FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

In the Matter of a Complaint by FINAL DECISION

Nancy Griswold,

Complainant

against Docket #FIC 2024-0365

Land Use Administrator, Land Use Department, Town of Thomaston, Land Use Department, Town of Thomaston; and Town of Thomaston,

Respondents June 11, 2025

The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on October 30, 2024, at which time the complainant and the respondents appeared, stipulated to certain facts and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint.

After the contested case hearing, by letter dated January 24, 2025, the complainant submitted an after-filed exhibit, which has been admitted into evidence without objection, and marked as follows: Complainant's Exhibit G (after-filed): email correspondence between Attorney Steven Byrne and Stacey Sefcik, with the top email dated May 24, 2024.

After consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:

1. The respondents are public agencies within the meaning of §1-200(1), G.S.

2. It is found that, by email dated May 23, 2024, the complainant requested copies of the following records:

(a) "[the videos of] the Board of Selectmen regular meeting held on May 21, 2024 and the Board of Finance special meeting held on November 30, 2023 [recorded by Stacey Sefcik]"; and

(b) "any and all enforcement records (including photographs) concerning unregistered motor vehicles stored on Planning and Zoning Commission Chairman Ralph Celone's property located at 348 Cedar Mountain Road."

3. It is found that, by email dated May 24, 2024, the respondents sent the complainant a copy of their Freedom of Information ("FOI") request form and advised the complainant to complete and return such form in order for the respondents to timely process her request.

4. By letter of complaint, dated and filed June 21, 2024, the complainant appealed to this Commission, alleging that the respondents violated the FOI Act by failing to provide the records described in paragraph 2, above.[1]

5. Section 1-200(5), G.S., provides:

> "[p]ublic records or files" means any recorded data or information relating to the conduct of the public's business prepared, owned, used, received or retained by a public agency, or to which a public agency is entitled to receive a copy by law or contract under 1-218, whether such data or information be handwritten, typed, tape-recorded, videotaped, printed, photostated, photographed or recorded by any other method.

6. Section 1-210(a), G.S., provides, in relevant part:

> [e]xcept as otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute, all records maintained or kept on file by any public agency, whether or not such records are required by any law or by any rule or regulation, shall be public records and every person shall have the right to … (3) receive a copy of such records in accordance with section 1-212.

7. Section 1-212(a), G.S., provides, in relevant part: "[a]ny person applying in writing shall receive, promptly upon request, a plain, facsimile, electronic or certified copy of any public record."

8. It is found that Stacey Sefcik is the former Land Use Administrator for the Town of Thomaston ("town") and that she left that office on or around September 6, 2024. It is also found that during the applicable time period, as set forth in paragraph 2, above, Ms. Sefcik was a party to personal litigation involving the town.

**Request for Video Recordings**

9. At the hearing on this matter, the respondents argued that the video recordings described in paragraph 2(a), above, are not public records within the meaning of §§1-200(5) and 1-210(a), G.S.

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[1] The Commission notes that by post-hearing motion, dated January 24, 2025, the complainant attempted to broaden the scope of her complaint to include a request for a third video recording. However, as such third video recording is outside the scope of her request described in paragraph 2, above, it is not at issue herein and will therefore not be further addressed.

10. It is found that, as of the date of the hearing on this matter, Ms. Sefcik was no longer employed by the town and did not testify. It is also found, however, that the respondents submitted into evidence sworn affidavits of Ms. Sefcik, in which she attested to the purpose and nature of the video recordings described in paragraph 2(a), above.

11. Ms. Sefcik attested, and it is found, that she recorded the videos described in paragraph 2(a), above, on her own personal cellphone and for her own personal use, relative to the litigation described in paragraph 8, above. Ms. Sefcik also attested, and it is found, that in her official capacity as the Land Use Administrator, it was not her normal practice to record meetings of the Board of Selectmen or the Board of Finance. Ms. Sefcik further attested, and it is found, that she did not share copies of the videos with anyone other than her own personal attorney whom she hired in connection with the litigation described in paragraph 8, above.

12. It is found that the video recordings described in paragraph 2(a), above, were not prepared, owned, used, received or retained by a public agency within the meaning of §1-200(5), G.S.

13. It is therefore concluded that the video recordings described in paragraph 2(a), above, are not public records within the meaning of §§1-200(5) and 1-210(a), G.S. See Fromer v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 90 Conn. App. 101, 109 (2005) ("Because … the PowerPoint presentations were not prepared, owned, used, received or retained by the university, the court properly upheld the commission's determination [that they are not 'public records or files' as defined by §1-200(5), G.S.]"). Consequently, it is concluded that the respondents did not violate the FOI Act, as alleged by the complainant, with respect to such records.

**Request for Enforcement Records**

14. It is concluded that the records described in paragraph 2(b), above, are public records within the meaning of §§1-200(5) and 1-210(a), G.S.

15. With regard to the request described in paragraph 2(b), above, it is found that, by two separate emails dated October 30, 2024, the respondents disclosed 88 pages of responsive records to the complainant, with certain redactions. It is also found that the respondents submitted such records into evidence as Respondents' Exhibit 2.

16. At the hearing on this matter, the complainant contested the redactions made to responsive records and alleged that the respondents failed to disclose such responsive records promptly. The complainant also asserted that she was not challenging redactions made to motor vehicle license plate numbers.

17. On November 19, 2024, by order of the hearing officer, the respondents submitted to the Commission an unredacted copy of the responsive records for an in camera inspection, along with an in camera index. Such records shall be identified hereinafter as IC-2024-0365-1 through IC-2024-0365-46.

18. On the in camera index, the respondents contended that portions of the in camera records are exempt from disclosure under §§1-210(b)(2), 1-210(b)(4), 1-210(b)(10), 1-210(b)(13), and 1-210(b)(19), G.S.

19. It is found that IC-2024-0365-32 through IC-2024-0365-46 were withheld from the complainant in their entirety.

20. With regard to the respondents' claim that certain records, as indicated on the in camera index, are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(19), G.S., such statute provides, in relevant part, that nothing in the FOI Act shall be construed to require disclosure of:

> [r]ecords when there are reasonable grounds to believe that disclosure may result in a safety risk, including the risk of harm to any person, any government-owned or leased institution or facility or any fixture or appurtenance and equipment attached to, or contained in, such institution or facility … Such reasonable grounds shall be determined (A) … (ii) by the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection, after consultation with the chief executive officer of a municipal, district or regional agency, with respect to records concerning such agency…. (Emphasis added.)

21. Section 1-210(d), G.S., provides, in relevant part:

> [w]henever a public agency … receives a request from any person for disclosure of any records described in subdivision (19) of subsection (b) of this section under the Freedom of Information Act, the public agency shall promptly notify the … Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection … of such request in the matter prescribed by such commissioner, before complying with the request as required by the Freedom of Information Act … If the commissioner, after consultation with the chief executive officer of the applicable agency … believes the requested record is exempt from disclosure pursuant to subdivision (19) of subsection (b) of this section, the commissioner may direct the agency to withhold such record from such person …. (Emphasis added.)

22. It is found that the respondents failed to provide any evidence or testimony that they "promptly notif[ied] the … Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection" of the complainant's request or that such commissioner determined that disclosure may result in a safety risk, and therefore directed the respondents to withhold such records from the complainant. It is also found that the respondents failed to argue such exemption at the contested case hearing.

23. It is therefore concluded that the respondents failed to prove that the in camera records, identified in paragraph 20, above, are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(19), G.S.

24. With regard to the respondents' claim that certain portions of the in camera records, as indicated on the in camera index, are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(13), G.S., such statute provides that disclosure is not required of:

> [r]ecords of an investigation, including any complaint or the name of a person providing information under the provisions of section 4-61dd [i.e., the Whistleblower Statute] or sections 4-276 to 4-280 [i.e., the CT False Claims Act], inclusive.

25. It is found that §§4-61dd and 4-276 through 4-280, G.S., apply specifically to state agencies and quasi-public agencies, and not to municipal agencies. Consequently, it is found that the exemption to disclosure found in §1-210(b)(13), G.S., does not apply to investigation records of a municipality.

26. It is further found that the respondents failed to provide any evidence or testimony that the in camera records are related to an investigation being conducted pursuant to §§4-61dd or 4-276 through 4-280, G.S.

27. It is therefore concluded that the respondents failed to prove that the in camera records, identified in paragraph 24, above, are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(13), G.S.

28. With regard to the respondents' claim that certain portions of the in camera records, as indicated on the in camera index, are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(2), G.S., such statute provides that disclosure is not required of "[p]ersonnel or medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute an invasion of personal privacy."

29. The general rule under the FOI Act is disclosure; exceptions to this rule must be narrowly construed, and the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption clearly rests upon the party claiming the exemption. New Haven v. FOI Commission, 205 Conn. 767, 775 (1988); Ottochian v. FOI Commission, 221 Conn. 393 (1992). "This burden requires the claimant of the exemption to provide more than conclusory language, generalized allegations or mere arguments of counsel. Rather, a sufficiently detailed record must reflect the reasons why an exemption applies to the materials requested." Director, Retirement & Benefits Service v. FOI Commission, 256 Conn. 764, 773 (2001), citing New Haven, supra.

30. In order to prove the applicability of §1-210(b)(2), G.S., the claimant must first establish that the files in question are personnel or medical or similar files. Second, the claimant must show that disclosure of the records would constitute an invasion of personal privacy, by establishing both of two elements: (1) the information sought does not pertain to a legitimate

matter of public concern; and (2) disclosure of such information would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. See Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, 228 Conn. 158, 175 (1993).

31. The respondents did not identify the person or persons whose privacy allegedly would be invaded by disclosure of the in camera records, and it is found that the respondents offered no evidence that they had notified any such person(s) of the request. However, after careful inspection of the in camera records, it is found that the following records are, as described on the in camera index, emails by and between certain employees of the Town of Thomaston regarding "work-related concerns": IC-2024-0365-32; IC-2024-0365-33; IC-2024-0365-34; IC-2024-0365-35; IC-2024-0365-39; IC-2024-0365-42; and IC-2024-0365-43. After a careful inspection of the in camera records, it is also found that IC-2024-0365-36 is an FOI Act request attached to and concerning an email by one employee of the Town of Thomaston making a complaint against another employee of the Town of Thomaston.

32. It is therefore found, based upon a careful inspection of the in camera records, that the in camera records identified in paragraph 31, above, constitute personnel or similar files within the meaning of §1-210(b)(2), G.S.

33. It is found that the respondents failed to offer any testimony or evidence that the in camera records identified in paragraph 31, above, do not pertain to a legitimate matter of public concern or that disclosure of such information would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.

34. In Perkins the court noted that "disclosures relating to the employees of public agencies are presumptively legitimate matters of public concern." Perkins at 174. In addition, the court stated "that when a person accepts public employment, he or she becomes a servant of and accountable to the public. As a result, that person's reasonable expectation of privacy is diminished .... The public has a right to know not only who their public employees are, but also when their public employees are and are not performing their duties." Id. at 177.

35. After a careful inspection of the in camera records identified in paragraph 31, above, it is found that such records do pertain to a legitimate matter of public concern.

36. It is therefore concluded that the in camera records, identified in paragraph 31, above, are not exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(2), G.S.

37. With regard to the respondents' claim that certain portions of the in camera records, as indicated on the in camera index, and as identified in paragraph 31, above, are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(4), G.S., such statute provides that disclosure is not required of "[r]ecords pertaining to strategy and negotiations with respect to pending claims or pending litigation to which the public agency is a party until such litigation or claim has been finally adjudicated or otherwise settled...."

38. The phrase "pending claims" as defined in §1-200(8), G.S., means:

> [a] written notice to an agency which sets forth a demand for legal relief or which asserts a legal right stating the

> intention to institute an action in an appropriate forum if such relief is not granted.

39. The phrase "pending litigation" as defined in §1-200(9), G.S., means:

> (A) a written notice to an agency which sets forth a demand for legal relief or which asserts a legal right stating the intention to institute an action before a court if such relief or right is not granted by the agency; (B) the service of a complaint against an agency returnable to a court which seeks to enforce or implement legal relief or a legal right; or (C) the agency's consideration of action to enforce or implement legal relief or a legal right.

40. At the hearing on this matter, the respondents put into evidence, Respondents' Exhibit 6: meeting minutes of the Thomaston Board of Finance special meeting of November 30, 2023 ("exhibit 6"). Exhibit 6 establishes that, on November 30, 2023, the Thomaston Board of Finance entered executive session to discuss pending litigation in the matters of "Joseph J. Watley v. Town of Thomaston (Case #LLI-CV-23-5015292-S) and Stacey M. Sefcik et al v. Joseph J. Watley et al (Case #LLI-CV21-6027971-S)". It is found that, as of the date of the contested case hearing on October 30, 2024, both matters were still pending in the Superior Court.[2]

41. It is therefore concluded that, as of the contested case hearing on October 30, 2024, the respondents were party to a pending claim or pending litigation that had not been finally adjudicated or otherwise settled, within the meaning of §1-210(b)(4), G.S.

42. The Supreme Court in Stamford v. FOI Commission, 241 Conn. 310 (1997), cited with approval the definitions in Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the words "strategy" and "negotiations" within the meaning of §1-210(b)(4), G.S.:

> Strategy is defined as 'the art of *devising or employing plans or stratagems.*' [Emphasis in original] .... Negotiation is defined as 'the action or process of negotiating,' and negotiate is variously defined as: 'to communicate or confer with another so as to arrive at the settlement of some matter: meet with another so as to arrive through discussion at some kind of agreement or compromise about something'; 'to arrange for or bring about through conference and discussion: work out or arrive at or settle upon by meetings or agreements or compromises'; and 'to influence successfully in a desired way by discussions and agreements or compromises.'

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[2] The Commission takes administrative notice of the case detail and status of the above-referenced matters on the State of Connecticut Judicial Branch, Superior Court E-Filing website: https://www.jud.ct.gov/external/super/E-Services/efile/.

Stamford v. FOI Commission, at 318.

43. With respect to the definition of "strategy", the court provided additional guidance in Bloomfield Educ. Ass'n v. Frahm, No. CV 93 0703802 S, 1993 WL 280109, aff'd, 35 Conn. App. 384, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 926 (1994) ("Bloomfield I"). There, the court stated that:

> a report, record or statement of strategy would appear to be a recordation of plans or methods of proceeding to obtain a favorable outcome in the grievance resolution process. One would expect such records to be of an *internal* nature, i.e. designed to communicate information to another who stands on the same side of an issue as the author of the plan or method or strategy. Such records might typically comprise discussion of different avenues of approach to a problem, an evaluation of likelihood of success, and a discussion of possible repercussions if a particular tack is followed.

Id. at *3 (emphasis in original).

44. Based upon a careful inspection of the in camera records identified in paragraph 37, above, it is found that such records consist of communications by and between certain employees of the Town of Thomaston regarding "work-related concerns" and are therefore "internal" in nature. It is also found, however, that such records do not discuss different avenues of approach to a problem, evaluate the likelihood of success, or discuss possible repercussions if a particular tack is followed.

45. Based upon the findings in paragraph 44, above, it is concluded that the in camera records identified in paragraph 37, above, do not pertain to "strategy" with respect to the pending claim or pending litigation described in paragraph 41, above.

46. In Bloomfield I, the court also provided guidance with respect to the definition of "negotiations". There, the court stated that "the word 'negotiations' implies offers and counter-offers between the parties to narrow the gap between those parties." Id. at *4.

47. The Appellate Court provided further guidance in Bloomfield Educ. Ass'n v. Frahm, 35 Conn. App. 384, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 926 (1994) ("Bloomfield II"). There, in affirming the lower court's decision in Bloomfield I, the Appellate Court stated that:

> '[n]egotiations is a broad term, not in all connotations a term of art, but in general it means the deliberation which takes place between the parties touching a *proposed agreement* ... the deliberation, discussion, or conference on the terms of a *proposed agreement*; a treating with another with a view to coming to terms.... Negotiations look to the future, and are preliminary discussions; the preliminaries of a business transaction....'

> A key element of negotiations is the existence of an offer of possible settlement. In decisions concerning labor disputes, courts have described negotiations as the 'process of submission and consideration of *offers* until an acceptable offer is made, and accepted....'

Bloomfield II, at 390 (citations omitted; emphasis in original).

48. Based upon a careful in camera inspection, it is found that the in camera records identified in paragraph 37, above, are not external in nature and do not consist of offers and counter-offers between the parties, or touch on a proposed agreement, or reveal the process of submission and consideration of offers until an acceptable offer is made and accepted. It is found, rather, that such in camera records reveal internal discussions regarding "work-related concerns" and complaints by one employee against another.

49. Based upon the findings in paragraph 48, above, it is concluded that the in camera records identified in paragraph 37, above, do not pertain to "negotiations" with respect to the pending claim or pending litigation described in paragraph 41, above.

50. It is therefore concluded that the in camera records identified in paragraph 37, above, are not exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(4), G.S., because they do not pertain to strategy and negotiations with respect to the pending claim or pending litigation described in paragraph 41, above.

51. With regard to the respondents' claim that certain portions of the in camera records, as indicated on the in camera index, are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(10), G.S., such statute permits a public agency to withhold from disclosure records of "communications privileged by the attorney-client relationship."

52. The applicability of the exemption contained in §1-210(b)(10), G.S., is governed by established Connecticut law defining the privilege. That law is well set forth in Maxwell v. FOI Comm'n, 260 Conn. 143 (2002). In that case, the Supreme Court stated that §52-146r, G.S., which established a statutory privilege for communications between public agencies and their attorneys, merely codifies "the common-law attorney-client privilege as this court previously had defined it." Id. at 149.

53. Section 52-146r(a)(2), G.S., defines "confidential communications" as:

> all oral and written communications transmitted in confidence between a public official or employee of a public agency acting in the performance of his or her duties or within the scope of his or her employment and a government attorney relating to legal advice sought by the public agency or a public official or employee of such public agency from that attorney, and all records prepared

> by the government attorney in furtherance of the rendition of such legal advice. . . .

54. The Supreme Court has also stated that "both the common-law and statutory privileges protect those communications between a public official or employee and an attorney that are confidential, made in the course of the professional relationship that exists between the attorney and his or her public agency client, and relate to legal advice sought by the agency from the attorney." Maxwell at 149.

55. The Commission recognizes that "[w]here legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, the communications relating to that purpose, made in confidence by the client, are at his instance permanently protected from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, except the protection be waived." Rienzo v. Santangelo, 160 Conn. 391, 395 (1971); see also Olson v. Accessory Controls & Equipment Corp., 254 Conn. 145, 159, 757 A.2d 14 (2000). Moreover, in Connecticut, "the attorney-client privilege protects both the confidential giving of professional advice by an attorney acting in the capacity of a legal advisor to those who can act on it, as well as the giving of information to the lawyer to enable counsel to give sound and informed advice. . .. The privilege fosters full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote[s] the broader public interests in the observation of law and [the] administration of justice." PSE Consulting, Inc. v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc., 267 Conn. 279, 329-30 (2004). However, the privilege only applies when necessary to achieve its purpose; it is not a blanket privilege. Harrington v. FOI Comm'n, 323 Conn. 1, 12 (2016). Further, a party can establish that a document is privileged by showing that the document itself is the record or memorialization of a communication between the client and the attorney; by showing that the document was created with the intent to communicate the contents to an attorney, and the client actually communicated the contents to the attorney; or by showing that the document was somehow transformed for the purpose of seeking legal advice and communicated or intended to be communicated to an attorney. See State v. Kosuda-Bigazzi, 335 Conn. 327 (2020).

56. With regard to claims of privilege involving records, "[t]he privilege must be established for 'each document separately considered' and must be narrowly applied and strictly construed." Id. at 342-43. However, if it is clear from the face of the records, extrinsic evidence is not always required to prove the existence of the attorney-client privilege. Lash v. FOI Comm'n, 300 Conn. 511, 516 (2011).

57. Based upon a careful inspection of the in camera records identified in paragraph 51, above, it is found that the following redacted portions of such records constitute written communications, transmitted in confidence, between a public official or employee of a public agency, acting within the scope of their employment, and their attorney(s), and that such communications are related to legal advice sought:

IC-2024-0365-37 (lines 7 through 8, 24 through 25);
IC-2024-0365-39 (lines 10 through 12, word 6);
IC-2024-0365-40 (lines 6 through 7, 27 through 28);
IC-2024-0365-42 (lines 25 through 27, word 6);

IC-2024-0365-43 (lines 22 through 23);
IC-2024-0365-44 (lines 4 through 5); and
IC-2024-0365-46 (lines 5 through 13).

It is also found that no evidence was provided by the complainant to rebut the presumption that such communications were made in confidence or that the privilege had been waived. See Blumenthal v. Kimber Mfg., Inc., 265 Conn. 1, 15 (2003).

58. With respect to the remainder of the redacted information claimed to be exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(10), G.S., it is found, based upon a careful in camera inspection, that such portions of such records do not constitute written communications, transmitted in confidence, between a public official or employee of a public agency, acting within the scope of their employment, and their attorney(s), and that such communications are not related to legal advice sought.

59. Accordingly, with the exception of the records described in paragraph 57, above, it is concluded that the respondents violated the disclosure provisions of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., by withholding the records described in paragraphs 23, 27, 36, 50, and 58, above.

**Promptness**

60. With regard to the complainant's allegation that the respondents failed to disclose records promptly, this Commission takes guidance from Advisory Opinion #51, In the Matter of a Request for Declaratory Ruling, Third Taxing District of the City of Norwalk, Applicant (Notice of Final Decision dated January 11, 1982).

61. In Advisory Opinion #51, the Commission advised that the word "promptly," as used in §1-210(a), G.S., means quickly and without undue delay, taking into consideration all of the factors presented by a particular request. As the court recognized in Commissioner of Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection v. Freedom of Information Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. HHB-CV-18-6047741 (July 20, 2020) *6, a public agency should consider its obligations under the FOI Act as a "primary duty" of that agency, "on par with the [agency's] other significant duties, or said another way, that the agency's FOIA duty is not a second class duty."

62. The advisory opinion goes on to describe some of the factors that should be considered in weighing a request for records against other priorities: the volume of records requested; the time and personnel required to comply with a request; the time by which the person requesting records needs them; the time constraints under which the agency must complete its other work; the importance of the records to the requester, if ascertainable; and the importance to the public of completing the other agency business without the loss of the personnel time involved in complying with the request.

63. With respect to the factors listed above, it is found that the responsive records consist of approximately 102 pages. It is also found that the complainant did not specify the time by which she needed the records, but due to the surrounding circumstances, it is found that the

respondents knew or should have known that the records were of high importance to the complainant.

64. With regard to the time constraints under which the respondent Land Use Administrator must complete her other work and the importance to the public of completing such other work, the Commission takes administrative notice of the evidence and testimony in Docket #FIC 2023-0543, Nancy Griswold v. Stacey Sefcik, Zoning Enforcement Officer and Land Use Administrator, Building and Land Use Department, Town of Thomaston, et al., (October 9, 2024), which decision described in detail the many responsibilities of Ms. Sefcik as the Land Use Administrator, the time constraints of such responsibilities, and the small size of the respondent Building and Land Use Department.

65. It is found that after Ms. Sefcik left her position as Land Use Administrator, on or around September 6, 2024, Attorney Erin Byrne personally located responsive records, reviewed such records for exemptions, and then disclosed such records to the complainant. It is also found that Attorney Byrne located and disclosed such records on October 30, 2024, less than two months after Ms. Sefcik left her employment, and less than five months after the complainant's records request.

66. It is concluded, based upon the facts and circumstances of this case, that the respondents did not violate the promptness requirements in §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., as alleged by the complainant.

The following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the above-captioned complaint:

1. Within fourteen (14) days of the date of the Notice of Final Decision in this matter, the respondents shall provide the complainant with unredacted copies of the in camera records described in paragraph 59 of the findings, above, free of charge.

2. In complying with paragraph 1 of the order, above, the respondents may redact motor vehicle license plate numbers due to the findings in paragraph 16 of the findings, above, and the information as set forth in paragraph 57 of the findings, above.

3. Henceforth, the respondents shall strictly comply with the disclosure requirements of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S.

Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of June 11, 2025.

Jennifer M. Mayo
Acting Clerk of the Commission

PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S., THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.

THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:

**NANCY GRISWOLD**, 24 Atwood Road, Thomaston, CT 06787

**LAND USE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND USE DEPARTMENT, TOWN OF THOMASTON**; **LAND USE DEPARTMENT, TOWN OF THOMASTON**; **AND TOWN OF THOMASTON**, c/o Attorney Steven E. Byrne and Attorney Nicole L. Byrne, Byrne & Byrne LLC, P.O. Box 1065, Farmington, CT 06034

Jennifer M. Mayo
Acting Clerk of the Commission

FIC 2024-0365/FD/JMM/June 11, 2205