

CONNECTICUT SITING COUNCIL

PETITION OF NEW CINGULAR)
WIRELESS PCS, LLC (“AT&T”) TO THE)
CONNECTICUT SITING COUNCIL FOR A) PETITION NO. 1010
DECLARATORY RULING THAT NO)
CERTIFICATE OF ENVIRONMENTAL) JANUARY 25, 2012
COMPATIBILITY AND PUBLIC NEED IS)
REQUIRED FOR THE PROPOSED)
INSTALLATION OF A CONCEALED)
TOWER ON A WATER TANK AND)
RELATED FACILITIES LOCATED AT A)
WATER TREATMENT PLANT AT 455)
VALLEY RD., GREENWICH, CT)

**APPLICATION OF LEE HIGGINS, KAORI HIGGINS, PETER JANIS,
ELIZABETH JANIS, RICHARD KOSINSKI AND SUSAN KOSINSKI
TO INTERVENE UNDER C.G.S. §§ 22a-19, 4-177a AND 16-50n**

Pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes §§ 22a-19, 4-177a and 16-50n, LEE HIGGINS, KAORI HIGGINS, PETER JANIS, ELIZABETH JANIS, RICHARD KOSINSKI and SUSAN KOSINSKI (hereinafter the “Proposed Intervenors”) hereby move and petition the Connecticut Siting Council to be party intervenors in the above application by New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC (hereinafter “AT&T”) for a petition for a declaratory ruling that no certificate of environmental compatibility and public need is required for the proposed installation of a tower at a water treatment plant located at 455 Valley Road in Greenwich, CT (hereinafter “AT&T’s Petition”). The Proposed Intervenors represent that their participation is in the interests of justice and the environment and that their participation will not impair the orderly conduct of the proceeding.

In support of this request, the Proposed Intervenors state the following:

1. The names and address of the Proposed Intervenors are as follows:

LEE HIGGINS, KAORI HIGGINS, PETER JANIS,
ELIZABETH JANIS, RICHARD KOSINSKI AND SUSAN KOSINSKI
c/o Ira W. Bloom, Esq. and Mario F. Coppola, Esq.
Berchem, Moses, and Devlin, P.C.
27 Imperial Avenue
Westport, CT 06880
Tel. 203-227-9545
Email: ibloom@bmdlaw.com and mcoppola@bmdlaw.com

2. The Proposed Intervenors have concerns for the public need to construct a telecommunications tower on a water tank that is located at 455 Valley Road, Greenwich, Connecticut (hereinafter "AT&T's Proposed Tower"). The 455 Valley Road property is owned by the Aquarion Water Company of Connecticut (hereinafter "Aquarion") and it consists of approximately 2.63 acres of watershed land, which is directly adjacent to and abuts the waters of the Mianus River and the Mill Pond (hereinafter the "Aquarion Watershed Land").

3. Upon information and belief, the Mianus River is one of two water sources in Greenwich, Connecticut and it serves approximately 130,000 residents, and it will be unreasonably impacted by AT&T's Proposed Tower.

4. Upon information and belief, the Aquarion Watershed Land is "class I" protected land within the meaning of C.G.S. § 25-37c(b), which cannot be legally leased and/or used for any purposes other than for water works purposes without a permit from the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Public Health, and it will be unreasonably and illegally impacted by AT&T's Proposed Tower. To date, AT&T has not presented any evidence to prove that it has obtained the necessary permit(s) from the Department of Public Health.

5. The deed transferring the Aquarion Watershed Land (attached hereto as Exhibit 1) contained a restrictive covenant limiting the use of the Aquarion Watershed Land for water works purposes as follows: "the premises hereby conveyed shall be used for water works

purposes, and shall revert to the [Town] herein, its successors and assigns, in the event the premises cease to be used for water works purposes.” Said restrictive covenant would be violated by the construction and existence of AT&T’s Proposed Tower on the Aquarion Watershed Land. *See, Morgenbesser v. Aquarion Water Company of Connecticut*, 276 Conn. 825 (2006); (Supreme Court held that a substantially similar restrictive covenant on land in Greenwich owned by Aquarion prohibited the installation of wireless telecommunication antenna panels and related improvements); (attached hereto as Exhibit 2).

6. The construction and existence of AT&T’s Proposed Tower will have a severe negative impact on this very sensitive environmental area, public water sources, inland wetlands, scenic vistas, and the surrounding neighborhood. Pursuant to C.G.S. §§ 22a-19, 16-50n and 4-177a, the Proposed Intervenors have a direct interest in the proceedings which will be specifically and substantially affected as they live in close proximity to the Aquarion Watershed Land. The Proposed Intervenors seek to intervene in the above proceedings for the purpose of submitting testimony, briefs and other evidence relevant to the Connecticut Siting Council’s consideration of Petition 1010.

7. AT&T’s Proposed Tower fails to meet the requirements of zoning in the Town of Greenwich in a way which fundamentally harms the general welfare of the community.

8. The Proposed Intervenors hereby present this verified pleading, pursuant to C.G.S. § 22a-19, for the purpose of asserting that evidence and testimony shall be presented in order to demonstrate that the activity proposed by AT&T for the Aquarion Watershed Land is likely to unreasonably harm the public trust in the air, water or other natural resources of the State of Connecticut because, if granted, AT&T’s Proposed Tower will unreasonably impact public water

sources such as the Mianus River and Mill Pond, “class I” protected land, inland wetlands, and the visual quality of the environment in a residential area.

9. The construction and existence of AT&T’s Proposed Tower will also violate a restrictive covenant, which was established by the Town of Greenwich in order to protect the Aquarion Watershed Land from any future construction or activity, such as AT&T’s Proposed Tower, which would unreasonably impair the Aquarion Watershed Land and/or the environmentally sensitive area which abuts it.

10. The Proposed Intervenors also seek to present evidence and testimony that will demonstrate that the severe environmental impact from AT&T’s Proposed Tower could be reasonably mitigated by the use of alternate locations.

11. The Connecticut Siting Council should be aware of the statutory requirements that apply to interventions pursuant to C.G.S. § 22a-19, also known as the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act (hereinafter “EPA”). Section 22a-19(a) provides that any person “may intervene as a party on the filing of a verified pleading asserting that the proceeding or action for judicial review involves conduct which has, or which is reasonably likely to have, the effect of unreasonably polluting, impairing or destroying the public trust in the air, water or other natural resources of the state.” Section 22a-19(b) provides that the Connecticut Siting Council “shall consider the alleged unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction of the public trust in the air, water or other natural resources of the state and no conduct shall be authorized or approved which does, or is reasonably likely to, have such effect as long as, considering all relevant surrounding circumstances and facts, there is a feasible and prudent alternative consistent with the reasonable requirements of the public health, safety and welfare.”

“The purpose of the EPA is to give private citizens a voice in ensuring that the air, water and other natural resources of the state remain protected, preserved and enhanced, and to provide them with an adequate remedy to protect the air, water and other natural resources from unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction.” (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Avalon Bay Communities, Inc. v. Coning Commission of the Town of Stratford, 87 Conn. App. 537, 547 (2005); *see also*, Branhaven Plaza, LLC v. Inland Wetlands Commission of Town of Branford, 251 Conn. 269, 276 (1999). The Connecticut Courts have consistently held that a plaintiff seeking to assert a claim under C.G.S. § 22a-19 merely needs to articulate a colorable claim of unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction of the environment. Finley v. Inland Wetlands Commission of Town of Orange, 289 Conn. 12, 35 (2008); Windels v. Environmental Protection Commission, 284 Conn. 268, 289-90 (2007). “Statutes such as the EPA are remedial in nature and should be liberally construed to accomplish their purpose.” Avalon Bay Communities, Inc., 87 Conn. App. at 548; *see also*, Keeney v. Fairfield Resources, Inc., 41 Conn App. 120, 132-33 (1996).


“Section 22a-19(a) makes intervention a matter of right once a verified pleading is filed complying with the statute, whether or not those allegations ultimately prove to be unfounded.” Avalon Bay Communities, Inc., 87 Conn. App. at 543; *see also*, Polymer Resources, Ltd. V. Keeney, 23 Conn. App. 340, 348-49 (1993) (“[Section] 22a-19[a] compels a trial court to permit intervention in an administrative proceeding or judicial review of such a proceeding by a party seeking to raise environmental issues upon the filing of a verified complaint. The statute is therefore not discretionary.”) The one who files a verified pleading under § 22a-19 becomes a party to the administrative proceeding upon doing so and that person then has statutory standing to appeal for the limited purpose of raising environmental issues. Mystic Marinelife Aquarium

v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 490 (1978). Upon the filing of the verified pleading, the Proposed Intervenor become parties with statutory standing to appeal, and that right to appeal is independent of any other party. Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, 175 Conn. at 499-500. Even the denial of an application to intervene under § 22a-19 may be appealed by filing an original appeal for improper denial of intervenor status. CT Post Limited Partnership v. New Haven City Planning Commission, Conn. Sup. 2000 WL 1161131 (July 21, 2000, Downey, J.).

For the above stated reasons, the Proposed Intervenor respectfully request that their application for intervenor status, pursuant to C.G.S. §§ 22a-19, 16-50n and 4-177a, be granted by this Honorable Connecticut Siting Council.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED BY:

**LEE HIGGINS, KAORI HIGGINS,
PETER JANIS, ELIZABETH JANIS,
RICHARD KOSINSKI & SUSAN KOSINSKI**

BY: 
Mario F. Coppola, Esq.
Berchem, Moses, and Devlin, P.C.
27 Imperial Avenue
Westport, CT 06880
Tel: 203-227-9545; Fax: 203-226-1641
Email: mcoppola@bmdl.com
Their Attorneys


PLEASE ENTER THE APPEARANCE OF:

Ira W. Bloom, Esq. & Mario F. Coppola, Esq.
Berchem, Moses & Devlin, P.C.
27 Imperial Avenue
Westport, CT 06880
FOR THE PROPOSED INTERVENORS


The Proposed Intervenor request copies of all filings made in the course of this Petition 1010 to date and from this date forward via regular U.S. Mail.

VERIFICATION


I, LEE HIGGINS, duly sworn, hereby verify that the above application is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.


LEE HIGGINS


Sworn and subscribed before me this 24th day of January, 2012.


Mario F. Coppola, Esq.
Commissioner of Superior Court


I, KAORI HIGGINS, duly sworn, hereby verify that the above application is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.


KAORI HIGGINS


Sworn and subscribed before me this 24th day of January, 2012.


Mario F. Coppola, Esq.
Commissioner of Superior Court

I, PETER JANIS, duly sworn, hereby verify that the above application is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.


PETER JANIS

Sworn and subscribed before me this 24th day of January, 2012.



Mario F. Coppola, Esq.
Commissioner of Superior Court

I, ELIZABETH JANIS, duly sworn, hereby verify that the above application is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.



ELIZABETH JANIS

Sworn and subscribed before me this 24th day of January, 2012.




Mario F. Coppola, Esq.
Commissioner of Superior Court

I, RICHARD KOSINSKI, duly sworn, hereby verify that the above application is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.



RICHARD KOSINSKI

Sworn and subscribed before me this 24th day of January, 2012.




Mario F. Coppola, Esq.
Commissioner of Superior Court

I, SUSAN KOSINSKI, duly sworn, hereby verify that the above application is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.



SUSAN KOSINSKI

Sworn and subscribed before me this 24th day of January, 2012.



Mario F. Coppola, Esq.
Commissioner of Superior Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on the above date a true copy of the foregoing has been sent by U.S.

Mail, first-class, postage pre-paid, to the following parties of record:

Ms. Linda Roberts, Executive Director, Connecticut Siting Council, 10 Franklin Sq., New Britain, CT 06051 (1 original, 15 copies, plus 1 electronic)

New Cingular Wireless, PCS, LLC (AKA – AT&T), Christopher Fisher, Esq. Cuddy & Feder, LLP, 445 Hamilton Avenue, 14th Fl., White Plains, NY 10601



Mario F. Coppola, Esq.

EXHIBIT 1

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TO ALL PEOPLE TO WHOM THESE PRESENTS SHALL COME, GREETING:

KNOW YE, THAT TOWN OF GREENWICH, a municipal corporation of the State of Connecticut, acting herein by C. Carleton Osborne, Frank R. Parker and John P. Sullivan, its Selectmen, hereunto duly authorized, by Resolution of the Representative Town Meeting held April 13, 1953, for the consideration of ELEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (\$11,500.00) DOLLARS received to its full satisfaction of GREENWICH WATER COMPANY, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Connecticut, and located in said Town of Greenwich, does remise, release, and forever QUIT-CLAIM unto the said GREENWICH WATER COMPANY, its successors and assigns forever, all the right, title, interest, claim and demand whatsoever as it the said Releasor has or ought to have in or to,

all that certain tract, piece or parcel of land, with the improvements, if any, thereon or attached thereto, situated in the Town of Greenwich, County of Fairfield and State of Connecticut, bounded and described as follows:

Beginning at the point formed by the intersection of the division line between land of the Releasor, being the premises hereby conveyed, and land of The Institute of Evolutionary Psychology with the easterly line of Valley Road, and running thence along land of The Institute of Evolutionary Psychology South $58^{\circ} 04' 40''$ East 36.0 feet, thence southerly along the westerly shore of a pond to and along the westerly bank of the Mianus River about 1015 feet, thence through land of the Releasor North $80^{\circ} 32' 40''$ West 37.71 feet to the easterly line of Valley Road, thence northerly along the easterly line of Valley Road 297.15 feet along the arc of a circle curving to the right on a radius of 200.8 feet, the chord of which is North $2^{\circ} 40' 25''$ East 270.77 feet, North $39^{\circ} 43' 10''$ East 73.0 feet, North $40^{\circ} 08' 20''$ East 248.90 feet, North $42^{\circ} 02' 02''$ East 85.09 feet, North $46^{\circ} 41' 10''$ East 15.86 feet, North $52^{\circ} 41' 30''$ East 23.72 feet, North $52^{\circ} 44' 00''$ East 8.36 feet, North $58^{\circ} 06' 20''$ East 15.75 feet, South $48^{\circ} 18' 00''$ East 26.67 feet, North $40^{\circ} 00' 50''$ East 84.69 feet, North $61^{\circ} 30' 50''$ East 26.69 feet and North $37^{\circ} 46' 20''$ East 26.53 feet to the point of beginning, and containing about 2.63 acres.

The general boundaries of the above described tract of land are northerly by Valley Road and land of The Institute of

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Evolutionary Psychology, Easterly by waters of a pond and Mianus River, Southerly by other land of the Releasor and Valley Road, Westerly by Valley Road.

Together with all rights of the Town of Greenwich in the Mill Pond, dam and river bed adjacent to the above described premises.

Said premises consisting of about 2.63 acres, and said Mill Pond, dam and river bed adjacent to said premises, are shown and designated on a certain map entitled, "Property of Greenwich Water Co. Greenwich, Conn." made by S. E. Minor & Co., Inc. Civil Engineers, Greenwich, Conn. September 2, 1953, filed or to be filed in the Office of the Town Clerk of said Greenwich, reference thereto being had.

Together with all the flowage rights, riparian rights in the river flow, and water rights conveyed by The Southern Connecticut Real Estate Company to the Town of Greenwich by Deed dated August 30, 1945, and recorded in the Greenwich Land Records in Book 402 at Page 577, except the right of the Releasor to have 1,000,000 gallons of water per day flow below the premises conveyed as provided in paragraph 2 of the restrictive covenants below.

This deed is given and accepted upon the following covenants, agreements and provisions which shall be binding forever upon the Releasee, its successors and assigns and inure to the benefit of the Releasor, its successors and assigns:

1. The Releasee covenants and agrees to install prior to December 31, 1954, at its own expense the necessary water mains and fire hydrants to make water service available in Mianus Mill Village, all as shown on a certain map entitled "Mianus Mill Property" dated February 5, 1953.
2. The Releasee agrees that it will release a flow of one million gallons per day below said described premises, provided that the Releasee may be temporarily relieved of the necessity of releasing all or any portion of said daily flow upon application to the Board of Selectmen of the Town of Greenwich if and when, in the judgment of the Selectmen, emergency drought conditions arise such that the water required to be released is more urgently required by the customers of Greenwich Water Company. The Releasee agrees that it will never exercise any present or future right of eminent domain in respect to the river flow below the aforesaid premises whereby by reason of such condemnation the flow below said premises shall be thereby reduced to less than one million gallons per day, and agrees that should this covenant not to condemn be violated, the premises hereby conveyed shall revert to the Releasor, its successors and assigns.
3. The Releasee agrees that the premises hereby conveyed shall be used for water works purposes, and shall revert to the Releasor herein, its successors and assigns, in the event the premises cease to be used for water works purposes.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the premises, with all the

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appurtenances, unto the said Release, its successors and assigns forever, so that neither it the Releasor, nor its successors or assigns nor any other person under it or them shall hereafter have any claim, right or title in or to the premises, or any part thereof, but therefrom it is and they are by these presents forever barred and excluded; except as provided above.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said TOWN OF GREENWICH has hereunto set its corporate name and affixed its corporate seal by C. Carleton Osborne, Frank R. Parker and John P. Sullivan, its Selectmen, hereunto duly authorized, this 27th day of September A.D., 1953.



Signed, Sealed and attested in the presence of:

TOWN OF GREENWICH

By C. Carleton Osborne

Frank R. Parker

John P. Sullivan

STATE OF CONNECTICUT }
COUNTY OF FAIRFIELD }

SS: GREENWICH September 22 1953

Personally appeared C. Carleton Osborne, ~~Frank R. Parker~~ and John P. Sullivan, Selectmen of said TOWN OF GREENWICH, hereunto duly authorized, signers and sealers of the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged the same to be their free act and deed, and the free act and deed of said municipal corporation, before me.

Harford W. Hulph
Notary Public

EXHIBIT 2



Supreme Court of Connecticut.
 Henry MORGENBESSER et al.
 v.
 AQUARION WATER COMPANY OF CON-
 NECTICUT et al.

No. 17395.
 Argued Nov. 22, 2005.
 Decided Jan. 24, 2006.

Background: Neighbors brought declaratory-judgment action against property owner and telecommunications company, asserting that restrictive covenant barred installation of wireless telecommunications facility on property. The Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk, Karazin, J., granted neighbors' motion for summary judgment. Company appealed, and appeal was transferred from the Appellate Court. Company dismissed appeal. The Superior Court, Hiller, J., granted joint motion for entry of judgment that dismissed all claims except declaratory-judgment claim. Company appealed.

Holding: The Supreme Court held that restrictive covenant prohibited installation of wireless telecommunications antenna panels and related improvements.

Affirmed.

West Headnotes

[1] Judgment 228 **185(2)**

228 Judgment

228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228k182 Motion or Other Application
228k185 Evidence in General
228k185(2) k. Presumptions and Burden
 of Proof. Most Cited Cases

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Practice Book

1998, § 17-49.

[2] Judgment 228 **185(2)**

228 Judgment

228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228k182 Motion or Other Application
228k185 Evidence in General
228k185(2) k. Presumptions and Burden
 of Proof. Most Cited Cases

Party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Practice Book 1998, § 17-49.

[3] Appeal and Error 30 **863**

30 Appeal and Error

30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
 General
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on
 Nature of Decision Appealed from
30k863 k. In General. Most Cited Cases

On appeal from decision on motion for summary judgment, Supreme Court must determine whether the legal conclusions reached by the trial court are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision of the trial court. Practice Book 1998, § 17-49.

[4] Appeal and Error 30 **863**

30 Appeal and Error

30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
 General
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on
 Nature of Decision Appealed from
30k863 k. In General. Most Cited Cases

Supreme Court's review of a trial court's decision to grant a defendant's motion for summary judgment is

plenary. Practice Book 1998, § 17-49.

[5] Covenants 108 ↪51(1)

108 Covenants

108II Construction and Operation

108II(C) Covenants as to Use of Real Property

108k51 Buildings or Other Structures or Improvements

108k51(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases

Restrictive covenant providing that structures and improvements on property were to be used for “water supply purposes or purposes incidental or accessory thereto” prohibited installation of wireless telecommunications antenna panels and related improvements; use of word “thereto” clearly was intended to tie incidental or accessory purpose to primary purpose of water supply.

[6] Contracts 95 ↪143(1)

95 Contracts

95II Construction and Operation

95II(A) General Rules of Construction

95k143 Application to Contracts in General

95k143(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases

Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms.

[7] Contracts 95 ↪143(2)

95 Contracts

95II Construction and Operation

95II(A) General Rules of Construction

95k143 Application to Contracts in General

95k143(2) k. Existence of Ambiguity. Most Cited Cases

When interpreting a contract, a court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity.

[8] Contracts 95 ↪143(2)

95 Contracts

95II Construction and Operation

95II(A) General Rules of Construction

95k143 Application to Contracts in General

95k143(2) k. Existence of Ambiguity.

Most Cited Cases

Any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used in the contract rather than from one party's subjective perception of the terms.

[9] Covenants 108 ↪49

108 Covenants

108II Construction and Operation

108II(C) Covenants as to Use of Real Property

108k49 k. Nature and Operation in General.

Most Cited Cases

Although the words in a restrictive covenant are to be interpreted in their ordinary and popular sense, if any of the words have acquired a particular or special meaning in the particular relationship in which they appear, such particular or special meaning will control.

[10] Covenants 108 ↪49

108 Covenants

108II Construction and Operation

108II(C) Covenants as to Use of Real Property

108k49 k. Nature and Operation in General.

Most Cited Cases

Restrictive covenant must be narrowly construed and ought not to be extended by implication.

[11] Covenants 108 ↪21

108 Covenants

108II Construction and Operation

108II(A) Covenants in General

108k21 k. General Rules of Construction.

Most Cited Cases

If the covenant's language is ambiguous, it should be construed against rather than in favor of the covenant.

****1079** Thomas J. Donlon, with whom was Edward V. O'Hanlan, Stamford, for the appellant (defendant Cellco Partnership).

Jay H. Sandak, Stamford, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

SULLIVAN, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and ZARELLA, Js.

PER CURIAM.

***825** This appeal arises out of an action brought by the plaintiffs, ^{FN1} individual owners of property in the town of Greenwich (town), against the defendants, Aquarion Water Company of Connecticut (Aquarion) and Cellco Partnership, doing business as Verizon Wireless (Verizon). The plaintiffs sought, inter alia, a declaratory judgment and temporary and permanent ***826** injunctions prohibiting the installation of telecommunications antenna panels and related improvements on a property located in the town at 20 Bowman Drive (property). The trial court rendered summary judgment for the plaintiffs on their action for a declaratory judgment and the plaintiffs withdrew their remaining claims. Verizon appeals from the judgment, ^{FN2} claiming that the trial court improperly interpreted the terms of a restrictive covenant governing the use of the property to prohibit the use of the property for this purpose. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FN1. The plaintiffs are Henry Morgenbesser, Karen Morgenbesser, Angela O'Donnell, Michael O'Donnell, Howard Roitman and Lisa Roitman.

FN2. The defendants appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. In February, 1952, King Merritt Acres, Inc., transferred the property, which was in a residential zone and was part of a subdivision known as King Merritt Acres, to the Greenwich Water Company. At the time of the transfer, the town's zoning regulations permitted certain nonresidential uses in residential zones. Specifically, the regulations provided for "[r]eservations for public water supply including land and improvements used for water supply purposes or purposes incidental or accessory

thereto." Consistent with this regulation, the deed transferring the property contained a restrictive covenant limiting the use of the property to "water supply purposes or purposes incidental or accessory thereto." ^{FN3} The Greenwich Water Company erected a water tower on the property ****1080** that was 114 feet in height and 50 feet in diameter. After King Merritt Acres, Inc., transferred the property to the ***827** Greenwich Water Company, it conveyed the lots in the King Merit Acres subdivision currently owned by the plaintiffs to the plaintiffs' predecessors in title.

FN3. The restrictive covenant provided: "The Grantee [Greenwich Water Company], for itself, its successors and assigns, covenants and agrees with the Grantor [King Merritt Acres, Inc.], its successors and assigns that said premises and the structures and improvements erected and maintained thereon shall be used for water supply purposes or purposes incidental or accessory thereto."

In December, 2000, the Greenwich Water Company's successor in interest, the Connecticut-American Water Company, entered into a lease with Verizon authorizing Verizon to install a wireless telecommunications facility (facility) on the property. The proposed facility included "[twelve] panel-type antennae attached to the railing of the water tower at approximately [sixty-five] feet above ground level ... [twelve] antenna cables, leading from the antennae ... a [twelve foot by twenty foot] equipment shelter less than [one] story in height located at the base of the water tower; and ... [two] ground air conditioning condensers surrounded by a noise attenuation structure." On April 3, 2002, Verizon applied to the town planning and zoning commission (commission) for approval of the site plan for the proposed facility. On April 26, 2002, the Connecticut-American Water Company assigned the lease to Aquarion. On July 30, 2002, the commission approved Verizon's site plan application.

Thereafter, the plaintiffs brought this action against the defendants alleging breach of the restrictive covenant and seeking, inter alia, temporary and permanent injunctions against the installation of the facility and a judgment declaring that the restrictive covenant prohibits the use of the property "for anything other than for water supply purposes or purposes

incidental or accessory thereto.” The defendants filed separate motions for summary judgment claiming that the plain language of the restrictive covenant precluded the plaintiffs’ interpretation that it allowed uses related to water supply only and that, therefore, the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The plaintiffs filed a cross motion for summary judgment claiming that the restrictive covenant precluded the defendants *828 from using the property for the proposed facility as a matter of law. The court granted the plaintiffs’ cross motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment declaring that the property could be used for water supply and uses related to water supply only. Verizon appealed to the Appellate Court and we transferred the appeal to this court.

Thereafter, this court sua sponte raised the question of whether there was an appealable final judgment because the trial court had not ruled on the plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief. Verizon withdrew its appeal and the parties submitted to the trial court a joint motion for entry of judgment in which the plaintiffs withdrew all of the counts and causes of action in their complaint except for the request for declaratory judgment. The trial court granted the motion and rendered judgment thereon, from which Verizon appealed. Verizon claims on appeal that the trial court improperly interpreted the language of the restrictive covenant to prohibit the installation of the proposed facility. We disagree.

[1][2][3][4] As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable standard of review. “Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.... The party moving for summary **1081 judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... On appeal, we must determine whether the legal conclusions reached by the trial court are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of *829 decision of the trial court.... Our review of the trial court’s decision to grant the defendant’s motion for summary

judgment is plenary.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) *Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp.*, 276 Conn. 1, 6-7, 882 A.2d 597 (2005).

[5][6][7][8][9][10][11] “Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms. A court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity Similarly, any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used in the contract rather than from one party’s subjective perception of the terms.... Although the words in a restrictive covenant are to be interpreted in their ordinary and popular sense, if any of the words have acquired a particular or special meaning in the particular relationship in which they appear, such particular or special meaning will control.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) *Southbury Land Trust, Inc. v. Andricovich*, 59 Conn.App. 785, 788-89, 757 A.2d 1263 (2000). “A restrictive covenant must be narrowly construed and ought not to be extended by implication. *Neptune Park Assn. v. Steinberg*, 138 Conn. 357, 361, 84 A.2d 687 (1951). Moreover, if the covenant’s language is ambiguous, it should be construed against rather than in favor of the covenant. *Hooker v. Alexander*, 129 Conn. 433, 436, 29 A.2d 308 (1942).” *5011 Community Organization v. Harris*, 16 Conn.App. 537, 541, 548 A.2d 9 (1988).

We conclude that the language of the restrictive covenant limiting the use of property to “water supply purposes or purposes incidental or accessory thereto” clearly and unambiguously limited the use of the property to uses related to water supply. The word “accessory” is defined as “aiding or contributing in a secondary way” or “present in a minor amount and *830 not essential as a constituent,” for example, as “an [accessory] mineral in a rock.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th Ed.1993). “Incidental” is defined as “being likely to ensue as a chance or minor consequence” or “occurring merely by chance or without intention or calculation.” *Id.* The use of the word “thereto” in the restrictive covenant clearly was intended to tie the incidental or accessory purpose to the primary purpose of water supply and, therefore, rules out the second alternative definition of each of these words. Thus, allowable uses must aid, contribute to or be likely to ensue from the primary use of water supply.

This interpretation is consistent with our decision in *Lawrence v. Zoning Board of Appeals*, 158 Conn. 509, 264 A.2d 552 (1969). In *Lawrence*, we construed a zoning ordinance that defined “ ‘accessory building or use’ ” as “ ‘[o]ne which is subordinate and customarily incidental to the main building and use on the same lot.’ ” *Id.*, at 510 n. 1, 264 A.2d 552. We stated that “[t]he word ‘incidental’ as employed in a definition of ‘accessory use’ incorporates two concepts. It means that the use must not be the primary use of the property but rather one which is subordinate and minor in significance. Indeed, we find the word ‘subordinate’ included in the definition in the ordinance under consideration. But ‘incidental,’ when used to define an accessory use, must also incorporate the concept**1082 of reasonable relationship with the primary use. It is not enough that the use be subordinate; it must also be attendant or concomitant. To ignore this latter aspect of ‘incidental’ would be to permit any use which is not primary, no matter how unrelated it is to the primary use.” *Id.*, at 512, 264 A.2d 552

The defendants argue, however, that *Lawrence* does not govern the present case because, in *Lawrence*, this court was construing an ordinance that defined the term “ ‘accessory’ ” by using the term “ ‘incidental,’ ” *831 while, in the restrictive covenant at issue here, those terms are used in the alternative. See *id.*, at 510 n. 1, 264 A.2d 552. They argue that the terms must be construed to have entirely different meanings in the restrictive covenant in order to avoid redundancy. See *United Illuminating Co. v. Wisvest-Connecticut, LLC*, 259 Conn. 665, 674, 791 A.2d 546 (2002) (“[t]he law of contract interpretation militates against interpreting a contract in a way that renders a provision superfluous”). We disagree. In *Lawrence*, we recognized that, in the land use context, the term “accessory use” traditionally connotes a relationship with the primary use. *Lawrence v. Zoning Board of Appeals*, *supra*, 158 Conn. at 512, 264 A.2d 552. Because the term “incidental” was used to define “accessory use” in that case, we concluded that the term “incidental” also connoted a relationship with the primary use. Thus, we recognized that the terms are similar and that their meanings overlap to some degree as used in that context. It does not follow that the words are completely synonymous or that they cannot be used disjunctively in a contractual context unless they are given entirely different meanings. Defining a

word by its very nature requires the use of other words that have similar but not identical meanings. Thus, our conclusion in the present case that both accessory purposes and incidental purposes must have a relationship to the primary purpose of water supply does not render the term “incidental” superfluous. It is not necessarily the case that any use that aids or contributes to the primary use also ensues as a consequence of that use. In any event, even if our interpretation rendered the terms “accessory” and “incidental” redundant, that result would be preferable to an interpretation that would require us to give a meaning to the word “incidental” that it clearly was not intended to have.

The defendants also argue that the restrictive covenant cannot be read to exclude uses not related to water *832 supply because: (1) ambiguous limitations on usage contained in a restrictive covenant must be construed against the covenant; (2) such an interpretation would render the entire phrase “or purposes incidental or accessory thereto” superfluous; and (3) the proposed use is consistent with public policy. We have concluded, however, that, to the extent that the words “accessory” and “incidental” are ambiguous, the use of the word “thereto” in the restrictive covenant clearly and unambiguously indicates that any subordinate uses of the property must be related to the primary use of water supply. The defendants’ interpretation would require us to rewrite the restrictive covenant to allow “water supply purposes or other accessory or minor purposes.” Moreover, our interpretation does not render the phrase “or purposes incidental or accessory thereto” superfluous. The construction of a road, for example, is not a water supply use in and of itself, but might contribute to the use of the property for that purpose and, therefore, could be an accessory use. Finally, the fact that the use of the property to operate a wireless communications facility might advance the public policy favoring universal access to telecommunications services does not **1083 permit this court to ignore the clear and unambiguous language of the restrictive covenant prohibiting such a use.

The judgment is affirmed.

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