State of Connecticut

Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection Commission on Fire Prevention and Control



Model Procedures for Fire Department Response to Hostile Situations

Version 1.1

July 2013

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<u>Purpose</u>

The purpose of this document is to provide guidance to Connecticut's Fire Service Incident Commanders and first arriving units that respond to a hostile or violent situation or a situation that may become hostile or violent. The primary goal is to minimize the risk to fire/EMS personnel and to provide a common framework on which fire departments may build a local protocol tailored to their specific community.

Introduction

Fire Department (F.D.) responses to hostile and violent situations are becoming more frequent. Such incidents include, but are not limited to, large scale complex incidents such as school shootings, workplace violence, and terrorist activities, as well as smaller scale/less complex incidents such as suicide attempts, single patient shootings and stabbings, domestic violence injuries, and assaults. The goal of this guide is to ensure coordination between agencies resulting in scene control, patient treatment, and evidence preservation while maintaining the safety of all emergency personnel.

One of the most serious and dangerous of these types of incidents is the Active Shooter incident (Appendix A). An active shooting event can occur at any time or any place. During the past several years, there have been active shooter incidents **where we shop** [2007 ... Gunman kills 5 and injures multiple others at a Utah mall], **where we exercise our free speech** [2011 ... Congresswoman Giffords critically shot while meeting with constituents at a market – 6 people killed and 3 others injured], **where we learn** [1999 ... Columbine High School 12 students and 1 teacher killed; 2007... Virginia Tech 32 killed and many others wounded; 2008 Northern Illinois University 5 students killed on campus], **and where we work** [2010 ... Gunman opens fire at Connecticut beer distributor, killing 8 people].

Most recently in 2012; the Newtown, CT elementary school shooting [...26 children and adults killed], the Webster, NY shooting of firefighters at the scene of a working fire [...4 firefighters shot, 2 fatally] and in Hoover, Alabama where firefighters responded to a medical and were shot at by the caller.

These incidents differ greatly from routine incidents due to an increase in safety requirements and the necessity of a unified command structure for incident mitigation and coordination of resources. Though it is the culture and nature of the fire service to go into any situation in order to save the lives of those they serve, hostile and violent situations require a different mindset in order to have a positive influence on the outcome.

The time has come for Fire Departments to evaluate various policies and procedures currently in place. The following model procedure, based on existing practices and sound principles, centers on the safety of fire department personnel, complements the concepts of unified command and mutual aid and generates a standard framework of operating guidelines that all departments will recognize. The role of the Emergency Telecommunicator (Dispatcher) will be critical to the outcome of any Hostile/Violent incident.

Many of the concepts used in this guide are similar to a Hazardous Materials incident response. A Hazardous Materials incident also has unseen dangers, can change rapidly, uses different response modes and requires a need for safety zones.

Model Baseline Policy¹

During a response to or arrival at a hostile/violent incident, the fire department will maintain a safe work environment for its firefighters and EMS personnel and will provide essential emergency and rescue services, in coordination with law enforcement, to the public as long as the safety of the responders is not endangered by the incident.

Model Operational Guidelines

Incident Priorities

As with all responses the following incident priorities will be safely achieved:

- 1. Life Safety
- 2. Incident Stabilization
- 3. Property Conservation

Response

If Fire Responders are aware of a hostile incident, fire units should consider one of two <u>response modes</u>:

- 1. Stage for Police Department (P.D.) and wait for the scene to be secured (see Active Fire page 6).
- 2. Respond directly to the confirmed, secured scene and proceed with caution.

In all cases, the first arriving unit or Incident Command (IC) will collect as much information as possible and rapidly communicate that information to responding companies. This may require a windshield survey as an initial scene size-up. The first arriving unit or IC will make the decision of which response mode to use. If possible, the F.D. Incident Commander should monitor the P.D. frequencies being used for the incident.

If F.D. companies respond to an incident of an unknown nature and find themselves in a hostile/violent situation, they will immediately retreat to a safe location. Emergency radio traffic priority should be used. Dispatch should be advised of the need for rapid P.D. response.

The primary responding agency shall be responsible for establishing command. As soon as possible, a Unified Command should be established (see Unified Command page 5).

For larger, more complex incidents, <u>safety zones</u> should be created. Personnel shall understand that these zones are dynamic and can change as the incident develops.

- **Hot Zone** is an operational (geographic) area, consisting of the immediate incident location with a direct and immediate threat to personal safety or health (not a secure area).
- Warm Zone is an operational (geographic) area with a potential threat to personal safety or health. The warm zone typically exists between the hot zones and the cold zones. This zone is established and secured by PD. Rescue Teams may be able to enter and remove patients without providing treatment. Personnel shall wear vests or jackets for easy identification while in the warm zone.
- **Cold Zone** is an operational (geographic) area surrounding the warm zone where first responders can operate with minimal threat to personal safety or health. In this zone personnel can provide treatment to patients.

¹ When developing a specific department policy/procedure, all departments should use the NIMS model for incident command including the use of incident action plans (IAP), which will ensure proper documentation is done as the event occurs, greatly easing the recovery process.

Response - Issues

NO SELF DISPATCH – A common problem that occurs during unique emergency incidents is F.D. personnel making a decision to Self Dispatch themselves, often in personal or department issued vehicles. Often with the best intentions and nature of the fire service being to go into any situation in order to save lives, these persons become part of the problem rather than the solution. Safety and accountability issues are only some of the problems caused. If not formally requested, do not Self Dispatch.

Unified Command

Unified Command is the integration of command personnel from each responding agency to a multijurisdictional or multi-agency operational event to enhance communication, planning, and logistics for all responding agencies by the utilization of shared resources, knowledge, and expertise.

- Upon announcement of establishment of unified command, all various agency command personnel shall report to the Command Post (CP). The CP shall be established in a safe location, preferably located in the Cold Zone or at a remote location.
- In most cases P.D. should designate this area.
- Expand the Incident Command Structure as needed.
 - a. The size and complexity of the organizational structure, obviously, will be determined by the scope of the emergency.
 - b. The only change in using the ICS on a very large incident rather than a small incident is the method of growth of the emergency management organization to meet the increased needs within the Unified Command.
 - c. The determination to expand the organization by the Incident Commander would be done when a determination is made that the existing ICS structure is becoming insufficient.
- Command vehicles may be co-located to facilitate command post operations.
- Other agency representatives (e.g. DOT, School Administration, and Division of Emergency Management and Homeland Security (DEMHS)) shall participate in Unified Command as needed.
- The IC shall develop an incident action plan.
- The IC shall designate a command operating channel.
- Designation of a Public Information Officer for the incident.
- Consideration of deploying an Incident Management Team.
- Consideration of a Critical Incident Debriefing Team response for responders.

Incidents with Active Fire

At hostile or violent incidents the coordination between agencies at the CP, with consideration of scene control, patient treatment, and evidence preservation while continually maintaining the safety of all emergency personnel, will ultimately determine F.D. actions toward extinguishment of active fires, regardless of size.

Incidents with an Active Fire situation should consider the following priorities:

- Active Fires will be allowed to burn until confirmation of a secure scene has occurred.
- Additional Fire Resources should be pre-staged, with consideration of the worst case scenario, should the Active Fire be allowed to burn with exposure and weather considerations.
- An Incident Action Plan should be developed specifically for fire attack.

INTEGRATED RESPONSE

Care of the victims is a shared responsibility between law enforcement, fire/rescue and EMS. Optimal outcomes depend on communications between responders. Some Municipalities have successfully trained Multi-Agency personnel to allow for a response during the active event phase of the incident to allow emergency personnel to expeditiously assess and attend to survivors. These teams use shared terms and jointly developed protocols. In cases where the scene may remain unsafe for an extended period Tactical Emergency Medical Support (TEMS) teams have been created. TEMS provides a system of care that supports the mission of law enforcement while maximizing victim outcome. This kind of medical support will often use principles which include the tactical combat casualty care (TCCC) guidelines (see Appendix F page 16) and an integrated active shooter response that includes the critical actions contained in the acronym **THREAT**²:

- 1. Threat suppression
- 2. <u>H</u>emorrhage control
- 3. Rapid Extrication to safety
- 4. <u>A</u>ssessment by medical providers
- 5. <u>Transport</u> to definitive care

Appendix A: Active Shooter Profile:

An **active shooter** is an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined space or other populated area. In most cases, active shooters use firearms and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims. Active shooter situations are often over within 10 to 15 minutes.

Active shooter situations are unpredictable and evolve quickly. Typically, the immediate deployment of law enforcement is required to stop the shooting and mitigate harm to victims. Active shooters usually will continue to move throughout building or area until stopped by law enforcement, suicide, or other intervention.

² ACS Joint Committee to Create a National Policy to Enhance Survivability From Mass Casualty Shooting Events : Hartford Consensus document

Appendix B: Author and Resources:

State of Connecticut -Model Procedures for Fire Department Response to Hostile Situations was developed by William M Higgins, Statewide Fire Service Disaster Response Administrator

The following available resources were used to create this document:.

1) Department of Homeland Security – Active Shooter Training @

http://emilms.fema.gov/IS907/index.htm

2) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) @

http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/ICSResource/assets/reviewMaterials.pdf

3) FEMA Guidelines for Haz Mat/WMD Response, Planning and Prevention Training @

http://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/hmep9-1801.pdf

4) Fire Chief.com Active Shooter Job Aid @

http://firechief.com/site-files/firechief.com/files/uploads/2012/07/active-shooter-job-aid.pdf

Other State of Connecticut Model Response Protocols:

Model Procedures for Responding to a Package with Suspicion of a Biological Threat, 2012

Model Procedures for Response of Emergency Vehicles During Hurricanes and Tropical Storms, 2011

Model Procedures for Response to Collapse or Potential Collapse of Buildings, 2011

Special thanks to personnel from the Connecticut Intelligence Center, Connecticut Division of Emergency Management and Homeland Security, Connecticut Fire Academy, and Connecticut Department of Public Health for their review and input of this document.

Comments or Recommendations regarding this document should be sent Bill Higgins at <u>William.Higgins@ct.gov</u>.

<u>Apper</u>	Appendix C: Active Shooter JOB Aid:																								
POST BLAST ACTIVE SHOOTER	۲ ۲		DID AID				ENTER				EVALUATE					EVACUALE						COMMAND			
DELINES	Outdoor Evacuation +++	850 ft	1,080 ft	1,360 ft	1,850 ft	1,500 ft	1,750 ft	2,750 ft	3,750 ft	6,500 ft	7,000 ft	nt) that could	ing to withstand	ce or glass									Metro Region EMS System		
TION GUI	Building Evacuation ++	70 ft	90 ft	110 ft	150 ft	320 ft	400 ft	640 ft	860 ft	1,240 ft	1,570 ft	rial (TNT equivale: oossible.	inreinforced build	nent throw distan zard distance.						X	gency				
EXPLOSIVE EVACUATION GUIDELINES	Explosive Mass [‡]	5 lbs	10 lbs	20 lbs	50 lbs	500 lbs	1000 lbs	4,000 lbs	10,000 lbs	30,000 lbs	60,000 lbs	Based on the amount of material (TMT equivalent) that could reasonably fit - variations are possible.	14 Governed by the ability of an unreinforced building to withstand severe damage or collapse.	the greater fragn d falling glass ha						by:	Metropolitan Emergency		Minneapolis – Saint Paul Metropolitan Medical	Response System	
EXPLOSIV	Threat	Pipe bomb (metal or PVC)	Suicide belt	Suicide vest	Briefcase or backpack	Compact car (in trunk)	Full size car (in trunk)	Passenger or cargo van	Small box van or truck	Large box van or water/fuel	semi-trailer	+ Based on the reasonably fi	++ Governed by severe dama	111 Governed by the greater fragment throw distance or glass breakage and falling glass hazard distance.					3E Job Aid	Sponsored by:	Metro		Minn	Resp	
COMMAND		orcement, EMS, and FIRE	to form Unified Command		Command Objectives:	containment	cuation corridor(s)	Establish evacuation teams with force protection	injured		EMS FIRE	First Arriving	Communicate evacuation corridors	 Do NOT co-locate operations and command staff 	Arriving Supervisor	 Establish contact with the initial EMS/Fire commander 	 Understand/assess situation 	 Assume command 	 Update to scene size up. Request additional 	 Fire Commander assigns: 	Operations Division Chief	 Exterior - apparatus shielding Interior - avariation team 	Interior - evacuation team Staging	 Communications - monitor TAC channels 	
COMI		Co-locate with Law Enforcement, EMS, and	to form Unifi		Command	 Inteat neutralization or containment Mark notential hazards 	 Establish and mark evacuation corridor(s) 	4. Establish evacuation te	5. Rapid evacuation of the injured		LAW ENFORCEMENT	First Arriving Scene size-uo. initial intel 	 Determine entry team/officer(s) 	 Designate team leader (if not single responder) 	 Enter scene/engage to prevent further life loss 	Arriving Supervisor.	 Establish contact with team leader 	 Understand/assess situation 	Assume command	 Designate command post – maintain contact with team leader 	 Separate Command and Operations as soon 	as practical	 Assign resources: Threat neutralization 	Victim search	 Determine perimeters (inner and outer)

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Caution

- prior to and after arriving (duffel bags/backpacks, Windshield survey (360 degree 3D) for threats vehicles, dumpsters, out of place persons etc.)
- While exiting vehicle visually clear a 15 foot safe Assess for radiological agent post blast zone all directions
 - After exit from vehicle extend visual sweep 75
- Check staging areas, corridors and victim areas in feet in all directions - 'z sweep'
- Notify dispatch/supervisor if a hazard is identified a similar manner - mark hazards as appropriate
 - Maintain situational awareness for secondary and take appropriate action
 - Incident specific PPE: threats
- Post Blast: dust mask, eye and skin protection
 - instructions from incident commander Active Shooter - body protection per

Communicate

- Establish communication with command and advise location of staging
- and severity of injured, hazards, resource needs Report type of event, provide size up: number
 - Assure interoperable communication (common talkgroups), request talkgroups and assign as required

Create

- Formal command post at a safe distance away Unified command separate from operations
- from scene (initial liaison of agencies may occur close to event)
 - Perimeters per law enforcement
- Patient Loading Area patients into ambulances Create Non - Injured and Walking Wounded
 - Assembly Area
 - Ambulance Staging
- to protect from a potential secondary device blast Safe cover: angle vehicles in relation to building Nave



Caution

- Perpetrator or accomplice may be among victims Hazards: Secondary devices, gas, hazmat,
- victims for weapons and other secondary threats electrical, structural, CBRN, fire, or inhaled dusts Make visual and physical body sweep of all the


Care

FIRST PRIORITY IS TO REMOVE PATIENTS FROM THE HAZARD AREA

- Triage in immediate area only vs. entire scene.
- Triage victims as alive or dead, do not touch or move dead victims (no CPR)
 - Unconscious with amputations or open head injury should be triaged last
- Penetrating injuries can be small examine trunk carefully when in a safer area
- hemorrhage with tourniquets or dressings If awaiting Evacuation Corridor control



- Mark Evacuation Corridors (police tape, spray Move along most secure entry/exit route
- Clear scene of non-injured and walking wounded along Evacuation Corridors to the Non - Injured paint, light sticks)
 - Make visual and physical body sweep of all the and Walking Wounded Assembly Area •
- victims for weapons and other secondary threats Request necessary drag/carry equipment for non
 - Extricate the living rapidly ambulatory
- Move patients along Evacuation Corridors to Patient Loading Area
- For delays in transport establish intermediary Triage Point for critical interventions (including tourniquets and dressings for active bleeding) load and go as rapidly as possible
 - sweeps and impound personal property before Request law enforcement to assist with body transport



Active Shooter ENTER

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Concealment and Cover

- Stay in safe areas out of any lines of potential fire Advance from staging as directed by staging
 - Consider using large vehicles (i.e. fire trucks) as supervisor/incident commander
 - COVER

Corridor

- wounded and determine Evacuation Corridors With law enforcement establish location of
- Once corridor is secured evacuation team(s) may enter towards wounded with law enforcement
- Take in tourniquets and bandages, minimize treatment cover



Corridor

- Enter safest/most accessible area first establish All movement in and out of scene must follow established Evacuation Corridors .
- geographic divisions within operations section based on event scope
 - Direct non injured and walking wounded to exit along Evacuation Corridors to Non - Injured and Walking Wounded Assembly Area
- Follow in the footsteps of others in case of buried hazards

Appendix D: Active Shooter DISPATCH Aid:

Active Assailant (Shooter) – Protocol 136

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International Academies of Emergency Dispatch HiRISC Policy

The International Academies of Emergency Dispatch considers any situation necessitating the provision of these instructions to be an extremely High Risk-Inherent Situation Case (HiRISC), and believes that the trained Emergency Dispatcher (certified EMD, EFD, EPD) or their agency, making a good-faith attempt to provide these instructions, should not be held responsible for any bad outcomes. This should not be considered a legal interpretation, but a strong official opinion of the Council of Standards and the Board of Trustees of the IAED.

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136 ACTIVE ASSAILANT (SHOOTER)

SU ACTIVE ASSAILANT (SHOUTER)								
KEY QUESTIONS	7	🐲 POST-DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS 🕜 🕥 🔕 🥝 O 🗘						
 What type of weapons are involved? — a. (Gun) How many shots have been fired? b. (Gun) When was the last time you heard shots fired? How many suspects are involved? Where's the suspect now? a. (Suspect left/leaving/circulating) How did s/he leave? i. (Vehicle) Obtain the vehicle description.—	F ====================================	 (Evacuation) a. If the assailant (attacker) leaves, tell me immediately. b. Do not put yourself in any (more) danger. (LOCKDOWN) c. If the assailant (attacker) is nearby, keep very quiet and stay out of sight. 						
 4. Can you safely evacuate/leave the building/area? Yes No or Unknown 5. (LOCKDOWN) Where exactly are you? a. What's the best way to get to you? b. How many people are with you? 6. How many people are in the building/area? 	S-1 S-2	 Do computer check. Follow department policy regarding the notification of department administration, specialty units (SWAT), and bordering agencies. 						
7. Does the suspect appear to be wearing a bulletproof		DLS * Link to 🖀 X-1 unless:						
 vest or body armor? 8. Did you see the suspect carrying anything? a. (Yes) Describe it to me. 9. Did you hear the suspect saying anything? 		Stay on the Line Image: Comparison of the Line Ima						
 a. (Yes) What did s/he say? 10. (Suspect on scene) Did s/he arrive in a vehicle? a. (Yes) Obtain the vehicle description. b. (Yes) Where's the vehicle now? 	1	Evacuation S-1 LOCKDOWN S-2 LEVELS # DETERMINANT DESCRIPTORS + C E G K M 0 CODES						
 11. Has the suspect taken any hostages? a. (Yes) How many? b. (Yes) Exactly where are they? 12. How many people are injured? 13. Is there anything else you can tell me? 		E 1 ACTIVE ASSAILANT (SHOOTER) 136-E-1						
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Protected by U.S. Patent 7,436,937. Patents per	dina	PPDS® v4.1a, NAE, 121221				
DESCRIPTION ESSENTIALS	Determinant Suffixes	Axioms				
 Weapons Gun (pistol, rifle, shotgun) Knife (long, short) Club (bat, tire iron) Other (glass, bottle, vehicle) Explosive (bomb) Person(s) (armed suspects first) Race Gender Clothing Age (DOB) Demeanor (calm, emotional, intoxicated) Name/Relationship Address/Phone number Build/Height/Weight Hair color/length/style Other identifiable characteristics (facial hair, accent, tattoos, piercings) Eye color Complexion 	The suffix codes help to delineate the specific type of weapon: C = Club E = Explosive G = Gun K = Knife M = Multiple weapon types O = Other ACTIVE ASSAILANT (SHOOTER) An armed person who has used any type of weapon to inflict deadly physical force on others and continues to do so while having unrestricted access to additional victims. LOCKDOWN A response utilized by schools, businesses, or individuals that secures people in a	 Individuals who are found by an ACTIV ASSAILANT (SHOOTER) and cannot get away should be mentally prepared to fight for their lives by using weapons, throwing objects, acting aggressively, and yelling. Most victims of the Columbine High School massacre were found in the library where students were unable to evacuate or go into a LOCKDOWN. The term "active shooter" is a phrase coined by law enforcement to describe armed assailants who use deadly force on individuals while having unrestricted access to additional victims. These assailants commonly use firearms, hence the term "active shooter"; 				
Hat Shoes Jewelry	facility or room to minimize their exposure to an ACTIVE ASSAILANT (SHOOTER).	however, any weapon could be used. NTOA Statement				
 Jeweny Vehicle (CYMBALS) Color Year Make/Model Body style Additional (paintwork, damage) License State/Province Boat (Vessel) Size Color Name Registration number Type (inboard, outboard, sail, cruiser, speed, racing, pontoon, ship) 	 Rules ASSAULT situations in which a suspect does not have unrestricted access to additional victims should be handled on Protocol 106. Evacuating, if safe to do so, is the best action callers can take to save lives. However, if this is not possible, instructions for callers to go into a LOCKDOWN are critical. Hostage situations developing in the course of an ACTIVE ASSAILANT (SHOOTER) scenario should be handled on Protocol 136. 	NTOA (National Tactical Officers Association) cautions against a change in police response based solely on a time delay of when shots were reportedly last heard. This time delay, by itself, does not negate the need for an immediate response. The perpetrator may be using, or preparing to use, other weapons (knives, IEDs, etc.), or her/his shots may not be audible. If the threat's location is not known, officers should begin searching or rescue wounded victims. Officers should transition to a hostage/barricade situation, if necessary, based only on the totality of circumstances.				

ACTIVE ASSAILANT (SHOOTER)

Appendix E: 9 QUESTIONS to help prepare your Departments response to Hostile Situations:

These nine questions can help you prepare for your department's response to a violent incident.

1. Do you use risk/benefit for every call? *"With incidents where there is a threat of, or actual violence, it must be remembered that a judgment is required to ensure that risks to personnel are not out of proportion to the benefits to be gained from achieving a given task" (Labour Research Department, 2005). Risk Management is not new to the fire service. The balance of perhaps limited potential benefit in light of substantial risk should be foremost in every responder's mind.*

2. Do you have an effective relationship (both at the 'boss' level and 'street' level) with the law enforcement agencies in your community? As noted by the Columbine Review Commission (2001), familiarity of personnel and roles prior to an incident through training and planning exercises provides for better communication and operation during the event. Fire Department personnel should have access to, and use, law enforcement intelligence information in order to preplan response to incidents. This may include information regarding domestic terrorism, gang violence, known or suspected drug factories and/or houses.

3. How good is the information you get from your Dispatcher? Response to an incident of violence carries significant uncertainties. The ability of the dispatch staff to reduce the uncertainty while increasing the level of information provided is critical. It is also helpful for responders to have the ability to communicate on a specific, shared, common, radio frequency to remove the potential for message corruption as it is passed through another person. Dispatch staff should critically and carefully monitor the operations radio channel of personnel responding to and operating at incidents of violence and perform Personnel Accountability Report (PAR) checks on a prescribed interval.

4. Do you allow members to 'first respond' directly to the scene? Many jurisdictions have response and deployment plans that include the dispatch of individual first responders and/or a single person in a response vehicle. This should be prohibited or at least limited to the extent possible. The ability of a single person to react to an act of violence is limited. It may not even be possible to retreat. Responding and deploying in a group provides added protection, awareness, and visibility.

5. Does your law enforcement agency use an incident management system? Each agency should strive to ensure that the IMS used in that community is applied as uniformly as possible. Fire departments should take a leadership role in assisting their law enforcement compatriots, particularly at the street or service delivery level, to understand and apply the IMS.

6. When responding to a potential violent incident, do you seek out a law enforcement officer when you arrive? Fire department personnel should communicate, face to face, directly with the law enforcement component on scene. Direct face-to-face communication, with clear understanding of the hazards, risks associated, potential outcomes, and planned actions on the part of each agency should precede any fire department response into a hazard area. 7. Have you told your fire officers/personnel that it is OK to leave the scene if things go ugly? If fire department operations have commenced and violence erupts, fire service personnel should consider leaving the scene until the law enforcement component has stabilized the situation.

8. Is there a point where we don't respond or limit our response to violent incidents? Fire department personnel may not respond into a hazard area due to the potential for additional violence or because the situation is not yet under control. Some responders and organizations fear their community will view this in a negative light. A 2005 Labour Research Department report stated 'the key issue here is the extent to which fire crews can make decisions when dealing with an incident and with the confidence that they will be backed up by senior management if criticized by the local community or in the press for leaving a fire to burn or holding back from attending (responding to) an incident." It is imperative for the department leadership to establish relationships with key stakeholders in the community to ensure they understand and support the response protocol.

9. What does your uniform look like? Uniform insignia, style, and color should be of sufficient difference that fire department personnel would not be mistaken for police officers.

Appendix F: TCCC guidelines

The Tactical Combat Casualty care (TCCC) guidelines 16 page document can be downloaded in its entirety at: http://ntoa.org/site/images/stories/tccc_guidelines_ntoa.pdf

NOTES: