Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ex rel. Marcia McIntosh-Waller	:	Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities
	:	CHRO No. 0750080
v.	:	HUD No. 01-07-0200-8
Donna Vahlstrom and David Vahlstrom	:	June 6, 2008

Final decision

Preliminary statement

On December 18, 2006, Marcia McIntosh-Waller (the complainant) filed a complaint affidavit with the commission on human rights and opportunities (commission) alleging that Donna Vahlstrom and David Vahlstrom (the respondents) violated General Statutes §§ 46a-64c (a) and 46a-58 (a) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 and 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (Title VIII). The complainant and the respondents live in adjoining condominium units. According to the complainant, the respondents harassed her and her sons because of her race (black) and ancestry (Jamaican). On April 24, 2007, the respondents filed their post-certification answer denying the allegations of discrimination. On September 21, 2007, the complainant's 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim was dismissed. On November 13, 2007, the respondents filed an amended answer and affirmative defenses. The public hearing was held on February 20, 2008 and February 26, 2008. Post-hearing briefs were due on May 1, 2008 at which time the record closed.

For the reasons stated herein, the complaint is dismissed.

Findings of fact

Based upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits and transcripts and an assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the following facts relevant to this decision are found (FF):

1. The complainant is black and of Jamaican ancestry. Joint stipulation.
2. The respondents are Caucasian. Joint stipulation.
3. The complainant and the respondents reside in Phase I of a condominium complex known as Cromwell Hills Condominiums, consisting of 316 condominium units in 43 buildings situated on twelve culs-de-sac. Tr. 276-78. The complainant and the respondent live in adjoining townhouses, sharing a wall between and a stairway to their respective units. Tr. 9-10, 13-14; Joint stipulation.
4. The complainant and her three sons, Jayvon, Jayrado and Frank, moved into their unit on December 25, 2005. Tr. 8. At the time of the hearing the ages of the sons were, respectively, 16, 19 and 24. Tr. 10-11.
5. As they were moving in, the complainant found on her front door a note from Donna Vahlstrom seeking the return of boot/mud scraper that had been outside the Vahlstrom door. The complainant wrote on the note that she and her sons had not taken the scraper and asked Donna Vahlstrom not to leave any more notes on her door. Tr. 12, 161-62.

6. Between December 25, 2005 and March 2006, the interaction between the complainant and the respondents was minimal but friendly and cordial. They exchanged greetings, they discussed Jayrado joining the high school football team, and they discussed him getting a job after school. Tr. 13, 125-27, 156-59.
7. In March 2006, as the complainant returned home from working a double shift, 3:00 PM to 7:00 AM, she was approached by Donna Vahlstrom complaining that some boys had egged her car. As the complainant was tired, she did not engage Donna Vahlstrom in conversation. Tr. 13.
8. Again in March 2006 as the complainant returned home from working a double shift, she was approached by Donna Vahlstrom complaining that some boys had thrown beer bottles on the ground. As the complainant was tired, she did not engage Donna Vahlstrom in conversation. Tr. 13-14, 96-98, 171-73.
9. In April 2006, Donna Vahlstrom called the police when she observed a black man standing behind a tree talking on a cell phone and what she perceived to be illegal drug related activity. She also complained to the condominium association about Frank asking her out on a date, four blacks emerging from the complainant's unit, and the smell of marijuana emanating from the complainant's unit. Tr. 34-36, 39, 84-85, 171; Commission exhibit (CHRO) 19 & 20.
10. Cromwell police officers came to the complainant's residence twice in April 2006 in response to complaints they had received alleging illegal drug activity. No drugs were found and no arrests were made. One of these incidents involved a

group of parishioners from the complainant's church who were at the complainant's residence for a prayer meeting. The complainant no longer has the prayer meetings at her residence because of her concerns that Donna Vahlstrom will call the police to allege drug activity. Tr. 34-37; CHRO 19, 20.

11. In June 2006, Donna Vahlstrom complained to the condominium association's property manager about the complainant's pit bull attacking a dog being walked by a neighbor. CHRO 15.

12. Three incidents occurred in August 2006 involving the Vahlstroms and the complainant and her sons. In one, Donna Vahlstrom knocked on the complainant's door and told the complainant that Jayrado was outdoors with a group of his friends being loud and vulgar. Jayrado, however, was in the house at the time. Tr. 14, 112.

13. The second incident occurred in August 2006 when Donna Vahlstrom called Jayrado a "black bitch." Tr. 15-16, 186-87.

14. In the third August 2006 incident, Jayrado sat on his front steps listening to music with while wearing headphones and waiting for the bus to take him to school. Donna Vahlstrom came to the door of her unit complaining that he was being too loud. She told him: "You people are ignorant." The complainant notified the police about the incident. David Vahlstrom told the police that the complainant's children deal drugs and smoke marijuana outside. No arrests were made. Tr. 16-17, 115, 120-23, 178-81, 195-200; CHRO 9.

15. On September 1, 2006, the complainant complained to the police department that the Vahlstroms had been constantly harassing her sons and using racial slurs. She told the police that the Vahlstroms were racists. She further complained that the Vahlstroms called the dog warden on her dog for no reason and filed unjustified complaints with the condominium association about her and her sons. CHRO 9.

16. On September 10, 2006, two of Jayrado's friends, John and Ryshelle, were in front of the complainant's unit waiting for Jayrado when Donna Vahlstrom came out of her unit and used her garden hose to spray water on Ryshelle. CHRO 10.

17. In December 2006, Donna Vahlstrom told a resident of the condominium complex that he should not let his children associate with the complainant's sons because they were drug dealers. Tr. 26-30; CHRO 2. The complainant told the neighbor that her sons were not drug dealers. The complainant's sons and the neighbor's children continued to associate with one another. Tr. 29-30.

18. On or about December 12, 2006, Donna Vahlstrom picked up some scraps of paper blowing across the front yard and put the paper on the stairs leading to the complainant's unit. The complainant complained to the police. Tr. 25-26; CHRO 12. The condominium association's property manager advised Donna Vahlstrom not to place litter on the steps of another unit and that in the future she should contact the management office for grounds pick-up. CHRO 21.

19. On December 17, 2006, the complainant complained to the condominium association that Donna Vahlstrom was slandering her family by accusing her sons of being drug dealers and that Donna Vahlstrom's conduct was unacceptable. CHRO 2. The complainant made several complaints to the condominium association about the Vahlstroms' behavior. Tr. 26, 30, 274.

20. On December 21, 2006, Donna Vahlstrom complained to the association about the complainant violating rules - a ripped screen in one window, patio furniture left on the rear deck past the removal date and bicycles parked all night in front of the complainant's unit. CHRO 22.

21. On March 15, 2007, Donna Vahlstrom, while screaming that she was not a racist, blocked the complainant inside her car. Tr. 42-46.

22. Donna Vahlstrom gave Jayrado 'the middle finger' on May 23, 2007. Tr. 48-49, 187; CHRO 8. She has given him 'the middle finger' five or six times. Tr. 187.

23. Recent incidents between the complainant and Donna Vahlstrom involve Donna Vahlstrom muttering under her breath when near the complainant, slamming her door when she sees the complainant, and running after the complainant's car while carrying a bag of trash. Tr. 50-51.

24. Incidents between the complainant and her sons and Donna Vahlstrom occur on an average of once per month. Tr. 50, 51; CHRO 7, 8.

Analysis

I

§ 46a-58 (a)

The complainant alleges that the respondents' conduct violated § 46a-58 (a). Section 46a-58 (a) of the 2008 supplement to the general statutes provides that: "It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section for any person to subject, or cause to be subjected, any other person to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities, secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of this state or of the United States, on account of religion, national origin, alienage, color, race, sex, sexual orientation, blindness or physical disability." The laws of the United States that the respondents are alleged to have violated are 42 U.S.C. § 1982 and 42 U.S.C. § 3617.

A

42 U.S.C. § 1982

Section 1982 provides that: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." "Section 1982's reference to the right to 'hold' property indicates that it is not confined to property transactions. . . . When interpreting a statute, a court must attempt to provide meaning

to every word in the statute. . . . To give effect to each term in the statute, the term 'hold' must have a meaning different from the terms 'purchase,' 'lease,' 'sell,' and 'convey.' . . . We agree with those courts that have concluded that section 1982's protection of the right 'to hold' property includes the right to use one's property." (Internal citations omitted.) *Whisby v. Kiekenapp*, 293 F.Sup.2d 845, 849 (N.D. Ill 2003).

"To state a sufficient claim for relief under Sections 1981 and 1982, the complaint must specifically allege (1) that the plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) an intent to discriminate on the basis of race by the defendant; and (3) the discrimination concerned one or more activities enumerated in Section 1981 or Section 1982." *Jones v National Communication & Surveillance Networks*, 409 F.Sup.2d 456, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'd, United States Court of Appeals, Docket No. 06-1220-CV (2d Cir. February 21, 2008) (2008 WL 482599). "The elements of required proof as articulated by the Second Circuit for such claims under sections 1981 and 1982 similarly require proof of a causal link between racial animus and the adverse decision." *Wood v. Real Renters LTD*, United States District Court, Docket No. 01 Civ 0269(MHD) (S.D.N.Y. March 1, 2007) (2007 WL 656907, 8).

It is evident from the cases cited in *Whisby* that the conduct giving rise to a section 1982 claim must be acts of violence or threats of imminent violence so as to cause a person to leave her residence. *Whisby v. Kiekenapp*, supra, 293 F.Sup.2d 849-50. In this case, there were no acts of violence or threats of violence by David or Donna Vahlstrom against the complainant or her sons because of her protected bases. The

complainant and her sons continue residing in the condominium unit next door to the Vahlstroms; Tr. 8; and to use the amenities of the condominium complex such as the swimming pool; Tr. 280. The incident in March 2007 in which Donna Vahlstrom blocked the complainant in her car is less evidence of discriminatory animus than it is evidence of overreaction by Donna Vahlstrom to the pending complaint affidavit.

B

42 U.S.C. § 3617

Section 3617 provides: "It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title." The federal regulation interpreting § 3617, 24 C.F.R. § 100.400, is a plausible construction of the statute and is entitled to deference. *Lachira v Sutton*, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:05cv1585 (PCD) (D. Conn. May 7, 2007) (2007 WL 1346913, 17). The regulation provides in relevant part: "(b) It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of that person having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of that person having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this part. (c) Conduct made unlawful

under this section includes, but is not limited to, the following: . . . (2) Threatening, intimidating or interfering with persons in their enjoyment of a dwelling because of the race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin of such persons, or of visitors or associates of such persons. . . .” Thus, the complainant “can assert a stand-alone § 3716 claim, seeking recovery not only for conduct interfering with efforts to acquire property, but also for post-acquisition interference.” *Lachira v Sutton*, supra, 2007 WL 134691, 17.

To succeed, the commission “must demonstrate severe and pervasive . . . harassment, not isolated or trivial instances of harassment, and a relationship between the harassment and housing.” *Abrams v Merlino*, 694 F.Sup. 1101, 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); *Glover v. Jones*, 522 F.Sup.2d 496, 503 (W.D.N.Y. 2007); *Rich v. Lubin*, United States District Court, Docket No. 02 Civ. 6786 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2004) (2004 WL 1124662, 4). The statute of limitations requires that only one harassing incident occur within the limitations period; once that is shown, consideration may be given to “the entire time period of the hostile environment in determining liability.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Glover v. Jones*, supra, 522 F.Sup.2d 504.

Section 3617 “was not intended to convert every quarrel among neighbors in which a racial or religious slur is hurled into a federal case. . . . A pattern of harassment which is invidiously motivated, however, may be actionable under § 3617. . . . Most of the cases finding a violation of § 3617 involve allegations of force and violence, such as the firebombing of a home or car, physical assaults, vandalism, firing weapons, or other

extreme activities designed to drive a person out of his or her home." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) *Lachira v Sutton*, supra, 2007 WL 134691, 19. Courts "have consistently applied section 3617 to threatening, intimidating, or extremely violent discriminatory conduct designed to drive an individual out of his home." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Whisby v. Kiekenapp*, supra, 293 F.Sup.2d 852. Isolated or sporadic inappropriate acts are not sufficiently pervasive and severe to constitute harassment under § 3617. *Rich v. Lubin*, supra, 2004 WL 1124662, 4.

"In extreme instances, however, lesser conduct which serves to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere may also be actionable. . . . [S]peech can amount to a violation of § 3617 only when it is directed to inciting or producing imminent violence and is likely in fact to do so." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) *Lachira v Sutton*, supra, 2007 WL 134691, 19. "In determining whether statements indicate impermissible discrimination, a court must ask whether the statements suggest a racial preference to an ordinary listener. . . . The ordinary listener is neither the most suspicious nor the most insensitive of our citizenry." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) *Wentworth v. Hedson,* 493 F.Sup2d 559, 569 n. 14 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).

In this case, the incidents between the complainant and her family and the Vahlstroms are nonviolent and infrequent, averaging one incident per month. FF 24. The Vahlstroms' conduct includes complaining about the complainant's dog and Jayrado's noisemaking, spraying water on someone unrelated to the complainant,

placing paper litter on the complainant's door step, giving Jayrado 'the middle finger' half a dozen times, and spreading unsubstantiated rumors of illegal drug use. FF 9, 11-14, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23. This conduct, while petty and upsetting, is not the violent conduct or the threat of violent conduct that violates § 3617.

C

§ 46a-58 (a)

Because no violations of §§ 1982 or 3617 occurred, no violation of § 46a-58 (a) occurred.

II

§ 46a-64c (a)

Section 46a-64c of the 2008 supplement to the general statutes provides in relevant part: "(a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section . . . (9) To coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this section."

While the words "coerce," "intimidate" and "threaten" imply actual or imminent violence, the definition of "interfere" is broader in scope. In defining "interfere" in

connection with General Statutes § 53a-181a, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the phase "'by offensive or disorderly conduct, annoys or interferes with another person' means: by conduct that is grossly offensive, under contemporary community standards, to a person who actually overhears or sees it, disturbs or impedes the lawful activity of that person." *State v. Indrisano*, 228 Conn. 795, 819 (1994). In the context of "coerce," "intimidate" and "threaten" and its judicial definition, then, "interfere" is grossly offensive conduct that is less than actual or threatened violence but more than a quarrel between neighbors of differing race or ethnicity. Section 46a-64c is not a civility code. Clearly, personal animosity for reasons unrelated to a protected basis does not constitute a hostile housing environment, and one is free to ignore one's neighbors. Nevertheless, one may not undertake grossly offensive conduct to disrupt the lawful activity of neighbors' quiet enjoyment of their property because of race, ethnicity or other protected basis; and it is obvious that creating a hostile housing environment for one member of the household may create a hostile housing environment for all members of the household.

Section 46a-64c has been found to sustain a cause of action by a neighbor against a neighbor for creating a hostile housing environment. *Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities ex rel. Ronald Little v. Stephen Clark*, CHRO No. 9810387 (Final Decision, August 2, 2000). To prevail on the complainant's hostile housing environment claim, the commission must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the complainant is a member of a class protected under the provisions of § 46a-64c; (2) the

complainant was the subject of unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on the complainant's protected class; and (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the complainant's living conditions and create an abusive housing environment. Id., 14. Consideration must be given to all the circumstances of the alleged harassment, "including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, rather than merely offensive; and whether it unreasonably interferes with the complainant's use and enjoyment of [her] home. . . . To determine whether the harassment was sufficiently severe and pervasive, I must examine the facts both from an objective perspective (i.e., that of a reasonable person) and from the point of view of the complainant." (Citations omitted.) Id., 14-15 "Cases have consistently held that isolated remarks or occasional episodes of harassment will not merit relief; the incidents must occur in concert or with a regularity that can reasonably be termed pervasive." Id., 16.[1]

The commission easily established two of the four elements of the complainant's hostile housing environment claim. First, in her complaint affidavit the complainant

[1] The state standard for a hostile housing environment mirrors the standard for a hostile work environment set forth in *Britell v. State of Connecticut*, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. CV-93-0351853s (September 9, 1997)(1997 WL 583840, 13), aff'd, sub nom. *Brittell v Department of Correction*, 247 Conn. 148 (1998). Although a hostile work environment can be established without violence, threats of violence, or rising to the level of a constructive discharge, federal courts appear to apply a higher standard more equivalent to that of a constructive discharge in an employment case when determining whether a hostile housing environment exists under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 or 3617.

alleged harassment based on her race and ancestry, both of which are protected classifications under § 46a-64c. Second, through the complainant's protests to the respondents, the condominium association and the police, the commission also established that the respondents' conduct was unwelcome. FF 5, 14, 15, 17-19. However, viewing the incidents in the totality of the environment they created, it is difficult to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the incidents were committed because of the complainant's protected bases or that they were sufficiently severe and pervasive from an objective perspective to constitute an actionable hostile housing environment.

Between December 25, 2006 and at least March 2007, the complainant and the respondents enjoyed a cordial relationship. FF 6. The race and ancestry of the complainant and her sons were no different in December 2006 than they were in March 2007. While that relationship obviously deteriorated, it is not evident that the deterioration was due to the complainant's race and ancestry. Rather, it appears that the deterioration began in April 2006 when the respondents began accusing the complainant's sons, falsely according to the complainant, of drug use and other inappropriate behavior. FF 9.[2] While the complainant was, reasonably and objectively, upset by the respondents' unsubstantiated accusations that her sons were drug dealers

[2] The complainant testified that the respondents also accused her of being a drug dealer. Tr. 28-29, 129. According to the police incident report, however, David Vahlstrom accused only her sons. CHRO 9. Also, in her own correspondence to the condominium association the complainant complained that "Donna is accusing my sons of being drug dealers." (Emphasis added.) CHRO 2.

and users; FF 9, 10, 14; and was, reasonably and objectively, humiliated when the police interrupted her prayer meeting and stopped her guests because of the respondents' unsubstantiated claims of drug activity; FF 10; these and the other incidents did not happen frequently enough to constitute a violation of § 46a-64c (9).

According to the complainant, the incidents between her and her sons and the respondents averaged one per month. FF 24. Often, though, months would pass without any incidents (December 2005 to March or April 2006; June 15, 2006 to August 10, 2006; September 10, 2006 to December 12, 2006; December 18, 2006 to March 15, 2007; March 15, 2007 to May 23, 2007). FF 5-22. Some of the incidents, even viewed collectively, can hardly be described as harassing. For instance, when Donna Vahlstrom approached the complainant in March 2006 to discuss the Vahlstroms' car being egged and the broken beer bottles, it is not clear from the complainant's testimony whether Vahlstrom was accusing the complainant's sons of these activities, whether Vahlstrom was just reporting what was going on in the neighborhood or whether the complainant simply assumed Vahlstrom was going to complain about her sons. The only thing that is clear about the complainant's testimony was that she did not want to speak with Vahlstrom. Much of Donna Vahlstrom's conduct can best be described as petty – placing litter on the complainant's steps, complaining about the condition of the complainant's unit, slamming her door when the complainant approaches – but given the infrequency of their occurrence together with the lack of direct face-to-face

adversarial interaction between the complainant and the Vahlstroms, the conduct cannot be found to have created a hostile housing environment.

Even factoring in the interactions between the respondents and Jayrado does not give rise to the conclusion of a hostile housing environment for the complainant. Donna Vahlstrom once accused Jayrado of being with a group of loud and vulgar youth when he was, in fact, home; once used a racial remark in calling him a "black bitch;" once told him he was ignorant; and gave him her middle finger five or six times. Again, these incidents are occurring infrequently over the course of a year or longer.[3] The complainant and her sons testified that Donna Vahlstrom's harassment of Jayrado and her accusations of drug use exacerbated issues of his mental health, causing hospitalization and medication. The commission, though, offered no medical witnesses substantiating and corroborating this testimony. While corroboration is not always necessary, in this case, given the mental health issues of the complainant's sons that pre-dated their moving next door to the Vahlstroms, such nonbiased third party corroboration is essential to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that it was the Vahlstroms' conduct toward Jayrado that so exacerbated his mental health issues as to create a hostile housing environment for the complainant.

[3] Donna Vahlstrom also complained to the condominium association about a roaming cat and an unleashed dog. Tr. 261. There is no evidence of the race or ancestry of the owners of these pets. She also complained about Ian and Billy. CHRO 16. There is no evidence of the race or ancestry of Ian and Billy.

Necessary third party corroboration is also absent in the incident involving Donna Vahlstrom using her garden hose to spray water on Ryshelle. FF 10**.** In their testimony, the complainant (who was not present when the incident occurred) and Jayrado testified that Vahlstrom also sprayed Jayrado with the garden hose, and remarked that the water "might wash black off of you" and that "without your doo-rag all of you people look the same." Tr. 19-22, 181-82; CHRO 11. The difficulty in finding as fact that this is how the incident occurred is the inconsistency with the police report taken at the time of the incident, CHRO 10. According to the police report, Jayrado's friend John called the police to report that Vahlstrom had sprayed water on Ryshelle. Ryshelle confirmed John's recitation of the incident, and the police officers observed that Rychelle's shirt was wet. Also according to the police report, Jayrado said that he did not see what happened because he had been inside the house when it occurred. CHRO 10. There is no mention in the police report of John or Ryshelle saying that Jayrado had also been sprayed with the hose or that Vahlstrom had made any racial remarks. Further, according to the police report, Ryshelle is white, making it less likely that there was any racial animus in the spraying. Given the inconsistencies between the two versions and the lack of corroboration by John, Ryshelle or the police officers, the only factual finding possible is that only Ryshelle was sprayed with the hose.

Conclusions of law

1. The respondents did not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1982 or 42 U.S.C. § 3617 because they did not engage in violence or threaten violence.
2. The respondents did not violate § 46a-58 (a) because they did not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1982 or 42 U.S.C. § 3617.
3. Section 46a-64c (9) prohibits discriminatory interference with any person in the person's post-acquisition exercise or enjoyment of his or her property. Prohibited interference includes severe, pervasive and grossly offensive nonviolent conduct directed against a person because of his or her race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status, age, lawful source of income or familial status.
4. Members of a household have a cause of action for actual interference in their own exercise and enjoyment of their property against a neighbor for the neighbor's severe, pervasive and grossly offensive nonviolent conduct toward any member of the household because of the member's race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status, age, lawful source of income or familial status.

5. The commission failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondents' conduct toward the complainant and her sons was because of the complainant's race or ancestry.
6. The commission failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondents' conduct toward the complainant and her sons was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the complainant's living conditions and to create a hostile housing environment for the complainant..

Order

The complaint is dismissed.

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Hon. Jon P. FitzGerald
Presiding Human Rights Referee

C:
Ms. Marcia McIntosh-Waller
Ms. Donna Vahlstrom
Mr. David Vahlstrom
Andrew L. Houlding, Esq.
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