FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

In the Matter of a Complaint by

FINAL DECISION
UPON REMAND

James Torlai,

Complainant

against

Docket #FIC 2017-0039

Chief, Police Department, Town of Darien; and Police Department, Town of Darien,

Respondents

December 11, 2019

The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on November 17, 2017, at which time the complainant and the respondents appeared, stipulated to certain facts and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint. For purposes of hearing, this matter was consolidated with Docket #FIC2017-0065; James Torlai v. Chief, Police Department, Town of Darien; and Police Department, Town of Darien.

On January 10, 2018, the Commission adopted a final decision in this matter. Notice of such final decision was mailed to the parties on January 18, 2018. The respondents filed an appeal of the final decision with the Superior Court on February 23, 2018. By order dated August 27, 2018 the Superior Court remanded this matter to the Commission to receive and consider evidence that was not available at the time of the hearing.

By Notice of Remanded Hearing, as ordered by the Court, a hearing was conducted on April 22, 2019 to allow the parties to present additional evidence and/or argument, at which time the complainant and the respondents appeared.

After consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:

1. The respondents are public agencies within the meaning of §1-200(1), G.S.

2. It is found that, on December 26, 2016, the complainant requested that the respondents provide him with copies of the following records related to the arrest of an identified individual on or around December 11, 2016:

a – the full name of the person arrested;
b – the address of the person arrested;

c – the race of the person arrested;
d – the date and time of arrest;
e – the place of arrest;
f – a list of all charges;
g – the complete arrest report;
h – records containing any DUI test results such as breath, urine, or blood tests;
i – any records prepared for the Department of Motor Vehicles; and
j – all recordings, including audio, video, and bodycam recordings.

3. It is found that, on January 3, 2017, the respondents provided the complainant with records responsive to the request described in paragraph 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, 2.e, and 2.f, above. Accordingly, such records are no longer at issue in this matter. However, it is also found that the respondents did not provide any remaining responsive records at such time, and indicated that the complainant should contact the Office of the State's Attorney for the remainder of the records. Thereafter, the parties exchanged further correspondence regarding the complainant's request, maintaining their positions that the complainant nevertheless sought the records described in paragraph 2.g, 2.h, 2.i and 2.j, while the respondents directed him to the State's Attorney.

4. By letter dated January 18, 2017, and filed January 20, 2017, the complainant appealed to the Commission, alleging that the respondents violated the Freedom of Information ("FOI") Act by failing to provide the records described in paragraph 2.g, 2.h., 2.i, and 2.j, above.

5. Section 1-200(5), G.S., provides:

> "Public records or files" means any recorded data or information relating to the conduct of the public's business prepared, owned, used, received or retained by a public agency, or to which a public agency is entitled to receive a copy by law or contract under section 1-218, whether such data or information be handwritten, typed, tape-recorded, printed, photostated, photographed or recorded by any other method.

6. Section 1-210(a), G.S., provides in relevant part:

> Except as otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute, all records maintained or kept on file by any public agency, whether or not such records are required by any law or by any rule or regulation, shall be public records and every person shall have the right to (1) inspect such records promptly during regular office or business hours, (2) copy such records in accordance with subsection (g) of section 1-212, or (3) receive a copy of such records in accordance with section 1-212.

7. Section 1-212(a), G.S., provides in relevant part that "[a] person applying in writing shall receive, promptly upon request, a plain, facsimile, electronic or certified copy of any public record."

8. It is concluded that the requested records, to the extent that they are maintained by the respondents, are public records within the meaning of §§1-200(5), 1-210(a), and 1-212(a), G.S.

9. Section 1-215, G.S., provided, in relevant part, at the time of the request and complaint in this matter as follows:[1]

> (a) For the purposes of this section, "record of the arrest" means (1) the name, race and address of the person arrested, the date, time and place of the arrest and the offense for which the person was arrested, and (2) in addition, in a case in which (A) the arrest has been by warrant, the arrest warrant application, including any affidavit in support of such warrant, or (B) the arrest has been made without a warrant, the official arrest, incident or similar report, provided if a judicial authority has ordered any such affidavit or report sealed from public inspection or disclosure, in whole or in part, the portion of the affidavit or report that has not been sealed, if applicable, as well as a report setting forth a summary of the circumstances that led to the arrest of the person in a manner that does not violate such order. . . .
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> (b) Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes, and except as otherwise provided in this section, any record of the arrest of any person shall be a public record from the time of such arrest and shall be disclosed in accordance with the provisions of section 1-212 and subsection (a) of section 1-210. No law enforcement agency shall redact any record of the arrest of any person, except for (1) the identity of witnesses, (2) specific information about the commission of a crime, the disclosure of which the law enforcement agency reasonably believes may prejudice a pending prosecution or a prospective law enforcement action, or (3) any information that a judicial authority has ordered to be sealed from public inspection or disclosure....
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> (c) In addition, any other public record of a law enforcement agency that documents or depicts the arrest or custody of a person during the period in which the prosecution of such person is pending shall be disclosed in accordance with the

[1] The language of §1-215(b), G.S., was subsequently amended by Public Act 19-43, however such amendments are not pertinent to the issues herein.

provisions of subsection (a) of section 1-210 and section 1-212, unless such record is subject to any applicable exemption from disclosure contained in any provision of the general statutes.

...

(e) The provisions of this section shall only be applicable to any record described in this section during the period in which a prosecution is pending against the person who is the subject of such record. At all other times, the applicable provisions of the Freedom of Information Act concerning the disclosure of such record shall govern.

10. With respect to the records described in paragraph 2.h and 2.i, above, on brief, the complainant contends that §14-227i, G.S., requires that he be given such records by the respondent.

11. Section 14-227i, G.S., provides:

(a) Notwithstanding any provision of the General Statutes, the investigating Police department shall maintain any record of a defendant concerning the operation of a motor vehicle by such defendant while under the influence of, or impaired by the consumption of, intoxicating liquor or drugs for a period of not less than two years from the date such defendant was charged with a violation of Section 14-277a.

(b)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of the general statutes, by making a written request to the investigating police department, a person injured in an accident caused by the alleged violation of Section 14-227a by any such defendant, any party to a civil claim or proceeding arising out of such accident, or the legal representative of any such person or party may review and obtain regular or certified copies of any record concerning the operation of a motor vehicle by such defendant while under the influence of, or impaired by the consumption of, intoxicating liquor or drugs.

(2) The investigating police department shall furnish regular or certified copies of any such record to any person or the legal representative of such person, or to such party, not later than fifteen days following receipt of such request. The investigating police department shall charge a fee for such copies that shall not exceed the cost to such police department for providing such copies, but not more than fifty cents per page in accordance with Section 1-212.

12. First, the complainant appears to be asking the Commission to enforce rights he believes he has under §14-227i(b)(2), G.S. The Commission has no such enforcement power.

13. Second, the Commission cannot agree that §14-227i(b)(2), G.S., provides the complainant with a right of access to the records described in paragraphs 2.h and 2.i, above. That statute provides rights of access to those individuals described in §14-227i(b)(1), G.S.; specifically: persons injured in accidents caused by drivers under the influence of intoxicating liquors or drugs; parties to civil claims or proceedings arising from such accidents; or the legal representatives of such individuals. The language in §14-227i(b)(2), G.S., clearly and specifically relates to the language in §14-227i(b)(1), G.S.

14. On brief, the complainant relies on the legislative history of §14-227i(b)(2), G.S. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the plain meaning rule, extratextual evidence of the meaning of a statute shall not be considered if the meaning of the statute can be ascertained from its text and relationship to other statutes. Section 1-2z, G.S.

15. Next, the complainant contends that, since the records described in paragraphs 2.h and 2.i, above, are neither set forth in §1-215, G.S., nor specifically exempted therein, it follows that such statute cannot operate to excuse such records from mandatory disclosure.

16. The Commission notes that the issue of whether §1-215, G.S., merely sets forth the minimum information that must be disclosed at the time of arrest has been decided to the contrary by the Supreme Court in Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety v. FOIC, 312 Conn. 513 (2014). The Court concluded that, during a pending criminal prosecution, a law enforcement agency's disclosure obligations under the FOI Act with respect to records related to the arrest are exclusively governed by §1-215, G.S. Accordingly, it is concluded that records not set forth in §1-215, G.S., which might also relate to an arrest, such as the records described in paragraphs 2.h and 2.i, above, are not required to be made available to the public during the limited time of a pending prosecution.

17. It is found that, at all relevant times through the January 18, 2018 Final Decision in this matter, the prosecution related to the arrest at issue was pending. Accordingly, based upon §1-215(e), G.S., it is concluded that the respondents did not violate the Freedom of Information Act by failing to provide the complainant with the records described in paragraph 2.h and 2.i, above, while the prosecution was pending.

18. With respect to the remaining records, described in paragraphs 2.g (arrest report) and 2.j (recordings), above, it is found that, on January 31, 2017, the respondents further contacted the complainant and offered to provide him with copies of the three page arrest report upon payment of $1.50, and a copy of a DVD containing video footage "depicting the apprehension and arrest" of the identified individual upon payment of $15.00. Thus, the complainant could have received copies of the remaining records at such time. However, it is found that he refused to pay the $1.50 fee for the arrest report prior to receiving such report, and refused to pay the $15.00 fee for the DVD.

19. With respect to the issue of the $1.50 arrest report, §1-212(a)(B), G.S., provides: "Any person applying in writing shall receive, promptly upon request, a plain, facsimile, electronic or certified copy of any public record...The fee for any copy provided in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act:...shall not exceed fifty cents per page...." Section 1-

212(c), G.S., provides: "A public agency may require the prepayment of any fee required or permitted under the Freedom of Information Act if such fee is estimated to be ten dollars or more....."

20. The complainant contended at the November 17, 2017 hearing and on brief that, since the $1.50 fee was under $10.00, as set forth in §1-212(c), G.S., the respondents were required to mail him the arrest report, and bill him for the record. The Commission cannot agree. A public agency need not provide requested copies if payment is not made at point of receipt. Thus, if the complainant had arrived at the respondents' offices, and demanded a copy of the three page report, the respondents would have every right to demand payment at the time records were provided. It is only because the transaction here was conducted through the mail that this issue has arisen. It should also be noted that nowhere in the FOI Act is it required that public agencies provide requested copies by mail, although that is normally done as a courtesy. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, it is concluded that the respondents did not violate the FOI Act by informing the complainant that they would send him the requested arrest report upon payment of the statutory fee of $1.50.

21. With respect to the $15.00 copying fee for the DVD, §1-211(a), G.S., provides:

> Any public agency which maintains public records in a computer storage system shall provide, to any person making a request pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, a copy of any nonexempt data contained in such records, properly identified, on paper, disk, tape or any other electronic storage device or medium requested by the person, including an electronic copy sent to the electronic mail address of the person making such request, if the agency can reasonably make any such copy or have any such copy made. Except as otherwise provided by state statute, the cost for providing a copy of such data shall be in accordance with the provisions of section 1-212....

22. In turn, §1-212(b), G.S., provides:

> (b) The fee for any copy provided in accordance with subsection (a) of section 1-211 shall not exceed the cost thereof to the public agency. In determining such costs for a copy, other than for a printout which exists at the time that the agency responds to the request for such copy, an agency may include only:
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> (1) An amount equal to the hourly salary attributed to all agency employees engaged in providing the requested computer-stored public record, including their time performing the formatting or programming functions necessary to provide the copy as requested, but not including search or retrieval costs except as provided in subdivision (4) of this subsection;

> (2) An amount equal to the cost to the agency of engaging an outside professional electronic copying service to provide such copying services, if such service is necessary to provide the copying as requested;
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> (3) The actual cost of the storage devices or media provided to the person making the request in complying with such request; and
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> (4) The computer time charges incurred by the agency in providing the requested computer-stored public record where another agency or contractor provides the agency with computer storage and retrieval services....

23. It is found that the respondents arrived at the fee of $15 by using a portion of the hourly rate of the employee who was charged with searching for, retrieving, and copying the requested recordings onto a DVD. It is found that the respondents failed to prove that such tasks constituted formatting and programming functions within the meaning of §1-212(b)(1), G.S., or that such tasks did not constitute search and retrieval within the meaning of such provision. Accordingly, it is concluded that the respondents violated the FOI Act by conditioning provision of the records requested in paragraph 2.j, above, upon payment of the $15.00 fee.

24. At the November 17, 2017 hearing in this matter, the respondents testified that the file in the arrest at issue has been sealed by a court, although the respondents could not obtain a sealing order to provide to the Commission. The respondents contended that, since the file was sealed, they could not provide the records described in paragraph 2.g and 2.j, above, to the complainant.

25. On December 10, 2017, the complainant filed a "Motion to Append the Record and Add One Exhibit," seeking to add as an exhibit a printout from the Judicial website, indicating that the file in the arrest at issue had been statutorily sealed. Receiving no objection, such request is granted and such one page printout has been marked as complainant's Exhibit J. On January 3, 2018, the respondents also moved to supplement the record by adding as an exhibit a copy of a January 2, 2018 email from the Assistant State's Attorney to the respondents indicating that the file in the arrest at issue had been sealed and including a reference to §54-56g, G.S. Such request is granted and such one page copy has been marked as Respondents' Exhibit 1.

26. It is found that the file related to the arrest at issue was sealed by the court.

27. The complainant contended, on brief, that the fact that court records were sealed did not allow the police to withhold their records, and cites to a previous Commission Final Decision, Docket #FIC2005-242; Michelle Tuccitto and the New Haven Register v. Chief. Police Department, City of New Haven; Police Department, City of New Haven; and City of New Haven. In that matter, the Commission construed the statute related to the pre-trial alcohol education system §54-56g, G.S., and concluded that the statutory sealing of court records in that scheme does not render police records related to the underlying arrest exempt or confidential.

28. The decision in Docket #FIC2005-242 was reached well before the amendments to the FOI Act which added the current provisions of §1-215, G.S., which, as described in paragraph 16, above, exclusively govern the disclosure of records related to arrest during the pendency of a prosecution, as was at issue in this matter.

29. Under §1-215, G.S., the sealing of the file by the court affects the disclosure of the record of arrest only; that is, the arrest report described in paragraph 2.g, above. As concluded in paragraph 20, above, the respondents did not violate the FOI with respect to the record described in paragraph 2.g, above. The complainant could have obtained a copy of the record had he paid the respondents for it at the time the respondents made the record available.

30. On brief, the respondents contended that §54-56g, G.S., precluded the disclosure of the requested records. Since the Commission has not ordered the disclosure of the records described in paragraphs 2.g, 2.h, or 2.i, the only remaining record at issue is the DVD, described in paragraph 2.j, above.

31. Section 54-56g, G.S., establishes the pretrial alcohol education program, and states in relevant part:

> (a)(1) There shall be a pretrial alcohol education program for persons charged with a violation of Section 14-227a, 14-227g, 15-132a, 15-133, 15-140l or 15-140n. Upon application by any such person for participation in such program and payment to the Court of an application fee of one hundred dollars and a nonrefundable evaluation fee of one hundred dollars the Court shall, but only as to the public, order the Court filed sealed....

32. On brief, the respondents contended that since §1-215(b)(3), G.S., covers "any information that a judicial authority has ordered to be sealed from public inspection or disclosure covered by the court order", then all records related to the case must be exempt. However, §1-215(b)(3), G.S., applies only to the "record of the arrest" as defined in paragraph §1-215(a), G.S. It is found that the remaining record, described in paragraph 2.j, above, is not a record of arrest, but rather is a record within the meaning of §1-215(c), G.S.

33. The Commission notes that the Legislature specifically separated the records contemplated in §1-215(c), G.S., from the records of arrest contemplated in §§1-215(a) and (b), G.S., and, additionally, set forth a separate standard for disclosure for such records.

34. It is concluded that the language in §54-56g, G.S., by its own terms seals only the court file. Since the respondents' record is a record of the Darien Police Department, it is concluded that §54-56g, G.S., does not provide a basis to withhold the record described in paragraph 2.j, above, from the complainant. Therefore, such record should have been disclosed in accordance with §1-215(c), G.S., at the time of the request.

35. On brief, the respondents' also contended that by the application of §54-56g, G.S., the pretrial alcohol education program may well lead to an eventual dismissal or erasure in the underlying arrest, and that if such event occurs, the erasure statute, §54-142a, G.S., will control and prohibit the disclosure of the record described in paragraph 2.j, above. The respondents further contended that to order release of records which might eventually be erased will inhibit the pretrial education program.

36. At the April 22, 2019 hearing on remand, and on brief, the respondents contended that, following the November 17, 2017 hearing and January 18, 2018 Notice of Final Decision, the respondents became aware that the court had entered a final judgment of dismissal and ordered erasure of all police records pertaining to the underlying criminal charge pursuant to §54-142a, G.S. The respondents further contended that the court provided them with a document entitled, "Court Abstract," which set forth, among other categories of information, the name of the identified individual, the court docket number, a disposition date of January 26, 2018 and a judgment of dismissed, and an erasure date of February 15, 2018. The respondents concluded that they were precluded from further disclosing to the complainant the records at issue.

37. Section 54-142a, G.S., provides

> (a) Whenever in any criminal case, on or after October 1, 1969, the accused, by a final judgment, is found not guilty of the charge or the charge is dismissed, all police and court records and records of any state's attorney pertaining to such charge shall be erased upon the expiration of the time to file a writ of error or take an appeal, if an appeal is not taken, or upon final determination of the appeal sustaining a finding of not guilty or a dismissal, if an appeal is taken.
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> (e)(1) The clerk of the court or any person charged with retention and control of such records in the records center of the Judicial Department or any law enforcement agency having information contained in such erased records shall not disclose to anyone, except the subject of the record, upon submission pursuant to guidelines prescribed by the Office of the Chief Court Administrator of satisfactory proof of the subject's identity, information pertaining to any charge erased under any provision of this section and such clerk or person charged with the retention and control of such records shall forward a notice of such erasure to any law enforcement agency to which he knows information concerning the arrest has been disseminated and such disseminated information shall be erased from the records of such law enforcement agency.

38. At the April 22, 2019 hearing on remand, and on brief, the complainant contended[2] that the respondents failed to meet their burden to establish that all of the underlying criminal charges were erased, and that the erasure statute was applicable to the records at issue. The complainant further contended that, even if the Commission finds that the records at issue are erased at the present time, the erasure did not apply at the time of the request, nor did it apply at the time of the Commissions January 10, 2018 Final Decision, and the Commission should therefore order disclosure in accordance with its decision in Docket No. FIC 2008-486, Glenn Conway v. Chief, Police Department, Town of Hamden and Police Department, Town of Hamden (Jan. 29, 2019). However, the Commission has more recently concluded to the contrary, as set forth in paragraph 41, below.

39. Following the April 22, 2019 hearing on remand, the hearing officer issued an amended order[3], directing the respondents to file with the Commission a redacted copy of the Court Abstract referred to by the respondents' witness during testimony. The Court Abstract has been marked as respondents' after-filed exhibit 3.

40. Based upon careful consideration of the evidence in the record, it is found that on January 26, 2018, the court dismissed all of the criminal charges pertaining to the arrest of the identified individual that occurred on or about December 11, 2016, and ordered erasure effective February 15, 2018.

41. It is found that the erasure provisions supersede the disclosure requirements of the FOI Act. See Docket No. FIC 2012-520, Robert Cushman v. Chief, Police Department, City of New London, and Police Department, City of New London (April 24, 2013), and Docket No. FIC 1999-353, Michele Graham v. Police Department, City of Stratford (Feb. 23. 2000).

42. The Superior Court recently issued a Memorandum of Decision in Commissioner, State of Connecticut Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection v. Freedom of Information Commission and Thomas J. McDonnell, No. HHBCV146027085S, 2019 WL 4201551 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2019), analyzing the meaning of "pertaining to such charge" in §54-142a, G.S, and the scope of records to which §54-142a, G.S, applies. The court concluded that the erasure statute "encompasses 'descriptive information' that discloses 'when or where a person was arrested, the nature of or circumstances surrounding the crime charged or the

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[2] The complainant filed several motions following the April 22, 2019 hearing on remand, dated April 27, 2019, June 6, 2019, June 16, 2019, June 24, 2019 and June 28, 2019, seeking admission of several documents. After careful consideration of each motion, each motion was denied, and the documents were marked for identification purposes only. Further, the complainant filed a "motion for a subpoena of certain records," dated May 7, 2019, requesting that the Commission order disclosure of certain records, or in the alternative, that the Commission order a search for certain information. After careful consideration, the motion was denied.

[3] The hearing officer first issued an order to the respondents to produce a copy of the Court Abstract. The respondents then filed a motion seeking an amended order, or in the alternative, an in camera review, contending that the Court Abstract itself is subject to the erasure statute. The complainant filed an objection. After consideration of the issues and arguments raised by the parties, the hearing officer ordered the respondents to produce a redacted copy of the Court Abstract. Subsequently, the complainant filed a motion "for order to produce an original document for comparison to a copy being accepted as an exhibit," dated August 8, 2019, requesting that the Commission order the respondents to provide the complainant with the original Court Abstract and the redacted copy for comparison. After careful consideration, the motion was denied.

names of witnesses from whom further information may be obtained'," as set forth in State v. West, 192 Conn. 488, 496 (1984), and "specifically include[s] police reports within the scope of records covered by §54-142a[, G.S.]."

43. On brief, the complainant relies on Boyles v. Preston, 68 Conn. App. 596, 607-10 (2002), to support the contention that the video footage identified in paragraph 2.j, above, is not subject to the erasure statute because "it is fair to assume that the video recording the Darien Police have is evidence."

44. Boyles was a civil action arising from a criminal allegation of sexual harassment that resulted in the intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. Certain criminal charges were dismissed as against the defendant, and evidence (including a videotape seized from the defendant's home) was suppressed. Id. During the civil action, the defendant unsuccessfully sought to preclude admission of testimony about the videotape, claiming it was erased pursuant to §54-142a, G.S. Id. On appeal, the Appellate Court noted that when the judge presiding over the criminal matter ordered the charges dismissed, the judge also ordered the videotape be preserved for any future civil litigation. The Appellate Court found that the erasure statute "does not include evidence obtained by the police in the course of an investigation, nor does it preclude the testimony of witnesses as to their personal recollection of events." Id. Furthermore, the court in McDonnell, supra, also advised that the Boyles decision should be read "in the context of the law in effect when it was issued," noting that when Boyles commenced, "the erasure statute expressly allowed disclosure of information in an erased file to the victim for use in civil litigation." McDonnell, 2019 WL 4201551, at *16.

45. The record does not support the complainant's assumption that the video footage identified in paragraph 2.j, above, was preserved by the respondents as evidence to be used in a future proceeding. It is therefore found that the DVD containing video footage of the apprehension and arrest of the identified individual, identified in paragraph 2.j, above, is erased pursuant to §54-142a, G.S. Since the video footage is statutorily erased, the Commission declines to order disclosure of the DVD at this time.

46. During the April 22, 2019 hearing on remand, the complainant also contended that, because the prosecution is no longer pending, the provisions of §1-215, G.S., are no longer applicable, that he is now entitled to records responsive to his request identified in paragraphs 2.g, 2.h, and 2.i, above. However, as set forth in paragraph 20, above, the respondents did not violate the FOI Act when they made the arrest report available to the complainant for $1.50. Additionally, and as set forth in paragraph 17, above, the respondents were not obligated, at the time of the request, to disclose records responsive to the request identified in paragraphs 2.h and 2.i., above. Furthermore, there is nothing in the FOI Act that requires the respondents to belatedly provide records after a prosecution is no longer pending.

47. The complainant also contended, on brief, that the respondents' actions in this matter demonstrate a pattern of delay and "stalling" to avoid disclosure of the records at issue by application of the erasure statute. However, there is no evidence in the record to support such contention.

48. The complainant also contended during the April 22, 2019 hearing on remand, and on brief, that since the Commission ordered disclosure on January 10, 2018 and the court did not enter a judgment of dismissal until January 26 and erasure until February 15, 2018, the respondents were obligated to comply with the Commission's order. However, the complainant failed to file an appeal with the Commission, alleging noncompliance with the Commission's order prior to the respondents' appeal. Additionally, as set forth above, the Commission declines to order disclosure of records that are statutorily erased.

On the basis of the entirety of the record concerning the above-captioned complaint, no order by the Commission is hereby recommended.

Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of December 11, 2019.

Cynthia A. Cannata
Acting Clerk of the Commission

PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S., THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.

THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:

JAMES TORLAI, 127 Barton Street, Torrington, CT 06790

CHIEF, POLICE DEPARTMENT, TOWN OF DARIEN; AND POLICE DEPARTMENT, TOWN OF DARIEN, c/o Attorney Patricia M. Gaug, Curtis Brinckerhoff & Barrett, PC, 666 Summer Street, Stamford, CT 06902

Cynthia A. Cannata
Acting Clerk of the Commission

FIC 2017-0039/FD/CAC/12/11/2019