #51 that, if immediate compliance is not possible, the agency should explain the circumstances to the requester.

46. It is found that when the respondents received the request set forth in paragraph 2, above, they were unclear as to what records the complainant was requesting.[1] It is further found that once the complainant clarified and subsequently amended the request, the respondents' Zoning Official directed the Land Use Coordinator to conduct a search for responsive electronic records in his possession. It is found that, in July 2024, the Land Use Coordinator conducted such a search. It is further found that the Land Use Coordinator contacted both the First Selectman and the Chairwoman of the Zoning Commission and requested that both individuals conduct a search for responsive electronic records in their possession.[2] It is further found that the Land Use Coordinator compiled all potentially responsive records from the Zoning Official, the First Selectman and the Chairwoman of the Zoning Commission and forwarded such records to the respondents' counsel. It is found that the respondents' counsel reviewed and redacted such records, and, on August 30, 2024, provided the complainant with copies of all responsive records, other than the redacted portions. Accordingly, it is found that the respondents provided the complainant with the responsive records within one month and twenty-eights days after receipt of the request.

47. Thereafter, it is found that, in order to ensure that all responsive records in the possession of the respondents' Zoning Official had been located, the Land Use Coordinator conducted a second search for responsive records—this time, conducting separate, electronic searches for each of the individuals, entities, and projects listed in both paragraphs 2.a and 2.b, above, and forwarded all potentially responsive records to the respondents' counsel. It is found that many of the records located as a result of the second search were duplicates of records that had been located during the first search. Nonetheless, it is found that the respondents' counsel reviewed and redacted the records, and, on March 18, 2025, provided the complainant with copies of all responsive records, other than the redacted portions. Moreover, it is found that, other than the 36 in camera records referred to in paragraph 16, above, the respondents provided the complainant with all the responsive records that they maintained without redactions.

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[1] In this regard, it is found that the respondents' need for clarification is understandable, given that the request set forth in paragraph 2.a, sets forth 35 individuals and entities and seeks all records "sent to or received from" such individuals and entities that "refer to or relate to" any of the 36 "matters or persons" listed in the request set forth in paragraph 2.b, above.

[2] Based upon the testimony of the Land Use Coordinator, it is found that the respondents did not maintain any hardcopy records responsive to the complainant's request.

48. Finally, it is found that, in addition to supporting the respondents' Zoning Official, the Land Use Coordinator, with the support of one assistant, supports ten additional commissions and departments.

49. Based on the facts in this case, it is found that the respondents provided the complainant with the requested records "promptly."

50. Accordingly, it is concluded that the respondents did not violate the promptness requirements of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., as alleged by the complainant.

The following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the above-captioned complaint:

1. Within forty-five days of the date of the Notice of Final Decision in this matter, the respondents shall provide to the complainant, free of charge, all portions of the in camera records, other than those portions specifically identified in paragraph 41 of the findings, above.

2. Henceforth, the respondents shall strictly comply with the disclosure provisions of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S.

Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of September 10, 2025.

Jennifer M. Mayo
Acting Clerk of the Commission

PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S., THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.

THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:

ENGLISH HARBOUR CAPITAL PARTNERS LLC, c/o Attorney Paul M. Geraghty, 38 Granite Street, P.O. Box 231, New London, CT 06320

CHAIRMAN, ZONING COMMISSION, TOWN OF EAST LYME; ZONING COMMISSION, TOWN OF EAST LYME; AND TOWN OF EAST LYME, c/o Attorney Michael P. Carey, Suisman, Shapiro, Wool, Brennan, Gray & Greenberg, P.O. Box 1591, New London, CT 06320

Jennifer M. Mayo
Acting Clerk of the Commission

FIC 2024-0589/FD/JMM/September 10, 2025