STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, REGULATIONS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS 25 SIGOURNEY STREET HARTFORD, CT 06106-5033

2017 Signature Confirmation

Client ID #	
Request #785019	

NOTICE OF DECISION

PARTY



PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On 2016, the Department of Social Services (the "Department") sent (the "Appellant") a Notice of Action ("NOA") setting up a Transfer of Assets ("TOA") penalty period for Long Term Care ("LTC") Medicaid, for a period of 23.88 months.
On, 2016, the Appellant's Conservator of Estate, (also, Appellant's "Significant Other" or "SO"), requested an administrative hearing on behalf of the Appellant to contest the Department's decision to impose such penalty period.
On 2016, the Office of Legal Counsel, Regulations, and Administrative Hearings ("OLCRAH") issued a Notice scheduling the administrative hearing for October 5, 2016.
On 2016, at the request of the Appellant's representative's legal counsel, OLCRAH issued a notice rescheduling the hearing for 2016.
On, 2016, in accordance with sections 17b-60, 17b-61, and 4-176e to 4-184, inclusive, of the Connecticut General Statutes, OLCRAH held an administrative hearing.
The following individuals were present at the hearing:
Annellant's Conservator of Estate


Counsel for
Family Friend,
Appellant's sister
Michelle Massicotte, Department's Representative
Michael Briggs, Department's Representative
James Hinckley, Hearing Officer

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE


The issue is whether the Department's decision to impose a penalty period of ineligibility

	payment of LTC nursing costs because the Appellant disposed of assets for less an fair market value, was correct.
	FINDINGS OF FACT
1.	On 2015, the Appellant was institutionalized in a long term care facility. (Hearing Record)
2.	On 2016, the Appellant applied to the Department for Medicaid for long term care. (Ex. 1: W-1 LTC Application form)
3.	Between 2015 and 2016, the Appellant transferred to her SO, assets totaling \$290,647.60. (stipulated by the parties)
4.	On 2016, the Department notified the Appellant of its preliminary decision that the transfers made between 2015 and 2016 were made in order to be eligible for assistance. (Ex. 3-A to Ex. 3-K: Transfer of Assets Preliminary Decision Notice(s), Hearing Record)
5.	On 2016 the Appellant died. (Hearing Record)
6.	On, 2016, the Department sent the Appellant/her representative notification that it did not agree with her rebuttal claim, and that a penalty period would be set up. (Ex. 4: W-495B Transfer of Assets Notice of Response to Rebuttal/Hardship Claim)
7.	On 2016, the Department sent the Appellant/her representative notification of its final decision that the Appellant transferred \$290,647.60 in order to become eligible for Medicaid, and that there would be a penalty period beginning on 2015 and ending on 2017 during which time Medicaid would not pay for any long-term care medical services. (Ex. 5: W-495C Transfer of Assets Final Decision Notice)
	Prior to the Appellant's institutionalization

8. The Appellant and her SO (were life partners, and lived together continuously at the same address since 1972. (SO's testimony)




- 15. Separate from her chronic gait disturbance, the Appellant periodically experienced acute episodes of weakness, tremors and loss of control of her legs with inability to move.
 - a. "...bilateral leg shaking that occurred earlier this evening. She states that the symptoms lasted about 45 minutes. She noted tremors in both legs" (Ex. 11,




b. "Pt has made great progress and has met all her goals. Pt has returned to

c. "Goal all clo purpo	(prior level of function) and is IND (independent) with all ADLs". (Ex. p.140: Visiting Nurse Association Discharge Summary, OT //14) Is Status: Met for return to independent self care with minimal set up of othing etc. to avoid bending down or reaching up for object retrieval pses" (Ex. 11, p. 138: Visiting Nurse Association Agency harge Summary //14)
	provide care for the Appellant on any regular or consistent basis, and home with the Appellant.
a. "She	has an SO but he spends the day 'at the bar or the coffee shop with Is'" (Ex. 11, p.3:
b. "She transp Her comp comp	does not have reliable help at home from her SO, no reliable cortation", "I have concerns about her home environment and safety. gait and vision are worsening (late radiation/post-surgical lications), she has an unexplained contusion, questionable med liance. She would benefit from VNA services and a safety ssment". (Ex. 11, pp. 18-19,
d. "After surge reliab	is alone much of the day". (Ex. 11, p. 25: PA 1/14) care Planning Recommendations: concerns regarding care after any and household member available to render care (but not clearly le – please make note of this. Patient is high risk for recurrent falls). 11, p.80, PA 1/15)
e. <u>"Safe</u>	tv awareness is limited as is help and support at home" (Ex. 11, p.81: PA //15)
f. "the	patient does not have good social support" (Ex. 11, p.82:
assist	is stable from a medical standpoint and safe to go home with tance. It is not clear if her SO is around often enough to assist when ed". (Ex. 11, p.91:
20. The SO was n medical emerge	ot present on several occasions when the Appellant suffered acute
a. "Says "weird home	s was standing in kitchen evening of , legs started to shake, felt d', went into living room and sat on couch", "Called SO and he came and took her to ER" (Ex. 11, p.428: ER Follow up /12)
sitting weak witho home	tells me that yesterday she was home and she had an episode while g on the couch of her legs suddenly starting to shake and her arms felt. She did get up and walk around, but then she felt slightly lightheaded ut a spinning sensation, and she called her significant other to come from work. When he came home he took her to the Emergency n". (Ex. 11, p. 168: Hospital Consultation Report, MD 14)
c. "She	presented to us here in again again, complaining of



- d. "had a fall and broke right (dominant) arm "trying to throw something wet over the shower curtain rod". Says entire body went into the bathtub and landed on R arm. Brought by ambulance to ER where dx was made by xrays". (Ex. 11, p. 81:
- e. "Diagnoses: Acute Urinary Tract Infection, Weakness", "Her significant other came home at 8:00, and found her on the couch, she was awake but she could not get off of the couch" (Ex. 11, p.181: MD 15)
- 21. In 2014-2012 2014, the SO went on a five-week trip to Switzerland to visit family. The Appellant did not have supervision when the SO left for his trip, because the SO did not make concrete arrangements for the Appellant to be supervised while he was away; he spoke with the Appellant's sister in Florida and was under the impression that the sister would be coming up to stay with the Appellant while he was away, but the sister never showed up. (SO's testimony, Hearing Record)
- 22. As late as 2015 in the progressive decline in the Appellant's state of health, the SO did not believe that the Appellant required 24 hour supervision or needed durable medical equipment (DME) to assist with her safety in the home.
 - a. "The amount of supportive services are not adequate in the face of the fact that neither the pt. nor her caregiver feel the need to provide 24 hr supervision unless it is covered under entitlement programs. Recommendations of necessary DME have also been rejected for the same reasons", "refusal on the pt's part as well as her SOs to provide adequate supervision & DME necessary for her safety" (Ex. 11, pp. 129-130:
- 23. The Appellant's typical capacity to independently perform her ADLs was diminished for periods of time on several occasions, while she was recovering after the occurrence of a serious acute medical event; the Appellant received services from VNA occupational and physical therapists and from Meals on Wheels during those times. (Ex. 11)
- 24. On occasions when the Appellant had reduced capacity to perform her ADLs, such as after she broke her arm on [15]/15, the SO provided the Appellant with some help in addition to the care provided by her caregivers.

 - b. "her R arm fracture has further compromised her balance, gait and ability to transfer safely", "VNA coming twice a week, working on a caregiver to come a few times a week. Says hard to get around, is essentially using her SO (he



	bulk of the medical evidence. (Appellant's Exhibit A, p.10: Affidavit from M.D., Hearing Record)
31.	The assertion in the Affidavit from M.D. dated 2016, that the Appellant would have required institutionalization as of 2012, is not credible because Dr. had limited knowledge of the Appellant's functional abilities in her home during that period, and because the conclusion is not supported by the bulk of the medical evidence. (Appellant's Exhibit A, pp. 11-12: Affidavit from M.D.)
32.	The Appellant did not have a need for long term institutionalization for a full two years prior to the date she was actually institutionalized on 2015. (Hearing Record)

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

- 1. The Department is the state agency that administers the Medicaid program pursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security Act. The Department may make such regulations as are necessary to administer the medical assistance program. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b-2; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b-262
- 2. The Department is the sole agency to determine eligibility for assistance and services under the programs it operates and administers. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b-261b(a)
- 3. The Department shall grant aid only if the applicant is eligible for that aid. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b-80(a)
- 4. The Department uses the policy contained in Chapter 3029 of the Uniform Policy Manual to evaluate asset transfers if the transfer occurred on or after February 8, 2006. UPM § 3029.03
- 5. There is a period established, subject to the conditions described in chapter 3029, during which institutionalized individuals are not eligible for certain Medicaid services when they or their spouses dispose of assets for less than fair market value on or after the look-back date specified in UPM 3029.05(C). This period is called the penalty period or period of ineligibility. UPM § 3029.05(A)
- 6. The look-back date for transfers of assets is a date that is sixty months before the first date on which both the following conditions exist: 1) the individual is institutionalized; and 2) the individual is either applying for or receiving Medicaid. UPM § 3029.05(C)
- 7. The look-back date for the Appellant is 2011.

- 8. The \$290,647.50 in assets transferred by the Appellant to the SO were transferred after the lookback date.
- 9. Any transfer or assignment of assets resulting in the imposition of a penalty period shall be presumed to be made with the intent, on the part of the transferor or the transferee, to enable the transferor to obtain or maintain eligibility for medical assistance. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence that the transferor's eligibility or potential eligibility for medical assistance was not a basis for the transfer or assignment. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b-261a(a)
- 10. A transfer of an asset is considered to be for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid if all of the following circumstances apply: A. Fair market value is not received; and B. There is no convincing evidence that the transfer is for another purpose; and C. The transferor does not retain sufficient funds for foreseeable needs. UPM § 3025.10
- 11. Compensation in exchange for a transferred asset is counted in determining whether fair market value was received. UPM § 3029.30
- 12. The Department considers a transferor to have met his or her foreseeable needs if, at the time of the transfer, he or she retained other income and assets to cover basic living expenses and medical costs as they could have reasonably been expected to exist based on the transferor's health and financial situation at the time of the transfer. UPM § 3029.15(B)
- 13. The Appellant did not receive compensation in exchange for the transferred assets, or retain sufficient funds for her foreseeable needs.
- 14. An institutionalized individual, or his or her spouse, may transfer an asset without penalty if the individual provides clear and convincing evidence that he or she intended to dispose of the asset in return for other valuable consideration. The value of the other valuable consideration must be equal to or greater than the value of the transferred asset in order for the asset to be transferred without penalty. (Cross Reference: 3029.20) UPM § 3029.10(G)
- 15. UPM Section 3029.20 provides for the general principles and criteria for transfers made in return for other valuable consideration as follows:

A. General Principles

- 1. Other valuable consideration may be received either prior to or subsequent to the transfer.
- 2. The value of the other valuable consideration, computed as described in 3029.20 A. 3, must be equal to or greater than the value of the

transferred asset in order for the asset to be transferred without penalty.

3. The value of the other valuable consideration, as described in 3029.20 B, is equal to the average monthly cost to a private patient for long-term care services in Connecticut, multiplied by the number of months the transferee avoided the need for the transferor to be institutionalized.

(Cross Reference: P-3029.30)

B. Criteria for Other Valuable Consideration

Other valuable consideration must be in the form of services or payment for services which meet all of the following conditions:

- 1. the services rendered are of the type provided by a homemaker or a home health aide; and
- 2. the services are essential to avoid institutionalization of the transferor for a period of at least two years; and
- 3. the services are either:
 - a. provided by the transferee while sharing the home of the transferor; or
 - b. paid for by the transferee.
- 16. The services provided to the Appellant by the SO did not meet the criteria for Other Valuable Consideration. The services were not essential to avoid institutionalization of the Appellant for a period of at least two years; the Appellant did not require institutionalization for a period of at least two years.
- 17. The Appellant did not receive nor intended to receive other valuable consideration in return for the \$290,647.60 that she transferred to her SO.
- 18. The Appellant did not provide clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the transfer of \$290,647.60 was made with the intent to obtain/maintain eligibility for medical assistance.
- 19. The penalty period begins as of the later of the following dates: 1. The first day of the month during which assets are transferred for less than fair market value, if this month is not part of any other period of ineligibility caused by a transfer of assets; or 2. the date on which the individual is eligible for Medicaid under Connecticut's State Plan and would otherwise be eligible for Medicaid payment of the LTC services

described in 3029.05 B based on an approved application for such care but for the application of the penalty period, and which is not part of any other period of ineligibility caused by a transfer of assets UPM § 3029.05 (E)

- 20. The Appellant's penalty period begins 2015, the date on which she would otherwise be eligible for Medicaid payment for long term care services.
- 21.UPM § 3029.05 provides for the length of the penalty period and nature of the penalty as follows:

F. Length of the Penalty Period

- 1. The length of the penalty period consists of the number of whole and/or partial months resulting from the computation described in 3029.05 F. 2.
- 2. The length of the penalty period is determined by dividing the total uncompensated value of all assets transferred on or after the lookback date described in 3029.05 C by the average monthly cost to a private patient for LTCF services in Connecticut.
 - a. For applicants, the average monthly cost for LTCF services is based on the figure as of the month of application.
 - b. For recipients, the average monthly cost for LTCF services is based on the figure as of:
 - (1) the month of institutionalization; or
 - (2) the month of the transfer, if the transfer involves the home, or the proceeds from a home equity loan, reverse mortgage or similar instrument improperly transferred by the spouse while the institutionalized individual is receiving Medicaid, or if a transfer is made by an institutionalized individual while receiving Medicaid...
- 4. Once the Department imposes a penalty period, the penalty runs without interruption, regardless of any changes to the individual's institutional status.

G. Medicaid Eligibility During the Penalty Period

- 1. During the penalty period, the following Medicaid services are not covered:
 - a. LTCF services; and
 - b. services provided by a medical institution which are equivalent to those provided in a long-term care facility; and

- c. home and community-based services under a Medicaid waiver.
- 2. Payment is made for all other Medicaid services during a penalty period if the individual is otherwise eligible for Medicaid.
- 22. The average monthly cost for LTCF services was \$12,170 as of the month of the Appellant's application.
- 23. The Appellant's transfer of \$290,647.50 results in a transfer of asset penalty for 23.88 months (\$290,647.50 divided by \$12,170).
- 24. The Department correctly determined that the Appellant was not eligible for payment of LTCF services during the 23.88 month penalty period beginning 2015 and ending 2017.

DISCUSSION

The executor of The Appellant's estate and his attorney argued that no penalty period of ineligibility should be imposed against the Appellant for transferring assets, because they claim the Appellant received other valuable consideration in exchange for the transferred assets.

In deciding whether other valuable consideration was received, I considered the SO's affidavits, as well as the affidavits from Drs. and and and, and the testimony of witnesses, but placed the greatest weight on the 457 pages of medical records. The medical records provided greater detail regarding the Appellant's medical condition and home circumstances at various times. The complete medical records also provided chronology and context that proved useful in evaluating whether the SO's care was essential to avoid the Appellant's institutionalization for two years or more.

While both doctors' affidavits contained accurate information regarding the Appellant's health, some assertions regarding the Appellant's functional capacity at home were of questionable accuracy. For example, Dr. affidavit stated that "by the end of 2011, had become unable to walk without a walker...". The medical records show clearly that although that Appellant was advised to use a walker, she was chronically noncompliant with that medical advice and almost always walked either unaided, or with the use of a cane only.

In considering the Doctors' affidavits, it is significant to note that neither Dr. ever provided care for the Appellant in her home, and neither had any direct knowledge regarding what care, if any, the SO actually provided to the Appellant. Dr. affidavit stated only that "It is my understanding that received the assistance she required from received from Mr. assistance she required". (Emphasis added) The doctors also had less knowledge about what care the Appellant required in her home than the caregivers who provided

her with hands on care. The caregivers who actually visited the Appellant at her home, and witnessed and tested her functional capabilities to perform her ADLs, and saw her home environment, had more knowledge about the Appellant's actual abilities and requirements, and their accounts deserve greater weight. The evidence shows that during the two years prior to her actual institutionalization, the Appellant was mainly independent with her ADLs, except during those times when she was recovering from an acute illness or injury. The Appellant would not have required institutionalization during that time due to a need for significant help in performing her ADLs; she had no such need.

A second argument made in both doctors' affidavits as to why the Appellant would have required institutionalization, besides her need for assistance with ADLs, was her need for full-time supervision for safety. Dr. stated in his affidavit, "She also was unable to safely go down the stairs leading from the house, making it impossible for her to safely exit the house in the event of a fire. At that point, she was unable to live alone" and, "She also required full-time supervision to provide assistance in the event of an emergency to help her exit the house". Dr. stated in her affidavit, "She also could not safely exit the house in the event of a fire".

The record shows that the Appellant was often alone and without supervision during that two-year period. On several occasions when the Appellant needed assistance, the SO was not at home, and she had to call him on the telephone, or wait until he came home from work. On one occasion, the SO was in Europe when the Appellant experienced a medical episode requiring an emergency room visit, and the Appellant had to be assisted by neighbors. In his testimony, the SO disputed one account in the medical records of an injury sustained by the Appellant on 2014 which described the Appellant as being unsupervised at the time (Ex. 11, p.25). The account stated that, after a fall, the Appellant had to lay naked on the bathroom floor for twenty minutes while she waited for the SO to come inside from smoking in the car. The SO testified that the account was untrue, and that he was actually right next to the Appellant when the fall happened. I found the SO's testimony credible that the Appellant was not always an accurate reporter or historian. The medical records show that the Appellant suffered many progressive complications from the brain radiation she received, including confusion and memory problems. As such, I did not necessarily consider verbatim statements from her as they were recorded in the medical records to reflect the absolute truth of the matter, but rather considered them in the context of the record as a whole. But even if it is correct that the SO was present on that occasion, on many other occasions he was not. And since the accident still happened, it is questionable whether his mere presence in the home equated to providing adequate supervision for the Appellant.

While the doctors' affidavits asserted that the Appellant needed full-time supervision, the SO, himself, never made that argument. The SO never argued that he provided the Appellant with full-time supervision, and did not dispute that he was not always at home with the Appellant. If the SO admits that he did not provide full time supervision, he cannot successfully argue that full-time supervision was the basis of the Appellant's

need for institutionalization which his care prevented.

DECISION

The Appellant's appeal is **DENIED.**

James Hinckley Hearing Officer

cc: Carol Sue Shannon, SSOM, Danbury Thomas Murphy, Esq.

RIGHT TO REQUEST RECONSIDERATION

The appellant has the right to file a written reconsideration request within **15** days of the mailing date of the decision on the grounds there was an error of fact or law, new evidence has been discovered or other good cause exists. If the request for reconsideration is granted, the appellant will be notified within 25 days of the request date. No response within 25 days means that the request for reconsideration has been denied. The right to request a reconsideration is based on §4-181a (a) of the Connecticut General Statutes.

Reconsideration requests should include <u>specific</u> grounds for the request: for example, indicate <u>what</u> error of fact or law, <u>what</u> new evidence, or <u>what</u> other good cause exists.

Reconsideration requests should be sent to: Department of Social Services, Director, Office of Administrative Hearings and Appeals, 25 Sigourney Street, Hartford, CT 06106-5033.

RIGHT TO APPEAL

The appellant has the right to appeal this decision to Superior Court within 45 days of the mailing of this decision, or 45 days after the agency denies a petition for reconsideration of this decision, provided that the petition for reconsideration was filed timely with the Department. The right to appeal is based on §4-183 of the Connecticut General Statutes. To appeal, a petition must be filed at Superior Court. A copy of the petition must be served upon the Office of the Attorney General, 55 Elm Street, Hartford, CT 06106 or the Commissioner of the Department of Social Services, 25 Sigourney Street, Hartford, CT 06106. A copy of the petition must also be served on all parties to the hearing.

The 45 day appeal period may be extended in certain instances if there is good cause. The extension request must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Social Services in writing no later than 90 days from the mailing of the decision. Good cause circumstances are evaluated by the Commissioner or the Commissioner's designee in accordance with §17b-61 of the Connecticut General Statutes. The Agency's decision to grant an extension is final and is not subject to review or appeal.

The appeal should be filed with the clerk of the Superior Court in the Judicial District of New Britain or the Judicial District in which the appellant resides.