NUCLEAR ENERGY ADVISORY COUNCIL
March 24, 2022 7 PM
Virtual Meeting via Zoom

MINUTES

Members Present
Rep Kevin Ryan, Chair
Alternate Chair Mr. Jeffrey Semancik representing DEEP Commissioner Dykes
Mr. Craig Salonia Mr. James Sherrard
Mr. John McGunnigle Mr. R. Woolrich
Mr. Bill Sheehan Sen Cathy Osten

Members not present:
Mr. A. Jordan

1. **Call to Order of Meeting**
   The Council’s, Alt Chair Semancik called the meeting to order at 7:02 PM via Zoom webinar/telephone conference (Council Chair Ryan experienced audio issues.) Mr. Semancik had Council members introduce themselves.

2. **Program** – Briefing on Millstone Power Station Annual Assessment by US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC): Matt Young, Chief, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects; J. Fuller, Senior Resident Inspector; E. Bousquet, Resident Inspector; E. Allen, Resident Inspector; R. Guzman, Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch I. (Council’s Requested Topics, NRC Notice of Public Meeting, and Meeting Presentation attached)
   a. Mr. Young introduced himself and discussed his experience. He noted that the NRC has three fulltime resident inspectors (RIs) with unfettered access to all areas of Millstone Power Station. These RI’s conduct the baseline inspections and supplements them with technical specialists from the Region 1 office in King of Prussia, PA and from NRC Headquarters in White Flint, MD.
   b. Senior Resident Inspector (SRI) Mr. Fuller introduced himself and discussed his education and experience. Resident Inspectors (RIs) Mr. Allen and Mr. Bosquet also introduced themselves and stated their experience and education. Mr. Fuller noted that the diverse professional nature of their experience and education enhances their observations and their ability to inspect.
   c. Mr. Fuller briefed the Council on overall NRC assessment of performance related to Dominion Energy’s operation of Millstone in 2021. He stated that Millstone continues to operate safely and securely, protect public health and safety, and protect the environment. The NRC conducted over 8700 hours of inspections of Millstone in 2021. Based upon NRC’s assessment, both Millstone Units 2 and 3 remain in the Licensee Response Column of the Regulatory Response Matrix (the highest level of performance) and will therefore remain under baseline inspection. All NRC performance indicators (PIs) are Green. The NRC has not
identified any cross-cutting issues. The NRC identified ten inspection findings, three by RIs and seven by technical specialists. Nine of the findings were non-cited violations of very low safety significance (green). One was evaluated under the traditional enforcement program and determined to be a severity level IV violation.

d. Mr. Fuller stated the NRC has no Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) concerns for 2021 at Millstone. The NRC assesses safety culture as part of Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspections. During the last PI&R inspection (December 2020) the NRC inspection team determined Dominion’s corrective action (CA) process was effective and that there were no challenges to SCWE with Millstone staff willing to raise concerns. The next PI&R inspection is scheduled for September of 2022. There were four allegations in 2021 which is not excessive when compared to the industry average. The next PI&R inspection is scheduled for September 2022. NRC RI’s remain available and accessible to all staff working at Millstone.

e. Mr. Fuller noted that during the COVID-19 public health emergency (PHE) the NRC remained focused on the health and safety of its workers while maintaining focus on ensuring safety and security of operations at Millstone. For example, he noted that during the height of transmission, the SRI and RI’s rotated so as to ensure one NRC inspector was on site. As transmission rates have fallen, Mr. Fuller noted that the NRC RI’s are back to a normal on site presence, - five days a week

   i. Mr. Young added that two inspections were rescheduled due to COVID transmission risks. However, the NRC was able to complete both inspections within the required periodicity.

   ii. Mr. Young also noted that Dominion supplied NRC inspectors with information technology (IT) equipment so that they could access plant databases, information, and plant parameters remotely.

f. Mr. Fuller discussed specific plant performance items requested by the Council.

   i. Status of unplanned power changes. Mr. Fuller noted that the Council noted an unplanned down powers and automatic reactor trip trend in 2020. In 2021, there were no unplanned down powers (the NRC performance indicator threshold for this is great than 20% reduction in reactor power) for either Millstone Unit No. 2 or Unit No. 3. NRC assessed that this performance improvement was due to better weather, better planning and conservative decision making. The licensee recognized the challenge and formed a multi-disciplinary team that developed procedure enhancements and other changes to improve resilience of the units to adverse weather. Mr. Fuller discussed the power history of the Millstone units in 2021. He noted that Unit No. 3 started the year in a forced outage to repair a non-safety related feed water heater returning to operation on Jan 7, 2021. In June, Unit No. 3 conducted a planned shutdown to conduct a
maintenance outage to replace the 3A reactor coolant pump (RCP) shaft seal. Both Unit No. 2 and Unit No. 3 proactively reduced power to 90% during tropical storm Henri. Unit No. 2 conducted a planned refueling outage in the fall of 2021.

ii. Mr. Fuller discussed the finding associated with Millstone’s response to the remnants of Hurricane Ida. The NRC and Dominion were monitoring weather. He noted that forecasts from the Connecticut Division of Emergency Management and Homeland Security (CT DEMHS) and the National Weather Service (NWS) predicted that the criteria for a localized intense precipitation event (LIP)\(^1\) could be met. However, Millstone control room operators did not have access to the DEMHS forecast. As a result, they did not enter the procedure until after the storm was on site. As a result, they could not close all the required flood doors. There was some minor flooding, but no adverse impact to safety systems. Licensee corrective actions have been implemented to ensure control room operators have access to the DEMHS weather forecasts.

iii. Mr. Fuller discussed the green (very low safety significance) self-revealing non-cited violation associated with the Millstone Unit No. 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump steam supply that resulted in Dominion filing two 10 CFR 50.72 prompt non-emergency reports for being in an unanalyzed condition. He noted that since November 2022, one of the two steam supply check valves would chatter after the TDAFW pump was run for surveillance testing. Operators would vent a pipe section to stop the chattering. However, after the test conducted in July, the valve stopped chattering without being vented. When maintenance personnel conducted a planned inspection of the valve during the planned refueling outage, they found the valve disc separated from the disc arm and repaired the valve. After the startup testing of the TDAFW pump, troubleshooting revealed that the valve had failed again. Mr. Fuller noted that the check valve has two safety functions: (1) to open to allow steam to run the TDAFW pump turbine; and, (2) to close in case of a steam leak of a steam generator to prevent impacting the non-faulted steam generator. The valve failures prevented the check valve from closing. Mr. Fuller stated the NRC determined that Dominion missed an opportunity to find and correct the cause of the failure following the test in July 2021. He noted the licensee’s corrective actions were to change the design to a more robust connection and compensatory actions to minimize chattering of the valve.

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\(^1\) A LIP is severe weather event defined as expecting greater than three inches of rainfall in a six hour period predicted to occur within the next twelve hours.
g. Mr. Guzman introduced himself and provided his background of 25 years of nuclear experience in the US Navy and NRC. He discussed specific licensing actions as requested by the Council:
   i. NRC has received a license amendment request from Dominion for a proposed power uprate at Millstone Unit 3. This would increase thermal power of Millstone Unit 3 by 59 MWth (1.6%). Dominion plans implementation during the completion of the spring 2022 refueling outage.
   ii. The NRC approved a frequency change for Steam Generator tube inspections at Millstone Unit No. 2 from every 72 effective full power months (EFPM) to every 96 EFPM. This change is consistent with a generic industry change approved by the NRC.
   iii. The NRC approved two license amendments based on previously approved Westinghouse topical reports.
      1. A change to the methodology used to model large break loss of coolant accidents
      2. A change to the reactor safety fuel limit for peak fuel centerline temperature. The previous safety limit was 5080 F minus 58 F for every MWD/MTU\(^2\). The NRC approved a change to was 5080 F minus 9 F for every MWD/MTU. Mr. Guzman noted the Council had expressed concern that the NRC approval stated the change to the burnup penalty was based upon empirical data and noted that empirical data is based on normal operations and not accident conditions. Mr. Guzman clarified that the change was based on a proposed change from the fuel vendor (Westinghouse) that was generically approved in 2017. He noted that the change was based on fuel centerline melting temperature changes determined from both empirical data as well as test data derived from experiments in a test reactor. He noted that the NRC approval was not specific on this point.

h. Mr. Young provide information on how the public and the Council could contact the NRC for more information.

i. Mr. Young discussed four generic questions raised by the Council
   i. Decommissioning Rule – earlier in March 2022, the NRC published a proposed final rule in the federal register (2022-03131) on changes to regulations to support decommissioning of nuclear power plants. The comment period is through May 17, 2022. He also noted there is a public meeting being conducted virtually on March 31, 2022 at 4 PM.
   ii. Vendor Quality Issues – The licensee is primarily responsible for ordering, obtaining, and installing quality parts. NRC has 13 staff members inspecting nuclear quality vendors and supporting site inspectors. RI’s are

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\(^2\) MWD/MTU = megawatt days per metric ton of uranium and is a measure of nuclear fuel burnup.
now required to support at least one inspection per year related to quality control as part of their maintenance effectiveness inspection procedure.

iii. Petition for Rulemaking related to 10 CFR 50.72 non-emergency reports – The Commission approved rulemaking to evaluate immediate notification requirements. Staff was directed to evaluate current requirements, determine if they represent an unnecessary burden and determine if changes are necessary while ensuring visibility of notifications. Staff recommendations will be discussed in regulatory basis document in June 2022. A proposed rule, if recommended, is expected in 2023 with a final rule implemented in 2024.

iv. Life extension and what major issues are being evaluated – A few reactor licensees have received approval to operate to 80 years. The NRC continues to evaluate aging management with respect to reactor pressure vessel (RPV) neutron embrittlement, instrumentation and control systems, concrete degradation, cables, and system and component performance. The NRC has not received an application to extend any license to 100 years yet but is proactively looking at aging management issues. Mr. Young noted that the NRC held a meeting to receive public comments on aging management issues in January 2021 (results can be found in NRC public documents as ADAMS ascension number M221247A253). NRC is also working with Department of Energy and international partners for a better understanding of degradation mechanisms and to develop scientific bases for impacts.

3. Questions from the Council
   a. Mr. Woolrich noted that the Council had toured the FLEX equipment storage facility at Millstone. He asked how the NRC verifies it will work. Mr. Young stated that initially the NRC required all equipment to be setup and tested to verify it would work. Subsequently, the NRC conducts at least one inspection per year of a surveillance test and maintenance on a piece of FLEX equipment. Mr. Fuller added that this involves checking water flow through pumps, etc. but not flow into plant connections. He also noted that equipment has specific locations for installation and that RI’s verify those locations remain unobstructed and clear of debris. Mr. Woolrich asked how NRC ensured equipment still worked if the licensee changed a pump or other equipment. Mr. Fuller responded that all design changes must evaluate the impact on FLEX equipment and NRC periodically inspects design changes.
   b. Mr. Woolrich thanked the NRC for their explanation of the TDAFW check valve issue and asked how decay heat is removed after the steam generators are isolation. Mr. Fuller explained that there are atmospheric steam release valves upstream of the Main Steam Isolation valves to remove decay heat. Mr. Woolrich expressed his concern that Dominion still doesn’t know the cause of
the check valve chatter that led to the failures. Mr. Fuller noted that Dominion has made great efforts to identify the cause and believes it is related to piping configuration. Mr. Young noted that the compensatory measures being taken while they still investigate the cause provide assurance of safety.

c. Mr. Woolrich asked how the NRC collects and sends out information related to failures such as the check valve. Mr. Young answered that the NRC has both informal and formal methods for sharing information. Informally, information is shared over daily regional calls. Formally, the NRC has an operational experience branch that collects and assesses information from both US and international plants. If they identify two or three instances, then they send out a report to all inspectors. He also noted that the industry has its own similar mechanisms for sharing information. Mr. Young also noted that vendors are required to report equipment defects per 10 CFR part 21.

d. Mr. Sheehan asked if any inspections conducted by regional or headquarters specialists were curtailed by COVID. Mr. Young responded that some were delayed and rescheduled but that all inspections were completed in required timeframe.

e. Mr. Sheehan noted the DEMHS weather forecasts are informative and asked if the lack of access to control room operators has been corrected. Mr. Fuller confirmed that Millstone operators now have access to the DEMHS forecasts.

f. Mr. Sheehan noted that RPV neutron embrittlement may be the biggest hurdle to further license extensions and asked if there was any feedback yet. Mr. Young noted that the NRC continues to look at this proactively and feedback was provided by the public as previously mentioned January 2021 public meeting.

g. Mr. Semancik noted that the 4Q21 inspection report included two findings related to the leak chase at Millstone Unit No. 2. One was related to the failure to inspect the leak chase and the other was that Dominion incorrectly stated they had inspected it in their request to extend the containment integrated leak rate test (ILRT) interval. Since the NRC noted that Dominion supplied incorrect information as a basis for a change that was approved, Mr. Semancik asked if the NRC considered rescinding this approval and how they verified the rest of Dominion’s submittal is accurate. Mr. Fuller responded that when they discovered the issue, they immediately verified that this was not a significant factor in their approval of the ILRT interval change. Mr. Guzman said he was not sure if they asked Dominion to resubmit the corrected information under oath and affirmation but said that they expected them to.

h. Mr. Semancik asked if the Turkey Point decision by the Commission which partially revoked that station’s supplemental license renewal (SLR) to 80 years until the generic environmental impact statement was revised impacted future SLR applications. Mr. Guzman did not know, but committed to provide an answer to the Council by email.

i. Mr. Semancik asked how the NRC took the failure of the FLEX generators at River Bend Nuclear Power Plant into consideration. Mr. Fuller stated that based on
that operational experience, the RI’s selected the 480 vac FLEX generators as their sample and verified they worked properly.

j. With respect to the TDAFW pump steam supply check valve failures, Mr. Semancik noted that the piping has not changed since the plant started operating and asked what has changed to cause the valves to start chattering. Specifically, he asked if they had evaluated the excess moisture carryover issue that they investigated several years back. Mr. Fuller said the licensee continues to evaluate all possible causes. He noted that the compensatory actions have prevented valve chatter.

k. Mr. Salonia asked where the specific Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water leak that caused a forced shutdown in January 2022 was located. Mr. Fuller stated that it was on a threaded connection, but he could not comment further as this was still actively being inspected.

l. Mr. Salonia asked for some clarification on the leak chase channels. Since Dominion thought that they had been filled with grout, he asked if they inspected the welds contained in them after the issue was discovered. Mr. Fuller affirmed that Dominion conducted remote inspections of the welds by borescope.

m. Mr. Salonia asked how the NRC assess changes to such things as the earthquake tolerance of plants when reviewing SLR requests. For example, the knowledge base of both earthquakes and material response has evolved. Mr. Young stated that consideration of maximum earthquake response is one of the areas the NRC evaluates in reviewing SLRs. They assess if anything has changed and apply new knowledge of how structures are affected to verify the plants can still withstand the maximum earthquake.

4. Public Comment. There were eighteen members of the public present. Mr. Young asked if any members had any questions or comments. There were no public comments or questions.

5. NEAC Business


   Mr. Semancik noted that as voted to at the December 16, 2021 Council meeting both the minutes and the annual report were approved by email vote. The approved documents were posted to and publicly available on the DEEP website.

b. NRC Correspondence Reviewed since past meeting.

   The following NRC Correspondence was reviewed by the Council

ii. Millstone Power Station, Unit 2 – Post-Approval Site Inspection for License Renewal - Phase 4 Inspection Report 05000336/20210111 dated January 20, 2022

iii. Notice Of Enforcement Discretion for Millstone Power Station, Unit 3 (EPID: L-2022-LLD-0000) dated January 31, 2022

   1. NRC Information Notice 2014-07: Degradation of Leak-Chase Channel Systems for Floor Welds of Metal Containment Shell and Concrete Containment Metallic Liner dated May 5, 2014

v. Millstone Power Station, Unit No. 3 - Issuance of Amendment No. 282 Re: Shutdown Bank Technical Specification Requirements and Alternate Control Rod Position Monitoring Requirements (EPID L-2021-LLA-0023) dated February 16, 2022

vi. NRC Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-22-02 In the Matter of Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Units 3 and 4) dated February 24, 2022

vii. Millstone Power Station Unit No. 3, North Anna Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, and Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Unit No. 1 Issuance of Amendment No(s). 283 (Millstone), 291 and 274 (North Anna), and 221 (Summer) to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-569, “Revision of Response Time Testing Definition” (EPID L-2019-LLA-0186) dated March 1, 2022.


c. Other Correspondence Reviewed since past meeting.
   The following other Correspondence was reviewed by the Council.
   i. Dominion Energy Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. Millstone Power Station Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 2021-002-00, Failed Check Valve Resulting In Unanalyzed Condition And Operation Prohibited By Technical Specifications dated January 5, 2022
   ii. Connecticut General Assembly raised bill No. HB 5202, An Act Exempting Existing Nuclear Power Generating Facilities in the State from the Nuclear Power Facility Construction Moratorium, February 2022
       1. Testimony Submitted by Commissioner Katie S. Dykes dated March 3, 2022

6. Adjournment
   Motion was made by Mr. Sheehan and seconded by Mr. Sherrard to adjourn; no objections; unanimous vote in favor; meeting adjourned at 8:58 PM.
Sec. 16-11a. Nuclear Energy Advisory Council; composition; duties. (a) There is established a Nuclear Energy Advisory Council which shall (1) hold regular public meetings for the purpose of discussing issues relating to the safety and operation of the nuclear power generating facilities located in this state and to advise the Governor, the General Assembly and municipalities within a five-mile radius of any nuclear power generating facility in this state of such issues, (2) work in conjunction with agencies of the federal, state and local governments and with any electric company operating a nuclear power generating facility to ensure the public health and safety, (3) discuss proposed changes in or problems arising from the operation of a nuclear power generating facility, (4) communicate with any electric company operating a nuclear power generating facility about safety or operational concerns at the facility, which communications may include, but not be limited to, receipt of written reports and presentations to the council, and (5) review the current status of facilities with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

NEAC requests that the NRC’s presentation focus on the safety, security, and operation of the facility referenced in the statute by discussing the following items over the period since the last NEAC presentation:

- Issues relating to the safety and operation of the nuclear power generating facilities
  - ROP Performance
  - Summary of significant NRC Findings
    - storm response finding (TS Ida)
  - Other regulatory actions
  - NRC performance indicators (PIs)
    - Discussion of Unplanned Power change PI (update from last year)
      - Assessment of Safety Culture including number of allegations submitted in the past year
- Discuss proposed changes in or problems arising from the operation of a nuclear power generating facility
  - Significant license changes
    - change of burnup penalty (from 58F to 9 F) for fuel centerline temperature safety limit
      - Comment from one member, “The change from 58F to 9F seems pretty drastic, particularly since it is based on empirical data. Empirical data is derived from routine, non-emergency operations. Most design limits are based on predicting worst case scenarios to prevent a catastrophic accident. I would like to request a briefing/discussion at one of our meetings to understand their logic”
    - life extension to 80 and potentially 100 years, - specifically, what are the key issues associated with this?
      - Dominion reported to the Council that Surry and North Anna have gone to the 80 year license; so, request the NRC address the major issues/factors looked at as well as generic issues for the 100 year licenses. At least one member listened in on the NRC meeting on BFPL for 100 year licenses
  - NRC Assessment of Licensee response to emergency and non-emergency events
    - the two 50.72 issues related to unanalyzed condition for the TDAFW check valve at Unit 2
      - Member comment – would like to see as part of presentation a simple piping schematic to understand issue
Other
  - Summary and status of decommissioning rule making
  - Generic vendor quality issues. What the NRC does to assure vendor and parts quality (big picture)
  - PRM (petition for rulemaking) on 50.72 (prompt non-emergency) reports, public engagement, and timeline for decision
Welcome!
This meeting will start shortly

If calling in using the phone:
Dial-in Number: (301) 576-2978
Phone Conference ID: 934440395#
Millstone
Annual Assessment Meeting

Reactor Oversight Process – 2021

Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region I
King of Prussia, PA
March 24, 2022
Agenda

• Opening Remarks – Matt Young
• 2021 Millstone ROP Assessment Summary – Justin Fuller
• COVID-19 Response Update – Justin Fuller
• Nuclear Energy Advisory Council (NEAC) Items of Interest  
  – 2021 Unplanned Power Changes (update) - Justin Fuller  
  – Local Intense Precipitation Finding - Justin Fuller  
  – Unit 2 Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Check Valve - Justin Fuller  
  – Millstone Significant License Changes – Rich Guzman
• Discussion with members of the Connecticut NEAC – Matt Young/Justin Fuller
• Public Question and Answer – Matt Young/Justin Fuller
How To Ask a Question

- Questions will be addressed during the question-and-answer session following the presentation and discussion with NEAC
  - If you’re on your computer, ‘raise your hand’ to indicate you have a question,
  - If on the phone, please unmute your phone and ask your question, then mute yourself again. Thank you.
Today’s Presenters

Matt Young
Branch Chief
Division of Reactor Projects

Justin Fuller
Senior Resident Inspector

Richard Guzman
NRC Project Manager
Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Opening Remarks

- Three full-time residents assigned to Millstone
- Inspectors have unfettered access to all areas of the site
- Technical specialists conduct additional inspection activities
- Inspectors have adapted to COVID-19 work environment
Millstone operated safely and in a manner that preserved the public health and safety and protected the environment.

Millstone Units 2 & 3 remained in the Licensee Response Column of the Action Matrix.

8,700+ hours of inspection and related activities.

Green Performance Indicators:

- 9 Green Non-Cited Violations (NCVs)
- 1 Severity Level IV Violation
SCWE

• No SCWE concerns
• The last PI&R was December 2020
• Next PI&R scheduled for September 2022

Allegations

• 4 allegations in 2021
• Resident inspectors and regional staff are highly accessible and take all allegation matters seriously
NRC Actions in Response to COVID-19

- Monitored plant activities through inspections and oversight
- Maintained emergency response capabilities within Regional Incident Response Centers and NRC Headquarters
**Inspection Impact Due to COVID-19**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inspection Procedure # - ‘Title’</th>
<th>Originally Scheduled Date</th>
<th>Completed Date</th>
<th>Date Required to be Completed By</th>
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<tr>
<td>IP 71114 Exercise Evaluation</td>
<td>June 2020</td>
<td>June 2021</td>
<td>12/31/2021</td>
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<tr>
<td>IP 71111.11B U2 Licensed Operator Requalification Program</td>
<td>November 2020</td>
<td>December 2021</td>
<td>12/31/2021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COVID-19 related licensing actions:**
- Temporary and final exemption from the annual force-on-force exercise requalification requirements of security personnel
- Exemption from the biennial emergency preparedness onsite and offsite exercise
- License Amendment for one-time deferral of the MPS3 steam generator (SG) tube inspections for MPS3 SGs A and C from fall 2020 to spring 2022
NEAC Items of Interest

• Unplanned Power Changes PI (update)
• Local Intense Precipitation (LIP) Finding
• Unit 2 turbine driven aux feedwater (TDAFW) check valve 50.72 reports
# No Unplanned Power Changes in 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Cause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Forced Outage</td>
<td>Feed water heater</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Maintenance Outage</td>
<td>3A RCP Seal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug 22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>Henri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>Henri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Refueling Outage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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NEAC Item of Interest - Local Intense Precipitation Finding (LIP)

- Remnants of Hurricane Ida 9/1/2021
- Possible LIP was predicted by National Weather Service
- GREEN Non-Cited Violation
NEAC Item of Interest – U2 Turbine Driven Aux. Feedwater Check Valve (1 of 2)

- Event Notifications:
  - 55565 (11/6/21)
  - 55576 (11/14/21)

- GREEN Non-Cited Violation of Quality Assurance Criteria 16, Corrective Action
Richard Guzman
NRC Senior Project Manager
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
NEAC Item of Interest – Millstone Significant License Changes

• Millstone Unit 3 Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Power Uprate
• Millstone Unit 2 Steam Generator Inspection Frequency Technical Specification Revision
• Millstone Unit 3 Technical Specification Changes – based on Westinghouse Topical Reports
  – Core Operating Limits Report for Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident analysis
  – Peak Fuel Centerline Melt Temperature Safety Limits
NRC Social Media Channels

Facebook  www.facebook.com/nrcgov/
Twitter    twitter.com/nrcgov
YouTube    www.youtube.com/user/NRCgov
Flickr     www.flickr.com/photos/nrcgov/
LinkedIn   www.linkedin.com/company/u-s--nuclear-regulatory-commission/
RSS        www.nrc.gov/public-involve/listserver.html#rss
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Meeting number: 20220247
Discussion with members of the Connecticut Nuclear Energy Advisory Council
Q&A with Members of the Public

• If on the computer, ‘raise your hand’ when ready to ask your question

• If on the phone, please unmute your phone to ask your question, then mute yourself again. Thank you.
This ends the Meeting

Thank You for Attending!